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ABSTRACT
This portfolio dissertation studies the activism of the transnational mining justice social movement
in Canada and Latin America from the late 1990s to 2019. It focuses on two of the movement’s
most significant human rights projects in that period: Indigenous right to consultation in Latin
American (company host states), and the right to remedy in Canada (company home state). Chapter
One undertakes an in-depth study of the Peruvian Campesino Community San Andres de Negritos’
long battle in search of a legal remedy for its dispossession in favor of Yanacocha Mine in the early
1990s. The Community’s “turn to the law” reveals a disjuncture between the expansion of
Indigenous rights recognition at one level, and the absence of appropriate causes of action and
procedures for operationalizing these rights on the ground. Widespread experiences of similar
injustices and impunity have led to endemic social conflict across the region in opposition to
neoliberal resource extraction. Chapter two analyzes a key state response, Indigenous right to
consultation legislation enacted in a number of Latin American countries. Drawing insights from
the relevant literature, alongside the experience of the Negritos Community, this chapter identifies
reforms that could facilitate access to the courts in the face of dispossession. Chapters three and
four shift the focus to activism in Canada since the late 1990s, calling for the creation of nonjudicial grievance mechanism to address human rights complaints against Canadian resource
companies abroad. These chapters document the relevant advocacy strategies and critically
analyze activists’ reform proposals as well as responses from the Canadian state. Chapter five
brings both case studies together to identify common patterns in the inadequate state responses to
the movement’s activism over the last 20 years. It argues that these shortcomings are due in part
to the persistence of three liberal/neo-liberal ideologies in the reforms in question: formalism,
voluntarism and privatism. To help explain these findings, it turns to three theories of human rights
activism: pragmatism, left critique/critical legal liberalism and counter-hegemony. Each chapter
endeavors to offer insights that may be instructive to those who pursue law reform agendas capable
of addressing pressing global environmental and social justice issues.
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INTRODUCTION
This short introduction begins by situating this dissertation’s five portfolio articles/chapters
within a broader frame of law and legal processes. In then outlines the common approach, activistengaged legal scholarship, that unites each of the chapters. Next it summarizes each portfolio
article’s topic and main contents before identifying three themes that connect the dissertation’s
portfolio articles.
1

Framing the Dissertation Context and Focus
Economic globalization is fundamentally characterized by the expansion of transnational

corporations, primarily headquartered in developed (home) countries, pursing foreign direct
investment activities in developing (host) countries through a complex network of corporate
subsidiaries. This economic activity is enabled, facilitated and protected by law: corporate law in
developed countries, investment-oriented laws in developing countries (for example mining laws),
a web of bilateral and multilateral free trade and foreign investment agreements between developed
and developing countries, together with a multitude of foreign investment contracts between
companies and states.

At the same time, the activities of the transnational corporation in

developing countries are, at least in theory, directly or indirectly constrained by public norms,
including the rights and obligations embedded in developing country constitutions and legislation,
reporting or other obligations enacted by developed country governments, and the obligations of
state signatories to international human rights treaties. Private law norms can also be invoked to
establish corporate liability, commonly the law of tort, contract or “extra-contractual obligations”.
This complex matrix of domestic and transnational law creates the rules that enable and
govern the terms and conditions of foreign investment and related areas of economic and political
decision-making. The term transnational law is used here to captures the full range of law that
“regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international
law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit such standard categories.” 1
Civil society actors with justice concerns and contestations related to economic
globalization often engage in trans-border advocacy through networks of organizations that are

1

Philip Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956) at 2. In recent years, this reference to “other rules”
is commonly understood to include corporate social responsibility norms, voluntary or self-regulation regimes and
state-based extraterritorial regulation.
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similarly trans-border in nature.2 In this context, local actors may join with these networks to
pursue norm development that is responsive to their concerns, and/or to search for legal recourse
and remedies, domestically or internationally. In addition to the public and private, domestic and
transnational law regimes, actors may also choose to navigate a plethora of voluntary corporate
social responsibility mechanisms of various sorts: some are internal to the corporation, some are
created by associations of corporations, others by financial lenders and still others by multistakeholder coalitions of states, international organizations, and corporations. Concerns over law’s
limited ability to govern the social and environmental impacts of transnational corporate activity,
particularly in developing countries, are often described as a global “governance gap”. Chapters 1
and 4 in particular significantly frame their discussion in relation to this concept and describe it in
greater detail.
This dense array of actors, regimes and processes form the backdrop for the relatively
circumscribed focus of this dissertation. It investigates some of the legal strategies taken up by the
transnational mining justice social movement in response to the operations of large transnational
mining companies. Economic globalization and its legal instruments, mentioned above, have
significantly intensified global resource extraction and imbued it with particular geographic
patterns. The majority of mining companies operating globally are headquartered in Canada, and
almost half of their activities take place in the resource rich countries of Latin America. Moreover,
most of these operations take place on land owned, claimed and/or occupied by Indigenous peoples
and Campesino communities. These patterns inform the jurisdictional focus of this dissertation.
Chapters 3 and 4 examine law reform advocacy in Canada with respect to the Canadian
government’s legal, political and economic relationship with Canadian mining companies’
operations abroad. Chapters 1 and 2 examine litigation and law reform in Latin America in
response to social conflicts that have arisen following transnational corporate resource extraction
on Indigenous and/or Campesino communally-held land. Finally, Chapter 5 considers these case
studies as a whole, in order to identify commonalities between these distinct yet related
experiments with law as a potential tool for justice in these contexts.
The social conflicts that industrial mining often generates between communities in
developing countries and foreign companies are increasingly trans-border in that they may
implicate states, NGOs, lawyers, journalists and researchers in multiple jurisdictions. In addition
2

Trans-border in this context simply refers to scope of activity of the civil society actors referred to.
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to other advocacy strategies, activists and communities within the mining justice movement have
at times turned to domestic and international litigation to seek remedies for the harms caused by
particular mining projects and in the hope of establishing jurisprudence that is favorable to their
social justice goals. They have also advocated in favor of domestic law reform, usually in the
realm of new legislation but in some cases also constitutional reforms. At the international level,
advocates have invoked existing human rights treaty obligation while also advocating for more
progressive interpretations and even new treaties to address the global problem of corporate
impunity. Some civil society actors have participated, alongside governments, companies and
other stakeholders in the creation of transnational voluntary regimes to address specific issues such
as security, environmental standards, and corruption.
The movement’s approach to norm development is an important focus of study because it
constitutes a significant mode of political engagement with foreign resource extraction and
economic globalization more generally. Within this broader realm of advocacy, this study focuses
on certain arenas of norm development unfolding over a period of approximately twenty years, and
taking place concurrently in two related areas. The first area pertains to Indigenous peoples’ rights
in relation to foreign resource extraction in Latin American “host states”. This part of the
dissertation (primarily Chapters 1 and 2) analyzes Indigenous rights recognition among
international human rights bodies, in Latin American constitutions, jurisprudence, and in the form
of legislation. The rights to communal property, and to free prior and informed consent and
consultation are the main focus. While these chapters draw on the development of these norms at
the international level, they specifically concentrate on how they are operationalized in domestic
litigation and in domestic legislation. This study presents empirical research from Peru, while also
consulting literature that examines how these same issues are unfolding in other countries in the
region.
The second area of norm development studied here (primarily in Chapters 3 and 4) is in
Canada in relation to “home state” obligations to ensure that communities adversely impacted by
the operations of Canadian mining companies have access to a remedy and/or that Canadian
companies are held accountable in some way for harms. Here this study analyzes the advocacy
strategies and law reform efforts of the mining justice movement in Canada, along with the
grievance mechanisms that Canada has created in response. This part of the dissertation captures
a wide variety of proposed and adopted norms, from federal voluntary grievance mechanisms, to
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proposed legislation, to adopted legislation (including Orders in Council). The nature of these
regimes has varied from voluntary, to administrative, to legislative, and the proposals have entered
the realms of both public law regulation and private law causes of action. Finally, this portion of
the dissertation recognizes the role of international human rights institutions and norms in this
ongoing conversation about domestic law and policy in Canada.
This dissertation’s study of the transnational mining justice social movement’s engagement
with law is inevitably selective and does not capture many pieces of a much larger picture. For
example, it is not a comparative study of the rights of Indigenous peoples recognized in Canada
and Latin America. Nor is it a study of the regulation of the transnational corporation as between
Canada and the United States (the home state for Newmont, the mining company that appears in
Chapter 1). Rather it is a study of a social movement and some of its legal strategies and
engagements with law in the pursuit of justice. Its chosen case studies reflect particularly intense,
sustained and innovative arenas of engagement which, as described above, also track the dominant
geographical patterns of transnational mining activity on the globe and in the Americas in the last
twenty years. In this regard, its primarily focus is on the development of state-based public law
and public law litigation (as in the case of Chapter 1). However, not all forms of public law
advocacy and norm development are captured, such as for example efforts to infuse international
trade instruments and agendas with human rights and environmental provisions.

2

Activist-Engaged Legal Scholarship
As stated in the previous section, this dissertation focuses on the work of a network of

organizations, activists, communities, journalist, lawyers and academics that it describes as
forming part of a discernible transnational mining justice social movement. All of the chapters
describe this movement and/or its participants in varying degrees of detail and Chapter 5 also
explores literature on social movement lawyering. In Chapters 1 and 5 in particular, I explicitly
situate myself in relation to the social movement and the subject matter of these chapters and I
disclosure my own role in relation to the advocacy and legal strategies under study.
However, my role and relationship with the subject matter is not the same in all cases. For
example, in Chapter 1, I was part of the legal team that systematized the facts of the case and
developed and pursued the legal arguments in question. On the other hand, my relationship with
the law reform efforts that I study in Chapters 3 and 4 is far less central, I contributed as a legal
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researcher (including as a supervisor of law students’ research) and as an advocate in public policy
debates (for example by writing op eds.). In some respects, the focus of all of the chapters are a
function of my own biography as, on one hand, a person who has lived in Latin America and has
had the opportunity to work with civil society groups in Peru in a sustained way, and on the other
hand, as a Canadian legal academic who has collaborated and built strong relationships with
Canadian civil society groups working on the issues in question.
My personal relationships and commitments also help explain and inform my particular
approach to scholarship which I refer to here as activist-engaged legal scholarship.3 In Chapter 5
of this dissertation, I survey an array of related literature that describes and theorizes social
movement lawyering, and presents theories of progressive engagement with liberal law from a left,
counter-hegemony or subaltern perspective.

These literatures are certainly relevant to this

dissertation and provide insight into its findings. Social movement lawyering literature examines
the ethical, cultural, practical and political dimensions that social movement lawyers navigate in
their efforts to use their legal knowledge to support a movement. In this work, the focus is on the
methods and tactics of those who are directly engaged in the advocacy work, as well as the
perspectives of those who are impacted by it, such as clients, affected groups and social movement
actors. Literatures on critical legal engagement with liberal law theorize how legal activism
succeeds in changing law and the wider society, and how progressive activism and justice claims
may in turn be reshaped in the process. This theoretical work is concerned with the larger
structural, ideological or rhetorical impact of the work done on specific cases of injustice, and in
particular it examines the possibility that certain justice claims or reforms may fail to address, or
even reinforce, the conditions or root causes of injustice. In chapter 5, I engage in detail with these
ideas, and I identify their contributions and insights, rather than seeking a conclusion about which
approach is more favorable. While these ideas and theories do not appear explicitly in chapters 1
to 4, they influence the arc of my scholarship throughout this dissertation.
These approaches are related to, but distinct from, the activist-engaged scholarship
approach I set out here, which refers to a method of scholarship where the academic/scholar
attempts to use the research process to contribute intellectually and practically to the justice cause

3

I would like to thank Ruth Buchanan for first supplying a version of this term to describe my approach.
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under study. 4 At the same time, in this approach, the scholar builds insights based on active
engagement in the subject matter as an advocate. The following four features of my approach to
activist-engaged scholarship are present in all of the dissertation’s chapters. First, I am interested
in the question of how positive law is, or can become, meaningful (or not) from the perspective of
mine-affected communities claiming harms. This informs my exploration of procedural issues in
Chapter 1, referring to how public law norms might be invoked in a specific case. This further
informs my inquiry in Chapter 2 into the social, economic, political and cultural context within
which legislated consultations take place with Indigenous communities in Latin America. In
Chapters 3 and 4, I critically examine the Canadian context to identify how specific proposals,
policies or laws may provide meaningful human rights protection or access to remedies for mineaffected communities. In my approach, a community-based lens often becomes pluralist as it
attempts to identify all of the legal instruments that come to bear on a particular community’s
experience, including those that structure political and economic exercises of power that affect a
community. Taking a community-based lens to law has the potential to offer insight and reveal
blind spots or gaps that may otherwise be hidden. In my conclusions to Chapters 1 and 4, I
elaborate on the benefits of this approach in considerable detail.
A second important feature of this approach is its commitment to tracking and recording
the movement’s history, with a special focus on advocacy and legal strategies. In my view,
academic publishing is an important and privileged opportunity to record this knowledge and
history in a rigorous, credible way that is educative, not only for myself as a researcher, but also
for other researchers and advocates. In Chapter 1, one of my goals was to create a comprehensive
record of events, arguments and strategies for the Negritos Community members, their children
and grandchildren. It is for this reason that I have more recently dedicated the time and resources
required to translate Chapters 1 and 2 into Spanish and publish them in Peru and Colombia
(respectively) with the help of a co-author. In the case of Chapters 3 and 4, my work to map the
movement’s advocacy strategies in Canada over twenty years was also inspired by an interest in
recording, and better understanding, this important history.

4

For an example of efforts to approach research in a similar way in the discipline of anthropology, see: Michael Ash,
“Indigenous Self-Determination and Applied Anthropology in Canada: Finding a Place to Stand” (2001) 43:2
Anthropologica 201-07; Emma Feltes, “Research as Guesthood: The Memorial to Sir Wilfrid Laurier and Resolving
Indigenous-Settler Relations in British Columbia” (2015) 57:2 Anthropologica 469-80.
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A third feature of my approach, which once again unites this dissertation’s portfolio articles,
is the commitment to using scholarship as a venue for the generation of ideas and insights of value
for the objectives of the movement or specific communities. In Chapter 1, the focus is on the
Negritos case but considerable discussion is dedicated to potential applications of the knowledge
acquired, and strategies explored in that case for similarly situated communities. In Chapter 2, the
focus is on practical reforms or institutional features that might attenuate some of the problems
associated with right to consultation legislation in Latin America. In Chapter 3 and especially in
Chapter 5, this dissertation attempts to critically and theoretically interrogate, from the standpoint
of human rights protection and the right to remedy, the content of proposed law reforms and actual
policies adopted in Canada. For its part, Chapter 4 examines the efficacy of a variety of strategies
in achieving better policy and law reform content. Finally, Chapter 5 examines various theories in
an effort to draw insights of interest and utility for the social movement. (In order words, it does
not set out, at least not as a primary objective, to draw insight from practice that might be
informative for theory, although this could be in indirect consequence of the research, or an
approach that one could pursue in subsequent work.) Thus, all chapters try, in different ways, to
produce knowledge of value to members of the transnational mining justice movement.
The final feature of my approach to activist-engaged legal scholarship is its commitment to
reflexivity and (self-)consciousness, both in my own research and analytical process but also within
the movement itself. All chapters treat the process whereby advocates endeavor to problematize
complex social reality in the frame of particular legal categories, claims and regimes, as a deeply
political and epistemological act that necessarily involves a variety of strategic decisions. At the
same time, not all parts of this process are necessarily conscious, and the process of
problematization is limited by a variety of factors, including our own imagination, our awareness
of and access to alternative frames and venues, our biases and predispositions, and other limitations
like political opportunity and resources. Similarly, advocates and scholars alike are not fully in
control of the outcomes of their activism and research and as such reflexive analysis after the fact
can be helpful to identify limitations, breakthroughs and blind spots not previously observed.
Finally, one’s perspective on a particular strategy or outcome is not only inflected by one’s position
in and experience with the movement, but also by the particular moment in time that an assessment
is made. This final point is referred to in Chapter 5.

7

3

Summary of the Chapters (Portfolio Articles)
The discussion above described some of the unities between this dissertation’s portfolio

articles. However, as standalone articles, they each contain their own distinct framing/introduction,
research questions and methodology, findings and conclusion. The fifth article synthesizes the
findings of the previous four articles and analyzes them as a whole by drawing on the work of
scholars concerned with social movements, law and social change. Chapters 1-5 are all published
or forthcoming and Chapter 1 and 2 have been translated into Spanish and submitted for
publication. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 update each other with respect to the Canadian case study as they
were published in 2012, 2018 and 2020 respectively. What follows is a brief summary of the topics
addressed in each chapter.
Chapter 1: Litigating Indigenous Dispossession in the Global Economy
This dissertation’s first portfolio article is entitled “Litigating Indigenous Dispossession in
the Global Economy: Law’s Promise and Pitfalls” published in 2017 in the Brazilian Journal of
International Law (pp 165-225) and is approximately 35,000 words.
Based on documents collected with local community members and advocates over the
course of more than a decade, this chapter begins by describing the legal processes whereby the
Campesino Community San Andres de Negritos allegedly “consented” to its own dispossession in
favor of the large foreign-owned Yanacocha Mine located in Northern Peru. This chapter frames
this story within the larger unfolding story of Agrarian Reform, neoliberal globalization,
transnational resource extraction, the rise of community-based activism, and the emergence of
Indigenous rights in international law and domestic constitutions in Latin America.
In this highly-textured context, this chapter describes how advocates developed an
innovative rights framework for problematizing the Negritos Community’s dispossession and
challenging the legality of Yanacocha’s operations. This unprecedented turn to the law ultimately
reveals a disjuncture between the expansion of Indigenous rights recognition at one level, and the
absence of appropriate causes of action and procedures for operationalizing these rights on the
ground. As the Negritos Community litigates its case against one of the most powerful mining
companies in the world, it has faced numerous challenges inside and outside of the courtroom.
This chapter critically analyzes the response of the state, the company and the domestic
legal system to the Negritos Community’s claims and litigation. It focuses in particular on the
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limitation period procedural rule and the formalist and ultimately discriminatory view of consent
that has permeated the courts’ decisions to date. In formulating this critique, the chapter theorizes
“the dynamics of dispossession” and reflects on human rights law’s promise and pitfalls as an
instrument of global economic justice. The conclusion articulates this chapter’s findings and
consequences for future research and law reform in this area.
Chapter 2: Contesting Indigenous-Industry Agreements in Latin America
This dissertation’s second portfolio article is entitled “Contesting Indigenous-Industry
Agreements in Latin America” forthcoming in Indigenous-Industry Agreements, Natural
Resources, and the Law, edited by Ibironke Odumosu-Ayanu & Dwight Newman (Routledge). It
is approximately 12,400 words and is a longer and updated version of the shorter chapter which
will appear in the book. A further updated Spanish translation of this second portfolio chapter is
forthcoming in the Latin American Law Review based at Los Andes University in Colombia.
This chapter reviews the contributions of scholars and activists who share my concern that
the legal and social contexts that typically inform the formation of Indigenous-industry agreements
in Latin America are marked by enormous power disparities and stark epistemological differences.
This literature review supports the proposition that it is likely that many Indigenous-industry
agreements in Latin America lack legitimacy and perhaps legality. This in turn raises serious
questions about whether or not Indigenous-industry “agreements” formed in these conditions could
possibly rest on any meaningful notion of consent.
This chapter make this important point in order to focus on a narrower question, one of the
present but also very much one of the future, as we face the aftermath, in the years and decades to
come, of the proliferation of agreements under present circumstances. What happens when a
community mobilizes in order to challenge the legality of a past agreement with industry, such as
for example by contesting the idea that it actually consented? What if the company and/or the state
holds up a document with signatures from past community leaders that allegedly represent consent?
If the company and the state are unresponsive to a community’s concerns about an agreement, can
it resort to the courts? This chapter explores some of these questions by referring to Peru as a case
study. In conclusion, it explores the significance of this study for ongoing normative developments
in relation to Indigenous peoples’ right to consultation, consent and the formation of Indigenousindustry agreements.
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Chapter 3: Canadian Mining Companies and Domestic Law Reform
This dissertation’s third portfolio article, entitled “Canadian Mining Companies and
Domestic Law Reform: A Critical Legal Account” (pp 1456-1486) was published in 2012 in the
German Law Journal (2012) and is approximately 10,400 words.
This chapter offers a critical legal account of transnational corporate accountability law
reform efforts undertaken by Canadian advocacy groups between 2005 and 2012, together with the
government’s first corporate social responsibility (CSR) response, introduced in 2009. It begins
by introducing the social and economic context that forms the backdrop of these efforts. In
particular it describes Canadian foreign investment in mining globally, and particularly in Latin
America. It also surveys existing research on the nature of the human rights concerns and harm
associated with Canadian mining companies’ overseas operations. It summarizes these in terms of
three main areas: the problem of criminalization of dissent, the problem of environmental harm,
and the problem of inadequate consultation and/or land acquisition. This final area (form of harm)
connects back to the theme of contract, consultation and consent in Chapters 1 and 2.
The relevant proposals for legal reform in Canada are then reviewed in three periods within
the time frame captured in the chapter. In the first, federal advisors made proposals that attempted
to blend private and public approaches to regulation. In the second, the federal government
introduced its 2009 CSR policy predicated on volunteerism. And in the third period, three
individual Members of Parliament tabled private members’ bills, each representing very different
private and public approaches to regulation.
Following this empirical description, each reform project is critically analyzed in terms of
the regulatory vision it presents and the concept of the state, the corporation, and civil society that
it advances. This paper represents a first step toward exploring how activists’ legal strategies and
reform proposals embed different articulations of the relationship between the corporation, the state
and civil society.
Chapter 4: Building the Case for a Home-State Grievance Mechanism
This dissertation’s fourth portfolio article, entitled “Building the Case for a Home-State
Grievance Mechanism: Law Reform Strategies in the Canadian Resource Justice Movement” was
published in 2019 in Human Rights in the Extractive Industries: Transparency, Participation,
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Resistance, edited by Isabel Feichtner and Markus Krajewski (Springer). It is approximately
14,600 words.
This chapter begins with a detailed review of the work of social justice advocates to
systematically document the concerns of mine-affected communities in relation to Canadian
operations in developing countries. It captures a significant body of empirical work that described
not only the nature of the social conflicts associated with Canadian companies but also the
mechanisms whereby the Canadian government provides companies with political, economic and
legal support. Beginning in 2005, activists, policy makers, industry leaders and international
human rights bodies participated in a sustained debate over the appropriate Canadian regulatory
responses to these issues.
This chapter analyses the strategies of law reform advocates between 2000 and 2017 in
favor of a non-judicial grievance and remedy mechanisms in Canada. This chapter summarizes
the statements of international bodies to Canada on this issue. It then gives special attention to the
2016 law reform proposal from Canadian civil society, the draft Business & Human Rights Act,
and the strategic trade-offs that advocates adopted when fashioning and proposing reform in this
area. The strategies profiled here are of special interest because they resulted in a significant, and
perhaps unexpected, breakthrough in early 2018 when the Canadian government announced its
intention to create a globally unprecedented new grievance mechanism: the Canadian
Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise. In conclusion, this chapter catalogues the movement’s
strategies into four areas: (1) documentation of harm that provides an account of the nature of the
problem; (2) engagement with existing CSR mechanisms to demonstrate their inadequacy; (3)
appeal to international human rights bodies; and (4) development of concrete reform proposals that
reflect strategic/pragmatic trade-offs.
Chapter 5: The Transnational Mining Justice Social Movement
This dissertation’s fifth portfolio article, entitled “The Transnational Mining Justice Social
Movement: Reflecting on Two Decades of Law Reform Activism” is approximately 26,000 words
and has been submitted for publication.
In this article, I consolidate my research in the four previous dissertation chapters that track
the activism of the mining justice social movement in Canada and Latin America from the late
1990s to present. As a starting point, I conceptualize this movement as a transnational political
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project that seeks to transform the terms of corporate resource extraction pursuant to the political
and legal arrangements of neo-liberal economic globalization. In this context, I critically analyze
the movement’s most significant human rights-oriented law reform projects in the Americas:
Indigenous right to consultation legislation in several Latin American countries, and a series of
non-judicial grievance mechanisms in Canada, in response to the right to remedy norm in
international law.
Drawing on existing research, I conclude that in both cases the state has responded with
law and policy reforms that fall far short of achieving the movement’s objectives. I argue that
these shortcomings are due in part to the persistence of three liberal/neo-liberal ideologies in the
reforms in question: formalism, voluntarism and privatism. To better understand and explain these
findings, I turn to three critical theories of human rights legal activism: pragmatism, left
critique/critical legal liberalism and counter-hegemony. I examine the work of a wide range of
scholars writing under the banner of each theory in order to identify key debates and insights that
may be instructive as the mining justice movement, and related social and environmental justice
movements, continue to aspire toward a law reform agenda capable of addressing pressing global
environmental and social justice issues.
4 Overarching Themes in the Dissertation
This section reviews three main themes that connect this dissertation’s portfolio chapters:
(1) consultation, consent and dispossession; (2) regulation and privatization; (3) the potential and
limitation of legal strategies. The unifying themes that connect Chapters 1 thru 4 are further
developed and analyzed this portfolio’s fifth and concluding chapter. The objective here is not to
fully reproduce all of the ways in which these themes are developed and discussed in this
dissertation’s substantive chapters. Rather it is to merely to introduce and foreground the themes
so that the reader is alert to them at the outset.

4.1 Consultation, Consent & Dispossession
As described above, this dissertation focuses on community-based legal strategies to
address the adverse impacts of mineral extraction in developing countries. In the Negritos case
study in Chapter 1, it uncovered the legal genesis of the Campesino Community’s as well as of
Yanacocha’s property rights (mineral and surface) and the terms of the easement and expropriation

12

“contract” between the company and the community. In applying an Indigenous and human rights
analysis to this property and contract arrangement, the chapter interrogates the meaning of
consultation and consent in this specific case study.
These themes extend from the Negritos case study into the analysis in Chapter 2 of right to
consultation legislation in Latin America. This genre of legislation was first enacted in Peru in
2011 as the Peruvian state’s primarily response to massive and violent conflict in 2009 between
police and Indigenous protestors in the Peruvian Amazon following the imposition of land and
resource laws favorable to foreign investors and in response to newly signed free trade agreements
at the time. A number of other Latin America countries then created their own Indigenous
consultation legislation in the years following. Thus, the question of how agreements/contracts
with respect to land and resources are made resonates from the Negritos case study through to the
emergence of domestic consultation legislation.
Certainly, all of these domestic developments were preceded by momentum in international
human rights law, including in the OAS beginning in the early 2000s, further entrenching the
recognition of Indigenous peoples right to free, prior and informed consultation and in some cases
consent. In that period, many corporate actors similarly began to endorse Indigenous peoples’ right
to consultation and the device of benefit agreement-making between companies and communities
has proliferated. In sum, property transfer by contract, which by definition entails consent, are
together the bedrock legal institutions of resource extraction under liberal law. For Indigenous
peoples disproportionately affected by resource extraction, the right to consultation has become a
primary devise for those seeking to challenge the property/contract resource extraction framework.
This dissertation examines this state of affairs in various ways, consistent with the activistengaged scholarship approach described above. Chapter 1 reports on one attempt to operationalize
the complete arsenal of recognized Indigenous and Campesino rights in support of the Negritos
Community’s legal challenge to allegedly illegal property transfers (dispossession). This exercise
reveals the many practical challenges to assembling legal cases and accessing justice using this
particular rights frame in Latin American countries. It also reveals the difficulty of translating
complex historically rooted social processes of dispossession into the available (and justiciable)
Indigenous rights frameworks.

Chapter 2 continues with this theme, revealing the gross

deficiencies of consultations laws across the region when evaluated in light of the extraordinary
disparities and inequities between companies and states on one hand, and communities on the other.
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These inequities are further reflected in the fact that these purported human rights laws contain
many features that were ultimately imposed by the state in question.
On the surface, the focus in Chapters 3 and 4 on home-state law and policy responses in
Canada appear removed from this detailed discussion of consultation and consent. However, the
evaluation in these chapters of the efficacy of home state responses, that aim to protect human
rights and strengthen access to remedy, is necessarily informed by the problems “on the ground”,
and especially the dynamics of dispossession and deficiencies in the available consultation and
consent human rights frames. In the end a troubling state of affairs emerges. In one respect
consultation and consent are the most widely recognized and accepted legal tools for Indigenous
communities concerned with harmful and imposed resource extraction, and they represent a
dramatic change, over the last twenty years, in the law.
On the other hand, these legal devices appear to suffer from serious inadequacies, perhaps
most profoundly, in their ability to properly account for the complexity of what free and informed
(meaningful) consultation and consent could possibly mean in the contexts studied here, where
radically socially and economically unequal actors encounter each other in the context of broader
legal frameworks that largely reinforces these power differences. Added to this, this dissertation
argues that there are serious practical difficulties, at least in Latin America, with translating these
human rights norms into legally enforceable standards that are helpful to affected communities in
their own domestic legal systems. Hence, social conflicts have continued in lockstep with the
intensification of resource extraction on the continent, and apparently unattenuated by the added
layers of consultation laws, as well as environmental assessment laws for that matter.
In the end, I have no comprehensive answers to this conundrum. However, several things
seem important. First, the significance of relatively new human rights frames like consultation and
consent should be fully recognized and appreciated. However, at the same time this study suggests,
and cites others who appear to agree, that these rights, at least on their own, are inadequate and,
even worse, can be status quo reinforcing. At least in the timeframe and in the context under study,
they have failed to produce notable results for affected communities and serious social conflicts
continue. It may be time to focus our energy on the development of approaches that change the
fundamentally colonial legal arrangements of extraction, and that go beyond simply adding a layer
of human rights or environmental law to them. The daunting task is to develop legal concepts and
regimes that are better able to account for historically informed inequities and power disparities,
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better able to contribute to environmental sustainability and social justice, while also being
workable, practical and enforceable.

4.2 Privatisim & State Regulation
Another theme that runs through this dissertation is that of privatism, which is closely
connected to voluntarism, referring to obligations that are not legally enforceable. This theme is
discussed most directly in Chapter 5, but it also appears in a number of ways throughout the other
chapters. As described above, this dissertation is concerned with the legal regimes and processes
that encourage and enable the privatization of communally held land via the transfer of title and
rights to transnational mining corporations. Related to this, it is attendant to the treatment of
agreements between companies and communities as private (confidential) matters, subject to the
assumptions of formal equality and classical liberal contract law. Chapter 2 describes how
Indigenous consultation laws in Latin America are so restrictive that they exclude many
communities from this public form of regulation, creating large zones of private/unregulated space
where excluded Indigenous and Campesino communities are left to negotiate private benefit
agreements directly with companies, which are not necessarily enforceable, especially once land is
transferred and company operations begin. Protests due to perceived company failures to fulfill
(unenforceable) agreements are common place.
The theme of privatism is also present in this dissertation’s analysis of law reform proposals
and outcomes in response to the assertion that Canada, as a home state, has obligations to promote
human rights protection and facilitate access to remedy for those harmed by Canadian mining
companies operating abroad. In this portion of the dissertation, the analysis focuses on how
conceptualizations of the state’s role in this realm have been deeply influenced by a particular logic
of privatism, where the state’s scope of authority and concern is tantamount to that of a commercial
actor or of a neutral third party, and/or where the state’s substantive objectives are partially or
totally conflated with those of the private sector. This is manifest in the kinds of state-imposed
sanctions envisioned (withdrawal of state financing and services as seen in several civil society
proposals) and in the role of the state as a neutral mediator of “private” company-community
disputes (as in the Canadian state’s CSR policies to date). While some proposals have had some
public features (public reporting following independent fact finding), ultimately substantive
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remedies for affected communities have remained outside of the reach of the home state public
regulation and thereby voluntary or available only through private causes of action.
Referring back to the activist-engaged scholarship approach described above, this critical
interrogation of privatism’s influence in the public regulation studied here raises questions about
how it limits the state’s capacity to fulfill its public interest function in ensuring corporate
accountability for harm and protecting human rights. This inquiry is also rooted in a commitment
to critical reflection on how pragmatic trade-off may involve accepting concepts of the state that
produce certain unintended consequences. As discussed in Chapter 5, this reflection is not an
attempt to second guess strategic choices or to suggest that there is only one method or avenue for
achieving justice. For example, this dissertation does not engage with private law’s potential as a
tool of social change (for example via litigation), including as a potential complement or instigator
of public law reform. Rather, the discussion here of privatism is informed, first by a commitment
to critically interrogating the concept of the state that is inevitably embedded in any public
regulation proposal, and second, by the hope that law reform activism in the area of corporate
accountability might better incorporate and insist on the state’s obligations to the public interest,
and its active role in constituting the market and establishing its enabling institutions.
4.3 The Potential & Limitations of Legal Strategies
A third theme that weaves through this dissertation’s chapters is a concern with the potential
and limits of legal strategies. This mode of inquiry is once again informed by this dissertation’s
approach to scholarship and is necessarily grounded in the specific subject matter of the dissertation
and the political moment: neo-liberalism economic globalization is entrenched and human rights
has obtained near hegemonic status as the language of justice. In one sense, the approach here to
law and legal strategies is profoundly optimistic. My chosen approach of activist-engaged legal
scholarship and my inquiry in Chapter 5 into theories of social movement lawyering entails a belief
that engagement with law has the potential to produce positive results from a social justice
perspective. Or at the very least a belief that law is a site of power that must therefore be struggled
over, lest it be used only by the powerful.
At the same time there is something profoundly dissatisfying with the whole exercise; the
scale of community resistance, protest and sacrifice, the volume of research and advocacy
establishing “the problem” seem, at least intuitively, to be out of proportion with the results, defined
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by the efficacy of resulting law reforms and the instances of meaningful results for affected
communities, at least in developing countries. And then there are those moments where human
rights activism has inadvertently produced perverse results, such as in the case of Canadian regimes
that allow companies to complain about activists, or in Latin America, those consultations that are
a farce and become tools for the legitimation of imposed results. Of course, these statements
instantly raise the obvious “but for” question – but for the efforts made, perhaps things would be
worse still, along with the equally obvious question of time scale – in what timeframe can and
should one measure the impact of the work done.
Once again, there are no obvious answers to these questions, but as before some things
seems relatively clear. Human rights frames can be powerful tools for problematizing the injustices
of economic globalization and for making those affected, exploited and dispossessed more visible
and less dispensable. At the same time, human and environmental laws are less effective when
they are simply layered on top of existing political, economic and legal systems. Moreover,
perhaps unsurprisingly given its colonial origins, the state has, more often than not, emerged as a
cynical entity, at times almost entirely impermeable to moral and/or evidence-based arguments.
Time and time again, at least in the domain studied here, the state has revealed itself to be deeply
vulnerable to capture by corporate interests such that a sophisticated analysis of the public interest,
or a serious consideration of the state’s powers to regulate, seem nearly unattainable. While the
state is captured, meaningful and structural law reform may well be out of reach when it comes to
corporate accountability.
Yet inspite of this, activists and activist-engaged scholars continue to engage law and
reinvent and rethink their approach.

Committed, creative, reflexive and courageous

experimentation with law as a tool of social justice in response to economic globalization appears
to be a constant, and this itself is rather hopeful, and certainly interesting.
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CHAPTER ONE: Litigating Indigenous Dispossession in the Global Economy: Law’s
Promises and Pitfalls
- Charis Kamphuis*
Abstract
Based on documents collected with local community members and advocates over the course of
more than a decade, this paper begins by describing the legal processes whereby the Campesino
Community San Andres de Negritos allegedly “consented” to its own dispossession in favor of the
large foreign-owned Yanacocha Mine located in Northern Peru. It frames this story within the
larger unfolding story of Agrarian Reform, neoliberal globalization, transnational resource
extraction, the rise of community-based activism, and the emergence of Indigenous rights in
international law and domestic constitutions in Latin America. In this highly-textured context, this
paper describes how advocates developed an innovative rights framework for problematizing the
Negritos Community’s dispossession and challenging the legality of Yanacocha’s operations. This
unprecedented turn to the law ultimately reveals a disjuncture between the expansion of Indigenous
rights recognition at one level, and the absence of appropriate causes of action and procedures for
operationalizing these rights on the ground. As the Negritos Community litigates its case against
one of the most powerful mining companies in the world, it has faced numerous challenges inside
and outside of the courtroom. This paper critically analyzes the response of the state, the company
and the domestic legal system. It focuses in particular on the limitation period procedural rule
and the formalist and discriminatory view of consent that has permeated the courts’ decisions to
date. In formulating this critique, the paper theorizes “the dynamics of dispossession” and reflects
on human rights law’s promise and pitfalls as an instrument of global economic justice. The
conclusion articulates this study’s findings and consequences for future research and law reform.
1 Introduction & Context: Global Resource Conflicts and the Governance Gap
In the last two decades, foreign investment in the extraction of natural resources has
expanded dramatically around the world. 1 Latin America in particular has become a region
plagued by social conflicts between communities, resource extraction companies and the states that
support them.2 These conflicts often originate in community concerns related to control over the
use of land, environmental protection and the equitable distribution of benefits.3 Social conflicts
* Published in (2017) 14:1 Brazil Journal of International Law 165.
1
Todd Gordon & Jeffery R Webber, Blood of Extraction: Canadian Imperialism in Latin America (Fernwood
Publishing, 2016).
2
OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders,
OROEA/Ser.L/II.Doc.49/15 (2015) at paras 48-50. Also see Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina,
“Mapa de Conflictos Mineros en América Latina”, online: http://www.conflictosmineros.net/; mcgill Research Group
Investigating Canadian Mining in Latin America, “Canadian Mining in Ecologically Vulnerable Areas: South
America”, online:
Http://micla.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/canadianmining_ecologically_vulnerable_areas.png;
Environmental
Justice Organization, Liabilities and Trade, “Environmental Justice Atlas”, online: http://ejatlas.org/.
3
Most resource extraction is an industrial for-profit activity that fundamentally involves permanently transforming the
surface and/or subsurface of significant tracts of land with which communities have a mix of historical, cultural,
economic and social relationships, along with asserted or recognized legal rights: Special Rapporteur on the Rights of
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are intense, involving everything from peaceful protests, civil disobedience and sit-ins or
occupations. These actions are often met with the exercise of force by public and private security
forces.

Activists and community members are too often defamed, threatened, surveilled,

incarcerated, injured and in some instances even murdered due to their criticism of resource
extraction projects.4 In Latin America as a whole, the proponents of resource extraction activities
are typically foreign companies headquarter in wealthy developed countries. As of 2016, mining
companies headquartered in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom had the greatest
presence in the region.5
The proliferation of these kind of social conflicts, not only in Latin America but also
elsewhere in the world, has led to an extensive global debate regarding the governance of
transnational resource extracting companies and their impacts on local communities in developing
countries.6 As a whole, this debate tends to center on the efficacy (or not) of corporate social

Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya, Extractive industries and indigenous peoples, GA, 24th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41
(2013) [Anaya]; OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Descendent
Communities, and Natural Resources: Human Rights Protection in the Context of Extraction, Exploitation, and
Development Activities, OROEA/Ser.L/VII.Doc.47/15 (2015) [OAS, Human Rights Protection].
4
See generally supra notes 1 and 2. Also see: Justice & Corporate Accountability Project, The “Canada Brand”:
Violence and Canadian Mining Companies in Latin America (JCAP, 2016); Jen Moore, In the National Interest?:
Criminalization of Land and Environment Defenders in the Americas (MiningWatch Canada, 2015); Charis Kamphuis,
“Foreign Investment and the Privatization of Coercion: A Case Study of the Forza Security Company in Peru” (2012)
37(2) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 529 [Kamphuis, “Privatization of Coercion”]; Global Witness, On
Dangerous Ground: The Killing and Criminalization of Land and Environmental Defenders Worldwide (London:
Global Witness, 2016).
5
Half of announced investment in metal mining between 2003 and 2015 in Latin America originated in Canadian firms
(50.6%), which also accounted for 83.0% of total investment in gold and silver mining. United Kingdom-based
companies made up the next largest source, representing 52.2% of investment in iron ore mining and 21.3% of
investment in copper, nickel, lead and zinc mining. The United States was the main source of investment in aluminum
and the second-largest investor in iron ore extraction: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(ECLAC), Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016, LC/G.2680-P (Santiago, 2016) at
107.
6
John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, OHCHR, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011); Penelope
Simons & Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights, and the Home State
Advantage (New York: Routledge, 2014).
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responsibility mechanisms7, the existence (or not) of a home state responsibility to regulate8 and
the viability (or not) of a binding international treaty instrument to address these matters.9 While
these conversations are prolific, they overwhelmingly focus on jurisdictions and instruments
outside of the developing countries where ground-level social conflicts around resource extraction
are taking place. There is relatively little debate in the global governance literature over the
emerging efforts of mine-affected communities in developing countries to engage with their own
domestic public law regimes in order to address their justice concerns.10 There are relatively even
fewer in-depth, extended studies of this form of legal activism and its implications.11
7

Hevina S. Dashwood, The Rise of Global Corporate Social Responsibility: Mining and the Spread of Global Norms
(Cambridge University Press, 2012); Cynthia A. Williams, “Civil Society Initiatives and ‘Soft Law’ in the Oil and Gas
Industry” (2003-2004) 36 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 457; Luis Eslava, “Corporate Social
Responsibility & Development: A Knot of Disempowerment” (2008) 2 (2) Oñati Journal of Emergent Socio-Legal
Studies 43; Ronen Shamir, “Corporate Social Responsibility: A Case of Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony” in
Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cesar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, eds, Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a
Cosmopolitan Legality (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Penelope Simons, “Corporate Voluntarism and Human
Rights: The Adequacy and Effectiveness of Voluntary Self-Regulation Regimes” (2004) 59 Relations industrielles/
Industrial Relations 101.
8
Sara L. Seek, “Home State Responsibility and Local Communities: The Case of Global Mining” (2008) Yale Human
Rights & Development Law Journal 177-206; ETOS for Human Rights beyond Borders, Maastricht Principles on
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (February 2012); Robert
McCorquodale & Penelope Simons “Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial
Violations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law” (2007) 70 Modern Law Review 598.
9
Jens Martens, Corporate Influence on the Business and Human Rights Agenda of the United Nations (Germany:
Global Policy Forum, June 2014); Penelope Simons, “International law’s invisible hand and the future of corporate
accountability for violations of human rights” (2012) 3:1 Journal of Human Rights and the Environment; Claire A
Cutler, “Private transnational governance and the crisis of global leadership” in Stephan Gill, ed, Global Crises and
the Crisis of Global Leadership (Cambridge University Press, 2011); Elaboration of an international legally binding
instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, HRC Res,
UNGAOR, 26th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (2014).
10
References to these efforts are beginning to appear in some places, although most are cursory. For a reference to a
court case in Chile, see: James S Phillips, “The rights of indigenous peoples under international law” (2015) 26(2)
Global Bioethics 120; Michelle Richard, “Conflict in Latin America over Natural Resource Exploitation” (2013) 19 L
& Bus Rev Am 561. For discussions of a court case in Argentina, see Brant McGee, “The Community Referendum:
Participatory Democracy and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent to Development” (2009) 27 Berkeley J
Intl L 570. For references to court cases in Columbia see: Viviane Weitzner, Holding Extractive Companies to Account
in Columbia: An evaluation of CSR instruments through the lens of Indigenous and Afro-Descendent Rights (The
North-South Institute, Proceso de Comunidades Negras, Resguardo Indígena Cañamomo Lomaprieta, 2016); EuropeThird World Centre & International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Mining and Human Rights Violations in
Colombia: The Case of Anglo Gold Ashanti vs the Afro-descendant community of La Toma, UNGA, 26th Sess, Annex,
Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/26/NGO/38 (2014). For references to court cases in Guatemala, see: Rachel Sieder,
“‘Emancipation’ or ‘regulation’? Law, globalization and indigenous peoples’ rights in post-war Guatemala” (2011)
40(2) Economy and Society 239; Shin Imai et al, “Breaching Indigenous Law: Canadian Mining in Guatemala” (2007)
6(1) Indigenous L J 101. For references to court cases in Ecuador, Bolivia and Costa Rica, see Begüm Özkaynak et
al, Mining conflicts around the world: Common grounds from an Environmental Justice perspective, EJOLT Report
No 7 (Environmental Justice Organisations, Liabilities and Trade, 2012).
11
For some recent examples of case studies of the genius, litigation and consequences of particular Indigenous rights
cases see: Cesar Rodríguez-Garavito & Diana Rodríguez-Franco, Radical Deprivation on Trial: The Impact of Judicial
Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global South (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Pooja Parmar, Indigeneity

20

This absence likely has more than one reasonable explanation. Developing country legal
systems are routinely viewed as either incapable or unwilling to rein in transnational resource
companies and subject them to the rule of law generally, much less to human rights standards more
specifically. Some point to the presence of endemic inefficiencies, corruption and inadequacies in
developing country legal systems, the product of some combination of a chronic lack of resources,
colonial histories, foreign influences, and imperial impositions.12 Other scholars point to the ways
in which international trade agreements and foreign investment protection agreements
circumscribe the range of public policy options available to decision makers in developing
countries in relation to foreign resource companies. 13 The applicable instruments of public
international law are often similarly viewed as inadequate, for the reason that, even when binding,
they represent a system of law that is non-enforceable vis-à-vis a developing country state that,
once again, is beholden to the powerful companies that it hosts. 14 Finally, logistically and
conceptually, it may be difficult for the transnational solidarity networks that support mine-affected
communities to engage with developing country legal systems, causing them to favor other more
familiar legal options and strategies.
These explanations and characterizations are well known. They form part of the context
for an important global conversation about how to address the “governance gap”, a term used to
and Legal Pluralism in India: Claims, Histories, Meanings (Cambridge University Press, 2015); Judith Kimerling,
“Habitat as Human Rights: Indigenous Huaorani in the Amazon Rainforest, Oil and Ome Yasuni” (2016) 40 Vermont
Law Review 445. For a series of studies of domestic human rights litigation in the African context in an effort to
challenge global poverty, see: Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman, Stones of Hope: How African activists reclaim
human rights to challenge global poverty (Stanford University Press, 2011).
12
See Simons & Macklin, supra note 6 at 16-17, citing the OECD definition of weak governance zones. In a
transnational tort action against a Canadian mining company, the British Columbia Court of Appeal recently decided
that the risk of an unfair trial in the Guatemalan courts was a factor that weighed in favor of its determination that the
province of British Columbia is the most appropriate jurisdiction to hear the Guatemalan plaintiffs’ claim: Garcia v
Tahoe Resources Inc, 2017 BCCA 39. For critique of Canadian foreign policy in relation to resource extraction in
developing countries, see generally: Stephen Brown, ed, Struggling for Effectiveness: CIDA and Canadian Foreign
Aid (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2012); Yves Engler, The Black Book of Canadian Foreign Policy (Fernwood
Publishing & RED Publishing, 2009).
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Policy Implications for Capital-Importing States” in Diego Sánchez-Ancochea & Kenneth C Shadlen, eds, The
Political Economy of Hemispheric Integration (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 83; Gus Van Harten,
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refer to the systemic impunity that transnational corporations, operating in developing countries,
appear to enjoy. 15

This article in no way aims to detract from this extremely important

conversation. Law reform and new enforceable mechanisms that aim to address problematic
corporate conduct are pressing.16 However, while the larger political struggle over the terms of
effective transnational regulation and extra-territorial jurisdiction continues, mine-affected
communities, local activists and lawyers in the Global South are deeply involved in the daily,
ground-level work of attempting to engage with existing, ostensibly enforceable, domestic public
law to address their ongoing social injustice concerns.17
In spite of many pitfalls, the public law regimes currently in force in developing countries
maintain a certain appeal for activists and their lawyers.

They offer an enforceable rights

framework, which, in the Latin American context and perhaps elsewhere, increasingly incorporates
international human rights law. Moreover, domestic public law represents the system of law with
the closest proximity to the historical context, democratic life and political struggles of mineaffected communities. This paper departs from the assertion that the task of recognizing, tracking
and analyzing mine-affected communities’ engagement with applicable public law regimes in the
Global South is incredibly important. To the extent that these efforts are successful (by some
measure), they represent an important advance toward the aspiration that law might be an
instrument of social justice in the hands of poor and marginalized communities in developing
countries. 18 To the extent that they are unsuccessful (by some measure), their pitfalls offer
important insight into public law’s shortcomings in the context of the foreign resource extraction,
with the potential to feed local law reform efforts as well as the broader global conversation on the
transnational regulation of the multinational corporation.
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Using the case study method, this article will focus on one Campesino Community’s
engagement with the matrix of public laws enforceable in its jurisdiction of Peru. It traces this
community’s attempts to translate its justice concerns with respect to the actions of a large
multinational mining company into terms that have traction with applicable domestic and
international law regimes. This case study is particularly interesting because its substantive issues
are at the heart of the contemporary resource extraction model, namely it examines the nature of
communities’ ownership and control over land and access to equitable compensation and benefits
when resources are developed. In this connection, this study profiles another important legal issue
that challenges many resource extraction projects around the world, namely the matter of how
courts should respond to past injustice claims, advanced now in the language and in accordance
with the procedures of constitutional rights and international human rights law. This case study
reveals some of the promises and pitfalls that may emerge when Indigenous communities in Latin
America attempt to bring their claims of dispossession in the global economy to their own domestic
legal systems. This test of one domestic legal system’s capacity as a potential instrument of justice
in this context has implications for substantive and procedural law at international human rights
bodies like the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, some of which I explore
in this paper’s conclusion. At both the domestic and the international level, what is at stake is the
ability of Indigenous communities to bring claims that might benefit from, and further advance,
these bodies’ promising statements of collective rights.
Part 2 of this paper reviews, by way of background, the first leg of the unfolding story of
the Peruvian Campesino Community San Andres de Negritos. Elsewhere, I have provided an
account of the legal processes whereby Yanacocha Mine, majority owned by American gold
mining giant Newmont, came to occupy the Negritos Community’s communally titled land in the
northern Andes of Peru.19 In this previous work, I argue that these processes were a product of the
convergence of Yanacocha’s corporate power with the Peruvian state’s public power. I described
a central feature of this convergence in terms of the production of the Community’s “consent” to
its own dispossession and ultimately its own legal annihilation or “annulment”. The present paper
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adds to the story by fully assessing the complex dynamics of dispossession and describing some of
the Negritos Community’s responses and forms of resistance to the circumstances of its
dispossession, setting the context for its ultimate turn toward the Peruvian courts. Further, it
situates these local forms of resistance in a national and international context of Indigenous
activism that has simultaneously spurred the emergence of Indigenous rights regimes while
reacting to ongoing neoliberal reforms of investment and resource laws.
Whereas Part 2 of this paper recounts the Negritos Community’s story of dispossession and
resistance, Part 3 tells the story of the case itself; focusing on how the Community has endeavored
to pursue justice through law. In 2011, the Negritos Community initiated a constitutional amparo
action in local courts in an effort to seek a remedy for its dispossession. Its action challenges the
legality of Yanacocha’s operations on its land, attempts to compel the state and the company to
respect and protect its constitutionally recognized communal property rights, and seeks to remedy
the alleged violations. Part 3 describes the Community’s legal strategies in the domestic scene, in
particular that of putting the full matrix of applicable public law before the court. Importantly, in
Peru, like in other Latin American countries, the constitutional rights regime applicable to
Indigenous and Campesino Communities incorporates certain international Indigenous rights
principles, ratcheting up the domestic legal standard and creating a matrix of rights enforceable
against both public and private actors. This makes the Negritos Community’s efforts to actualize
these rights provisions and principles all the more interesting, especially from the perspective of
the “governance gap” referenced above.
The section also analyzes the challenges that the Negritos Community has faced, both inside
and outside of the courtroom. Significantly, the actualization of rights principles through local
courts involves finding a suitable domestic cause of action. The Negritos case study reveals that
procedural matters can become front and center in communities’ struggles to frame their stories of
injustice in ways that are intelligible to public law rights protecting regimes. Legal claims are
successful not only with good facts and robust substantive rights frameworks. Crucially, they must
also package themselves into a recognizable cause of action and navigate the associated procedural
requirements. The Negritos case study reveals how the complexity of these matters is augmented
in the context of resource extraction, where the lived reality of dispossession’s legal and social
processes may be difficult to reconcile with procedural rules. It depicts how procedural rules
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become a site of struggle over the meaning of consent, the subjectivity of the rights holder, and
how to come to terms with past and ongoing injustice.
This overview requires a comment on the research methods that inform this paper. The
story that the Negritos case tells about dispossession and resistance (Part 2), as well as the story of
the Negritos Community’s engagement with public law (Part 3), are based on hundreds of pages
of primary documents collected and organized over more than a decade by Negritos community
members and pro bono local lawyers and law students based in Peru, with the support of volunteer
lawyers and law students in Canada. I was an active participant in this transnational team since its
inception. The documents referred to in Part 2 were collected beginning in 2006 and up until 2011
when the Negritos community filed its amparo claim before local courts. The documents described
in Part 3 were collected between 2011 and 2016 as the court case wound its way toward Peru’s
Constitutional Court, where, at the time of publication, it awaits a final decision. All of these
documents were produced either by Peruvian courts, government institutions, the company in
question, or the Community’s own governance bodies. These materials are complemented by
information published in secondary sources as well as through many conversations between
myself, members of the Negritos legal team and Community leaders over the course of multiple
visits to the Community and countless virtual conversations.
The strength of this method is derived from the opportunity it provides to critique the formal
legal justification for Yanacocha’s presence on the Negritos Community’s land. The documentary
record constitutes the formal legal underpinnings for Yanacocha’s operations, primarily rooted in
property and contract law. The review of this record offers an important and potentially powerful
opportunity to challenge the very legality of the company’s presence, using normative frameworks
embedded in constitutional and international law. In order words, the Negritos case scrutinizes
Yanacocha Mine’s claim to legality and advances a critique that brings the dynamics of
dispossession into a legal forum. However, there is no doubt that this reliance on documents,
including the Community’s own written records, has limitations. While myself and other members
of the Negritos legal team have spent time in the Negritos Community, our work did not include
ethnographic methods. As a result, the story told here can only very partially and tangentially
capture the lived experiences of Community members with respect to the events surrounding the
official documents and the litigation itself. It does not endeavor to account for the meanings that
Community members assign to the many legal and political moments in their journey, from the
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hacienda system, to Agrarian Reform, through to the arrival of Yanacocha, the Community’s
dispossession, and its ultimate decision to pursue justice in local courts.20
In telling this story, and notwithstanding the limitations of the documentary method, my
approach to law in this article resonates with the tenants of critical legal pluralism.21 I attempt to
capture the multiple scales of law at play (local, national, regional and international), the
interrelationship between multiple areas of law (private and public), the slippage between
substantive claims and procedural requirements, and the interaction between law, politics/ideology
and corruption. In this vein, this paper consciously employs the term “story” in order to make
explicit the techniques used to package complex social relationships into legal frameworks that
serve to justify or problematize those relationships. This reflects the socio-legal insight that, in
their efforts to pursue justice through law, social justice lawyers do not just find cases. Rather,
they act to convert complex social realities into terms that have currency with applicable systems
of law. In this article, I examine the techniques employed in a multidimensional, shifting and
sometimes contradictory legal landscape in order first, to articulate the Negritos story as one of
dispossession and second, to fashion a pathway for resistance using law.
This introduction reveals the fact that this article is fundamentally a product of advocacy
and activism, including my own. It is also written as part of an explicit effort to support the
Negritos Community’s case going forward. In other words, it takes the opportunity, in an academic
venue, to explore and develop the approaches to law that might enable the Negritos Community,
and communities like it, to pursue justice in domestic and international courts. Beyond its practical
value to communities, this advocacy-oriented approach, supported by an extensive documentary
record, has the potential to ground and inform a range of analytical and theoretical work going
forward. The thick description of context, practices, law and legal argument in the pages that
follow offers important data that is not easily or readily available to those who have not had the
opportunity to work intensively and continuously with mine-affected communities in the Global
South. This material has value to efforts to theorize the concepts of consent and knowledge, as
20
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well as the procedural and remedial legal forms the might govern encounters between Indigenous
communities and multinational companies operating in developing countries. As such, this paper
recounts an unfinished story in more than one sense. Not only does the Negritos Community’s
advocacy journey continue as it awaits a decision from Peru’s highest court, likewise, the concepts
and legal forms profiled here similarly await further in-depth analytical reflection and research.
This article’s conclusion in Part 4 takes some early steps toward this larger goal. It begins
by articulating the international and comparative research and potential law reform agendas that
flow from this work. Reflecting on the Negritos Community’s pursuit of justice, it offers insight
into law, lawyering and access to justice in the context of Campesino and Indigenous legal
challenges to resource extraction practices in Latin America. This includes an incipient reflection
on the transformative potential and pitfalls of collective property rights claims as a mode for
articulating the justice concerns of Indigenous communities adversely affected by the global system
of resource extraction.
2 The Negritos Story: An account of dispossession (the case tells a story about life)
In many Latin American countries, struggles over land, resources and rights often occur in
the context of rural property regimes characterized by a mix of communal and individual tenures.
Today’s legal framework is a product of a complex history of ideologically-driven land reform
initiatives that stretch from protectionist/nationalist policies enacted between the 1960s and the
1980s,22 through to on-going neo-liberal reforms begun in the 1990s that aim to foster private
investment including on Campesino land,23 and now, in some countries, with relatively new layers
of community consultation laws and an emerging Indigenous and Campesino constitutional rights
jurisprudence.24
22
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Each of these waves are of course the product of a complex interplay between transnational
and domestic trends and influences. As a practical matter though, mine-affected communities who
seek to challenge the legality of a company’s concession and surface property rights must navigate
this complex and even contradictory domestic legal matrix. The Negritos case study provides a
highly-textured example of how these trends have unfolded in Peru with consequences for present
day legal struggles between mine-affected communities and foreign mining companies.
2.1 Dispossession Story: Agrarian Reform, neoliberalism, transnational mining &
corruption
Agrarian Reform is an important historical point of departure for the Negritos Community
in that for the first time it became an entity with significance in Peruvian law. Agrarian Reform
came to Peru in 1969 with an agenda to transform the agrarian system by replacing the haciendas,
inherited from colonial times, with a fair system of property and a legal regime that would
guarantee social justice in rural areas.25 The Agrarian Reform Law also declared that “Indigenous
Communities” would thereafter be called “Campesino Communities”.26 The key provisions of
Agrarian Reform were later constitutionalized in the 1979 Political Constitution of Peru. The
program was also implemented in part through a series of statutes that purported to define
Campesino Communities, their political and economic institutions, and their legal relationship with
their communal lands. Most prominent among these were the 1970 Campesino Communities
Special Statute,27 the 1987 Campesino Communities General Law 28 and the 1987 Law for the
Demarcation and Titling of the Communal Territories of Campesino Communities. 29 The
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significance of this domestic legal regime for the Negritos case will be described more fully in the
next section.
In 1971 the Peruvian state designated the inhabitants of an area of land called “Negritos”
as beneficiaries of Agrarian Reform and in 1974 the country’s President decreed that 14,375
hectares of land would be communally titled in the Community’s name. The Negritos Community
is located in the northern Andes of Peru in the Department of Cajamarca, relatively close to the
regional capital city, also called Cajamarca.

It is one of approximately 118 Campesino

Communities in the entire Department. Cajamarca is a predominately rural region and has
consistently ranked among the poorest in the country. In 2015 about half of the population
continued to live in poverty and another one quarter struggling in extreme poverty. 30 In La
Encañada, the district where the Negritos Community is located, poverty levels in recent years have
fluctuated between 70 and 80%.31 The Negritos Community is located in the highlands, accessible
only by a simple road. Most households do not have electricity or running water.
The practical implementation of Agrarian Reform was a complex affair, under-resourced
and suffering from serious deficiencies, delays and in some cases, acts of corruption. 32 The
Negritos Community was not immune to these issues. For example, in 1975, in a patently illegal
move, state officials purported to sell the Negritos Community’s land to representatives of the
neighboring Campesino Community of Tual. In 1980, the payment requirement was removed but
title remained with the neighboring Community. When Negritos community members became
aware of these events in 1986, they called a General Assembly and agreed to pressure Peruvian
government bodies to recognize their Community and its property rights. This agreement was
recorded in a handwritten resolution entitled “Act of the General Assembly of the Negritos
Community”:
By majority we request the separation of Negritos land from the Campesino Community of
Tual and the [legal] formation of an independent community that will be called Negritos,
given that among other things we are an independent socio-economic territorial unit, which
is why it is absurd to consider that we might be part of the Campesino Community of Tual,
30
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given that the two communities have always lived independently without any links between
us. [translation]
There is a paper trail, beginning in the 1980s, of handwritten records (Acts) of decisions
made at Negritos Community General Assembly meetings.

To date, Community members

maintain original copies of the documents produced at these meetings. In these Acts, Community
members describe their communal decision-making processes regarding many practical matters of
interest to their Community as a whole. They make reference to their collective political and legal
institutions, elections of leaders, decisions related to communal justice, agreements regarding
communal planting and harvesting of crops, and the collective management of communal property
and finances.
Between 1987 and 1989, officials from the Ministry of Agriculture responded to the
Negritos Community’s requests for recognition in a series of field studies and meetings with
community members. Based on these visits, Ministry officials wrote in their technical reports that
the Negritos Community members are “natural-born” Campesinos, with their own unique
characteristics and institutions, “who have been working on the communal lands in question since
the time of their ancestors”. Finally, in 1990, the Ministry officially recognized the Campesino
Community San Andres de Negritos as a legal entity consisting of 140 families. Community
members then took steps to debate their Community Statute and Internal Regulations, “article by
article”, which they ultimately adopted with a signature from the head of each family. Among
other things, these rules allowed Negritos families to obtain “certificates of possession” of parcels
of Negritos communal land. Between 1990 and 1991, Community members worked with Ministry
staff to demarcate the boundaries of its territory. The agreed upon demarcations establishing a total
surface area of 13,609 hectares of Community land and this was incorporated into the Community’s
Internal Statute. Negritos’ communal title was registered in the local Public Registrar in October
of 1991.
Following these events, this story of recognition and communal titling abruptly reversed
itself over just a few short years. By 1995 Yanacocha Mine had established itself squarely within
the boundaries of the Negritos Community’s land. Moreover, according to the State and company,
the Negritos Community no longer existed in law and was not longer a property titleholder. The
remainder of this section will describe the documentary record of how this came to be.
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As the first large-scale foreign investment project of its kind in the country and perhaps
even the entire region, Yanacocha was truly emblematic of the new face of neoliberal globalization
in Peru, in the region and the entire world. It consisted of a joint venture between its majority
shareholder, the American company Newmont Mining, and its minority shareholders, the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), an arm of the World Bank, and Buenaventura, a Peruvian
company owned by one of the most powerful families in Peru.33 With significant start-up financing
from the IFC, Yanacocha quickly grew to be the largest gold mine in Latin America and one of the
largest in the world.34 Its extraordinary profitability, due in part to extremely low production costs,
has also been the subject of significant study, with some authors concluding that it quickly became
the most profitable mine in the world.35 Yanacocha’s size and profitability have arguably made a
significant contribution to the success of its majority shareholder. In 2015 Newmont Mining was
the second largest gold producer globally. 36 These figures starkly contrast those that depict
persistent extreme poverty in the region of Cajamarca, which marked 2015 with the highest levels
of extreme poverty in Peru.37
Yanacocha established itself in Peru at a time of radical neo-liberal restructuring of the
Peruvian legal and economic system, and just as neo-liberal globalization began to take a stronger
hold in many countries around the world.38 Elected president of Peru in 1990, Alberto Fujimori
became a champion of neo-liberal policies, immediately implementing a wide-ranging program to
reduce restrictions on international trade and investment while also cutting government funding of
social services, health and education. 39 Fujimori immediately began to pursue policies specifically
aimed at weakening Agrarian Reform and opening Campesino communal land up to foreign
33
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investment.40 In addition to this very favorable legal framework, Yanacocha’s investors further
benefited from a foreign investment agreement with the Peruvian government, guaranteeing it a
low rate of income tax, tax-stability, and a complete exemption from royalty payments.41
The comfortable relationship between Yanacocha Mine, its majority shareholder Newmont,
and the Peruvian government has, at a minimum, crossed ethical boundaries. In the mid-1990s,
Newmont became embroiled in a legal dispute in Peruvian courts with a French company over the
right to shares in Yanacocha.42 In the early 2000s, video evidence leaked as part of a New York
Times investigation revealed that, in the midst of the court case, in two separate meetings, a
representative of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and a Newmont executive
personally requested help from Vladimiro Montesinos, the head of Peru’s secret intelligence
agency and the most powerful official in the country at the time.43 In response, Monestinos met
with one of the seven justices of Peru’s Supreme Court who were presiding over the case.
Leaked videos depict Montesinos explaining to the judge that he must decide in Newmont’s
favor in order to improve Peru’s diplomatic position in negotiations with the United States on other
matters.44 Days later, the Supreme Court handed down its decision, with the judge in question
making the difference in a 4-3 vote in Newmont’s favor. The Yanacocha scandal was only the
beginning of Fujimori and Monestinos’ downfall. Beginning in 2007, and unrelated to Yanacocha,
Peruvian courts found Fujimori guilty of a long list of crimes, including crimes against humanity
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and corruption.45 Montesinos was similarly found guilty, beginning in 2002, of numerous crimes
related to corruption and abuse of public office.46 Thus, while the careers of these political leaders
ended, Yanacocha’s career, as a profitable mine surrounded by impoverished communities,
remained in full swing.
This broad strokes description of these macro processes paints a backdrop for the microlevel legal and social processes that opened doors for Yanacocha on the ground, or more
specifically, on the Negritos Community’s communally titled land. 47 Generally speaking, the
mineral tenure system in Peru is similar to that of many other countries in that a company can begin
extraction only after the state has granted it a mineral concession, referring to a kind of property
right to the subsurface minerals beneath a tract of land.48 As stated above, Newmont’s acquisition
of the concession rights to Yanacocha Mine are a point of controversy. However, with these rights
in hand, the company faced the task of securing access to the surface land above the subsurface
minerals, which of course happened to be the recently communally titled property of the Negritos
Community.
In Latin America more generally, the legal processes whereby companies acquire surface
property rights and access can be highly controversial for the reason that, in many cases, projects
proceed without the free, prior and informed consultation or consent of Indigenous communities
who either hold title, or claim title, to the surface area and perhaps even the subsurface minerals.49
Thus, for legal and practical reasons, the issue of access to surface land is often at the heart of
conflicts between communities and resource companies.

The Negritos case study offers a

particularly stark depiction of the extraordinary difficulty of informed consultation and consent
where a community is left to negotiate directly with a company in the context of immense power
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inequalities, which create serious risks of, among other things, the abuse of power, the breakdown
of community cohesion, and the corruption of community leaders.50
According to documents, in 1992 Yanacocha submitted a request to the Ministry of Mining
for the expropriation of 609 hectares of Negritos communal land (in an area known as Pampa
Larga). In 1993, the Ministry granted this request and title to this portion of land passed from the
Community to the company. Official documents indicate that Yanacocha and the Community
“directly agreed” to compensation in the amount of approximately $US 30,000, or just under $50
per hectare.51 These funds were transferred directly to only three community members, including
the then President, over 800 kilometers away in the national capital city of Lima. By 1995,
Yanacocha had obtained two mortgages over the expropriated property in exchange for loans from
the IFC and a German bank totaling US$ 85,000,000.52
The expropriation and the transfer of all of the compensation directly to the then Negritos
President in Lima was purportedly authorized by several Acts of the Community’s General
Assembly. In one Act, dated just months before Yanacocha solicited the expropriation, the
Community purportedly agreed to grant the President a certificate of possession to Pampa Larga,
coincidently the area that would shortly become the object of expropriation.

The timing and

contents of this Act suggest that the President took steps to position himself to benefit from the
expropriation before it was even officially requested.
Then, a few months after Yanacocha requested the expropriation, in another Act, the
Community purportedly made a number of important decisions: agreeing to the expropriation;
agreeing that 95% of the total compensation would be designated for the holder of the certificate
of possession to the expropriated area (the then President); and granting the then President and two
other community leaders the authority to act on behalf of the entire Community in all matters
related to the expropriation and the transfer of funds. On the basis of these “authorizations”, the
President then proceeded to unilaterally agree to, and personally accept, a compensation amount.
Notably, the Community’s alleged agreement in this Act to the expropriation and compensation
occurred before the compensation amount had been proposed, at least in writing.
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This expropriation is only one of a number of allegedly unconstitutional and illegal transfers
of Negritos’ communal property to Yanacocha. 53 In 1995, in exchange for approximately
US$18,000, Yanacocha obtained a mining easement in relation to 810 hectares of Negritos
communal land. The easement was tantamount to an expropriation given that its terms permitted
the full range of mineral extraction activities. The easement was also established under the same
provisions of Peruvian mining law and followed a very similar procedure to that of the
expropriation.
Not surprisingly, the Negritos Community asserts that its alleged consent to the
expropriation and easement was totally fraudulent. Between 1995 and 1996, the Community
passed at least two General Assembly Acts condemning the Community leaders who had signed
onto the expropriation and easement documents. Community members sent these Acts, along with
numerous letters, to local authorities. They alleged that the Community’s then President and his
small group of supporters had pressured fellow Community members off of their land in
anticipation of transfers of land to Yanacocha, had sold land to Yanacocha that did not belong to
them, had participated in fraud and extortion in relation to the procurement of signatures on
Community Acts and in the creation of certificates of possession, and had not shared any of the
expropriation compensation with the rest of the Community. There is no record that state officials
did anything to respond to these concerns, sent in writing. Rather, Yanacocha’s operations
continued to benefit from state support.
Finally, between 1992 and 1995, the Ministry of Agriculture designated the Community’s
communally titled land as eligible for individual title, leaving only a small portion known as the
“reserve area”, considered in Peruvian law to be property of the state (although this is not the
Community’s view). This process of individual titling culminated in an administrative act executed
by the Ministry in 1995 that purported to strip the community of its legal status (legal personality)
as a Campesino Community. The actions of the Ministry to convert communally titled land to
individual titles and to annul the Community’s legal personality were highly problematic and
appear to have violated, not only the Community’s constitutional rights, but also basic
administrative law principles. 54

The documents suggest that Ministry officials actively
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misinformed Negritos Community members by advising them, among other things, that their
Campesino Community did not have communal property rights and that they had no other choice
but to accept individual title. This approach to the Community starkly contrasts the Ministry’
actions, just a short few years prior, to recognize and communally title the Negritos Community.
The introduction of individual title and the purported annulment of the Negritos
Community was perfectly timed with Yanacocha’s arrival and occurred at a time of crisis in the
Community due to the apparent betrayal of its leaders to Yanacocha. Individual title made it even
easier for the company to acquire land through direct dealings with individual Campesinos.
Community members recount that transfers of property to Yanacocha were often induced by a
combination of misinformation, threats, extortion and unfulfilled promises. 55 Researchers have
reported that Yanacocha workers drove poor and illiterate community members to the land titles
office in company vehicles in order to sign the necessary paper work.56 By 2009, Yanacocha Mine
occupied approximately one third of the Negritos Community’s original communally title property
area. Part 3.2 of this paper analyzes these events by conceptualizing the knowledge and power
dynamics of dispossession in the Negritos case. Part 3.5 describes the substantive rights violations
that the Negritos Community attributes to these events.
As Yanacocha consolidated the surface rights necessary to initiate and quickly expand its
operations, social conflict began to brew.

As early as 1993, Campesinos from numerous

Communities in the area had begun to complain about land usurpation, extortion, environmental
impacts on animals and water and excessive use of force on the part of Yanacocha’s security
forces.57 These early years of protest against Yanacocha were also witness to the birth of a growing

55

A number of empirical studies have documented the tactics adopted by Yanacocha in purchasing land from local
Campesinos: S Langdon, ‘Peru’s Yanacocha Gold Mine: The IFC’s Midas Touch?’ in Profiling Problem Projects
(Project Underground, Berkeley CA 2003); Anthony Bebbington et al, “Mining and Social Movements: Struggles over
Livelihood and Rural Territorial Development in the Andes” (2008) 36 World Development 2888. Wierner & Torres
accuse the company of tactics to pressure Campesinos to “sell” their land for unbelievably low prices. This includes
threatening Campesinos with expropriation if they refuse to sell and hiding information about the gold deposits in
order to induce them to accept lower prices for their land. These authors characterize the processes whereby Yanacocha
acquired land as a “brutal fraud and pillage” of land: supra note 35 at 14-15.
56
J Bury, “Neoliberalismo, minería y cambios rurales en Cajamarca” in A Bebbington, ed, Minería, Movimientos
Sociales y Respuestas Campesinos (CEPES & IEP, Lima 2007) 49 at 76–7.
57
Marco Arana, “El Cerro Quilish y la Mineria del Oro en Cajamarca”, online: http://cajamarca.de/mine/quilish.htm;
Fabiana Li, “Relating Divergent Worlds: Mines, Aquifers and Sacred Mountains in Peru” (2013) 55 Anthropologica
399 at 401 [Li, “Divergent Worlds”]; Wierner & Torres state that the first legal complaints about water contamination
occurred in 1999: supra note 35 at 18.

36

class of local NGOs in the Cajamarca region.58 In 2000, Yanacocha’s subcontracted trucking
company was responsible for a serious mercury spill along a local road.59 The subsequent handling
of the spill and the alleged cover up did not help the deteriorating relationship between the mine
and surrounding communities. 60 The community living alongside the road suffered extensive
mercury poisoning and there are widespread allegations that compensation agreements between
the company and victims were inadequate with many victims receiving no compensation at all.61
2.2 The Turn to Law: An unresponsive state and the emergence of local activism
Beginning in 2004 with a long general strike, social unrest linked to Yanacocha culminated
over the years in more than one period of social crisis, widespread blockades and general strikes.62
Of course the Negritos Community, living with Yanacocha literally in its backyard, was involved
in many of these protest events, which have at times implicated multiple Campesino Communities
and sometimes spread to the nearby regional capital city of Cajamarca. Especially in the first
decade following Yanacocha’s arrival in the area, communities, including the Negritos
Community, typically expressed their opposition with social protest, civil disobedience and road
blockades.63 In recent years, these tactics have been increasingly accompanied by resort to local
courts.64
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This section describes the Negritos Community’s trajectory from participation in broadbased grassroots community activism and protest to political advocacy with local officials to the
articulation of collective rights claims with the support of a transnational legal team. Attention to
the multiple scales of law that surround the Negritos case reveals that, at the turn of the century,
growing social discontent with Yanacocha specifically, and large scale mining in Peru and the
Americas more generally, occurred in conjunction with significant shifts in the international and
domestic legal landscape of Indigenous rights.
Nearly two and a half decades after Agrarian Reform had declared that Peru’s Indigenous
peoples would thereafter be called “Campesinos”, the term “Indigenous” began to reappear in
Peruvian law along with a series of legal and institutional innovations with respect to peoples more
generally in Peru, including Indigenous, Campesino and Afrodescendant communities. In 1993,
Peru passed 1989 ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries65 (“Convention No 169”) into domestic law, ratifying it the following year.66 Then in
1995, the National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian
Peoples was created.67 These developments continued between 2003 and 2011 as the Peruvian
government passed a series of laws protecting and recognizing Campesino and Indigenous peoples’
rights, including in relation to Campesino traditional institutions of communal justice (2003),
Indigenous groups in voluntary isolation in the Amazon (2006), Campesino and Native
Communities’ right to water (2009), and Indigenous Peoples’ right to prior consultation (2011).68
With respect to the 2003 law on Campesino communal justice, it explicitly extended the protections
of Convention No 169 to traditional justice institutions, called Rondas Campesinas.69 Between
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2002 and 2005 Peru’s environmental laws also added special recognition for Indigenous peoples,
Campesino and Native communities, including references to rights protection, knowledge
recognition, equitable compensation and consultation.70
At the same time, at the international level, and especially in the Americas, the Indigenous
rights movement was making gains, catalyzed by the 2001 landmark Awas Tingni ruling where the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that the property rights protected by the 1969
American Convention on Human Rights encompass an Indigenous right to collective property.71
Since then, the Inter-American Court has produced a notable body of jurisprudence on Indigenous
property and cultural rights, often in response to cases brought by communities affected by resource
extraction. 72 These claims often echo many of the issues raised by the Negritos Community,
namely that extraction activities are occurring without the consent and to the detriment of affected
communities. 73 This inter-American jurisprudence is important because it has the potential to
influence and even direct the development of constitutional law in many Latin American countries
with monist legal systems.74
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It is fascinating that these national and international shifts in law and political consciousness
occurred roughly in parallel to a renewal of activism and hope for justice within the Negritos
Community. In 2005, following the massive 2004 regional general strike against Yanacocha
(mentioned above), the Negritos Community elected a new leadership with a mandate and the
capabilities to begin to investigate the past wrongs that had led to Yanacocha’s entry into its
territory. The Community had not forgotten about the expropriation of Pampa Larga. However,
while Community members carried a strong sense of betrayal and injustice, they knew very little
about how their dispossession had actually been achieved in law, just over 10 years prior.
In this context, Negritos Community leaders began to collect volumes of official documents
pertaining to the legal status of their Community and its property rights. These documents,
spanning from the 1970s to the mid-1990s, were primarily collected from government entities such
as the Public Registrar and government ministries, but they also included the handwritten record
of communal decisions (Acts) made at countless community General Assemblies.

These

documents ultimately formed the basis of the Community’s legal case and the allegations described
throughout this paper. The Community’s internal decision to investigate its own case in order to
understand it and pursue some form of justice underscores the assertion that the elimination of the
Community’s property rights and its very existence, as described in the previous section, occurred
without the informed consent or even knowledge of the Community. While in the eyes of the
company and the Peruvian state the Community no longer existed in law, it certainly existed as a
sociological fact.
Bolstered by what they saw in these documents, Community leaders initiated a series of
formal and informal appeals with a wide range of administrative and political decision makers, as
well as Yanacocha itself. In 2006, the Community found a local lawyer who helped them file civil
law proceedings against a group of third parties (non-community member), who were apparently
attempting to occupy and illegally obtain title to a portion of the Community’s land, known to the
Peruvian state as the “Reserve Area” and to the Community as “Llagaden”. Community members
believed that these “invaders” were receiving informal support from Yanacocha. In order to better
investigate and document the situation, the Community resolved to undertake a traditional
communal inspection of the area. However, it feared that these third parties were armed and violent
and made numerous requests for protection from local authorities, including to the regional
Governor, the prosecutions office and the police. After these requests went unanswered, the
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Community resolved to undertake the inspection anyway with over 250 community members in
attendance. Unfortunately, during the inspection unknown assailants shot at the Community
members and one person was injured.
This new threat to communal property appears to have catalyzed yet another series of
appeals to state and company officials. It also starkly revealed that without state recognition, the
Negritos Community’s capacity to protect its communal property interests would be limited.
Between 2006 and 2009 the Community sent at least eight letters to the regional office of the
Ministry of Agriculture requesting official recognition as a Campesino Community and title to
Llagaden (the Reserve Area). In response, the Ministry consistently took a number of problematic
positions in its communications to the Community, from claiming that the Reserve Area is stateowned property, to stating that the Community does not exist, to denying that the matter is in its
jurisdiction, to proposing that the area could only be demarcated and titled in exchange for
thousands of dollars. The Ministry’s responses to the Community’s letters were less than timely,
often delayed by months, and sometimes up to a year at a time. Community leaders’ frequent
requests to meet with officials in person yielded similarly sparse results.
In the same time period, the Negritos Community sent complaints to the Ministry of Energy
and Mining and at least thirty letters to Yanacocha. In these letters, the Community advised that a
recent expansion of the Mine had occurred without consulting the Community and it detailed the
impact of mining activities on ongoing traditional communal uses of land and livelihood.

The

Community requested that Yanacocha negotiate matters related to the acquisition of communal
property with the recognized and elected leaders of the Community and that the company cease to
use and occupy communal property without permission.

In written responses Yanacocha

consistently denied the Community’s existence and stated that it had fulfilled all of its
commitments. Yanacocha refused to meet with Community leaders, stating that its operations take
place exclusively on property owned by the company and threatened to initiate legal action against
anyone who failed to respect its property rights.
2.3 Developing a Legal Strategy: Putting dispossession into a rights framework
In 2007 the Community solicited the support and legal representation of a local NGO who
in turn sought support from international partners. Beginning in 2008, a transnational team of pro
bono Canadian and Peruvian lawyers and academics began to organize and analyze the documents
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collected by Community members. Working with hundreds of pages of documents, these lawyers
reconstructed the historical record of the Negritos Community’s land title and status as a
Campesino Community. The documents detailed the story recounted in the previous section, of
how, after granting Yanacocha the concession rights to the minerals beneath the Negritos
Community’s land, the Peruvian state had proceeded to expropriate a portion of the Community’s
communal land, designate its communally titled land as eligible for individual titling, and strip the
Community of its legal status.
The Negritos legal team undertook to analyze these documents in light of applicable
domestic, constitutional and public international laws. Their starting point was the status of
Campesino Communities in Peruvian law. As referenced above, the first mention of Campesino
Communities in Peruvian law occurred in 1969 with the promulgation of the Agrarian Reform
Law, which declared that Indigenous Communities were to be denominated Campesino
Communities from that point forward. Previously, Indigenous Communities were recognized in
the 1920 Constitution, which specified that the State had a duty to protect the “indigenous race”
and to pass special laws to support its development in harmony with its needs.75 This now historic
Constitution also afforded Indigenous communal property special protections, stating that
Indigenous property interests may not be diminished by prescription, that Indigenous property can
only be transferred to the state and that such transfers may occur only as prescribed by law.
Following Agrarian Reform, Campesino Communities were recognized in the 1979
Constitution. This legal text is relevant to the Negritos Community’s case because it applies to
those events that took place prior to the introduction of the subsequent 1993 Constitution. This
includes for example the expropriation of the Community’s land and the conversion of a portion
of its communal property interest into individual interests. The 1976 Constitution states that
Campesino Communities have legal existence and legal personhood, that they are autonomous in
their communal organizations, work, land uses, economy and administration, and that the State
must respect and protect their traditions. 76 It also creates a state duty to promote Campesino
Communities’ development and communal enterprises.77 Finally, it provides special protections
for communal property, stating that Campesino land is unalienable except in one of two
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circumstances: either by a law based in the Community’s interest and approved by two-thirds of
community members; or in the case of an expropriation, by a law based on public need and utility.78
These 1970s Campesino rights and protections are relatively progressive for their time, especially
due to their recognition of political and economic autonomy and rights. However, it should be
noted that these Campesino property rights recognitions are surface rights, they do not include
ownership of the subsurface minerals.
Fujimori’s 1993 Constitution, which remains in place today, significantly weakened these
constitutional recognitions and protections for Campesino Communities. It recognizes the right to
communal property but controversially allows the state to claim rights over “abandoned” lands.79
In a context where so many communities remain unable to acquire communal title due to
deficiencies in domestic land laws, this provision puts untitled communities at risk. Like its
predecessor, the 1993 Constitution recognizes the legal existence of Campesino Communities, their
autonomy, and some property protections. However, it very significantly removed the requirement
that communal property might only be alienated on the basis of a two-thirds majority vote of
Community members.80
The 1993 constitutional changes were consistent with Fujimori’s wide-sweeping program
of law reform that aimed to weaken communal property rights and facilitate private foreign
investment in natural resource extraction. Of interest though, is the fact that Fujimori’s reforms
left the most important Agrarian Reform statutes in place, including the 1987 Campesino
Communities General Law and the 1987 Law for the Demarcation and Titling of Communal
Territories of Campesino Communities. Importantly, these statutes, which remain in place to date,
maintain the property protections that Fujimori eliminated from the Constitution, including the
requirement for a two-thirds majority vote.81
Taken together, these Constitutional and statutory laws referring to Campesino
Communities formed the basic starting point for the Negritos legal team’s in-depth analysis of the
documents that the Community had been collecting. However, key features of the Peruvian
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constitutional system allowed the Negritos legal team to complement these domestic rights
provisions by drawing upon international legal principles on the rights of Indigenous peoples.82
Doctrinally, this was possible due to the combined operation of two rules, one domestic and the
other international.
Beginning with the domestic rule, Peru, like many Latin American countries, is a monist
legal system in that article 55 of its 1993 Constitution explicitly incorporates international treaties
into national law upon ratification by the Peruvian state. In 2005 Peru’s Constitutional Court
interpreted this provision to include international human rights treaties such as the 1969 American
Convention.83 In 2009 the Court acknowledged that ILO Convention No 169 and the jurisprudence
of the Inter-American Court also have the status of enforceable law in Peru.84
This recognition of the constitutional status of international human rights treaties and
jurisprudence in Peru requires some clarification regarding the applicability of these sources of law
to past events. In international law, the rights recognized in any given treaty become binding on a
state after it ratifies the treaty. In Peru, these rights become binding domestically once the treaty
is specifically incorporated into Peruvian law by legislation. For example, ILO Convention No
169, first available for ratification in 1989, was not incorporated into Peruvian law until November
1993, just months after the expropriation of Negritos land but nearly two years before the mining
easement was established. As such, its provisions would apply to the latter but not the former.
The temporal applicability of the relevant jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court in
Peru also merits comment. When the Inter-American Court considers provisions of the 1969
American Convention in any given case, its interpretation of the content and meaning of specific
rights are available to analyze facts that pre-date the case at hand. This is due to the nature of rights
jurisprudence in international as well as domestic public law. Part of a court’s judicial function is
to interpret the rights statements contained in the constitution or treaty within its jurisdiction. In
other words, public law rights jurisprudence interprets and applies existing rights, it does not create
new rights. This is precisely what makes it such an important and powerful tool for analyzing the
present-day legal significance of past injustice. On this basis, the Negritos legal team invoked the
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Indigenous rights jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court to analyze the earlier facts of the
Community’s case.
With this framework, the Negritos team advanced the proposition that the above-named
sources of international law (Convention No 169, the American Convention and decisions of the
Inter-American Court) should be relied on, together with the constitutional and legislative
provisions pertaining to Campesino Communities in Peru, to analyze the facts of the Negritos case.
Indeed, there are remarkable parallels between Peru’s 1970s and 80s Campesino Community laws,
and the Indigenous rights principles developed in international law beginning with ILO Convention
169 in 1989 and continuing with the Inter-American Indigenous rights jurisprudence beginning in
2001. These parallels allowed the Negritos legal team to create a robust and coherent substantive
rights framework by effectively weaving these international sources of Indigenous rights law
together with the Campesino rights provisions already present in the Peruvian Constitution and
domestic law.
The impact of this approach was further complimented by the operation of another rule,
this time emanating from an international source. Article 29(b) of the American Convention
establishes that its provisions cannot be interpreted to limit the enjoyment and exercise of any right
or freedom recognized under the domestic law of the state in question or recognized by an
international treaty ratified by that state. In the context of the Negritos case, this principle infuses
the Indigenous property rights jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court with the rule from the
Campesino Communities General Law that Campesino land cannot be alienated without a twothirds majority vote. Given that this jurisprudence has constitutional status in Peru (as described
above), the operation of article 29(b) in the context of Peru’s Constitutional framework creates a
kind of feedback loop, elevating the property rights-related provisions of the Campesino
Communities General Law to constitutional status on their own terms. This also accords with the
principle that rights recognized in domestic statutes should be considered when interpreting related
constitutional rights.
As a result, the two-thirds majority vote rule should retain significant legal weight in Peru,
even after Fujimori’s 1993 Constitution removed it. This is relevant to the conversion of the
Negritos Community’s communally titled land into individually titled land (one form of
alienation), which occurred both before and after this constitutional amendment. It is also helpful
due to the fact that the sources of international law applicable to the Negritos facts have only
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recognized a limited Indigenous right to free, prior and informed consent to the alienation of
communally-held land.85 As a result, the two-third majority rule arguably has the potentially to
create a higher standard than international sources, at least in the context of the potential alienation
of communally titled land.
In sum, article 55 of the Peruvian Constitution and article 29(c) of the American Convention
allow for the integration of the rights protection offered by applicable international human rights
treaties and Peruvian domestic law in order to assemble a rights framework that contains the most
robust and comprehensive level of protection available. Consequently, the sources of law relevant
to the Negritos case are: the American Convention, Convention No 169, the Peruvian Constitution,
Peruvian domestic law, the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, and the
jurisprudence of the Peruvian Constitutional Court. The Negritos legal team considered these
sources holistically to identify the substantive rights available to the Negritos community. In other
words, the focus of the rights analysis was not on each relevant article and statements of law, which
taken together are numerous. Rather, the Negritos legal team synthesized the relevant articles and
their interpretations to identify the substantive rights that these provisions, taken together as a
whole, recognize in relation to the facts of the Negritos case. In one sense, the articulation of this
framework was ambitious in that it required significant effort to integrate all of the multiple sources
of applicable law in a rigorous and coherent way. However, in another sense the approach reflected
merely the routine methods of lawyering in that the framework was constructed following wellestablished rules for identifying applicable sources of law, and it incorporated rights already
recognized by domestic and international laws and tribunals.
Applying this holistic method, Community’s legal team ultimately concluded that there was
strong documentary evidence that the actions of the Peruvian state and Yanacocha Mine had
violated the Negritos Community’s rights, as protected by Peruvian constitutional and international
laws applicable at the time of the acts in question. It identified violations of the following
substantive rights: (1) the right to collective property; (2) the right to free, prior and informed

85

The Inter-American Court has recognized that the state must obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of affected
communities before proceeding with certain types of projects such as where the project may endanger the physical or
cultural survival of a community: Saramaka, supra note 72. See: Forest Peoples Programme, Indigenous Peoples’
Rights and Reduced Emissions from Reduced Deforestation and Forest Degradation: The Case of the Saramaka
People v. Suriname (UK: Forest Peoples Programme, 2009). The UN Declaration is not directly applicable to the
Negritos facts since it came into being much later: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
UNGAOR, 62 Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 68 UN Doc. A/61/L.67 (2007).

46

consent prior to a change in the status of the Community’s property title from communal to
individual; (3) the right to the recognition of the Community and its legal personhood; (4) the right
to free, prior and informed consent prior to a change in the Community’s legal status or
personhood; (5) the right to free, prior and informed consultation prior to the expropriation of the
Community’s land; (6) the right to equitable indemnification in exchange for the expropriation of
the Community’s land; (7) the right to benefit equitably from the benefits generated by mining
activity on the Community’s land; and (8) the State’s obligation to take special measures to protect
the aforementioned rights. The alleged violation of these rights stems primarily from the State’s
actions, detailed in the previous section, to expropriate communal land and strip the community of
communal title and legal status, concurrently with the establishment of Yanacocha Mine squarely
within the boundaries of the Negritos Community’s communally titled property.86
The articulation of these rights arguments was a watershed moment for Negritos
community members because it represented a significant reframing of their concerns into a legal
framework that they had been largely unaware of. Community members previously had very
limited knowledge of their legal rights as a Campesino Community and even less information about
how the state and the company had purported to diminish or eliminate those rights in law. As such,
they had expressed their sense of injustice primarily in the language of a general demand for
recognition as a Campesino Community and in reference to a raft of specific practical grievances
with the Yanacocha and the impact of its operations on daily subsistence life. Community members
welcomed and celebrated the proposition that international law and Peruvian constitutional law
recognize that their Community has special status, including special property rights, that should
command the attention and respect of company and state alike. However, given that the state and
company were certainly not listening, the Community’s last resort was to approach a court of law
that could recognize and enforce its rights claims.

Crucially, this was contingent on the

identification of an appropriate legal forum and a cause of action. The next part of this paper turns
to this issue.
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3 The Negritos Case: Litigating a dispossession claim (the story of the case itself)
This part begins with the practical question of what would be required to operationalize the
statements of international and constitutional Campesino rights described above. The InterAmerican Commission for Human Rights can admit a petition only when claimants have complied
with a number of procedural requirements, including the “exhaustion of domestic remedies” rule.87
The Negritos volunteer legal team ultimately determined that a domestic constitutional cause of
action called amparo was in principle available in Peru to protect the Community’s constitutionally
enshrined rights, as set out in the previous section. If the amparo action were to fail, the Negritos
Community would be in a position to present a petition to the Inter-American Commission alleging
violations of the American Convention on the part of the Peruvian State.
In general, once the Commission deems a petition admissible, it evaluates the claim on the
merits. If it finds one or more human rights violations, the Commission can refer the case to the
Inter-American Court where claimants can seek a binding judgment against their home state.88 As
such, if the Negritos Community were to have any chance of pursuing justice with either
international or domestic public law, it would have to navigate its own domestic regimes by fitting
the particularities of its Campesino rights claim into the parameters and logic of Peru’s amparo
domestic cause of action. The following section describes the Negritos amparo action and touches
on its significance in terms of the global debate on the regulation of the transnational corporation,
referred to in this paper’s introduction.
3.1 The Amparo: A cause of action for dispossession in Peru?
Peru’s Constitutional Procedural Code establishes three potential causes of action for rights
protection. The habeas corpus action is linked to the protection of individual freedoms, typically
in the realm of criminal law, and the habeas data action typically relates to the right to receive
information from any public office. 89 The amparo action is available to protect all other
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constitutional rights not covered by these first two, including presumably Campesino rights. In
this sense, it is considered a “residual” cause of action.90
The Peruvian amparo shares common features with the cause of action by the same name
in a number of other countries in the region.91 It is a civil law procedure that enables a plaintiff to
request a court order requiring the defendant to cease any actions or omissions that the court finds
responsible for violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.92 An amparo action can be brought
against a private party and/or a state defendant. In the sense that it offers judicial protection of
constitutional rights, the amparo resembles the procedure known as judicial review in common law
countries, with one significant difference being that the Peruvian amparo is not available to
challenge the constitutionality of statutes or legislation.93
An amparo claim in Peru must allege violations of the constitutionally protected aspects of
the rights claimed.94 In this regard, the Code specifies twenty-four different constitutional rights
that the amparo protects.95 Campesino and/or Indigenous rights are not mentioned anywhere in
this long list. As such, they necessarily fall under the twenty-fifth and final item listed, namely
“other rights that the constitution recognizes.” 96

Notably then, while Peru’s 1979 and 1993

Constitutions both set out Campesino rights in some detail, the accompanying Constitutional
Procedural Code does not provide for a cause of action specifically tailored to these rights, nor
does it even mention them explicitly.97 This general absence of Campesino Communities from
Peru’s procedural code led the Negritos legal team to undertake intensive consultations with
Peruvian constitutional experts before determining that the amparo cause of action was in principle
available to the Negritos Community.
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The Negritos Community began the process of assembling its legal claim in 2008 and in
2011 it filed its amparo action before a local court of first instance in the city of Cajamarca, Peru.
Interestingly, this period of time coincided with an unprecedented series of decisions from Peru’s
Constitutional Court. Between 2008 and 2012, the Constitutional Court issued eight decisions that
addressed the issue of Indigenous peoples’ constitutional rights in Peru for the first time.98 Seven
of the eight cases were initiated between 2008 and 2009 and as of the date of publication, there
have been no further decisions on Indigenous constitutional issues at the Constitutional Court level
since 2012. 99 In only three of these eight decided cases did the Court find in favor of the
claimant. 100

Nonetheless, as a group, these cases are important because they pushed the

Constitutional Court to recognize, as mentioned earlier, that both ILO Convention No 169 and the
Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence on Indigenous peoples rights have constitutional force in
Peru.101
Notwithstanding their achievements, the substantive rights claims advanced in these cases
have limited precedential value for the purposes of the Negritos claim. For the most part, these
cases have focused on asserting an Indigenous right to consultation prior to enacting national
legislation that impacts Indigenous communities.102 In this sense these cases can be understood as
an attempt to address some of the neo-liberal investment oriented reforms referred to earlier. A
smaller subsection of these eight cases focused on rights related to a healthy environment.103 Only
one case advanced a claim to an Indigenous right to communal property. However, the allegations
in that case related to trespass and hold little resemblance to those of the Negritos case in that they
do not involve allegations of elimination of title and illegal property transfers to a foreign mining
company.104 As a result, to date, there is not a single case on record in Peru’s highest court whereby
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a Campesino Community has initiated a constitutional rights claim that resembles that of the
Negritos Community, claiming violations of communal property title, recognition, consent and
compensation for violations.
The total absence of a Campesino or Indigenous rights jurisprudence in Peru until 2009 is
striking in light of the fact that the contemporary recognition and protection of Campesino and
Native communal property, social, economic and cultural institutions first occurred in the 1979
Constitution. Indeed, even among the Indigenous rights cases decided since 2009, five of the eight
to date were brought by civil society groups impugning national legislation on behalf of Indigenous
communities generally.105 In only two cases were the claims on behalf of a named community or
group of communities and in only one case (the trespass case) was the community itself the
claimant.106
Notwithstanding the constitutionalization of Campesino rights since 1979 in Peru, this
overview points to three absences. First, Campesino rights are absent from Peru’s Constitutional
Procedural Code. Second, Campesino and Indigenous rights are absent from the Constitutional
Court’s jurisprudence before 2009. And finally, at least to date, Campesino and Indigenous
communities as claimants are almost totally absent from the Court’s jurisprudence on their rights.
Arguably, these absences suggest that there are barriers that prevent these communities from
accessing Peruvian courts to advance their interests though constitutional rights protection claims.
This highlights the importance of tracking the barriers that arose in the Negritos case as well as the
strategies employed over the course of the case’s journey in the Peruvian court system.
While the shortage of comparable precedents on point certainly presents a challenge for the
Negritos claim, it is not fatal to its pursuit of justice. As lawyers well know, an absence of
comparable case law does not necessarily mean that innovative claims are not legitimate, viable
and even a necessary part of broader efforts to push the law to respond to social realities. Moreover,
in spite of the absences described above, the Peruvian amparo has two feature that are particularly
promising for a community like Negritos, seeking to advance a legal claim against a foreign
resource company for violations of its Campesino rights, including communal property rights.
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First, the Peruvian amparo permits a plaintiff to bring a constitutional rights action against
a public authority, functionary and/or a private person, which includes a corporation.107 As such,
in the Negritos amparo action, the Community named Yanacocha as a co-defendant alongside the
Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mining. The Community was able to allege that the actions and
omissions of state authorities and the mining company, often in combination, had violated the
Community’s collective rights.
Second, a successful amparo claimant obtains an enforceable remedy from the Peruvian
courts. The available remedy aligns with the purpose of the amparo as a cause of action, namely
to protect constitutional rights.108 As such, the court will attempt to return the plaintiff to the state
in which they were before the violation occurred. To this end, the judge may order a defendant to
fulfil its legal obligations or, in the case of a public authority, to perform an administrative act.109
The court may issue a declaration requiring the defendant(s) to cease rights violating actions, or in
the case of omissions, requiring the defendant(s) to undertake some form of positive action in order
to respect the claimant’s rights.110 The court has the power to impose fines or other penalties on a
defendant who refuses to comply with court orders.111
These two features are significant especially when considered together with the
incorporation of international human rights law into the Peruvian constitutional framework, as
described in the previous section. In summary, the amparo creates a domestic cause of action, with
an enforceable remedy, against a public or private actor who violates constitutionally protected
Campesino rights, which includes certain Indigenous rights recognized in international human
rights law. Within this framework, the Negritos Community’s amparo claim is fundamentally
about the pursuit of an enforceable remedy via a domestic cause of action in Peru directly against
a foreign resource company for the violation of its constitutional and international human rights as
a Campesino Community.
As such, the Negritos claim brings together a constellation of rights, remedies and actors
that is of particular interest in the context of the global conversation, referred to in this paper’s
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introduction, regarding the problem of the “governance gap” in the effective regulation of the
human rights impacts of transnational corporations operating in developing countries.

The

techniques described here are fascinating in light of the widely-observed fact that communities in
developing countries often lack a forum and an enforceable cause of action when seeking to mount
rights claims, and in particular international human rights claims, against foreign resource
companies. While this paper undoubtedly explores the problems that the Negritos Community has
faced in the course of its efforts to access this regime in practice, the mere fact of its existence is
significant.

In light of the governance gap, the Negritos amparo action appears to represent a

relatively unusual opportunity, at least to date. Human rights lawyers in Peru report that there is
now a handful of Indigenous property claims of various kinds against foreign resource companies
in progress in the lower courts in Peru. However, the Negritos claim remains the only one of its
kind now before Peru’s Constitutional Court.112
3.2 Dispossession as Knowledge and Power: An equitable approach to the limitation period
The previous section described how the amparo offers the Negritos Community an avenue
for constitutional rights protection and remedy in that it applies to the substance of its case, framed
in terms of violations of its Campesino constitutional rights. However, like most civil causes of
action, the amparo imposes various procedural rules on claimants. While several of these
requirements presented challenges to the Negritos Community, the limitation period rule ultimately
became its biggest obstacle. The Peruvian Constitutional Procedural Code requires that an amparo
claim be filed before a court of first instance within sixty days of the time that the claimant’s rights
were first violated.113 The rationale for this rule appears to be rooted in the amparo’s conception
as a simple and prompt remedy for the urgent protection of rights.114
The limitation period rule as set out in the Code includes two important qualifiers, first the
claimant must have knowledge of the violating act, and second, the claimant must have the ability
to present the claim to the courts. The rule states that if either of these obstacles exist, the limitation
period will be calculated from the moment that the impediment is removed.115 Thus the limitation
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period rule as it appears in the Code exists in the form of a strict rule (60 days) accompanied by a
kind of equitable exception, internal to the rule itself, that gives the court the discretion to account
for the claimant’s knowledge and ability in relation to the alleged violation and, arguably, the legal
system itself. This general statement of the limitation rule in the Code precedes a list of numbered
exceptions to the rule, to be considered in the next section of this paper.
The Inter-American Court has indirectly addressed procedural questions in relation to
Indigenous peoples’ rights claims with an important statement regarding the right to remedy. The
Court has stated that Indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost their lands are entitled to a legal
remedy and that the right to a remedy persists so long as their relationship with the land exists, or
where there are impediments to the maintenance of this relationship, so long as those impediments
exist.116 Notably, this statement regarding the right to a remedy is qualified with the requirement
that the loss of land must have occurred “unwillingly”, in other words, without their consent.
These statements from the Inter-American Court can be read together with the statement of
the limitation period rule in Peru’s Constitutional Code to identify at least some of the general
principles that might apply to the question of the admissibility of the Negritos Community’s claim.
First, the Negritos Community’s right to a legal remedy persists so long as the loss of its legal
interests occurred unwillingly, meaning without its consent; and second, the limitation period for
seeking a legal remedy will be triggered at the point in time when the Community has knowledge
of the violating acts and the ability to bring its claim forward. In this light, consent, knowledge
and ability all emerge as central concepts in the admissibility and right to remedy analysis. At the
same time, Parts 2.3 and 3.5.b of this paper both describe how the concept of consent, which is of
course inextricably linked with knowledge, is also at the core of the alleged rights violations in the
Negritos case. Taking all this together, an interesting situation comes into sharper focus, with
potential implications for the litigation of other Indigenous dispossession claims. In the Negritos
amparo claim, the concepts of knowledge and ability/power are engaged in the analysis of
procedural questions related to admissibility, as well as in the analysis of the Community’s
substantive right to consultation and consent.
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Arguably, at both the procedural and substantive phases, these concepts must be considered
in context. 117 Given that the amparo is in place to protect constitutional rights, including
Campesino rights, it is critical that its procedural requirements, including the limitation period
requirement, be interpreted in context. This refers to the lived reality of those rights and by
extension, rights violations. In the Negritos case, searching for the lived reality of rights violations
requires a brief review of the factual story, told in Part 2 of this paper, of the social and legal
processes that led to the elimination of the Community’s Campesino property title and legal status,
as well as the processes whereby the Community came to assert rights and claim rights violations.
The Negritos legal claim arises from contemporary processes of dispossession and lack of
recognition that are rooted in a history of colonial relations and the subsequent inadequacies of
Agrarian Reform. Part 2 of this paper described how in the early 1990s, newer legal and economic
forms of globalization mapped onto a preexisting context of disadvantage and social exclusion that
was only partially addressed by Agrarian Reform. As a result, the processes of dispossession in
the Negritos case unfolded in the context of fundamentally unequal power relationships, between
the Campesino Community on one side and the state and the foreign company on the other. Indeed,
the interests and actions of the state and the corporation (Yanacocha) were at times so highly
coordinated that the exercise of public and private power seemed to converge. The Peruvian state
and the company often appeared to operate in a complementary fashion toward achieving a
common objective. This occurred in part through the exchange of roles, responsibility, resources
and information and through the mutual facilitation of the social and legal processes necessary to
ostensibly eliminate the Negritos Community’s legal interests.118
When the state and company’s interests prevailed, this occurred formally through processes
that engaged the legal constructs of property, contract and consent. For example, the name of the
titleholder in the state registry changed from that of the Community to the mining corporation,
purportedly on the basis of an expropriation “agreement” between Yanacocha and the Community.
Other pivotal moments involved the elimination of the Community’s legal personhood and its
communal property title in favor of the opportunity to obtain individual titles. Legal title to many
individually titled properties was also transferred to the Mine. Critically, these changes to the
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Community’s status and property interests in law all occurred with the signatures of some (but not
all) Community members, procured at different intervals between 1991 and 1995, and just as
Yanacocha began to produce its first bars of gold. Part 2 of this paper described how in 1995 and
1996 the Community publicly denounced, including in letters to state officials, the legitimacy of
these legal processes along with the allegedly corrupt leaders that facilitated them. However, and
of particular importance for the limitation period discussion, the Community did not respond to
these events with an immediate and coordinated turn to the law, much less with a formulated
constitutional claim. Indeed, the Negrito amparo action was only filed much later, in 2011 with
the support of a transnational team of lawyers and law students.
On a socio-historical level, the Negritos Community’s delayed turn to the law might be
understood in light of the long history of indifference (or even animosity) on the part of Peru’s
Campesino Communities toward laws emanating from the Peruvian state.119 This may explain in
part the many absences, described previously, of Campesino and Indigenous communities from
Peruvian constitutional jurisprudence. However, turning to the specific facts at issue in the
Negritos case, the amparo action alleges that unequal power relations enabled illegal practices such
as fraud, corruption, extortion and misrepresentation, which in turn reinforced or deepened these
power relations. Although the state and the company purported to procure signatures from
Community members, there are many unresolved questions surrounding the validity of these
signatures. Community members allege that signatures were falsified, extorted or otherwise
uninformed. Moreover, even the number of (contested) signatures was insufficient to comply with
the constitutional requirement in Peruvian law that the agreement of two-thirds of the Community
is required before communal land can be alienated.
Nonetheless, the signatures of some Community members on the documents that purported
to transfer title and eliminate rights in the Negritos case raise the obvious possibility that an outside
observer may presume that the signatories had knowledge of the contents of the documents signed,
understanding of their meaning, and the capacity to act, thereby triggering the sixty-day limitation
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period. This reveals that the concept of knowledge and capacity employed in the limitation period
analysis is a crucial matter and requires critical interrogation. Beyond the allegations of dubious
dealings described above, the Negritos amparo action alleges that, even if these signatures are
taken at face value, the facts reveal that Community members did not know what they were signing
due to lack of adequate information and inappropriate procedures. At this juncture, an important
argument emerges with respect to how the court should approach the limitation period. The
assertion here is that where the substantive rights issues in amparo proceedings raise questions of
consent, the court cannot avoid a careful consideration of the plaintiff’s knowledge and capacity
for the purposes of the limitation period analysis. Moreover, in order to properly interpret the legal
standards of knowledge applicable to an Indigenous community, the courts must consult with the
case law on point.
As stated previously, the Negritos amparo action asserts that the Community has a right to
free, prior and informed consent prior to the alienation of its communal property, and in the case
of expropriation, a right to free, prior and informed consultation. 120

The Inter-American

Commission has stated that consent requires, at a minimum, that all members of the Community
be fully and precisely informed of the nature and consequences of the proposed project and of the
decision-making process; and that they be afforded the opportunity to effectively participate
individually and collectively.121 For its part, Peru’s Constitutional Court has stated that access to
“true information” is not only a fundamental human right, but also an essential condition for free
choice.122 Drawing on Inter-American jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court has recognized that
the appropriate methodology for consultation is case specific, considering the needs and
circumstances of each community. However, at a basic level, the information required in relation
to a proposed resource project would include information about the company proposing the project,
the kind of resource, the exploitation area and the potential environmental and health impact.123
Moreover, communities should have adequate time to digest this information during the
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consultation process and the process itself should aim to achieve an agreement that protects the
legitimate interests of the community, including the preservation of its economic and cultural
activities and the environmental integrity of its territory.124
The work of legal anthropologists in the Peruvian context offers critical insights that help
illuminate the complexity of the concepts of adequate information and appropriate procedures as
described in the case law above. They have accumulated a rich body of research that reveals that
consultation and consent processes with Indigenous peoples will only be effective if they are
designed to account for information and knowledge differences and power disparities. 125
Anthropological work with Campesino Communities in Peru suggests that these inequities are
exacerbated by deeper epistemological differences between the parties regarding the meaning of
community, property, livelihood, development, and the environment.126 A number of studies have
observed that Communities have complex, mixed and multilayered conceptions of property that
blend communal and familiar rights into different and variable arrangements that do not coincide
with state-based legislation or legal concepts.127 One researcher who did ethnographic work with
Negritos Community members reports that when Yanacocha arrived in the early 1990s most of the
adults in the Community were illiterate and did not understand exactly what a “mine” was.128
As stated, the Negritos amparo action alleges that for most Negritos Community members
the legal processes that lead to their dispossession in law (on the books) were initially either entirely
unknown or, if known, their significance was not understood. Moreover, there is continuity
between the formal legal processes of dispossession and the material outcomes of the mining
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project that these processes purport to legalize. The adverse material impact of the project on the
Negritos Community embodies the fundamentally different understandings and worldviews (at
best), and fraud, extortion and misrepresentation (at worst), that characterized the initial legal
processes that presumed to eliminate the Community’s property title and status with its “consent”.
The Negritos Community’s dispossession was consolidated by the subsequent deepening
of its relative marginalization as Yanacocha’s operations picked up speed and it became grossly
unable to equitably benefit from the mining project. This occurred as a result of a two-fold process.
First, the Community was substantively excluded from the model of mining “development”
initiated by the changes to its property title. Community members did not obtain meaningful
employment and otherwise meaningfully share in Yanacocha’s wealth production.

Second,

Yanacocha’s operations diminished Community members’ capacity to engage in their land-based
livelihoods. They allege that their natural sources of water have been contaminated, that their
traditional pathways for moving animals have been destroyed and that their homes have suffered
the consequences of blasting.

In the Negritos case the subsequent wealth disparities are stark:

Part 2 referred to the fact that after more than twenty years of Yanacocha’s operations, members
of the Negritos Community remain among the poorest inhabitants of one of the poorest regions of
Peru while Yanacocha’s wealth has consistently topped the charts globally. Its success is arguably
due in part to the way that it originally leveraged its title to Negritos’ land to obtain start-up
financing loans in the amount of US$ 85,000,000.
This account of the Negritos Community’s knowledge and ability for the purposes of the
limitation period analysis must also account for its processes of resistance and its ultimate turn to
law. Gradually Community members became aware of the stark material consequences of their
dispossession, the grossly unequal and disadvantageous conditions in their midst, and the adverse
impact of the mine’s operations on their livelihood. As mentioned earlier, explicit or open conflict
between Yanacocha, the Negritos Community and other neighboring communities emerged toward
the end of the 1990s, once the mine was well into the operations phase and the reality of its potential
and actual environmental, social and economic consequences were felt. Part 2 of this paper
described how these initial conflicts occurred primarily in the form of social protests as opposed to
claims brought to the courts.
As the Negritos Community came together in the years that followed to seek solutions for
a variety of problems, it encountered the consistent message from state and company officials that
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it lacked the status to make demands as a Community, in other words, that it did not exist. All of
this served as a catalyst for renewed Community mobilization and search for justice. However, it
took a period of years for the Community to explore its options. The previous section described
how following several episodes of protest in the region, in 2005 the Negritos Community began to
intensify its pursuit of potential avenues of recourse, directly appealing to political actors,
administrative decision makers and the corporation itself.
When these avenues consistently failed, the Community ultimately turned to the law,
searching for legal mechanisms that might govern the public and private actions and inactions in
question. In the process, it faced serious hurdles as it sought to collect hundreds of pages of
documentation from state authorities in order to understand what had happened to its legal interests.
Finally, it turned to the only legal counsel willing to assist, a team of volunteer lawyers, law
students and local NGO workers, who in turn received support from a small group of national and
international allies. This team was ultimately able to file the Community’s claim in local courts in
early 2011. This brief recap of the Community’s pursuit of justice signals that a final condition of
inequity has reinforced its dispossession, namely its lack of access to legal counsel and the
resources necessary to efficiently bring its claims to local courts.
In sum, the Negritos Community’s dispossession fundamentally involved the nonconsensual loss of land and status, resulting in the enrichment of Yanacocha, growing economic
disparity and the deprivation of the Community.

The processes that purported to imbue

dispossession with a veneer of legality and consent were underpinned by vast inequalities in
economic and political power. The impossibility of meaningful consent in this context is a
consequence of at least four conditions of inequity or what I refer to as the “dynamics of
dispossession”: (1) lack of meaningful access to information about material fact and law, (2)
inaccessible, inappropriate, inefficient or unfair administrative procedures, (3) epistemological
differences with respect to the meaning of legal categories and events, and (4) lack of access to
appropriate legal support.
This account emphasizes the temporal aspect of these legal and social process in order to
explain why the Negritos Community’s turn to the courts took place gradually, over a period of
years, and far beyond the 60-day limitation period required by statute.

The dynamics of

dispossession help explain why the Negritos Community did not have the knowledge or ability to
mount a legal challenge to the alleged rights violations, which began between 1991 and 1995, until
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it finally presented its case to local courts in 2011, a decade and a half later. As I have noted, this
examination of the specific features of knowledge, ability and consent in the Negritos case raises
important questions regarding how the courts should interpret and apply limitations period rules in
the context of Indigenous rights claims like that of the Negritos Community.
Importantly, the above account signals that the inequities that enable the legal processes of
dispossession can be the same factors that prevent the community from promptly understanding
the full significance of these processes and bringing legal action. For example, not only does a
lack of access to information and fair process make meaningful consent impossible, it can also
prevent a timely response from the Community. The Negritos story reveals that, due to the
dynamics of the unequal power relationships that inform the processes of dispossession, the legal
underpinning of the impugned act or omission is often consolidated without the full knowledge or
participation of the Community and according to the terms of a system of law that the Community
is not familiar with. As a result, it may take a period of years or even decades for a Community to
become aware of the loss of its rights in the eyes of state-based law, as well as the possibility, and
potentially the necessity, of seeking redress through the state’s legal system.
The Negritos Community’s experience in this regard supports a more general argument,
namely, that where an Indigenous community’s constitutional claim alleges the nonconsensual loss
of property and rights, for the purposes of the limitation period rule the claimant’s knowledge and
ability must be considered in the full context of each case and on the basis of relevant principles in
the applicable Indigenous rights jurisprudence. Strict adherence to the sixty-day limitation period
requirement on the basis of formal signatures would put the law dramatically out of touch with the
ways in which Indigenous property rights are often lived and lost on the ground. To demand by
way of a generic procedural requirement that the Negritos Community, and communities like it,
should mobilize within sixty days of the impugned act or omission would be to perpetuate the very
dynamics of dispossession that form the basis of the claim. Especially where questions of
dispossession and consent are at issue, to assume at the admissibility stage that the Community’s
knowledge and ability was sufficient to launch a legal challenge within sixty days of the alleged
violations would amount to a premature and formalistic determination of the substantive issues.
Indeed, issues such as what the Community knew are central to the allegations of rights violations.
Thus, a strict application of the limitation period criterion in the context of Negritos case, and cases
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of a similar nature, would risk creating a de facto bar in Peru to Indigenous communities seeking
constitutional redress for constitutional wrongs that fall outside of a 60-day period.
3.3 Dispossession as Ongoing Actions and Omissions: A doctrinal approach to the
limitation period
The previous section set out the amparo’s limitation period rule as stated in the
Constitutional Procedural Code.

It observed that the 60-day limitation rule contains a

qualification, internal to the rule itself, that references a claimants’ knowledge and capacity. This
grounded the argument that the rights violations alleged in the Negritos case, rooted in the
dynamics of dispossession, are a direct result of inequities related to knowledge and capacity,
thereby explaining the fact that the Community did not turn to the law for several years. While
this equitable argument makes an important contribution to a critical analysis of the limitation
period, it also faces important evidentiary obstacles. The substantive arguments in the Negritos
action rely on the available documentary record to argue that the Community’s loss of title and
status was non-consensual. However, further evidence would be required to prove that the
Community lacked sufficient knowledge and capacity to bring its claim in the years between the
initial loss of its rights (1992-1995) and the moment when it filed its claim (2011). This would
likely be difficult to prove in light of the strict evidentiary requirements of the amparo action. The
amparo procedures do not typically allow forms of evidence that would need to be tested and
weighed by the court, such as witness testimony in the form of affidavit evidence.129
In this context, the Negritos legal team sought an alternative approach to overcoming the
limitation period hurdle, one that would not raise complex evidentiary questions and equitable
arguments. It turned to a list of specified exceptions that appear in the Constitutional Procedural
Code immediately following the statement of the rule. In this regard, articles 44(3) and 44(5) were
particularly promising.

These two provisions permit exceptions to the amparo’s sixty-day

limitation period rule in circumstances where the alleged violations are generated by omissions
and/or ongoing actions. Relying on these provisions, the Negritos amparo asserted that the courts
should admit the claim and exempt the Community from the application of the 60-day limitation
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period requirement on the basis that the alleged rights violations are the result of continuous actions
or omissions. Continuous actions are actions that have been occurring, that continue to occur, and
that will certainly continue to occur.130 Another way to identify continuous actions is by their
effects. Decisions of Peru’s Constitutional Court state that the effects of a continuous action are
periodically produced and reproduced, leaving the rights holder constantly unable to exercise the
right.131
On the basis of these provisions and their interpretation, the Community argued that the
rights violations it attributes to the mining company and the state did not end with the initial
changes in law to the Community’s status and its property title, such as for example through the
expropriation of Pampa Larga. Rather, the Community asserted that the violations of the rights in
question, the right to property, the right to recognition, the right to consultation and consent, and
the right to equitable compensation and an equitable share of the benefits of resource development,
should all be characterized as the product of continuous actions and omissions. However, given
the absence already noted of decided constitutional cases in Peru with facts comparable to those of
the Negritos case, it is not surprising that there is a similar absence of guidance in the case law with
regard to how limitation period exceptions should be interpreted in the context of Campesino
constitutional rights claims. As a result, in order to support the argument that the rights violations
in the Negritos claim are continuous, the Community’s legal team sought analogies with continuous
actions and omission in other contexts already recognized by Peru’s Constitutional Court.
The Negritos submissions developed two main analogies with established case law
interpreting the meaning of continuous actions and omissions. The first related to the allegations
in the Negritos claim that the state and company had violated the Community’s right to equitable
compensation for the loss of its property interest and the right to benefit equitably from mining
activity on its land. The amparo claim argued that these violations were generated by the
company’s continual failure to transfer compensation and benefits and by the state’s failure to
ensure that these rights are respected. In developing this argument, the Negritos action put forward
the view that the deprivation of one’s right to a constitutionally protected economic entitlement is
an ongoing violation of that right. To support this assertion, it drew upon the fact that Peru’s
Constitutional Court had upheld this principle in a series of pension benefits cases, where the court
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found that the failure to provide these benefits constituted an ongoing violation of the claimants’
rights.132
The second analogy drew on the allegations in the Negritos case that any purported consent
or consultation was invalid because the Community lacked the information necessary to make a
free and informed decision with regard to changes made to its status and property title. The
Community’s amparo action argued that this deficiency constituted a failure (omission) on the part
of the state and the company to provide appropriate information. In making this argument, it drew
on Peruvian jurisprudence that accepts that a lack of access to adequate information is an ongoing
omission that exempts a claimant from the limitation period requirement.133
Moving beyond these doctrinal analogies, the Negritos amparo claim extended the concept
of ongoing violations and omissions to the case’s core rights issues of Campesino communal
property title and status. Referring to Yanacocha’s alleged illegal acquisitions of the Community’s
property for its mining operations, the Negritos claim asserted that the physical act of Yanacocha’s
occupation is an ongoing action, thereby constituting a continuing violation of the Community’s
communal property rights. With regard to the state’s purported elimination of the Negritos
Community’s legal status, the amparo claim asserted that the failure of the state to fulfill its duty
to recognize the Negritos Campesino Community as such is an ongoing omission. On the facts of
the Negritos case, this omission has become an active violation of the Community’s right to
recognition due to the state’s consistent rejection of the Community’s requests for recognition.134
Moreover, this sustained refusal to recognize the Community has made it vulnerable to new and
ongoing impacts on its rights. Part 2 of this paper described how Yanacocha and other third parties
have taken advantage of the Community’s uncertain legal status. It recounted how in one instance,
when non-community members invaded tracts of land which were formally communally titled, the
Community’s efforts to confront these invaders and obtain protection from the police were
frustrated in part by the state’s continued denial of the Community’s very existence.
The Negritos legal team ultimately made a strategic decision to invoke the “ongoing
actions” and “omissions” exceptions to the limitation period, rather than focusing its limitations
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argument on the conditions of knowledge and capacity referred to within the rule itself. In doing
so, it appealed to doctrine, as described in this section, rather than the equitable arguments put
forward in the previous section. There were two reasons for this. First, the team calculated that
the courts would be more likely to accept arguments based on analogies with established doctrine
than arguments rooted in a social analysis of the inequities that inform the dynamics of
dispossession. Second, even if successful in the Negritos case, going forward, arguments regarding
any given community’s knowledge and ability at the time of dispossession would need to be proven
on a case by case basis, thereby maintaining procedural and evidentiary obstacles for other
communities in a similar situation. In contrast, if the Negritos Community were successful with a
doctrinal argument that constructs relations of dispossession in terms of ongoing actions and
omissions, this could potentially be useful to communities facing similar hurdles at the limitation
period stage.
The viability of any doctrinal argument depends considerably on the willingness of the
Court to accept the proposed construction of law. At the admissibility stage of the Negritos case,
this refers to the proposed construction of the alleged rights violations as ongoing actions and
omissions.

Arguably, the distinction between rights violating actions that have ceased, are

continuous or qualify as omissions, is not self-evident, but rather can only be resolved by making
analytical choices. As with any application of law to fact, and particularly when adjudicating rights
claims, there is often more than one reasonable construction and the ultimate path chosen will be
informed by the courts’ underlying political and social values.135
Ultimately then, the outcome in the Negritos case would depend on the importance, in the
eyes of Peruvian courts, of making the amparo cause of action accessible to Communities whose
dispossession has occurred over time and under conditions of gross inequality. Absent such a
willingness, the limitation period requirement stands to perpetuate the factors of inequity and risks
creating an absolute bar to any Campesino justice claim that is not brought within sixty days of the
first occurrence of rights violating acts. As argued above, the very circumstances that inform rights
violations in contexts like the Negritos case often serve to prevent Communities from presenting
their claims to the courts within such a narrow timeframe. With all of this in the background, the
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next section will critically examine the Peruvian courts’ responses to the Negritos amparo to date,
with particular attention to their treatment of the limitation period issue.
3.4. San Andres de Negritos Campesino Community v Yanacocha Mine
This section is divided into three parts. The first recounts the Negritos Community’s experience
in the courtroom to date litigating its constitutional claim against Yanacocha Mine and the Peruvian
State. The second offers a critical analysis of this experience. The third describes some of the
challenges that the Community has faced outside of the courtroom.
a. The Litigation
The Negritos legal team filed the Community’s amparo claim in civil court in the regional capital
city of Cajamarca, Peru in March 2011. In its response submissions, Yanacocha made four
objections to the admissibility of the claim. It argued that the Community did not have the legal
capacity to present an amparo claim because it did not have legal personhood, meaning it did not
exist in law. Adding to this, the company argued that the Community could not claim property
rights violations because it was not a property titleholder. It further asserted that the Community
had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that the claim was outside the limitation
period.136
Yanacocha and the Community’s lawyers made a series of written and oral submissions
with regard to these objections over the course of nearly six months before the proceedings ran into
procedural delays. Three distinct procedural disputes emerged and each was only resolved on
appeal, leading to considerable delays as the case was transferred back and forth between two levels
of court each time. Confusion over the proper service of documents and the timeliness of the
Ministry of Energy and Mining’s written submissions caused the first procedural delay. This issue
arose in part because the Ministry’s response to the Negritos claim was filed outside of the
timeframe required in the Procedural Code. The Ministry had also failed to specify an address in
the regional capital city of Cajamarca for the service of documents, instead insisting on service at
its headquarters in the national capital city of Lima. The service issue was significant for the
136
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Community given that its pro bono lawyer at the time was located in the city of Cajamarca and
without a budget for executing service in the nation’s capital, hundreds of kilometers away.
In the final weeks of 2012, an appeal court resolved the matter, ordering the Ministry to
accept service at its regional office.137 Although the Ministry remains a named defendant and
continues to be served with documents in the proceedings, it has declined to make a single
submission to the courts on any of the substantive or admissibility issues raised by the other two
parties. In light of all this, it seems fair to describe the Ministry’s role in the proceedings as one of
indifference, at the very least, and less charitably, perhaps even incompetence. Without a doubt,
the Ministry’s errors added to the delays in the process and created further challenges for the
Community.
The second procedural issue arose when Yanacocha challenged a resolution of the court of
first instance allowing the Community to make audio recordings of oral submissions at hearings.
Yanacocha argued that such recordings would violate its lawyers’ rights to free expression and to
preserve their “image and good reputations”. The finagling over this issue continued (in parallel
to other issues) for nearly two years until an appeal court sided with the Community in 2013 and
awarded it the right to make the recordings requested.138 In spite of this win, on the day of the
hearing, the presiding judge nonetheless failed to ensure that the courtroom was furnished with the
necessary audio video equipment. Community members were forced to record what they could
with their cellular phones.
The third issue arose in 2013 when a Canadian NGO, the Justice and Corporate
Accountability Project (JCAP), sought permission to participate in the Negritos amparo
proceedings as an intervenor in order to make written submissions to the court on points of law
(known in Peru as an amicus curiae). Yanacocha argued that the court should refuse to grant JCAP
amicus status. The company asserted that JCAP was not objective or impartial and that, in any
case, in the company’s view the subject matter of the litigation did not raise any public interest
issues that would merit intervener participation. This issue was temporarily addressed on appeal,
when the court decided that JCAP’s amicus request would be determined together with the issue
of the admissibility of the amparo action itself. This resolution of the issue meant that JCAP’s
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amicus, which included substantial analysis of admissibility-related issues, was not part of the
record before the court when it determined the admissibility of the amparo.
These three procedural disputes created additional obstacles and distractions from the
threshold issue of the Negritos amparo’s admissibility in light of Yanacocha’s objections. In June
2014, more than three years after the amparo claim was first filed, the local court of first instance
finally issued a decision, declaring the Community’s claim inadmissible. It reached this conclusion
by finding in favor of two of Yanacocha’s four objections.139 It agreed with Yanacocha that the
Community did not have the legal status to present its claim (it did not exist in law) and that its
claim was beyond the limitation period. In coming to this latter conclusion, the court relied on the
principle that, absent evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that both natural and legal
persons have knowledge of the records contained in the Public Registry. 140 This refers to the
official repository of documentation where the changes to the Negritos Community’s property title
and legal status were registered.

In its judgement, the lower court failed to address the

Community’s doctrinal arguments that the codified exception to the limitation period should apply
on the basis that the alleged violations are ongoing actions and omissions.
The Negritos Community appealed this lower court decision to Cajamarca’s regional appeal
court for civil matters and the appeal court issued its decision in May 2015.141 It rejected three of
Yanacocha’s four objections, overturning the lower court’s conclusion that the Community did not
have the legal status to present its claim. However, it agreed with the lower court’s conclusion that
the claim was outside of the limitation period. On this basis, the appeal court upheld the lower
court decision to rule the Negritos amparo claim inadmissible. At the same time, it denied JCAP’s
request to act as an amicus curiae in the proceedings. The Community sought and received leave
to challenge the appeal court’s decision before Peru’s Constitutional Court. The Community
continues to wait for a hearing date, knowing that delays are notorious due to a heavy backlog of
cases at the highest Court. The legal questions that frame the Negritos Community’s appeal to the
Constitutional Court will be addressed in the final section of this paper.
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a. Critical Analysis of the Appeal Court Decision
There are at least two important observations to make of the Negritos Community’s
experience in the courtroom to date litigating against Yanacocha and the Peruvian state. The first,
and most obvious, relates to process, and the second, and more complex, addresses the appeal
court’s admissibility analysis of the Negritos claim. A final point of analysis focuses on the appeal
court’s treatment of JCAP’s amicus curiae request.
Turning to issues of process, the proceedings notably suffered from significant procedural
delays. This is evident from the fact that it took more than four years for the Community to receive
an admissibility decision from Cajamarca’s appeal court and the Community continues to wait for
a hearing before the Constitutional Court. Much of this delay was caused by procedural issues
triggered by either the company or the Ministry of Energy and Mining. This ranged from the
Ministry’s failure to properly participate in the proceedings to Yanacocha’s objections to increased
transparency and public participation in connection to the Community’s attempt to film the
proceedings and JCAP’s request to submit an amicus. Undoubtedly, a four-year court battle on
the threshold issue of admissibility took a toll on the Negritos Community, especially where it
spent much of that time fighting to make the proceedings more transparent and open to public
participation.
A second observation arises from a concerning set of developments at the core of the court’s
treatment of the limitation period issue. Yanacocha has challenged the claim’s admissibility by
adopting a strategy of conflating the substantive legal issues in the case with admissibility
questions. Critical analysis of this strategy reveals that it is predicated on a formalistic concept of
consent and an abstract universalizing construction of the legal subject. These two approaches to
consent and subjectivity have infiltrated the court’s admissibility analysis in the form of formalist
assumptions that have the effect of decontextualizing the Community’s dispossession claim,
rending its experience invisible or irrelevant, and ultimately excluding its justice claims from the
courts. This section will examine how this has occurred.
As stated, in its objections to the Negritos claim’s admissibility, Yanacocha took the
position that the Community does not exist and does not have a property right to defend. Both
assertions rely on a common sense formal notion of consent to the legal events that lead to the
elimination of the community’s legal status and property title. They ask the court to presume that
the signature of some community members on the relevant documents is a full and sufficient
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answer to the Negritos claim. This ignores the fact that the question of free and informed consent
to these legal events is precisely at the heart of the case. It is problematic to implicitly presume
informed consent at a preliminary stage when the alleged absence of informed consent is central to
the substantive issues in the case.
Although the appeal court’s admissibility decision rejected these two objections, it accepted
another of Yanacocha’s objections, namely that the Community’s claim is barred because it is
outside of the limitation period. Crucially, the limitation period objection depends on the same
problematic formalist notion of consent and knowledge. The reasoning of the appeal court on this
point is revealing. The court began its discussion of the limitation period objection by emphasizing
that constitutional rights are not absolute and must be balanced with other objectives, presumably
referring to the objective of legal certainty generally associated with limitation period rules.142 It
rejected the theory of continuous rights violations and omissions, instead taking the position that
any alleged rights violations would have concluded with the finalization of the legal transactions
in question, referring to the transfer of property interests from the Community to the company.
The court seems to have relied on “common sense” reasoning to support this conclusion, as it did
not point to any supporting case law, nor did it directly address the Community’s submissions on
point.
In reaching these conclusions, the appeal court explicitly assumed that these legal processes
occurred with the consent of the Community. The court stated that as soon as these property
transfers occurred, the Community is presumed to have had the ability to act in defense of its own
rights. 143 It reasoned that the Community cannot argue that it did not have the technical or
economic capacity to do so given that it had previously registered itself as a Campesino
Community, therefore interacting with the Public Registry. The court concluded that any argument
that the Community leaders who signed the property transfer documents were corrupt is
unsupported and merely serves as a convenient reason for bringing a claim after the expiry of the
limitation period. The court further observed that it would be impossible for the Community not
to know that there was a mine operating in its midst on the basis of these property transfers.
The appeal court’s reasoning on the limitation period issue made dramatic presumptions
about the Negritos Community’s knowledge and consent, without acknowledging that these issues
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are directly related to the Community’s substantive arguments on the merits of the case. In doing
so, the court avoided the need to consider documentation suggesting misrepresentation, corruption,
fraud and extortion. It failed to consider alternative approaches to the limitation period and
Peruvian and international jurisprudence elaborating on the right to remedy and the meaning of
informed consent and consultation.

Further, it ignored the social context of the Negritos

Community, its poverty, isolation, limited literacy, lack of legal knowledge, and lack of access to
competent lawyers capable of taking on a case against the most powerful foreign company in Peru.
Rather, the appeal court implicitly held the Negritos Community to a standard that would
require it to engage with Yanacocha as though it were also a legally sophisticated, knowledgeable
and resourced actor. The court conflated the obvious fact of the Community’s knowledge of the
physical existence of the Mine, with knowledge of its legal rights, alleged violations and available
causes of action. It presumed that since the Mine’s presence is based on official documents and
publically registered title, then the Community should have had knowledge of these documents and
of its legal rights and remedies in this respect. In this way, the court measured the Community’s
conduct against the standard of an ideal subject, with qualities that do not reflect the Community’s
actual social experience. To the extent that the Community cannot meet this standard due to its
social disadvantage, the appeal court’s approach is exclusionary and discriminatory.

This

reasoning effectively transforms the limitation period rule into an absolute bar to the pursuit of
justice through law for the Negritos Community and communities like it.
The appeal court’s reasoning leaves unanswered the question of what kind of information
and consultative community processes would be required for the Negritos Community to make a
free and informed collective choice, in the early 1990s, to transfer large portions of its communal
land to one of the largest and most powerful mining companies in the world, in order to build one
of the largest and most profitable gold mines in the world, such that its members would live with
this mammoth open pit mine as their neighbor for decades and generations to come. In this context,
and putting aside questions of allegedly illegal acts in procuring signatures, it does not seem
reasonable to presume that the Community made a free and informed choice to extinguish all of its
rights and its very existence in law in exchange for a few thousand dollars. This is highlighted by
the apparent contradiction between the Community purported agreement to annul its legal existence
and the fact that it continued with its communal economic, cultural and governance practices as
before. Given the high indicators of poverty among Campesino Communities in the region,

71

combined with limited to no access to basic education, much less legal advice, it seems unlikely
that the Community had meaningful knowledge in the early 1990s that it had collective rights
protected in Peruvian constitutional and international law. This all casts in serious doubt the appeal
court’s conclusion that the Community had the capacity to marshal the knowledge and the
resources necessary to bring its case to court within sixty days (the limitation period) following the
events in question.
When the appeal court rejected the community’s doctrinal arguments with respect to the
application of the codified exceptions of continuous actions and omissions, it appeared to do so
offhandedly, and not on the basis of doctrinal reasoning. Rather, it chose to rest its decision on
presumptions about the Community’s consent and knowledge. In choosing to go down this path,
it was incumbent on the court to consider a contextualized equitable approach to the limitation
period as well as the case law on Indigenous knowledge and consent in an effort. These sources
would have certainly complicated the formalist notion of consent and knowledge that the appeal
court ultimately adopted. It is discriminatory for the court to adopt an interpretation of the
limitation period rule and presumptions about the Community’s consent and knowledge that do not
take the Negritos Community social context of historical disadvantage into account.
In the final portion of its decision, the appeal court rejected JCAP’s amicus curiae,
presented earlier in the proceedings. The controversy regarding the admission of the JCAP amicus
arose due to some uncertainty in the law on this area. As a starting point, the regulations of the
Constitutional Court give it the discretion to directly invite a third-party to act as an amicus
curiae.144 However, according to some legal experts, the right to proactively request amicus curiae
status (without an invitation from the court) is rooted in Peru’s constitutional provisions
establishing the right to make legal submission to public authorities, the right to publicize legal
proceedings and the right to participate in the political life of the nation.145 In practice, it has
become increasingly common practice for Peru’s Constitutional Court, as well as lower courts, to
accept amici curiae from third parties without previous invitation from the court, although there
are some notable (and arguably politicized) exceptions.
144
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participation of amici curiae in public interest cases in Latin America is widely seen as part of a
trend toward greater democratization and transparency in legal debate and judicial decision making
that takes into account the broader public and social impacts of individual cases. 147 The InterAmerican Court has emphasized the importance of amici curiae because of their capacity to
represent relevant public interests and contribute to debate in cases with broad social consequences
that require greater public and democratic deliberation. 148 Peru’s Constitutional Court has
reiterated this perspective in a number of cases.149
The court of appeal in the Negritos case ultimately concluded that the JCAP amicus was
inadmissible because the court had not directly requested it from the NGO. As such, it adopted a
conservative interpretation of the law on point, converting the court’s discretion to solicit an amicus
into a strict rule that an amicus is only admissible if it is solicited. In doing so, the appeal court
ignored the public interest purposes of the amicus. However, the court went further, reasoning that
the fact that the amicus’ authors had presented it on their own initiative made it evident that they
were not impartial and objective. The court then went on to say that JCAP’s interest in the case
reveals that the case itself is a product of third-party NGO interests, aimed at generating instability
in the country by taking advantage of a difficult social context on mining issues.150
As such, the appeal court’s reasoning and conclusion in relation to the amicus appears to
be based on ideological rather than legal considerations. It does not offer any support for its
statement that JCAP aims to cause social instability in the country. This conclusion appears to be
based on unfounded assumptions and a suspicious view of the Negritos Community’s decision to
resort to the courts with the help of civil society actors. The court’s comments with respect to
JCAP’s amicus are consistent with a conservative strand of thinking in some circles in Peru that
delegitimizes, and in some cases, even dehumanizes and criminalizes, Campesino Communities
and NGOs for their concerns and critiques of resource extraction in the country.151 In doing so, the
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appeal court ignored accepted practice and relevant jurisprudence with regard to the public policy
and democratic function of an amicus curiae in human rights cases.
The forgoing analysis of the appeal court’s comments on the JCAP amicus, taken together
with the reasoning in its admissibility decision and the procedural delays in the Negritos legal
proceedings to date, paint a bleak access to justice scenario for Campesino Communities in Peru.
First, the appeal court was willing to ignore evidence, jurisprudence and social context in order to
rule the Negritos claim inadmissible on the basis of a formalist and exclusionary notion of consent
and knowledge. It implicitly evaluated the Community’s conduct against the standard of a legally
sophisticated and resourced subject, thereby turning the limitation period rule into an absolute bar
to justice for Campesino Communities in a position similar to that of the Negritos Community.
This obstacle was augmented in the proceedings themselves when both the company and the
Ministry generated delays on procedural matters. Ultimately, this has forced the Community to
somehow marshal the resilience and the resources to advocate in a process that has continued for
nearly six years and counting.
Finally, the appeal court’s reasoning on the admissibility of the amicus seals the
Community’s fate. To the extent that the Community receives support from civil society actors,
include foreign lawyers, the court presumes that the claim is illegitimate and animated by nefarious
goals, as opposed to a bona fide concern to defend the rights in question. Following the logic of
the appeal court, not only must the Community have the ability to mount its legal case extremely
quickly, with full knowledge of the law, it must do so without the support of civil society
organizations, lest its intentions be called into question. This paper’s conclusion will explore the
wider implications of the Peruvian courts’ treatment to date of the Negritos claim.
b. Challenges outside the Courtroom
The previous sections recounted the challenges that the Negritos Community faced inside
of the courtroom over the course of its litigation journey. This captures only one dimension of the
of “the dog in the manger”, to refer to Indigenous and Campesino communities who oppose resource extraction on
their land, thereby creating obstacles to national prosperity for all. He accused them of being irrationally attached to
a way of life that only traps them in poverty and prevents progress. This discourse is used to justify militarized
responses to opposition and protest. For commentary see: Moore, supra note 4 at 12-3; Roger Merino Acuna, “The
politics of extractive governance: Indigenous peoples and socio-environmental conflicts” (2015) 2 The Extractive
Industries and Society 85; Kamphuis, “Foreign mining”, supra note 19 at 135; Anthony Bebbington & Denise
Humphreys Bebbington, “Actores y ambientalismos: Continuidades y cambios en los conflictos socio-ambientales en
el Perú” (2009) 35 Iconos 117.
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complex set of economic, political, cultural and social challenges that Campesino and Indigenous
communities face when they choose to engage with state law against a powerful foreign company.
This section will profile some of the additional challenges that the Community faced in relation to
its litigation efforts. Just as Part 2 of this paper contextualized the Negritos Community’s
dispossession story, this section sketches some of the social context details that have characterized
the Community’s litigation experience to date.
The Negritos Community litigated its case in a broader social context where the corruption
of public officials in Peru is an ongoing concern. Unfortunately, it seems that corruption concerns
and allegations continue to maintain close proximity to both Yanacocha and the Negritos case. The
lower court decision in the Negritos amparo action in favor of Yanacocha’s admissibility
objections was issued by a judge of the Superior Court of Cajamarca by the name of Guhtember
Pacherres Pérez. This is the same judge who neglected to duly organize audio recordings of certain
hearings. Throughout the proceedings, the Negritos Community members and their local lawyer
strongly suspected that Justice Pacherres Pérez was not an ethical judge and they believed that he
was intentionally delaying the proceedings. It appears that they may have had good reason to
suspect as much. Coincidentally, the day after Justice Parcherres Perez issued his decision
dismissing the Negritos’ amparo claim, he was filmed accepting a bribe in another case and was
subsequently arrested, tried, and sentenced to a nine-month prison term.152 He admitted his guilt,
and the evidence revealed that he had solicited the bribe on July 11, 2014, just days before he issued
his admissibility decision in the Negritos case.
The Negritos Community has no direct evidence that Justice Pacherres Perez accepted
bribes from Yanacocha in relation to the Negritos amparo proceedings. There is no doubt though
that this lower court judge was engaged in acts of corruption while he presided over the Negritos
proceedings. The uncertainty about whether or not corruption has influenced outcomes to date in
the Negritos case is heightened by the grim reminder of the high-profile corruption allegations that
plagued the decision of the Supreme Court of Peru in favor of Newmont in Yanacocha’s early
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days. 153 Moreover, just a few months before the Pacherres Pérez corruption scandal broke,
Yanacocha was implicated in yet another high-profile corruption story. In May 2014, Peruvian
journalists reported on a leaked audio recording of conversations that took place in 2012 between
Yanacocha’s governmental affairs manager and three elected public officials in Cajamarca. In the
recordings, the public officials requested a financial contribution from the company in return for
their support of its controversial mine expansion project, known as Minas Conga. In response,
Yanacocha’s manger promised to raise the issue of “economic support” with senior management.
Following the publication of these recordings, Yanacocha promised to investigate and reiterated
its commitment to transparency.154
There can be little doubt that the challenges associated with litigating a case like that of the
Negritos Community’s has taken a personal toll on the Community and its allies. In 2014, the local
NGO that had been providing legal representation for the Negritos Community since 2007
withdrew from the case without an official explanation. As a result, for much of the litigation
process, the Community was represented by a young local lawyer, working pro bono, with the
distant help of a volunteer group of students and lawyers in Lima, Peru and in Canada. Just like
the mine that sits on its land, the Negritos Community’s case is mammoth, involving hundreds of
pages of documents and complex arguments of fact and law. Dispossession cases are often
complicated by nature, making them difficult to for NGO workers and pro bono lawyers to sustain.
The logistical, social and human conditions of the Negritos Community itself has added to
these challenges. This paper has already referred to the Community’s relatively low levels of
education and continued high levels of poverty and exclusion from basic services. Community
members live high up in the mountains, making communication very difficult with limited
telephone access or electricity. In order to meet with Community members, lawyers must wait for
regularly scheduled monthly General Assembly meetings.

Community members walk long

distances to attend meetings and it is often difficult for lawyers to find and pay for transportation
for the trip up into the mountains. Meetings take place in the open air, sitting under the hot Andean
sun. Community leaders and members come to nearby Cajamarca only periodically and can
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sometimes be hard to locate with inconsistent access to a telephone. The Community’s isolation,
lack of resources and logistical challenges are just some of the obstacles that have made it difficult
for Community members and pro bono lawyers alike to engage in a court process against a
powerful company over a period of years.
These observations offer only a very partial picture of the social context that framed the
Negritos Community members’ experiences of the legal arguments, procedures and decisions
taking place in the courtroom. Importantly, the documentary record does not capture the social
and cultural impact of the case on the Negritos Community itself. Whenever a community decides
to bring its justice concerns to the dominant legal system, it will undoubtedly face stresses and
strains on community relationships and political leadership. 155 Litigation inevitably triggers a
complex array of internal and external pressures that may create or exacerbate divisions within the
Community. Community members and leaders may come under enormous pressure to drop or
settle the case, sometimes they are offered bribes, sometimes they are threatened and sometimes
they are actually harmed.156 It is well documented that Yanacocha’s operations are increasingly
militarized with may reported incidences of its security services threatening, harming or surveilling
the company’s critics.157 Further in-depth fieldwork is required to fully document the Negritos
Community’s social experience with respect to the litigation to date and as it continues to unfold.
In sum, the Negritos Community has faced multiple challenges in its efforts to use the
domestic Peruvian legal system to advance communal property claims grounded in international
human rights law and the Constitution. Outside of the courtroom, these challenges have included
the risk of corruption and bias in the local judiciary and a lack of access to trained and funded legal
counsel. Inside the courtroom, the Community faces the formalist application of procedural rules
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to justify the dismissal of its case on the basis of a concept of consent and subjectivity that is
arguably discriminatory.

This live legal issue is the focus of the Negritos Community’s current

appeal to Peru’s highest court.
3.5 Negritos Case Next Steps: Precedents & Remedies
As stated, the Negritos Community has appealed the dismissal of its amparo action to
Peru’s Constitutional Court. In Peruvian constitutional law, this type of appeal is called a recurso
de agravio. The Constitutional Procedural Code grants an amparo claimant a general procedural
right to appeal a negative decision of a court of second instance to Peru’s highest court.158 Thus,
according to the Code, the Peruvian Constitutional Court is required to consider all recurso de
agravio petitions if they are presented according to the specified rules.
However, recent developments in Peruvian constitutional jurisprudence have expanded the
grounds upon which the Constitutional Court may refuse to grant a full hearing to such an applicant.
In 2014, the Court issued the Vásquez Romero precedent, which established a special expedited
procedure for dismissing recurso de agravio claims in certain situations.159 The decision identifies
a list of deficiencies that could, alone or in combination, form the basis for the Court’s decision to
summarily dismiss the case: the alleged violations are manifestly unsubstantiated; the question of
law at issue does not have “special constitutional importance”; the claim relies on law that clearly
contradicts an established precedent of the Court; and finally, cases with substantially similar legal
issues have been unsuccessful.160 Referring to the criterion of “special constitutional importance”,
the Vásquez Romero decision states that this threshold is met when a case requires the court to
consider the content or scope of a fundamental right, when the alleged violations affect the
constitutionally protected aspects of the rights in question, or when the issues at stake require
especially urgent rights protection. 161 Commentators have observed that the Vásquez Romero
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criteria are highly subjective and they speculate that the Constitutional Court will likely be forced
to provide further precision on their meaning in subsequent decisions. 162
Importantly, the Court’s inquiry into the “constitutional importance” of the case is
expeditious, in that the Court makes this assessment without an in-depth review of the proceedings.
Rather, the claimant must make a written submission to the court addressing the issue of
constitutional importance. This is a function of the fact that the Vásquez Romero criteria were
introduced, at least in part, to help reduce the unmanageable case load that the Constitutional Court
faces. In 2013, the Court had an accumulated load of over six thousand and six hundred cases
pending.163 This situation obviously impedes the Court’s ability to attend to urgent and important
cases in a timely manner.
Given the centrality of the “constitutional importance” criteria, the remainder of this section
will describe the legal significance of the Negritos case in the context of the ongoing tension in
Peru between neoliberal reforms and Indigenous rights. If the Constitutional Court agrees to
consider the case on the merits, it would have the opportunity to develop jurisprudence in three
distinct aspects of Indigenous and Campesino rights law with respect to resource extraction. First,
admitting the case would give the Court the opportunity to clarify the status of Peru’s Campesino
Communities vis-à-vis the incorporation of international Indigenous rights norms into Peru’s
constitutional order. Second, the substantive arguments in the case address matters relating to the
nature of Campesino constitutional rights, including norms governing: the conversion of communal
property into individual property; the legal recognition of Campesino communities; the
expropriation of Campesino communal property, and meaning of fair and equitable compensation.
Finally, if successful on the merits, the case would give the Constitutional Court the opportunity to
explore law’s capacity to remedy dispossession claims.
Due to its focus on the ongoing Negritos amparo litigation, this section of the paper frames
the important questions and arguments advanced in the case in terms of their potential contribution
to Peruvian law. However, many of the issues in the Negritos case are arguably a microcosm of
the tensions between Indigenous communities around the world and the globalized model of
foreign resource extraction. As such, the discussion in this section, while situated in the Peruvian
context, arguably transcend the Negritos case. Controversy over the foreign resource extraction
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model are very often about the legal status of rights holders, the meaning of consent, the terms of
property ownership, transfer and compensation, the tension between private and public law, as well
as the nature of available legal remedies. At the same time, exploring these themes in a discrete
case study is helpful because it illuminates law’s potential and limitations as a tool for responding
to the underlying justice concerns that the Negritos case represents. I will take this topic up again
in this paper’s conclusion.
a.

The Indigenous Status of Campesino Communities in International Law
Part 2 of this paper described briefly how in the 1920 and 1933 Peruvian Constitutions,

“Indigenous Communities” were given special status and rights. The 1969 Agrarian Reform Law
changed this terminology when it declared that from that moment forward, the Indigenous
Communities of Peru would be denominated “Campesino Communities”.164 The Peruvian state
subsequently developed an elaborate statutory regime pertaining to Campesino Communities and
in the 1979 and 1993 Constitutions they were granted special status and rights. In each of these
Constitutions, the term “Campesino Community” was used together with “Native Community” in
reference to the same set of cultural, political, and property rights. Specific legislation clarifies
that Campesino Communities are those located in the Andes while Native Communities are found
in the Amazon region of Peru.
Part 2 also referred to the fact that at the international level, Indigenous peoples began to
make significant gains beginning in the early 1990s. In 1989 the ILO revised its earlier 1957
Convention165 to approve Convention No 169, which remains the only binding international treaty
on the subject of Indigenous peoples’ rights. In 2001 the Inter-American Court pronounced in its
first Indigenous land rights case, interpreting existing provisions of the 1969 American Convention
to include an Indigenous right to communal property.166 Finally, in 2007, the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was broadly endorsed by the international
community. Part 3 of this paper described the legal significance of these international law
developments in Peru. Peru’s Constitutional Court has held that it is bound by the jurisprudence
of the Inter-American Court, including its interpretations of Indigenous rights, while Convention

164

Agrarian Reform Law, supra note 25 at art 115.
Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, International Labour Organization, Convention No 169, (1957).
166
Awas Tingni, supra note 71.
165

80

No 169 is similarly part of Peruvian Constitutional law, acquiring constitutional status after it was
approved by Peru’s Congress in 1993.
This brief recap reveals that a curious situation has arisen in Peruvian law. While relatively
recent international statements of Indigenous rights have been incorporated into Peruvian
Constitutional law, the category of “Indigenous Communities” disappeared from the 1979
Constitution in favour of the terms Campesino and Native Communities. Thus, while international
and domestic law have converged in Peruvian constitutional law, the legal categories employed in
these two spheres have diverged. In this context, the status of Peru’s Campesino Communities visà-vis international law has become an important question. In other words, do the rights of
Indigenous peoples, as incorporated into the Peruvian Constitution through various international
instruments, apply to Campesino Communities? This question is pressing. There are over 5000
Campesino Communities in Peru and a significant portion of mining activity affects land belonging
to these Communities.167
Human rights institutions, both inside of Peru and internationally, have consistently treated
Campesino Communities, either implicitly or explicitly, as Indigenous for the purposes of the
application of the Peruvian Constitution and international law.168 Certain domestic statutes have
also treated Campesino Communities and Indigenous peoples as a single grouping for the purposes
of describing their rights. 169 However, the Peruvian State’s official position on this issue is
inconsistent at best and it has tended to deny that Campesino Communities have Indigenous rights.
In 2009 the Peruvian State informed the ILO Expert Committee that it intended to treat Campesino
Communities as collectivities similar to Indigenous Peoples in the recognition of their ethnic and
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cultural rights. 170 Yet in a 2011 decision, the Constitutional Court took note of the Peruvian
government’s submissions that Convention No 169 does not apply because Peru has very few
Indigenous peoples and Campesino and Native Communities are fundamentally mestizo or
‘mixed’.171
Also in 2011, the Peruvian state legislated a controversial set of objective and subjective
criteria for the recognition of Indigenous peoples, including that they must be “direct descendants”
of the country’s “original inhabitants” and that they must self-identify as Indigenous. 172 This
definition directly contradicts statements of the ILO Expert Committee on the application of
Convention No 169 in Peru.173 The Committee has clearly stated that if Campesino Communities
fulfill the requirements of the Convention, they should receive the full protection of its provisions.
Notably the language of the Convention is significantly broader than the concepts of “direct
descendant” of “original inhabitants”.174 Moreover, the ILO has stated that the use of the term
“Indigenous” by a community in the Peruvian context is not a requirement and its absence should
not be used to preclude the application of the Convention. 175 In spite of this, in 2012, Peru’s
Ministry of Culture adopted an even more restrictive definition to the effect that, in order to be
registered in the Official Indigenous Peoples’ Database, communities must speak an Indigenous
language and remain in their ancestral territory.176 Local lawyers have documented instances
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where the Ministry of Energy and Mining has used this restrictive definition to avoid consulting
with Campesino Communities impacted by proposed mining projects.177
In spite of the controversy and importance of this issue, Peru’s Constitutional Court has
declined to offer any meaningful guidance in its decisions to date. It has referenced the issue only
once by way of comments that were tangential to its ultimate decision. On this occasion, the Court
stated that the Indigenous status of Campesino Communities for the purposes of the application of
Convention No 169 in Peru must be considered on a case-by-case basis.178 Unfortunately, the Court
refrained from offering any additional guidance regarding this form of individualized
consideration.
Taken together, the legislation described above and the Court’s decision ostensibly create
a situation where, prior to invoking the rights and protection of Convention No 169, each individual
Campesino Community must somehow prove its status as an Indigenous community. As a result,
Campesino Communities in Peru exist in a legal context where there is a presumption that they are
not Indigenous and where the onus is on them to prove their indigeneity. When making a legal
claim in a court, this amounts to an additional threshold evidentiary burden on Campesino
Communities who claim Indigenous rights as recognized in international law. Given that the 1969
Agrarian Reform in Peru declared that Indigenous Communities would thereafter be dominated
Campesino Communities, the Peruvian State’s contemporary approach to the legal category of
Indigenous converts this change in terminology into a presumption in favor of Campesino
Communities’ loss of Indigenous status and the concomitant reduction of their rights in
international law. Not only does this contradict the professed social justice purpose and spirit of
the Agrarian Reform Law and its implementing legislation, it converts Agrarian Reform into a
fundamentally assimilationist rights-reducing project.
In the context of the ongoing controversy in Peru over the legal definition of Indigenous
communities, the Negritos amparo claim takes the position that Campesino Communities as such
have the legal status of Indigenous communities under international law. This argument is
legalistic as opposed to anthropological. It begins with the historical progression in Peru’s
Agrarian Reform Law from the term Indigenous to Campesino. It further points to the significant
177
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conceptual similarities between international Indigenous rights regimes and the Peruvian domestic
legal regime with respect to Campesino Communities. Peruvian laws recognize Campesino
Communities’ legal personhood, their culturally specific characteristics as a group, their communal
political and economic institutions and their special relationship to a specific area of land or
territory. On this basis, the Negritos amparo claim argues that to identify oneself as part of a
Campesino Community in Peru is the equivalent, for the purposes of the application of international
law, to identifying oneself as a member of an Indigenous group.
This argument attempts to counteract the State’s assimilationist approaches by intentionally
relying on legal histories and facts available to all Campesino Communities in order to construct a
broad claim for their international status as Indigenous people. The value of this approach is that
Campesino Communities are not required to marshal complex historical anthropological evidence
before invoking international Indigenous rights statements to support their claims. This avoids the
imposition of a heavy evidentiary burden on Campesino Communities, which in practical terms
may be insurmountable. In the context of litigation, such a burden would only exacerbate the
existing procedural and practical obstacles described in the previous sections of this paper. In this
way, the Negritos amparo action has the potential to set an important precedent by advancing an
approach that would clarify some of the legal uncertainties and alleviate some of the evidentiary
burdens that presently plague Peru’s Campesino Communities who assert Indigenous rights in local
courts.
b. Substantive Rights Precedents
Previous sections of this paper described how the Negritos amparo action draws on
domestic and international law and jurisprudence to advance four substantive rights claims of
precedent setting value. Each claim speaks to an unresolved point of law in the Peruvian context
and, if accepted, would make an important contribution to the advancement of Campesino and
Indigenous rights in Peru. Beyond their legal significance, these claims have political significance
in that they confront a suite of neoliberal state policies and company practices that continue to pose
a threat to Campesino Communities’ land and legal status. While certain events in the Negritos
case occurred decades ago, they remain emblematic of the vulnerabilities and pressures that
Campesino Communities in Peru continue to face vis-à-vis legal regimes designed to promote
foreign investment at the expense of rights protection. This highlights the need for strategic

84

Campesino rights litigation like the Negritos case to push the political debate and legislative
agenda.
The first significant substantive rights claim in the Negritos action is that the communal
property of a Campesino Community cannot be alienated or converted into individual property
without the free, prior and informed consent of the majority of the Community.179 This assertion
is grounded in the 1979 Constitution and 1987 Campesino Communities General Law which
require a vote of two-thirds of the community in these circumstances. 180 Part 3 of this paper
described how international and domestic law principles imbue this provision of the Campesino
Communities General Law with constitutional significance even after it was dropped from the 1993
Constitution. International sources of law support the proposition that this vote should be free,
prior and informed, emphasizing (among other things) that information should be meaningful,
appropriate and allow for effective decision-making.181
This argument is important because of consistent efforts of the Peruvian State since the
early 1990s to introduce policies that attempt to facilitate and expedite the conversion of
communally titled property into individual property.182 The expressed goal of these policies has
often been to facilitate the disposition of (formerly) communal property to private, often foreign,
investment. While the state has repealed some of these policies due to their controversial and
allegedly unconstitutional status, this has only occurred after significant social conflict. 183 As
recently as 2015, the Peruvian government passed laws purporting to allow a small number of
Campesino Community leaders to approve mining projects without bringing the proposal to a
General Assembly, 184 thereby expediting the sale of communally owned Campesino and
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Indigenous property to private investors.185 Notably, these laws presume to legalize the very type
of process that was actually followed in the Negritos case in the early 1990s. Commentators have
denounced these 2015 laws for contravening provisions of the Campesino Communities General
Law and international law regarding consultation and consent and for interfering with
Communities’ political autonomy and rights under national and international law to establish their
own governance structures and decision-making procedures.186
In sum, the Peruvian state and the private sector have consistently pursued legal frameworks
that help expedite the commodification of communal land. This has led to policies and practices
on the ground that generate significant pressure on Campesino Communities to individually parcel
and/or sell their land to companies. In this context, the facts of the Negritos case remain extremely
relevant. Their judicial treatment would give the courts an opportunity to make a clear statement
that informed consent with the meaningful participation of the majority of Community members is
the standard in relation to the alienation of communal land.
The second substantive claim of constitutional significance in the Negritos action arises
from the state’s administrative action purporting to eliminate the Community’s legal existence.187
As a result, the Negritos amparo action offers the courts the opportunity to pronounce on
Indigenous and Campesino rights to political and legal recognition. This directly relates to the first
legal claim in the Negritos case in that the state’s efforts to eliminate communal land rights were
directly linked with its efforts to eliminate the legal personhood of the Community itself. Domestic
and international tribunals are clear that state recognition of Campesino and Indigenous
communities is declaratory and not constitutive.188 The Negritos case builds on this to argue that,
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following recognition, any change in the legal status of a Campesino Community may only take
place with the free, prior and informed consent of the majority of the Community. Given that the
recognition of the Community as such strengthens its capacity to assert rights claims in legal and
political arenas, establishing a standard of informed consent prior to any changes to the
Community’s legal personhood is a fundamental first step toward securing robust rights protection
for Campesino Communities.189
The third claim of constitutional importance in the Negritos amparo action relates to the
domestic regulatory regime that governs the expropriation of Campesino communally owned land
in favour of private mining interests. The Peruvian Constitution allows the state to expropriate
both communal and individually titled land in situations of public necessity and utility or for a
social interest, in accordance with law and with fair monetary compensation. 190 Peru’s 1992
Mining Law gives mineral concession owners the right to submit a request to the Ministry of
Mining to expropriate property for the purposes of mining activities. 191 This law does not
distinguish between individually titled and Campesino communally titled property.
The Mining Law also specifies the resulting procedures, which apply equally to all property
titleholders.192 It requires that, within fifteen days of receiving notice from the Ministry of Mining,
the titleholder must attend a “negotiation meeting” with the mineral concession holder in order to
reach an agreement regarding the expropriation. If the property owner fails to attend, the process
will continue in its absence. If the owner does attend but an agreement cannot be reached at the
meeting, the Ministry will designate an expert official to impose a final decision regarding the
process and the compensation.193 In all cases, whether the property owner agrees or not to the
expropriation, a visual inspection of the property must occur within sixty days of the meeting and
a report must be issued in the thirty days following. Upon receiving the report, the Ministry must,
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189
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within thirty days, issue a final resolution approving or not the expropriation request.194 Thus the
entire expropriation process is designed to wrap up in approximately four and half months and
property owners, including Campesino Communities, are legally entitled to only fifteen days at the
outset to participate in the process and negotiate an agreement. If they are unable to agree in this
period, the Ministry has the power to impose an agreement upon them.
The Mining Law contemplates an identical process in order to establish an easement in
favor of a concession holder over privately owned property, including Campesino property.195 The
substantive effect of the mining easement on Campesino communal land interests is tantamount to
that of an expropriation. In other words, just like the expropriation, the easement allows for the
involuntary and potentially permanent transfer of the right to use the surface of a particular piece
of land. Although an easement does not transfer title, mining easements in Peru allow for activities
that permanently and radically alter the land. For example, in the Negritos case the easement
afforded Yanacocha the open-ended right to undertake work related to mining exploration and
exploitation, broadly defined.
The expropriation of a portion of Negitos communal land known as Pampa Larga was
executed in 1993 and the establishment of a mining easement in favor of Yanacocha over another
portion of Negritos land occurred in 1995. Both processes occurred in accordance with the
procedures dictated by the Mining Law, as outlined above. The now discredited Community
leaders agreed to the expropriation and the easement at a negotiation meeting with Yanacocha,
with no further consultation with the rest of the Negritos Community and even before many key
details of the transaction were specified, including the compensation amount. As stated earlier,
there is no evidence that the Community received any information about its legal rights and the
anticipated consequences and impacts of the mining activities contemplated. Part 2 outlined the
dubious dealings that occurred in relation to both transactions and the grossly inequitable final
arrangement.
The Negritos amparo action claims that, while the expropriation and easement procedures
with respect to the Negritos Community’s land may have followed the provisions of the Mining
Law, they did not conform to the constitutional standard of free, prior and informed consultation
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with at least two thirds of Community members. 196 It is inconceivable that a Campesino
Community could participate in meaningful consultation with respect to the expropriation of its
land for the purposes of a large mining project within fifteen days and in the absence of basic
information regarding the expropriation and the project. The imposition of such a severe timeframe
effectively subverts Communities’ right to engage in decision making in accordance with their
customs and traditions and in light of their social and economic constraints.197 The Negritos action
argues that respect for the Campesino right to meaningful consultation is part of the constitutional
framework of due process and legality that constrains the state’s power to expropriate communallyheld land.198 In this respect, Peru’s Constitutional Court has stated that the right to consultation is
engaged by the expropriation of Indigenous land and that the content of that right is elevated where
the impact of the expropriation will be significant.199 For its part, the Inter-American Court has
stated that in the case of large scale projects with a significant impact on an Indigenous group’s
territory, the state must obtain their consent.200
Within the scope of the Negritos amparo action, the assertion that the expropriation and
easement in the Negritos case was unconstitutional has only indirect implications for the relevant
provisions of the Mining Law. It is not open to a court in amparo proceedings to find that the
Mining Law’s expropriation provisions are themselves unconstitutional as they apply to Campesino
land. This is due to the fact that the amparo is a cause of action against public and/or private
actions/omissions, and not legislation.201 However, in spite of these constraints, the Negritos action
marshals a claim with considerable impact. It argues that while the conduct of the state and the
company may have formally occurred in conformity with the Mining Law, this conduct is
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nevertheless unconstitutional (and therefore illegal) because did not comply with the constitutional
requirement of free, prior and informed consultation.202
Judicial treatment of the Negritos claim in this regard is pressing since the status quo in
Peru on this issue remains deeply problematic. The 1992 expropriation provisions of the Mining
Law were not modified following the 2011 Right to Consultation Law, thereby contributing to a
situation of regulatory incoherence that puts Campesino Communities’ rights at risk.203 Moreover,
recent expropriation laws that aim to support large development projects have failed to include
provisions that would protect Indigenous and Campesino land. 204 In 2015 a law regulating
expropriation more generally was modified so that it could be read to apply to Campesino and
Native Communities’ lands.205 Like the 1992 Mining Law, the 2015 general expropriation law
fails to stipulate appropriate conditions and procedures for meaningful consultation with
Campesino Communities. It also implements nearly identical expedited procedures, including the
extraordinarily limited fifteen-day window for negotiating compensation followed, failing this, by
the imposition of an agreement.206 In this context, Indigenous and Campesino communities in Peru
continue to demand that the state must, at a minimum, undertake free, prior and informed
consultation with them prior to transferring their land interests over to resource companies.207
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In sum, the legal status quo in Peru continues to be one where Campesino and Native land
are subject to expropriation laws that do not account in any way for their right to meaningful free
prior and informed consultation. In light of this reality, the questions raised in the Negritos action
are certainly constitutionally significant and require urgent judicial consideration.
The fourth contribution of the Negritos amparo action to substantive law in Peru moves
beyond the process required before expropriating Campesino Community land (consultation and
in some cases consent) to address the matter of Campesino Communities’ rights to equitable
compensation. Part 2.1 told the story of how, using the legal instruments of expropriation and
easement, Yanacocha received title and/or full access rights to a combined total of just over 1200
hectares of Negritos communally titled land in exchange for a total payment of approximately US$
48,000. The company subsequently mortgaged the expropriated property for financing loans
totaling US$ 85 million.
At a minimum, Peruvian and international law requires fair compensation where
Campesino communal land is expropriated.208 As such, the meaning of fair compensation in this
context must be explored. Clearly a meaningful process of free and informed consultation prior to
a proposed expropriation is essential to determining the terms of fair compensation. According to
the Inter-American Court, fair compensation for any limitation on Indigenous property rights in
favor of private investment includes the right to participate in the creation of a “development
plan”.209 Moreover, the state must guarantee that Indigenous communities’ reasonably benefit
from the plan.210 Peru’s Constitutional Court has similarly stated that where expropriation occurs
to facilitate resource extraction, Indigenous peoples’ right to compensation includes the right to an
equitable share in the profits and benefits211 and that a failure to ensure equitable compensation is
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actionable.212 These standards are rooted in the recognition that land has a special spiritual and
cultural significance for Campesino Communities and its loss can put their very existence as such
into jeopardy.213
Drawing on this international and domestic jurisprudence, the Negritos amparo action
argues that the expropriation and easement in favor of Yanacocha violated, not only the
Community’s right to consultation, but also its right to fair and equitable compensation. Part 2.1
of this paper recounted the Negritos Community’s continued social and economic deprivation in
the face of Yanacocha’s extraordinary profitability over more than two decades. Moreover, the
meaning of fair and equitable compensation remains pertinent in Peru. While the mining laws,
consultation law, and expropriation laws referenced throughout this section all regulate in some
regard the potential transfer of communal land interests to private companies, none of these laws
have addressed Indigenous and Campesino rights to equitable compensation.
Unfortunately, the legislative trend in Peru is to specifically curtail the concept of equitable
compensation. The most explicit example of this is the recent 2015 expropriation law. It expressly
states that property, including Campesino and Indigenous property, can only be valued in terms of
its commercial value, fixed by the value, present and future, of any existing improvements and
crops being cultivated at the time that the acquisition or the expropriation is solicited.214 This
provision has the effect of precluding any consideration of the post-expropriation profitability of
the property. Moreover, this same law specifically prohibits calculating compensation by taking
into account “non-economic” valuations, such a property’s cultural, social and spiritual
significance to its owner.215
Undoubtedly, this economic approach is a disadvantage for Peru’s Indigenous and
Campesino Communities who generally do not have large amounts of capital and who mostly use
their land for subsistence purposes. It also directly disadvantages Communities if they chose not
to cultivate certain tracts of land for conservation or other reasons.

Most importantly, the
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directly prohibited a purely economic approach to compensating Indigenous peoples for limitations
or losses of property interests.216 In this context, the Negritos case stands to make an important
contribution by presenting the court with the opportunity to analyze the right to equitable benefit
in a well-documented factual matrix.
c. Legal Remedies for Dispossession
The claims made in the Negritos action ultimately require inquiry into the nature of the
remedies available in an amparo proceeding in response to a dispossession claim such as that of
the Negritos Community. The question of remedy is of major constitutional significance given the
lack of jurisprudence in this area in Peru. It critically goes to the heart of law’s potential as an
instrument of justice in these circumstances. Especially given the significance of the procedural,
substantive and practical obstacles to the Negritos claim, it is important to be clear about what is
at stake and what might be accomplished by the Community’s decision to resort to domestic courts
against the odds. In this light, questions of remedies in the context of the Negritos claim allow for
an important reflection on the possibilities and limitations that shape law’s ability to redress
Indigenous dispossession in the global economy.
In its written submissions, the Negritos Community must request action from the court
(petitorio) on the basis of the facts and allegations presented in its case. Section B.1 of this paper
explained that the remedial focus of Peru’s amparo cause of action is on the protection and
restoration of constitutional rights. As such, the Procedural Code neither mandates nor prohibits
a monetary damages award to the claimant as compensation for violations. Rather, it empowers
the Court to issue a declaration ordering the cessation of the offending action and the restoration
of the claimant to its original position prior to the violation. The amparo process is restorative in
that the objective is “to restore the enjoyment of the plaintiff’s injured right, reestablishing the
situation existing when the right was harmed, by eliminating or suspending, if necessary, the
detrimental act or fact.”217 To this end, the Court may also order the defendant to perform a positive
action in the case of proven omissions.
These are the statutory parameters that shape the nature of the remedies that the Negritos
Community may request if the Constitutional Court finds in its favor on the merits of its case.
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Within this framework, the Negritos legal team fashioned four specific remedies that attempt to
redress the injustice of the Community’s dispossession in terms that fit the scope of the court’s
remedial power in an amparo action. These proposed remedies reflect a preliminary effort to
explore the question of what might be required, practically speaking, in order to take the Negritos
Community’s justice claims and its right to remedy seriously. Given the Peruvian courts’ limited
consideration of Indigenous property rights to date, there does not appear to be any domestic case
law directly on point. As such, this discussion of remedies refers to relevant Peruvian commentary
as well as statements of international human rights bodies.
The first available remedy would be a declaration that the Ministry of Energy and Mining
and Yanacocha Mine violated the Negrtios Community’s rights (as described above) and failed to
fulfil their obligations to the Community under the Peruvian Constitution and international law.
This first step would form the basis for the second remedy, namely a declaration that the
administrative decisions that purported to eliminate or diminish the Community’s communal
property rights and legal existence are null and void. This includes the Ministry’s approval of the
expropriation and mining easement.
Building on these first two remedies, as a third step, the court could restore the Negritos
Community to its original position before the violations by declaring that it remains a legal person
and rightful property owner of the Reserve Area (Llagaden), the expropriated area (Pampa Larga)
and the area subjected to a mining easement in favor of Yanacocha. This third order could include
recognition of the Community’s right to participate in the benefits of the mining activity taking
place on its land and to be equitably indemnified for the damage it has suffered due to past
violations of it property rights and the illegal occupation of its property since the early 1990s for
the purposes of mining activity.218
Finally, to secure the ongoing protection of the Negritos Community’s rights in light of
Yanacocha’s occupation of its land, the court could add a fourth order requiring the company to
negotiate an agreement with the Community. Such an agreement would govern the terms of the
co-existence of the mining company and the Community in light of the Community’s rightful
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ownership of the land upon which the company conducts some of its key operations. 219 The court
should specify that the negotiation of this agreement must be conducted in accordance with the
principles of constitutional and international law that define the Community’s right to equitable
compensation and equitable benefit in return for the loss of its land to mining activity.
To ensure that the company commits to such negotiations, the court could impose a fine or
penalty if the company refuses to comply. 220 However, it could also take a more proactive
approach, by ordering the suspension of all mining activities that impact the Community’s property
interests until such an agreement is reached.221 A proactive approach may be important in light of
the severe nature of the rights violations and the extraordinary power imbalance between the
parties. It would incentivize Yanacocha to take its negotiations with the Community seriously and
reach an agreement, thereby protecting the Community’s right to property and equitable
compensation. Of course, if it is difficult to reach an agreement expeditiously, at the Community’s
discretion the suspension of mining operations could be lifted by way of an interim agreement
predicated on the consolidation of a longer-term agreement.
These proposed remedies are structured to acknowledge that, while the amparo is a public
law rights-protecting cause of action, some of the Negritos Community’s specific rights claims
have distributive consequences. In particular, this refers to the right to equitable compensation for
damage to its property and to an equitably share of the profits generated by resource extraction.
The legal remedies described above address this through a combination of orders that recognize
rights, restore rights and require the company to do the same, including by applying economic
pressure on the company through a suspension order.
This discussion of remedies makes apparent the fact that, in problematizing the Negritos
story of dispossession by raising rights claims rooted in constitutional and international human
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rights law, the Negritos case taps into deeper questions regarding judicial remedies for past wrongs.
More specifically, in fashioning a remedy for dispossession, courts are often forced to address a
material conflict between rights rooted in public law, due in this case to the claimant’s special
status as a Campesino Community, and rights rooted in private law, acquired here by the mining
company through the law of contract and property.222 In this context, Peruvian constitutional
experts have advocated for the principle that private law rights must give way to constitutional
rights where there is a conflict. 223 Statements from international human rights bodies have
similarly concluded that the state should suspend a company’s private rights to exploit a natural
resource where its operations have been approved and undertaken without fully respecting the
rights of affected Indigenous communities.224 Even those who argue that private rights should be
insulated from public law remedies for historic injustice nonetheless qualify their argument to those
cases where the private rights-holders are “morally innocent”, having acquired their rights many
years after the original violations. 225 Undoubtedly where the private rights-holder is also the
original rights violator, as alleged in the Negritos Community’s action against Yanacocha, this
reasoning should not apply.
4 Conclusion: Dispossession Research and Law Reform Agenda
This case study told the story of how one domestic legal system in Latin America responded
to an Indigenous dispossession claim that fundamentally challenges the legal arrangements
underpinning the operations of a large and profitable foreign-owned gold mine. In conclusion, I
will summarize the practical consequences of this study for those who seek to continue the work
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of studying and problematizing Indigenous dispossession in the global economy. This includes by
advancing rights claims in domestic and international legal fora in order to support Indigenous
communities confronted with unwanted models of resource extraction. In this section, I outline this
study’s two most significant findings, along with their potential consequences for national and
international law reform and future comparative research. The first set of findings relate to the
study and problematization of dispossession using human rights law. The second set speak to the
litigation of dispossession in domestic and international courts. I will describe each area in turn.
First, this paper demonstrates the strategic value of accumulating a critical mass of
empirically informed systematic studies of the legal processes of Indigenous dispossession in the
global economy. In the preceding pages, I relayed the story of the Negritos Community’s
dispossession and resistance, making an effort to tell this story in its larger social, legal, economic
and political context. I also analyzed this story systematically in order to describe the “dynamics
of dispossession”. While this description is rooted in the Negritos Community’s experience, it has
the potential to contribute to further comparative study and theorizing of dispossession in the global
economy. Although every Indigenous community’s dispossession story has its own specificities,
systematic and comparative studies may reveal patterns. More studies are needed of the mechanics
of how legal processes facilitate, maintain and enforce the dispossession of local communities in
the global economy and a comparative review of existing studies may be in order.226
Not only can this mode of inquiry be useful for specific communities, studies of this kind
can present a powerful challenge to the contemporary model of global resource extraction,
revealing the extent to which it is predicated on relations of dispossession. The strength of
communities’ efforts to challenge the ethics and legality of the relations that underlie global
resource extraction will depend in part on the quality of the evidence behind each dispossession
story. Uncovering (and interrogating) a company’s official claim to legality is a critical starting
point.
This paper also described how the Negritos legal team drew on constitutional and
international human rights law to develop a legal framework for problematizing the Negritos
Community’s dispossession. It depicts how the expansion of Indigenous rights principles in
international law complements existing constitutional frameworks and jurisprudence in Peru to
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create a relatively robust, and generally applicable, set of standards and rights for problematizing
dispossession and making a claim for remedy. These principles, enforceable in the jurisdiction,
include the right to communal property, the right to free, prior and informed consultation and in
some cases consent, the right to legal personhood, and the right to benefit equitably from resource
extraction activities. Most importantly from the perspective of Negritos Community members,
these principles speak to their lived experience of dispossession and they offer a language for
challenging their material loss of property and legal personhood, as well as their alleged consent
to these processes. Thus, at least at the level of principle or the rights framework itself, the Negritos
experience suggests that human rights law can be a useful frame for translating dispossession
concerns into legal and political claims.
Despite this, the state has failed to respond to the Negritos Community’s claims and the
domestic courts have become the Community’s last resort. This paper tells the story of how the
Negritos Community has attempted to give practical effect to its Campesino Community rights.
This provides an important opportunity to examine the available causes of action that might channel
dispossession claims to local (and international) courts. While much is known about the expansion
of Indigenous peoples’ substantive rights internationally, much less is known about how these
rights are operationalized in domestic legal systems. As the Negritos Community discovered,
Peru’s domestic legal system offers a single cause of action, the amparo action, for presenting a
claim to local courts alleging violations of constitutional Campesino rights and international human
rights law.
Rights are only meaningful if processes and mechanisms exist whereby communities can
advance their substantive claims before legal decision makers. In the process of litigating its case,
the Negritos Community encountered multiple hurdles in the courtroom. Among these, the
limitation period has emerged as the most significant procedural obstacle. To date, domestic courts
in the Negritos case have ignored other possible approaches to the limitation period requirement,
opting for an interpretation that would have required the Community to bring its legal claim within
sixty days of purportedly signing the documents that transferred its land to the company. I have
argued that the courts’ interpretation of the limitation period requirement in the Negritos case is
doctrinally unnecessary in that it was open to the court to conceptualize the impugned rights
violations as ongoing actions or omissions. Perhaps more importantly, I have argued that if the
court decides to draw conclusions with respect to an Indigenous claimant’s knowledge and capacity
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at the admissibility phase of a dispossession claim, it must consider these concepts in context and
in light of Indigenous rights case law. To do otherwise is problematic from an equitable perspective
because it ignores the power dynamics that characterized the processes that lead to the
Community’s dispossession. To date, the courts in the Negritos case have been unwilling to
substantively consider the factors that impacted the Community’s knowledge and capacity to bring
its claim in a timely fashion.
Rather, the courts in the Negritos case have ultimately relied (at least to date) on the same
formalist, superficial view of consent that Yanacocha put forward in its submissions. Thus, a
certain irony emerges. The Community is attempting to access the court in order to assert a rights
framework that includes the right to free and informed consultation, and in some cases, consent.
The facts of the case provide strong evidence suggesting that the signatures procured on the
documents in question fall far short of meeting the free and informed standard being developed in
international law and in Peruvian domestic law. The Community is precluded from a substantive
consideration of its consent-related allegations due to the operation of a formalist notion of consent
in the limitation period analysis at the admissibility stage.
This observation lays the groundwork for this paper’s second major finding. The expansion
of Indigenous rights frameworks in both domestic and international law is undoubtedly important
and, as described above, these statements of principle seem capable of effectively problematizing
relations of dispossession. However, this expansion of substantive rights recognition has not been
accompanied by a parallel concern for the development of appropriate and accessible judicial
procedures and legal remedies. Communities’ legal claims are successful not only because they
have good facts and are decided with robust substantive rights frameworks. Crucially, they must
also be able to package themselves into a recognizable domestic cause of action and navigate the
associated procedural requirements. Access to justice is of course as contingent on appropriate
procedures as it is on rights statements and enforcement. Arguably international and domestic
lawmakers have been insufficiently attentive to the procedural aspects of the assertion of
Indigenous and Campesino rights, and particularly property rights, in domestic courts. This
observation applies in particular to contexts where the claims relate to past violations associated
with established projects.
In Peru, despite the existence of promising statements of law, there is no specific
constitutional procedure for the litigation of Campesino and Indigenous rights claims. When the
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Negritos Community attempted to bring its rights claim using the only cause of action that
ostensibly applied, the associated procedural rules proved susceptible to the re-introduction of
formalist concepts of consent. Thus, the rules of procedure themselves have become a new site of
political and legal struggle. This suggests that appropriate public law mechanisms, procedures and
principles must be developed to prevent courts from dismissing Indigenous rights claims at the
procedural phase of legal proceedings on the basis of formalistic notions of consent. More research
is needed to identify whether or not substantive Indigenous rights frameworks and remedies are
similarly inaccessible in other domestic legal systems in the Americas. There may be good reason
to believe that this issue is systemic given that the Peruvian amparo as a cause of action is similar
to amparo proceedings in other countries across Latin America.227 Law reform may be needed to
design new mechanisms, or to make available mechanisms more accessible and responsive to the
reality of Indigenous claims, especially claims of past rights violations. If this does not happen,
the Negritos experience teaches that existing domestic rights protection mechanisms will work to
simply reinforce the dynamics of power and exclusion that give rise to rights violations.
Importantly, this Indigenous rights-based critique of domestic procedure and access to
justice in Peru has its international counterpart with international consequences. This paper has
described how the Negritos case unfolded in parallel with the emergence, at the turn of the
millennium, of a body of inter-American jurisprudence that acknowledges Indigenous rights.
However, these rights might only be claimed before the Inter-American Commission or Court in
accordance with certain procedural requirements. Perhaps most significant is the long-standing
exhaustion of remedies requirement: all claimants must exhaust available remedies in their
domestic legal system, albeit with some exceptions.228 Thus, the expansion of Indigenous rights
recognition in the inter-American system has not been accompanied by, at least on its face, any
changes to the procedural requirements that Indigenous groups must meet in order to operationalize
these rights.
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Yet the Negritos case study reveals that an ostensible domestic cause of action may in
practice include procedural requirements that are interpreted to create an insurmountable obstacle
for Indigenous dispossession claims. The Negritos example is important because it documents
how a community can become caught in a web of procedural requirements that threaten to
effectively frustrate its capacity to assert its substantive rights claims before any court of law, either
domestically or internationally. There is potentially a kind of misalignment between interAmerican procedures and statements of Indigenous rights on one hand, and on the other, the
complex domestic legal and political terrain that Campesino and Indigenous communities must
navigate in an effort to simply identify a cause of action and convince a court to admit their claim
and consider it on the merits. Due to the exhaustion of remedies requirement, where an ostensible
cause of action exits these domestic efforts are a necessary prerequisite, even if they are ultimately
fruitless, before a community may appeal to an international human rights body, like the InterAmerican Commission.
This points to a potential area of future public international law research focused on the
admissibility decisions of the Inter-American Commission in response to Indigenous rights related
petitions. If the domestic mechanisms available for actualizing Indigenous rights in the region are
systematically and seriously deficient, more research is needed to identify how this reality is
informing, or should inform, admissibility rules at the inter-American level. For example, how has
the Inter-American Commission applied the exhaustion of remedies requirement (and its
exceptions) to petitions presented by Indigenous communities in the Americas? Can a systematic
pattern of deficient local remedies be observed across the petitions presented to date? If so, how
should the Commission respond in its admissibility determinations? Are specialized admissibility
considerations or rules warranted for Indigenous rights petitions? Should the Commission develop
substantive principles to inform debate over the domestic causes of action and procedural rules that
would ensure Indigenous communities’ meaningful access to their local courts?
As a stand-alone case study, the Negritos case cannot answer these questions; rather it can
only help to pose them. While a single case study will always have inherent limitations, one of the
strengths of the Negritos study is the depth and detail of information compiled over more than a
decade. As such, it offers a unique window into the interaction between the domestic legal system,
a Campesino Community, and a transnational mining company, where enforceable Constitutional
rights and international human rights are at stake. It tells us that the incorporation of international
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public law, and specifically rights related to Indigenous communal property, into the domestic
sphere, can trigger important access to justice problems due to the absence of appropriate
procedural rules. More detailed empirical and longitudinal studies of other cases and contexts are
needed to identify the extent to which these problems extend beyond Peru.229 In this work, it would
be important to distinguish between the proactive use of the courts to resist the imposition of a
project, and recourse to the courts in order to remedy past violations and dispossession.
The Negritos case study depicts a particular form of legal practice in contemporary
conditions of economic globalization. At the broadest level, it represents an attempt by activists to
use international human rights concepts to address issues of global economic justice. This activism
must be informed by a conception of the nature of the problem it seeks to address and of course
such an exercise is always contentious and complex. 230 In the amparo action, the Negritos
Community’s concerns were primarily framed as violations of communal property rights. This
was in part due to the nature of the available documentary evidence. Perhaps with other forms of
evidence, other legal frames could have been adopted, such as cultural rights or environmental
rights. However, as stated above, the Negritos experience suggests that there is significant value
in framing cases of this kind as struggles over property in particular. The property lens reveals the
material, corporeal, aspect of foreign mining activities, where land is taken, transferred, occupied
and exploited in the midst of people, communities and livelihoods. In the Negritos case, the
property lens was powerful because it allowed the Community to challenge the very legality and
the legitimacy of Yanacocha’s mining operations, and arguably by extension, the global status quo
of transnational resource extraction as described in this paper’s introduction.
In the first paragraphs of this conclusion I referred to the importance of studying
dispossession in the global economy and the promise that human rights law seems to hold as one
problematizing frame for this endeavor. However, at the same time, the procedural obstacles in
the Negritos case point to a potential weakness or irony of property claims as a human rights claims.
229
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In a market economy, property is traded through contracts, usually in exchange for money. This
exchange of course is predicated on some notion of consent. Legitimate property transfers must
be consensual. Where they are not consensual, they must be justified in the national public interest,
as in the case of expropriation.231 The Negritos study reveals how slippery the notion of consent
can be, not only in relation to substantive rights matters, but also at the procedural stage of legal
proceedings. The case law and literature cited in Part 3.3 of this paper emphasize that for
Indigenous communities the question of consent is never merely a matter of formal information
transfer, but can only be understood in a cultural, social, historical context and with attention to
different ways of knowing. In the Negritos case, to date the courts, the state and the company have
all accepted the idea that, in exchange for practically nothing, the Community consented to the
elimination of all of its communal land interests, any other community right or interest, and its very
existence in law.
In one view, the Negritos case study is perhaps an extreme example due to the time period
of the property acquisitions in question. In today’s Latin America, arguably few communities
occupy a position comparable to that of the Negritos Community in the early 90s: most have at
least heard about the pitfalls of large-scale foreign mining and many have relatively greater access
to information and supportive civil society actors. However, these changes are a matter of degree.
Communities in Latin America and foreign resource companies continue to encounter each other
in the context of vastly unequal power relations. The widespread resource related social conflicts
described in this paper’s introduction reveal that, politically speaking, the terms and meaning of
consent remain very much unsettled, notwithstanding the growing international Indigenous rights
case law.
In this light, many of the deeper questions in the Negritos case maintain their relevance. Of
particular importance is the question of just how free consent can be under current conditions, not
only of unequal power relations, but where the rules of property and contract that ultimately govern
these relations remain squarely in the political economy of neoliberal capitalism. Even where
Communities are relatively better resourced and equipped to negotiate with companies, it can be
difficult to escape a model that pushes toward the commodification of rights, exchanging monetary

231

Political Constitution of Peru, 1993, art 70; American Convention, art 21(2).

103

compensation in return for permission to exploit resources. 232 One important commonality
between the Negritos case and the circumstances of present day resource conflicts is that few
communities have real choices and control over outcomes when it comes to proposed resource
projects and the legal frameworks that determine who has ultimate decision making power.233
Property has come to occupy this ambivalent space, as a foundational right in Indigenous
rights frameworks as well as in the neoliberal economic system. This paper previously described
how, in Peru and in many other countries in the region and around the world, Indigenous rights and
neoliberal legal (foreign investment) projects have unfolded almost in parallel. The Negritos case
study reveals that the slippage between these two worlds often occurs in the context of the struggle
over the meaning of consent, crystalized in this study in arguments over how to apply the limitation
period. While this paper has advocated for progressive interpretations of limitation period laws, or
other Indigenous appropriate procedural reforms, in the background we are always confronted with
the possibility that in order to approximate global social justice, we must address and transform the
system of property that generates the very injustices we seek to redress.234 This raises questions
about whether or not, or under what conditions, human rights, and Indigenous property rights more
specifically, can be liberating, or conversely, whether or not even the most robust procedural
reforms will nonetheless somehow fail to convert law into an instrument of justice for the
dispossessed.
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In the meantime, while we contemplate how we might change the legal structures of the
global economic system, or while we strategize legal responses to the global governance gap
described in this paper’s introduction, we must bear in mind one final lesson from this study. As
we reach to global debates and work toward structural changes, we must nonetheless remain
grounded in the struggles of the dispossessed. This involves thinking critically, conscientiously
and consulting as we craft legal frames for problematizing relations of dispossession. It requires
using law to fight practices and ideologies that would treat the dispossessed as inevitable,
irrelevant, nonexistent, invisible, or deserving of their fate. At the same time, we must be realistic
that even the most committed communities may become weak and divided after decades (or
centuries) confronting relations of power and exploitation. And even when our efforts feel futile in
the face of what we confront (delays, corruption, formalism), we must continue to support
communities’ demands that their local legal systems be efficient, fair, equitable and accessible.
May we be creative and courageous in our pursuit of remedies, reparations and a new order of legal
relations.
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CHAPTER TWO: Contesting Indigenous-Industry Agreements in Latin America
- Charis Kamphuis1
Abstract
In this chapter, I review the contributions of scholars and activists who share my concern that the
legal and social contexts that typically inform the formation of Indigenous-industry agreements in
Latin America are marked by enormous power disparities and stark epistemological differences.
This literature review supports the proposition that it is likely that many Indigenous-industry
agreements in Latin America lack legitimacy and perhaps legality. This in turn raises serious
questions about whether or not Indigenous-industry “agreements” formed in these conditions
could possibly rest on any meaningful notion of consent. I make this important point in order to
focus on a narrower question, one of the present but also very much one of the future, as we face
the aftermath, in the years and decades to come, of the proliferation of agreements under present
circumstances. What happens when a community mobilizes in order to challenge the legality of a
past agreement with industry, such as for example by contesting the idea that it actually consented?
What if the company and/or the state holds up a document with signatures from past community
leaders that allegedly represent consent? If the company and the state are unresponsive to a
community’s concerns about an agreement, can it resort to the courts? In this chapter, I explore
some of these questions by referring to Peru as a case study. In my conclusion, I explore the
significance of this study for ongoing normative developments in relation to Indigenous peoples’
right to consultation, consent and the formation of Indigenous-industry agreements.
1

The Context for Indigenous-Industry Agreements in Latin America
The principle that resource extraction should only occur on Indigenous land (owned or

claimed) after a process of free, prior and informed consultation with affected communities first
made its appearance on the international legal stage in the 1989 International Labour Organization
(ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries
(Convention 169).2 Since then, this principle has become ubiquitous, endorsed in many statements
of international law, in some countries’ constitutions and/or constitutional jurisprudence around
the world and in the policies of international financial investors and corporations. The related
principle that consultation must occur “in order to obtain the free, prior and informed consent” of
affected Indigenous peoples has continued to gain acceptance since its articulation in the 2007 UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).3 In his 2013 final report to the UN
1

Chapter in The Law & Politics of Indigenous-Industry Agreements, edited by Dwight Newman & Ibironke OdumosuAyanu (Routledge, 2020).
2
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, 27 June 1989, C169 art 15(2) (entered into force 5 September 1991) [Convention 169].
3
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 13 September 2007, A/RES/61/295 art 32(2)
[UNDRIP].
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Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya
argued that there is a general rule in international law that extractive activities should not take place
on the territories of Indigenous peoples without their free prior and informed consent.4 Notably
though, the precise meaning of the right to consent remains controversial.5
Latin American countries have been at the forefront of these global legal developments. Of
the countries that have ratified Convention 169 worldwide, approximately two-thirds (15) are Latin
American. 6 After UNDRIP was adopted, a number of Latin American countries developed
legislation to regulate Indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior and informed consultation and by
2015, four countries, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru, had passed legislation in this area.7
Attention to these rights instruments in the region is not surprising given that many Latin American
states claim sovereignty over a land base that is also inhabited and claimed by Indigenous peoples.
In particular, countries located in the Andean and Central American regions have large Indigenous
populations.
Not only are many Latin America countries the site of some of the richest mineral and
petroleum deposits in the world, most have adopted a common political economy of extraction
consistent with neoliberal economic globalization.8 This refers to, inter alia, the use of domestic
law to attract and facilitate foreign investment in large scale resource projects, the use of
4

James Anaya, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, Extractive industries and
indigenous peoples, UNGAOR, 24th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 (2013) at para 27 [Anaya, Extractive Industries].
Anaya emphasized that this rule applies in “the standard scenario”, where states or third-party business enterprises
promote the extraction of natural resources within Indigenous territories. However, he also identified a preferred
political economic model of resource development, which is not the prevailing business model (see ibid at paras 8–
17).
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See e.g. David Szablowski, “Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Extractive Industry Sector?
Examining the Challenges of a Negotiated Model of Justice” (2010) 1:2 Can J Development Studies 111 at 116
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consent), grounded in an Indigenous right to self-determination and to exercise jurisdiction over resources. However,
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a proposed project will significantly and adversely impact a community, such as through displacement: Saramaka
People v Suriname (2007) Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) No 172 at para 134. See also James Anaya, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNGAOR, 21st Sess, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/47 (2012) at para 65
[Anaya, Report].
6
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Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela: see
International Labour Organization, “Ratifications of C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989
(No. 169)”, online:
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?P=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314>.
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Patricia Urteaga-Crovetto, “Implementation of the Right to Prior Consultation in the Andean Countries: A
Comparative Perspective” (2018) 50:1 J Leg Pluralism & Unofficial L 7 at 8 [Urteaga-Crovetto].
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Fábio De Castro, Pitou Van Dijck & Barbara Hogenboom, The Extraction and Conservation of Natural Resources
in South America: Recent Trends and Challenges (Amsterdam: CEDLA, 2014) at 6-7 [De Castro et al].
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international economic law to protect foreign investors from certain kinds of state decisions, and
the use of corporate law and tax law to enhance foreign companies’ profits and locate them outside
of the countries where they operate.9 In this framework, foreign mineral extraction has intensified
in Latin America over the last twenty years.10
In a context of strong and continued resource extraction, and in light of the widespread
diffusion of the principles of consultation and consent, it stands to reason that resource companies
operating in Latin America are increasingly pursing benefit agreements with affected communities.
Many have espoused the “business case” for respecting human rights and securing community
agreement.11 The idea here is that agreements improve profitability by securing greater social
stability for specific projects and positively impacting a company’s reputation. Notably, Industrycommunity agreements are primarily formed outside of formal state-led consultation processes.
This is due to the fact that consultation-related legislation in Latin America to date has focused
exclusively on regulating the state’s consultation process and agreement making with affected
Indigenous communities.

The relationship between these state-led processes and Industry-

community agreements in Latin America is further explored throughout this chapter.
Alongside these normative developments, neo-liberal resource development also coincides
with serious and endemic social conflicts in Latin America.12 In a 2016 report, the organization
Global Witness found that in 2015 alone, 185 environmental defenders had been assassinated
across 16 countries around the world.13 In this study, mining was the industry most linked to
violence and four of the top five countries with the worst incidence of violence were Latin
9

Ibid. See also Anaya, Report, supra note 5 at para 74.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America
and the Caribbean, 2016, LC/G.2680-P (Santiago: 2016) at 107; OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
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of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities, OROEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.47/15 (2015) at 15 [OAS, Human
Rights Protection].
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Global Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Enhanced Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy to Strengthen Canada’s
Extractive Sector Abroad – Doing Business the Canadian Way: A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility
in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad”, online: (2014), at 8 <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Enhanced_CS_Strategy_ENG.pdf>; Anaya, Extractive Industries, supra note 4 at
para 29; OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 ed (OECD Publishing, 2011) at para 40
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf>; John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, UNGAOR, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011) at 8, 14.
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OAS, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders,
OROEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc.49/15 (2015) at paras 48-50.
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Worldwide (London: Global Witness, 2016) at 5.
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American: Peru, Brazil, Nicaragua and Colombia. 14

In 2016, the Justice and Corporate

Accountability Project (JCAP) published a study of reported incidents of violence and
criminalization in Latin America in relation to Canadian mining operations. It found that between
2000-2015 there were 44 deaths and 403 injuries across 13 Latin American countries in incidents
involving 28 different companies.15 In sum, land and environment related conflicts in the region
are often violent and in far too many cases community leaders who oppose or criticize projects are
murdered, harmed, threatened, surveilled and criminalized.
This background reveals that over the last twenty years, a curious state of affairs has
emerged. The Indigenous right to consultation has been widely endorsed by Latin American
governments and courts in tandem with the intensification of proposed resource extraction on
Indigenous land and the proliferation of violent conflicts over specific projects as well as over proextraction laws and policies more generally.16 In making this observation, my intent is not to
undertake a full examination of this phenomena and potential explanations.17 Rather, it is to frame
a more narrow set of arguments and inquiries in relation to the formation of Indigenous-industry
benefit agreements in this context.
In Part 2 of this chapter, I refer to the contributions of scholars and activists who share my
concern that the legal and social contexts that typically inform the formation of Indigenous-industry
agreements in Latin America are marked by enormous power disparities and stark epistemological
differences. Their findings raise serious questions about whether or not Indigenous-industry
“agreements” formed in these conditions could possibly rest on any meaningful notion of consent.
This literature review supports the proposition that it is likely that many Indigenous-industry
agreements in Latin America lack legitimacy and perhaps legality.
14

Ibid at 8.
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I make this important point in order to focus on a narrower question, one of the present but
also very much one of the future, as we face the aftermath, in the years and decades to come, of the
proliferation of agreements under present circumstances. What happens when a community
mobilizes in order to challenge the legality of a past agreement with industry, such as for example
by contesting the idea that it actually consented? What if the company and/or the state holds up a
document with signatures from past community leaders that allegedly represent consent? If the
company and the state are unresponsive to a community’s concerns about an agreement, can it
resort to the courts?
In Part 3 of this chapter, I respond to some of these questions by referring to Peru as a case
study. I begin by summarizing the main features of the constitutional and regulatory frameworks
that inform the formation of Indigenous-industry agreements in that country. I complete this
section by sharing the experience of San Andres de Negritos, a community that has sought to
challenge the constitutionality of two agreements/contracts with Yanacocha Mine in Peruvian
courts. This experience illuminates both interesting opportunities, as well as procedural obstacles
when it comes to challenging illegitimate agreements in Latin America. The judicial response to
date in the Negritos case study underscores the need for adequate and accessible oversight of
Indigenous-industry agreements in these circumstances, a topic that I return to in this chapter’s
conclusion.
While this study is framed in relation to relevant literature on Latin America as a region, it
adopts Peru as a useful case study for two reasons. First, Peru shares many familiar challenges
with other Latin American countries, and likely with many developing countries in other regions
of the world. Its history and democratic present are marked by deep problems with the rule of law,
extreme social inequality, entrenched economic dependency on foreign resource extraction, and
endemic and violent social conflicts rooted in social inequality. At the same time, Peru has a
relatively strong history of recognition, regulation, litigation, law reform and political mobilization
in relation to Indigenous issues. It also has a one of the largest Indigenous populations in Latin
America and in 2011 was the first country in the region to regulate the right to consultation.18
Finally, many key features of Peru’s constitutional tradition and procedures are commonly shared
by other Latin American countries.

18

Notably, this occurred in response to an exceptionally violent conflict between Peruvian security forces and a broad
coalition of Indigenous communities protesting laws promoting investment and extraction in their territories.
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All of this makes Peru a useful site of study for examining the possibilities and pitfalls of
the implementation of the right to consent and consultation in the region and the theoretical and
practical concerns with the formation of Indigenous-industry agreements in these contexts. While
every country has unique features, the dynamics captured in this chapter’s case study will
undoubtedly resonate with other countries in Latin America and potentially countries in other
regions of the world. In my conclusion, I explore the significance of this study for ongoing
normative developments in relation to Indigenous peoples’ right to consultation, consent and the
formation of Indigenous-industry agreements, either independently or in conjunction with broader
state-led processes.
2

Critical Research on Consultation, Consent and Indigenous-Industry Agreements in
Latin America
Writing in 2010, David Szablowski observed a dearth of knowledge about the effective

implementation of Indigenous peoples’ right to consent in practice, and in particular, about the
actual institutional arrangements required to give this principle concrete meaning in different
contexts.19 In Szablowski’s view, where Indigenous communities lack legal rights to resources
and are obligated to settle “for what they think they can get in the circumstances”, this falls short
of consent.20 After referring to developments in public international law, private transnational
regimes and corporate policy, he concluded that “FPIC is everywhere discussed, but it is not much
of an exaggeration to say that it is practised virtually nowhere.”21 Moreover, Szablowski expressed
concern that if power imbalances remain unaddressed, consent could become a double-edged
sword for Indigenous peoples. As a partial remedy to this, Szablowski argued that the concept of
“informed” consent must infuse the contractual relationship between industry and communities
with fiduciary obligations (the duty to inform), thereby requiring a departure from the classical
liberal approach to consent common in contract law.22
These relatively early assertions raise questions about Indigenous-industry agreements. In
his 2013 report, Anaya articulated a normative standard for evaluating the legitimacy of these
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agreements. Specifically, he endeavoured to describe the legal conditions that enable consent to a
proposed project “on equitable and just terms”.23 Anaya proposed a human rights approach that
characterizes consent as a safeguard for Indigenous peoples’ rights more generally. Importantly,
his framework captures two issues, first the wider legal and negotiating context within which the
agreement is formed, and second, the substance of the agreement itself.
With respect to the first issue, Anaya argued that the protection of basic civil and political
rights (free expression, including the right to oppose projects without repression and
criminalization) is a pre-condition for the formation of legitimate agreements. However, the wider
context must also include regulatory regimes that recognize and protect the full range of Indigenous
peoples’ rights and apply sanctions for violations.24 Anaya also addressed the negotiation dynamic
itself, stating that consultation procedures should ameliorate power imbalances between companies
and Indigenous peoples. To this end, he asserted that States should establish mechanisms for
sharing information and ensuring that Indigenous peoples have adequate negotiation capacity.25
Having established these contextual conditions, Anaya identified the fundamental
characteristics of “rights-centered equitable agreements”. In his view, these agreements must
safeguard rights and/or mitigate the impact of resource development on rights.26 As a preferred
model, agreements should also ensure genuine long-term partnership such that Indigenous peoples
participate in project decision-making and benefits as well as regulatory control.27 According to
Anaya, this substantive standard for agreements is required by international human rights law.
Furthering Anaya’s framework, Elisa Morgera has argued that his principle of fair and
equitable benefits-sharing has received insufficient attention among international human rights
bodies and experts in the area.28 Morgera advocates for an expansion of Anaya’s argument through
23
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cross-fertilization between international human rights law and international environmental law.
She argues that a combined doctrinal reading of these two areas supports a positive concept in
international law of equitable benefit-sharing. Morgera argues that this principle is not only a
procedural safeguard, but also as a substantive right that is integral to Indigenous peoples’ rights
connected to natural resources.29
In pursuing this line of doctrinal development, Morgera and Anaya explicitly cast their
approach as a remedy to the potential pitfalls of consultation, consent and benefits-sharing.
Morgera refers to the risk that benefits-sharing will convert complex issues into mere financial
transactions, reinforcing advantages of the powerful and legitimizing loss of resources by the
vulnerable.30 Anaya similarly specified that agreements should not result from “undue pressure”
and that access to basic services should not be conditioned upon acceptance of extractive projects.
Anaya also indicated that the State and company should guard against the manipulation or
intimidation of Indigenous leaders by public or private officials.31 He cautioned that “consent is
not a free-standing device of legitimation”.32 Notably, Szablowski, Morgera and Anaya all see a
connection between the developments in human rights law in relation to Indigenous consultation
and consent, and the formation of Indigenous-industry agreements. They all elaborate on the
fundamental proposition that human rights law should come to bear in some way on these private
agreements.
However, and of considerable importance given this chapter’s focus, these authors provide
very little guidance with respect to how questionable agreements might be reviewed on substantive
or procedural grounds if disputes arise.33 Lack of attention to this issue is of concern in light of the
fact that, at least in Latin America, many of consent’s pitfalls are indeed materializing in practice.34

arising from the use, management and conservation of their natural resources, “wherever possible”. The concept of
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Ibid at 8.
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Anthropologists Riccarda Flemmer and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor studied forty state-led
consultation processes in Bolivia and five in Peru, all undertaken in accordance with recent
legislation in each country regulating the Indigenous right to free, prior and informed consultation
with respect to proposed resource projects. In a 2015 publication of their results, they concluded
that the implementation of this right is abysmally distant from the ideals of human rights advocates
working on norm development at the international level.35
Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor found that the terms of consultations, including
procedures, timelines, scope/issues and information, were largely imposed by the State. Moreover,
consultations suffered from serious power asymmetries, enormous information and knowledge
deficiencies, and intercultural inadequacies.36 All of this limited the legitimacy of the process and
the effective participation of Indigenous groups involved. Notably, consultations were often
overloaded with a wide range of community concerns not directly related to the extractive project
in question. Finally, these researchers observed that agreements reached between government
authorities and Indigenous communities were weak, lacked follow up mechanisms and key
provisions were subsequently disregarded.37
Drawing on these findings, Flemmer and Schilling-Vacaflor argue that, while Bolivia and
Peru may be at the forefront of regulating state-led consultations with Indigenous peoples in Latin
America, both countries lack the preconditions necessary to ensure that these processes fulfil their
rights protecting promise. In both countries, the State has endeavoured to implement consultations
without changing the status quo: Indigenous communities do not have a decisive say in extraction
activities; they lack continuous channels for political participation; their basic social and economic
needs are not met; and broader Indigenous rights to land, territory, autonomy and political power
are ignored. Moreover, these authors observed that without addressing these pre-conditions,
consultation processes can have disempowering or exacerbating effects.38 A 2017 unpublished
study of numerous compensation agreements between Indigenous communities in Peru’s Amazon
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region and large oil and gas companies dramatically supports the conclusion that poorly conceived
agreements can leave communities worse off.39
In 2018, Oxfam and CooperAcción jointly published a comprehensive study, authored by
lawyer and researcher Ana Leyva, of the 38 consultation processes that the Peruvian state had
undertaken in the context of proposed mining and hydrocarbon projects in the six years following
the implementation of Peru’s consultation regulations. 40 The study found numerous serious
deficiencies with these processes, mirroring many of the findings in the Flemmer and SchillingVacaflor study. Leyva similarly observed that Indigenous participants in the consultations had a
profound lack of knowledge about the basic functions of the state, the legal obligations of
companies, and their own rights.41 Perhaps one of Leyva’s most important additional findings is
that consultations took place after the state had already made all, or nearly all, key decisions about
the project.42 As a result of these deficiencies, Leyva observed that the resulting state-community
agreements had extremely little, if any, relevance to protecting the rights of the communities
involved in relation to the proposed extractive project.43 Rather, agreements duplicated the existing
legal obligations of both the state and the company, rather than improving the conditions for the
project in relation to communities’ rights. Agreements often simply recorded the communities
demands for public services or to resolve historic grievances, with the state authority merely
committing to pass these concerns along to other competent authorities.44 In only one case, with
independent legal support, were communities able to secure direct economic benefits, but even
then they failed to obtain additional environmental protection clauses.45
Colombian legal scholar César Rodríguez Garavito has also undertaken detailed fieldwork,
mostly in Colombia but also in Ecuador, Chile and Peru, on the implementation of consultations
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with Indigenous peoples.46 He found that consultations are highly procedural/technical (rather than
addressing substantive issues), are primarily focused on monetizing anticipated harms, and are
plagued by endemic miscommunications (which are sometimes intentionally produced by
company and State officials). Perhaps most significantly, Rodríguez Garavito found that the
conditions of negotiation are often so coercive (physically and economically) and asymmetrical
that, in his view, free participation and consent are not possible in practice.47 He argues that even
where agreements are formed, communities’ substantive claims are diluted and the terms of
agreements create new dependencies (on experts and companies), internal divisions and conflicts.48
On the basis of these findings, Rodríguez Garavito concluded that consultation is the new
devise for the assimilation of Indigenous peoples and the legitimation of a global economy
predicated on “accumulation by dispossession”.49 He argues that that, in practice, consultation is
being reduced to a formal procedural right (due process and free contract), based on the “liberal
fiction” of formal equality (“a level playing field”), leaving questions of power, the right to selfgovernment, and the material conditions necessary for genuine deliberations unaddressed.50
These observations from the field are further supported by the work of Peruvian academic
Patricia Urteaga-Crovetto, who undertook a comparative textual study of state-led consultation
laws in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador. Urteaga-Crovetto tracked how technicalities and
procedures in each country’s law work to diminish the political significance of the rights in
question. She also recorded reports of manipulation to obtain agreements with communities in
Colombia and Peru.51
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Urteaga-Crovetto’s textual analysis of consultation laws, in combination with the
observations from the field described above, support Peruvian legal theorist Roger Merino Acuña’s
theoretical critique of consultation regimes in Latin America. He argues that the mainstream
rationale for the Indigenous right to consultation, as a mechanism to reduce the barriers to
investment created by social conflicts (ie “the business case”), reveals its roots in the colonial
legality and capitalist political economy of classical liberalism.52 In opposition to this, he calls for
recognition of the right to territory and to self-determination as foundational rights, beyond liberal
colonial legality. 53 He further argues that negotiations must not be limited to the benefits of
extractive activities, but rather must be permitted to fundamentally question the “extractivism
model” itself.54
Robert Coulter extends Merino Acuña’s critique of consultation rights to address the related
right to free prior and informed consent.55 He argues that the current conception of Indigenous
consent in international law is fatally flawed in that it fundamentally presumes agreement to an act
that would otherwise violate Indigenous rights. Referring to specific provisions of UNDRIP,
Coulter argues that consent has been reduced to at best a procedural right that, rather than
safeguarding substantive rights, simply permits Indigenous peoples to negotiate the financial terms
of rights violations. In Coulter’s view, the right to consent has diverted attention from Indigenous
peoples’ most fundamental substantive right “the right to own, use, control, benefit from, and
dispose of lands and natural resources and the right of self-determination, the right to control or
govern activities that seriously and directly affect indigenous peoples, communities and
resources.”56 He asserts that the concept of consent is so poorly defined that is it practically useless
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and that, due to these limitations, “in practice, some form of monitoring is needed to guard against
abuse, fraud, corruption and dishonourable dealings.” 57
Like Coulter, Nathan Yaffe advocates for some form of independent third-party monitoring
of Indigenous-industry agreements.58 Yaffe bases this recommendation in part on his analysis of
the Indigenous consent policies of various international private sectors actors, including individual
companies, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) and the International Finance
Corporation. His analysis in this regard includes a case study featured in the ICMM’s Guide on
the topic, of an agreement between American mining company Newmont and a community in
Suriname.59 Yaffe concluded that the private sector’s approach to Indigenous consent is often
purely or predominately commercial and presumes a “thin, liberal, individualistic lens”. 60 He
argues that the private sector’s dominate role in implementing the right to consent through benefit
agreements is thus “radically altering” consent’s normative foundations in the right to Indigenous
self-determination.61 He cautions that this should raise alarms about the “experiment of corporatecontrolled” Indigenous consent processes.62
The research reviewed above uses five different methods to approach the topic of
Indigenous consultation and agreement-making with industry and/or the state: international law
normative interpretation, empirical/fieldwork data collection, regulatory analysis, corporate policy
analysis, and theoretical critique. These scholars share specific expertise in Latin America and/or
broader international perspectives. Those who have conducted fieldwork in the region all point to
profound power disparities and information gaps. They argue that present institutional conditions
exacerbate or fail to ameliorate these issues: poorly designed processes; profound lack of accessible
information; lack of recognition and enforcement of substantive Indigenous rights, including selfdetermination; and lack of safeguards and oversight of agreements with private or public-sector
representatives. In general, these researchers’ findings apply equally to consultations/negotiations
and agreements undertaken by either private or public officials. Finally, these conclusions are
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bolstered by the findings of researchers focused on law and policy textual analysis, including
corporate policies.
Notably, all of these researchers share Szablowski’s early observation that there are few
examples in practice of agreements that meet human rights standards. They also commonly assert
that classical liberal contractual approaches to consent risk legitimatizing inequitable agreements,
perpetuating inequalities and perhaps even leaving communities worse off. Several conclude that
the Indigenous right to consent must be rooted in the right to self-determination in practice, and
that more radical transformations of the legal and political context are necessary to address the
historical, economic and political roots of Indigenous peoples’ dispossession and ongoing
marginalization.
3

Legal Challenge to Illegitimate Indigenous-Industry Agreements in Peru
The body of research reviewed in the previous section supports the conclusion that, under

present conditions, agreements between Indigenous peoples in Latin American and industry actors
are rarely, if ever, a product of meaningful, legitimate and emancipatory free, prior and informed
consultation and consent. This section conveys the experience to date of the Peruvian Campesino
Community San Andres de Negritos and its attempts to challenge the legality of a so-called
agreement with Yanacocha Mine. It begins with an overview of the complex legal framework in
Peru in relation to state-led consultation and Indigenous-industry agreements. It then presents the
Negritos Community’s experience as a case study of the dynamics of illegitimate agreements.
Finally, this section will describe the pathway to challenging such agreements in Peruvian courts,
as well as the obstacles and opportunities that the Negritos Community has encountered to date.
3.1 Legal Framework
There are approximately 7,267 Campesino and Native Communities in Peru.63 Campesino
Communities generally inhabit the mineral rich Andean mountains and Native Communities
inhabit the oil and gas rich Amazon region of the country. Many (but not all) of these communities
63
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acquired communal title during the agrarian reform years. Thus, the governance of IndigenousIndustry agreement in Peru is often intertwined with two main issues: (1) the status of Campesino
and Native Communities vis-a-vis international and national laws recognizing Indigenous rights,64
and (2) the legal terms that govern the acquisition of surface and resource rights to communally
titled property by investors. An array of constitutional provisions, statutes and case law constitute
the matrix of positive State law that governs struggles over the answers to these questions. This
includes: 1970s and 80s agrarian reform laws and related constitutional provisions, neo-liberal
foreign investment laws beginning in the 1990s and continuing to date; and a handful of Indigenous
rights statutes and case law, emerging just after the turn of the millennium.65
Agrarian reform laws declared in 1969 and 1974 that Peru’s Indigenous peoples would
thereafter be called Campesino and Native Communities.66 Subsequent laws recognized these
communities as legal persons, with special cultural characteristics, self-governing political
institutions, communal property and various other communal institutions, including political and
economic autonomy. This included a statutory rule, constitutionalized in 1979, that communal
property can only be alienated with a vote of 2/3 of the community. However, Alberto Fujimori’s
government halted communal titling programs and rewrote the Constitution in 1993, removing the
2/3 vote rule.

Fujimori also introduced laws to facilitate foreign investment in resources,

particularly on communally held land, and subsequent governments have continued on this path.
This includes laws facilitating the conversion of communal title to individual title and expediting
agreements between companies and communities, for example by requiring only a bare majority
vote of the community members in attendance at any given meeting.67
Following unprecedented violent conflicts in 2009 between police and Indigenous
protesters opposed to pro-foreign investment legal reforms in relation to land and resources, the
Peruvian government passed Indigenous consultation legislation in 2011.68 This statute, along with
its 2012 regulations, imposes an obligation on state entities to consult Indigenous communities
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before undertaking legislative or administrative acts that may directly affect their rights. Notably,
this regime explicitly excludes consultations led by private companies and does not mention
Indigenous-industry agreements. Critically then, proponent-led negotiations and agreements with
communities in Peru remain essentially unregulated.
Peru’s consultation legislation is controversial for many reasons, not least due to the fact
that many provisions demanded by Indigenous organizations were omitted from the final version.69
One of its most controversial aspects is its narrow definition of Indigenous peoples. The onus is
on communities to “objectively” prove their Indigeneity by, inter alia, showing that they are the
direct descendants of populations that inhabited the country at the time of colonialism and that they
have maintained some or all of their social, economic, cultural and political institutions. In 2012
the Ministry of Culture added two more requirements, that communities must have maintained an
Indigenous language and must reside in their ancestral territory. 70 These criteria are far more
restrictive than the terms set out in Convention 169 and UNDRIP and are widely criticized.71
Peru’s restrictive definition of Indigeneity for the purposes of national consultation laws works to
exclude many Campesino and Native Communities in Peru who cannot meet these strict criteria.72
It is widely believed that the state’s intention was to exclude Campesino Communities’ land where
the majority of mining projects are located.73 There are multiple reports of government efforts to
exclude certain communities from the consultation law, including by paying private consultants to
“scientifically prove” the inexistence of Indigenous peoples in certain areas.74
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For those Campesino and Native communities who hold communal title but do not enjoy a
state-recognized right to consultation, the applicable land and resource laws create enormous
pressure to agree to resource development in ways that are likely inconsistent with agrarian reform
laws and the Peruvian constitution.75 For example, as recently as 2015, Peru passed legislation
permitting the sale of land or other private agreements between communal property holders and
private actors with only a bare majority of votes of the communities’ executive leadership in
attendance at any given meeting.76 Peru has also strengthened expropriation laws in favour of
private investors and mineral tenure holders.77 For example, after a resource company solicits the
expropriation of communal land, Campesino or Native Communities have only 15 days to meet
directly with the company and come to an agreement. If this does not happen, the relevant ministry
has full power and discretion to approve the expropriation.78 Notably, Peruvian law severely
constrains the available compensation amount, including for communally held land. 79 These
coercive legal conditions form the statutory context within which Campesino and Native
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communal titleholders, not recognized as Indigenous by the Peruvian state, are left to negotiate
land-related agreements with the private sector.
The situation is only marginally better for Indigenous peoples in Peru who have gained
state recognition under the 2011 consultation law.80 Among other limitations, Peru’s consultation
laws impose short and strict timeframes, including a maximum of 120 days for the formal
consultation process. 81 The consultation process first begins informally when state authorities
proposing a legislative or administrative measure believe that it may directly affect an identified
Indigenous community. 82 The state authority may then undertake preparation meetings with
identified communities “to inform them of the proposed Consultation Plan”.

83

Once the

Consultation Plan and the proposed state measure to be consulted about are published, the process
formally begins. Communities then have 30 days to designate their representatives and between 30
and 60 days to review information about the proposed decision.84 This is followed by the internal
evaluation phase, where communities have 30 days to make an internal decision, either to enter
into an agreement with the state authority, or to oppose the proposed measure. 85 If the community
disagrees, the maximum time allotted for “intercultural dialogue” is 30 days

86

before the

responsible state entity must make a decision.87
In Leyva’s 2018 study of all consultations undertaken pursuant to this regime between 2012
and 2018, she found that the majority were completed between 49 and 90 days, a much shorter
timeframe than the maximum allowed.88 Furthermore, the majority of this time transpired between
the publication of the prospective decision and the information meeting. Incredibly, Leyva
reported that the time between the information meeting and the internal decision meeting was often
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extremely short. Sometimes these two events were separated by only a few days or even occurred
on the same day. 89 In other words, in practice, communities have had very little time to evaluate
the proposed measures, their impacts, and make proposals.
Where an agreement is reached between the Peruvian government and an Indigenous
community, the regulations make it enforceable against both parties. Of interest is the recognition
in the regulations that Indigenous peoples have a right to participate in the benefits of resource
extraction and a right to equitable compensation for any harm suffered. In spite of this, in Leyva’s
study, state agreements with Indigenous communities contained no such provisions and were
largely lacking in any rights-protecting provisions. Also of note, the regulations make no reference
to remedies for a possible failure on the part of the state to appropriately consult or fulfil the terms
of an agreement. Interestingly, in 2013 a Permanent Multisectoral Commission was created with
a broad mandate to follow up on the implementation of the consultation law. However, in 2016
the Commission’s mandate was limited to following up exclusively on agreements reached in
consultation processes. Notably, the Commission is not independent; rather its membership
consists entirely of state representatives, and primarily members of the Executive. 90
In terms of jurisprudence, since 2008, the Constitutional Court of Peru has decided eight
cases on the subject of Indigenous rights, with most of the decisions issued between 2008 and 2010.
Early cases confirmed that in Peru’s monist system, certain Indigenous rights recognized in
international law are incorporated directly into Peru’s Constitution.91 In this framework, Peru’s
constitutional case law has recognized that Indigenous communities have the constitutional right
to communal property, the right to free, prior and informed consultation and in some cases consent,
and finally the right to equitably benefit from resource extraction that impacts their land and
livelihood.92
While notable, these jurisprudential advances have their limitations.93 For example, the
Constitutional Court has declined to provide guidance with respect to the definition of Indigenous
89
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peoples in Peru. Moreover, in the cases to date the litigants have primarily been NGOs seeking
constitutional review of foreign investment laws on behalf of all Indigenous peoples in Peru. At
present, the Negritos case (described below) is the only case to come before the Constitutional
Court that raises the substantive rights of a specific community in relation to a proposed resource
project and further seeks to challenge the constitutionality of a so-called agreement. The decided
cases have also not touched on other key issues like remedy for failure to consult appropriately or
for deficient or fraudulently obtained consent.94 The relatively sparse constitutional case law on
Campesino and Indigenous rights in Peru is notable given that Campesino and Native
Communities’ rights were first constitutionally recognized in 1979 and noting that international
Indigenous rights norms were first incorporated into Peru’s constitution in the early 1990s. Clearly
there is a significant gap between the articulation of norms/rights on one hand, and access to the
courts on the other.95
This description of Indigenous peoples’ consultation rights in Peru would not be complete
without a reference to civil rights issues. Recall that in Anaya’s framework, respect for civil and
political rights is a basic pre-condition for right-centred agreements. In other words, the legitimacy
of industry-Indigenous agreements cannot be analysed in isolation from the circumstances that
communities will face if they oppose a project. The history of numerous environmental conflicts
in Peru indicates that when communities oppose projects, companies and state officials alike are
often unable or unwilling to effectively manage the situation.96 Like elsewhere in Latin America,
Community leaders who are critical of proposed projects are often intimidated, defamed, harassed,
threatened, or even subjected to bodily harm. When communities in Peru resort to protest or civil
disobedience they are often met with the exercise of force by police operatives in the employ of
the company.97
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The criminalization of dissent in Peru has extended to international advocates who work
with mine affected communities. In a very troubling 2017 case, Jen Moore, a Canadian NGO
worker, was detained and permanently banned from returning to Peru after she showed a
documentary film about Canadian company Hudbay, in the very communities where the company
is developing a large copper mine.98 Peruvian authorities defended their decision by arguing that
Moore is a threat to public order.99 This echoes the long standing view among certain public
officials that those who oppose the dominant resource extraction model are standing in the way of
the nation’s progress. Significantly, some Campesino communities in the area of Hudbay’s
operations have signed land transfer and benefit agreements with the company and others are under
pressure to do so. At the same time, public security forces, employed by Hudbay, have responded
violently to community members protesting the proposed mine.100 The Peruvian government’s
actions to ban Moore ensure that agreements between Hudbay and local communities will be signed
without the presence of international human rights advocates.
This brief review of key laws that apply to communally held (or claimed) land in Peru helps
to flesh out and highlight many of the critiques described in the previous section. While Peru’s
consultation regime has many deficiencies, 101 many Campesino and Native communities are
excluded entirely from its application, including those who obtained communal property titles
following agrarian reform. Regardless of a community’s legal status, there is no specific regulation
of agreements negotiated between industry and Indigenous communities, including Campesino and

entre la Policía Nacional y las empresas extractivas en el Perú (Peru, 2019)
<h t t p s : / / d r i v e . g o o g l e . c o m / fi l e / d/ 1 t n t e p 6 a v g - s z _ X _ _ l 3 9 m n q w s i p v q t 7 i g / v i e w > .
98
John Dougherty, “Investigativemedia releases online version of Hudbay Minerals documentary “Flin Flon Flim
Flam”” (31 December 2015) Investigativemedia (website), online
<http://www.investigativemedia.com/investigativemedia-releases-online-version-of-hudbay-mineralsdocumentary/>.
99
Minister of the Interior, COMUNICADO MININTER N° 008 – 2017, (22 April 2017), online:
<https://www.mininter.gob.pe/content/sobre-la-situaci%C3%b3n-migratoria-irregular-de-una-ciudadanacanadiense-y-un-norteamericano>. This decision is now being challenged by human rights organizations in
Peruvian courts.
100
These events were captured by the same documentary film that Moore was screening in Peru: see Dougherty,
supra note 98.
101
The researchers cited throughout this section agree that the legislation lacks basic pre-conditions for the effective
implementation of consultation: (1) state institutions able to justly balance the interests of diverse groups; (2) measures
to reduce power imbalances within consultations; (3) joint decision-making processes with binding agreements; and
(4) recognition of self-determination and autonomy: Schilling-Vacaflor & Flemmer supra note 63 at 813-4. See also
Urteaga-Crovetto, supra note 7. Merino Acuña argues that Peru’s consultation laws were designed as a mechanism
to inform and convince Indigenous peoples of a decision already made by the state: Merino Acuña, “Legal
Indigenism”, supra note 53 at 22.

126

Native communities. General resource and land laws apply to the many Campesino or Native
communities that the Peruvian state does not recognize as Indigenous. As such, these groups must
deal directly with private companies, under aggressive timelines and extra-ordinary power
asymmetries. Moreover, opposition to proposed projects often faces criminalization by state
authorities and recent state actions have served to isolate communities from international observers
and human rights experts. This detailed description of Peru’s domestic context confirms that, under
current conditions, there are serious risks that agreements between industry actors and Indigenous
communities will fail to meet basic criteria for legitimacy or even legality.
3.2 The Dynamics of Illegitimate Agreements
The experience of the Campesino Community San Andres de Negritos, whose members
reside in the Andean region of Peru, offers some insight into how illegitimate agreements with
industry may form and come to be subsequently challenged. Although the story of the Negritos
Community’s contemporary dispossession began decades ago, its struggle to challenge an
illegitimate agreement with Yanacocha Mine (majority owned by American mining company
Newmont), is very much a story of the present. Moreover, the Negritos Community’s experience
reveals some of the legal barriers that may arise when a Community mobilizes to challenge an
illegitimate agreement.

Given the contexts and dynamics of consultations now taking place in

Latin America and the concomitant risk of illegitimate agreements between industry actors and
Indigenous groups, the Negritos Community’s experience remains highly relevant.
The Negritos Community acquired legal title to its land pursuant to agrarian reform
legislation and a declaration by Peru’s President at the time, granting the Community communal
title to 14,375 hectares in 1974. However, shortly after the arrival of Yanacocha Mine to the area,
in 1993 and 1995 the Community allegedly consented to transfer title to approximately 1400
hectares of its land to the company in exchange for approximately $US 48,000. This arrangement
was reflected in two different contracts signed by company and community representatives after
the company had officially requested the expropriation of the Community’s land.102 Yanacocha
quickly mortgaged a portion of the transferred property (609 hectares) to international banks, for
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loans totalling $85 million. At the same time, between 1991 and 1994, state authorities initiated
measures to convert Negritos’ communal land title into individual/family-based land titles,
followed by a state decision in 1995 to annul the Community’s legal personality. This allowed
Yanacocha to subsequently pursue private land sales with individual community members. The
Negritos Community alleges that the documents that underlie these transfers were signed by a
handful of corrupt community leaders, that community members were misinformed, bribed or
extorted into signing certain ancillary documents, and that the Community as a whole was never
properly consulted or even informed of these dealings, much less its rights in Peruvian
constitutional law and international law applicable at the time.103
The Negritos Community’s gradual turn to the law began a decade after these events, in
tandem with a general rise in Indigenous and Campesino protest, rights consciousness and growth
in civil society organizations in Peru and across Latin America. Campesino protests against
Yanacocha began in 2004 and in 2006, a Negritos community leader opposed to the mine was
assassinated and a protestor was killed by security forces in the employ of Yanacocha.104 In spite
of this, Negritos community members persisted and raised the money necessary to collect
documents from various government ministries. They then handed these large piles of paper over
to pro bono lawyers for legal analysis.

Emboldened by what they saw in the documents,

community members appealed to the company, various public officials and administrative decision
makers for recognition of their rights and responses to their grievances, but to no avail. Finally, in
2011, the Negritos Community presented its claim before a court of first instance, alleging that its
communal property had been transferred without proper consultation, without free and informed
consent and that the payment made in return was grossly unfair and inequitable.105
While the underlying facts of the Negritos case took place in the early to mid 1990s, the
literature reviewed in the previous sections demonstrates that many communities in Peru continue
to face similar power asymmetries. Like the Negritos Community, they are isolated and lack:
awareness of their rights; independent advice; access to credible and accessible information about
the impact of proposed projects; previous experience negotiating with companies; and experience
103
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resorting to the courts. Communities also often face coercive conditions, including poverty, social
exclusion and threats of violence if they oppose proposed projects. Like the Negritos case, at
present agreements and access to land are still often procured by: dividing and misleading
community members; disregarding or actively subverting broad consultation; and/or choosing to
negotiate secretly with leaders that already support the company, often in exchange for personal
gain.
As in the Negritos case, there continues to be significant risk that industry-Indigenous
agreements will, at worst, be improperly obtained through corruption, extortion or dishonesty, and
at best, that communities will negotiate agreements without fully understanding applicable laws,
as well as social, environmental and economic consequences. All of this makes the Negritos
Community’s litigation instructive, as it explores the question of how a potentially unconstitutional
or otherwise illegally obtained agreement between a foreign company and an Indigenous
community (communal titleholder) might be challenged in court on the basis of constitutional and
international Indigenous rights principles.
3.3 Challenging Illegitimate Agreements in the Courts
As indicated, in 2011 the Negritos Community launched a constitutional challenge to
agreements with Yanacocha Mine, signed in the early to mid 1990s. Under Peru’s Constitutional
Procedural Code, an amparo action is the single cause of action available to defend Campesino and
Native constitutional rights in these circumstances.106 In principle, it could allow for a kind of
judicial review of Indigenous-industry agreements. This is possible due to three important features
of Peruvian constitutional law. First, the amparo allows communities to request a remedy for
alleged violations of Campesino and Native rights already explicitly recognized in the constitution
and domestic legislation. Second, communities can bolster their claims by referring to certain
international Indigenous and human rights principles that are directly incorporated into Peru’s
constitution and are therefore legally binding. Third, the amparo allows communities to bring their
claim directly against a private party’s acts or omissions, such as for example those of a resource
company. Of further interest is the fact that these features of Peruvian constitutional law are similar
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in a number of other countries in Latin America.107 While the Negritos Community brought its
amparo action against the specific transfer of its property interests executed in contracts signed
with Yanacocha, given that the Procedural Code refers to any act or omission by a private or public
actor that violates a constitutional right, it appears that the amparo cause of action could capture
Indigenous-industry agreements more broadly.
Since presenting its amparo action, the Negritos community has faced many delays and
obstacles both inside and outside of the courtroom.108 Unsurprisingly, defendant Yanacocha Mine
responded by immediately objecting to the admissibility of the Community’s claim.109 However,
only one objection has prevailed at both first and second instance, namely that the claim is outside
of the required limitation period. This refers to the provisions of Peru’s Constitutional Procedural
Code that require a claimant to bring an amparo claim within 60 days from the time that the
claimant: (1) became aware of the rights violation, and (2) is able to bring the claim. The Code
also recognizes exceptions to this general rule, including where the alleged rights violating actions
are ongoing, or where the alleged violations are the result of omissions. 110
In 2015, an appeal court held that the 60-day limitation period began on the precise date in
the mid-1990s when a handful of Community leaders signed the agreement with Yanacocha to
transfer the company title and interests in communally owned land. The court reasoned that the
Negritos Community must have known about the land transfer due to the fact that the change in
title was filed in the public registrar and given that community members could plainly observe the
mine’s subsequent operations on formerly communal land. It characterized the Community’s
constitutional concerns about the agreement as a convenient excuse. The court also refused to
consider the argument that the limitation period rule should be interpreted equitably, taking into
account community members’ lack of knowledge of their substantive and procedural rights, and of
the nature and consequences of the agreement with Yanacocha. The court also declined to consider
the argument that the impugned agreement represents ongoing violations and/or omissions with
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respect to the Community’s rights, thereby triggering an exception to the 60-day limitation period.
On this basis, the court refused to consider the Community’s claim on the merits.111
In doing so, the appeal court presiding over the Negritos Community’s amparo action
adopted a formalistic view of consent whereby the signatures on an agreement document were
sufficient to trigger a very short limitation period of 60 days. This reasoning ignored the fact that
the Community’s central substantive allegations in the case are precisely that its land titles were
transferred to the company without its informed consent, on the basis of misinformation, falsehoods
or extortion, and in some cases without its knowledge. In other words, the appeal court’s approach
to consent in the limitation period context ignored the social and cultural reality of these early
interactions between Negritos Community members and representatives of Yanacocha Mine.
Rather, the court expected the Community to interact with Yanacocha like a sophisticated legal
actor, fully aware of and able to act on all of its procedural and substantive rights. The Negritos
Community is challenging the appeal court’s decision on these points in Peru’s highest
constitutional court.
4

Conclusion: Equitable Rights-Centred Oversight Mechanisms
This chapter reviewed literature evaluating the regulation of the Indigenous right to

consultation in various Latin American countries, as well as the implementation of this right on the
ground (Part 2), including through industry’s efforts to negotiate agreements with affected
communities. Building on this, it offered an account of the Peruvian legal context in order to
establish the relationship between state-led consultations under statute, and unregulated
Indigenous-industry agreements (Part 3). On this basis, I have argued that the legal and political
conditions in many Latin American countries generate a serious risk that Indigenous communities
will enter into benefit agreements with resource companies in the absence of full information and
knowledge of the meaning and significance of the agreement, without a variety of human rights
safeguards, and sometimes as a result of inappropriate or illegal tactics.
The Negritos Community’s efforts to challenge agreements with Yanacocha Mine related
to the transfer of property interests have uncovered an avenue for judicial scrutiny of allegedly
unconstitutional agreements. Peru’s constitutional order contains three key features that make this
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possible: it recognizes Campesino and Native Communities’ communal rights; it incorporates
certain internationally recognized Indigenous rights; and it allows rights violations claims to be
brought directly against a company. These features are also part of the legal systems of a number
of other Latin American countries. This framework is interesting in that it subjects private contracts
to constitutional scrutiny and the standards vested in constitutionalized Campesino, Native and
Indigenous rights.112
However, the social and legal dynamics of the Negritos case underscore that it can take a
great deal of time for communities to realize that they have a legal basis for challenging an unfair
agreement, find capable legal support and marshal all that is required to bring a case forward.
While the applicable limitation period in Peru’s Procedural Code is short, the rule is articulated
with important references to a claimant’s knowledge and capacity to bring a claim. Moreover, the
Code provides for certain exceptions to the rule. In principle this would give the courts discretion
to take a claimant’s social circumstances into account. However, in the Negritos case the courts to
date have chosen to ignore this in favour of a narrow interpretation of the limitation period rule.
This could convert the Community’s delay into an absolute bar to a substantive constitutional
consideration of its case.
The observations and findings in the Negritos case study merit analysis in relation to the
research reviewed in Part 2 of this chapter. This includes the work of authors who have attempted
to address, at a normative and theoretical level, the relationship between the Indigenous right to
consultation/consent and the right to self-determination, the problem of power, law’s colonial
legacies, and the meaning of consent and knowledge in the context of Indigenous-industry
agreements. This also includes widespread critiques of Indigenous consultation laws in Latin
America and the strong consensus that in principle and in practice these laws have failed to address
these normative and theoretical issues. Rather, they have tended toward the formalistic, liberal
concept of consent associated with classical contract law.
The Negritos Community’s experience reveals that the very same inequities, power
asymmetries and improprieties that lead communities into illegitimate agreements also prevent
112
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them from launching legal challenges in a timely fashion. Thus, notwithstanding the existence in
principle of potential legal avenues for judicial scrutiny of Indigenous-industry agreements, in
practice the formal equality logic of liberal contract law may work to bar Indigenous challenges to
past agreements with industry. In other words, there is an important continuity between the failure
to address questions of social context and power in the conceptualization and implementation of
the rights to consultation and consent/agreement, and the failure to address these same issues in the
procedural rules that function as gatekeepers to substantive judicial scrutiny of Indigenous-industry
agreements.
This observation should be important to those seeking to develop emancipatory normative
and practical approaches to Indigenous consultation and consent. As stated, the literature reviewed
in this chapter has critiqued the ways in which these rights are being articulated and implemented
in Latin America.

The Negritos case study adds to this critique, revealing that normative

developments in this area have also failed to consider the procedural obstacles to defending these
rights, including in the courts. In particular, they have failed to articulate the rules that should
govern how communities might challenge the legitimacy of past agreements with industry on
substantive or procedural grounds.
Current social and legal dynamics in Latin America indicate that this is not a small
oversight. There is a clear need for mechanisms capable of independently scrutinizing the validity
of Indigenous-Industry benefits agreements against the normative criteria of substantive
Indigenous rights.

Such mechanisms must safeguard against formalistic and exclusionary

approaches to consent, as exemplified by the Peruvian courts to date in the Negritos case. These
mechanisms must adopt equitable and contextual approaches to substantive and procedural
questions. In short, Anaya’s concept of equitable rights-centered agreements must be accompanied
by the development of equitable rights-centered causes of action, limitation period rules, and
normative standards for scrutinizing Indigenous-industry agreements after the fact.
As companies continue under present conditions to pursue benefits agreements with
Indigenous peoples in Latin America, there are problems and there will be more problems with
these agreements. In the absence of specialized oversight mechanisms, courts will often be the
only forum for resolving rights and distribution claims and ensuring the legitimacy and legality of
past agreements. However, judicial oversight will only be possible if civil procedures enable
communities to access the courts in practice. At stake is communities’ ability to operationalize
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substantive Indigenous rights principles to remedy past and ongoing violations that have been
enshrined in so-called “agreements”.
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CHAPTER THREE: Canadian Mining Companies and Domestic Law Reform: A Critical
Legal Account
By Charis Kamphuis*
Abstract
This article offers a critical legal account of law reform efforts undertaken by Canadian activist
groups between 2005 and 2012, together with the government’s response, introduced in 2009. It
begins by introducing the social and economic context that forms the backdrop of these efforts. The
relevant proposals for legal reform in Canada are then reviewed in terms of three periods. In the
first, federal advisors made proposals that attempted to reconcile private and public approaches
to regulation. In the second, the federal government introduced a corporate social responsibility
(CSR) policy predicated on volunteerism. And in the third period, three individual Members of
Parliament have tabled private members’ bills, each representing very different private and public
approaches to regulation. Following this, each reform project is analyzed in terms of the regulatory
vision it presents and the conception of the state, the corporation, and civil society that it advances.
This paper represents a preliminary step toward considering how the private or public nature of
the legal forum might shape activists’ legal strategies and articulations of the corporation, the
state and the problem.
1 Introduction & Research Context
In the last decade, Canada has become the most important home jurisdiction for mining
companies operating globally. Certain Canadian NGOs, faith groups and labor unions1 argue that
these activities systematically give rise to conflicts between companies and local communities in
circumstances where companies frequently enjoy effective impunity for the human rights
violations they may commit. This assessment has prompted these groups and other likeminded
actors to advocate for a series of law reform proposals.
This article offers a critical legal account of these law reform efforts, undertaken between
2005 and 2012, together with the government’s response, introduced in 2009. It begins in Part 2
by introducing the social and economic context that forms the backdrop of these efforts. This
consists of a description of the Canadian foreign mining sector and some of the associated social
conflicts. Extractive activities and conflicts in Latin American are profiled in particular given the
significance of that region for Canadian mining companies. The relevant proposals for legal reform
in Canada are then reviewed in Part 3 in terms of three periods. In the first, federal advisors made
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proposals that attempted to reconcile private and public approaches to regulation. In the second,
the federal government introduced a corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy predicated on
volunteerism. And in the third period, three individual Members of Parliament have tabled private
members’ bills, each representing very different private and public approaches to regulation.
Following this review, each reform project is analyzed in Part 4 in terms of the regulatory
vision it presents and the conception of the state, the corporation, and civil society that it advances.
In conclusion, this article’s place within its broader research context is explored. To date, the
Federal government has declined to enact legislation that would specifically regulate the activities
of Canadian mining companies operating abroad. In the absence of such a regime, advocates
interested in pursuing legal recourse in Canada are presently engaging with an ad hoc mix of private
and public legal mechanisms to pursue corporate accountability on behalf of affected communities.
The present article is part of a larger project that examines this engagement and inquires into the
theoretical, political and strategic considerations that might guide this activism. Among the broader
questions at stake is that of the nature of the relationship between legal form and substance in the
context of private or public law activism. This may be particularly of interest to those concerned
with the question of how the private or public nature of the legal forum might shape the substance
of activists’ legal and political struggles.
2 Canadian Mining Abroad: Social & Economic Context
2.1 The Canadian Mining Sector: Global and National Economic Significance
Canadian mining companies have historically had a strong global presence and until very
recently, their outward investment has consistently exceeded inward investment levels.2 In the last
two decades, Canadian stock exchanges have come to dominate the global mining industry. As of
2012, Canadian stock exchanges listed more mining companies than the exchanges of any other
country in the world and Canadian-listed companies conducted about 40% of all mineral
exploration globally.3 This market activity is concentrated on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX)
2
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and the TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV), currently home to 58% of the world’s publicly traded
mining companies.4 These two exchanges are also the largest source of equity capital for global
mining exploration and production. From 1999-2011, on average they facilitated over 80% of all
global mining equity financings, and in 2011 and 2012 that number rose to 90%.5
Just as the activities of these companies are significant globally, they are also important for
Canadian capital markets generally. Among Canada’s goods-producing sectors, mining companies
listed on Canadian stock exchanges are the largest single group of outward investors. This has
grown from $13.5 billion in investments in 1990 to $58 billion in 2010, with a historic high of
$66.2 billion in 2008.6 This sector accounts for a sizable portion of all Canadian direct investment
abroad, at over 12% in 2005 and 9.4% in 2010.7
Almost half of all mineral exploration projects held by TSX/V companies are outside of
Canada8 and Latin America is one of the most significant regional destinations for this investment.
According to statistics from 2009 and 2010, approximately 50% of all Canadian mining assets
abroad are invested in Latin America and the Caribbean9 and there are 286 TSX/V listed mining
companies operating in South America alone. 10 Moreover, Canadian mining investment in this
region appears to be growing. In 2010, companies on the TSX/V raised a record amount of capital
for projects in Latin America11 and in 2011 projects in South America received the largest share of
the total amount of mining equity capital raised.12
In sum, Canadian mining companies are major global players and Canadian capital markets
play a crucial role in facilitating the investment activity that drives the global mining industry. In
this context, Latin America is one of the most important regional destinations for Canadian mining
investment. Taken together, these activities are also significant for Canada in that they form an
important part of Canada’s overall foreign investment activity.
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2.2 Canadian Mining & Social Conflict in Latin America
Any review of law reform efforts must begin by describing “the problem” that such reforms
seek to address. In many policy matters this can be controversial and the activities of Canadian
mining companies abroad is no exception. In this context, it is useful to begin with sources that
share a relatively high degree of consensus. The activities of Canadian mining companies were
intensively studied by the Advisory Group of the Canadian National Roundtables on Corporate
Social Responsibility and the Extractive Industry in Developing Countries, a group of experts
representing industry, NGOs and academia. In its consensus report, this group summarized the
concerns at issue in terms of: “environmental concerns; community relations; human rights;
security and armed conflict; labor relations; indigenous peoples’ rights; compatibility of resource
development with national and local economic priorities; benefit sharing with local communities;
ineffective legal systems and the potential for corruption.”13
The Advisory Group developed this list in part on the basis of information provided by a
large number of civil society organizations in Canada and internationally14 that are dedicated to
documenting the concerns expressed by numerous communities located in countries where
Canadian mining companies operate. This grassroots work is prolific and in many cases it involves
allegations that are highly contentious. At the same time, it has given rise to a handful of legal
proceedings in Canada, together with a small concentration of academic writing and empirical
research. Of course even these accounts, presented in the formal settings of law and academia, are
also contested. To date no court has considered a case based on its substantive merits for the reason
that mining company defendants have successfully raised preliminary objections that prevented
these cases from moving forward.
This review draws on this relatively small body of published academic writing and legal
claims to provide some specific examples of “the problem” associated with the activities of
Canadian mining companies abroad. It maintains a focus on Latin America, partly because of the
economic importance of this region, evidenced above, but also due to the fact that the public record,
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as generated by legal activism and academic writing, is arguably greater in relation to Canadian
mining in Latin America than in any other regions. While this review is brief and non-exhaustive,
it nonetheless offers a preliminary sketch of the nature of the social conflicts at issue.
Perhaps not surprisingly, concerns regarding current or potential environmental damage are
a significant underlying factor in many of the conflicts attributed to Canadian mining. The most
famous case in this category arose from an environmental catastrophe caused by the collapse of a
tailings dam in 1995 at the Omai Gold Mine in Guyana, owned by Cambior.15 While this is the
only case brought in Canada to date on the basis of actual environmental damage, there is
documentation of growing concern for potential environmental damage. This is expressed through
the emerging practice of the local community referendum, which generally consists of a formal
opportunity, organized by and for community members, to vote either for or against a proposed
project. With regard to Canadian mining companies, there are three well-documented examples to
date in Latin America (in Peru, Guatemala and Argentina), all resulting in the popular rejection of
the proposed project.16 While these votes have occurred in the context of varying domestic legal
frameworks and their legal implications are contested, 17 they have had important political
consequences.
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The phenomenon of community referenda raises the issue of the meaningful participation
and consent of local communities to mining projects. This in turn feeds into another significant
underlying factor in Canadian mining conflicts in Latin America, namely the failure to respect
communal and individual land and property rights. While allegations of this nature are numerous,
there are several cases where it has been possible to collect extensive supporting documentation.
The Marlin Mine in Guatemala, owned by Goldcorp, is accused of failing to properly consult with
local communities prior to mine development and of coercing landowners into selling their
property to the company.18 Also in Guatemala, the Canadian owners of the El Estor Mine have
been accused of ignoring the land claims of indigenous communities and of participating in the
violent eviction of community members. 19 Finally, the La Platosa Mine in Mexico, owned by
Excellon Resources, is accused of failing to respect its land rental agreement with local communal
landowners.20
These bases for community opposition to Canadian mining frequently result in conflicts
that include acts of violence against community members, and particularly against prominent
leaders. It is alleged that in 2006 the employees of a private security company, contracted by
Copper Mesa, attacked unarmed members of a community in Junin, Ecuador who opposed the
company’s proposed project. 21 The community referenda in Peru and Guatemala, referenced
18
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above, were both accompanied by violence. Community leaders were assassinated in the context
of both referenda, and in Guatemala police and army officers killed an individual at a public
protest.22 In relation to the El Estor Mine in Guatemala, since 1969 there have been numerous
assassinations of community leaders, most recently in 2009.23 The El Estor Mine is also the focus
of one of the most disturbing allegations of violence against a Canadian mining company to date.
It is alleged that in 2007, police, military, and the mine’s security personnel raped ten Mayan
women while undertaking land evictions in favor of the company.24
These micro-level accounts of the use of violence in order to protect the interests of
Canadian mining companies resonate with the general observations of international human rights
bodies. In 2010, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
Defenders reported that private corporations are allegedly impeding the activities of human rights
defenders working on issues related to the exploitation of natural resources. The Rapporteur noted
instances where security guards employed by mining companies allegedly committed acts of
violence against human rights defenders concerned with the negative impacts of these activities.25
Similarly, in 2011 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights observed that violence
against defenders of the environment has become more pronounced where there are serious
tensions between the supporters of extractive industries, and those sectors that resist the
implementation of projects in order to prevent environmental harm.26
In sum, the legal and academic accounts touched upon in the above review can by
synthesized in terms of three key potential sources of social conflict between Canadian mining
companies and communities in Latin America. First, conflicts can arise were communities suspect
actual or potential environmental damage. Second, conflicts can originate in a lack of consent and
inadequate community participation in project development. Finally, violations of communal or
22
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individual property rights and/or disregard for land claims may lead to conflict. When these three
concerns remain unaddressed and conflicts occur, there is a risk that community opposition to
mining will be met with significant violence and repression.
3 Resource Extraction & Law Reform Efforts in Canada
Communities’ concerns and the associated risks of violence form the social context that has
compelled civil society actors to advocate in favor of law reform in Canada. While these law reform
efforts are multifaceted, they have nonetheless been dominated by a fundamental struggle between
two models. Certain civil society actors have advocated for Canadian government regulation and
enforceable laws, while certain industry representatives have taken the position that voluntary
mechanisms represent the best governance model.
The struggle in Canada between these two approaches, which has largely taken place since
the early 2000s, can be understood in terms of three main, yet somewhat overlapping, periods. In
the first period, federal government advisors proposed regulatory models that attempted to
reconcile public regulation and private voluntary governance models. Following this, the federal
government introduced its CSR policy in the form of a private voluntary model that is facilitated
by designated government actors. In the third period, federal Members of Parliament introduced
three different private members bills, respectively representing public law, private law and
voluntary approaches to regulation. The proposals developed in each of these periods are reviewed
below with a focus on their regulatory features.
3.1 Federal Advisors: Reconciling Private Volunteerism and Public Regulation?
After civil society activists succeeded in bringing concerns regarding the conduct of
Canadian mining companies abroad to the attention of federal lawmakers, the Parliamentary Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Development held periodic hearings into the matter.
In 2005, the Sub-committee drafted a report entitled Mining in Developing Countries: Corporate
Social Responsibility,27 which was subsequently adopted by the Standing Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) and submitted to Parliament.
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The SCFAIT Report called on the Government of Canada to “put in place stronger
incentives to encourage Canadian mining companies to conduct their activities outside of Canada
in a socially and environmentally responsible manner and in conformity with international human
rights standards.”28 The Committee urged that such measures “must include” conditioning federal
government financial and political support29 for companies on their adherence to “clearly defined
corporate social responsibility and human rights standards”.30 Further, the Committee urged the
government to “establish clear legal norms in Canada to ensure that Canadian companies and
residents are held accountable when there is evidence of environmental and/or human rights
violations”.31
These core recommendations are notable for the particular approach to public regulation
that they promote. The SCFAIT Report envisions a role for the federal government that evaluates
mining companies’ compliance with a set of normative standards, prior to extending political or
financial support. In this regard, it defines “financial support” as project loans made with public
funds, primarily through Export Development Canada. Further, the Committee proposes that this
preliminary conditionality be accompanied by a complaint or investigation mechanism with the
enforcement power to ensure accountability, in the form of the withdrawal of government support,
for violations of these standards. Finally, while the Report references CSR standards, its overall
language appears to propose public international human rights law, such as international human
rights treaties, as the basis for developing the enforceable standards it calls for.
In addition to proposing a public regulation approach, the SCFAIT Report calls on the
federal government to actively promote the enforcement capacity of certain private transnational
mechanisms. Specifically, the Report calls upon the government to advocate for a model of
mandatory compliance with regard to the, at-present voluntary, OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. It also calls on the Government of Canada to advocate for a model

compiled on the basis of the committee’s recent round of hearings in continuation of the committee’s compilation of
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among international financial institutions (IFIs) where project financing is made contingent on
adherence to international human rights standards.32
In response to the 2005 SCFAIT report, in 2006 the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) established the National Roundtables on Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) and the Extractive Industry in Developing Countries. To support the
Roundtables, DFAIT convened an Advisory Group of experts from academia, labor, civil society,
the socially responsible investment community, and industry. After participating in roundtables in
four Canadian cities, the Advisory Group drafted a final report with consensus recommendations
for the creation of a CSR Framework by the Government of Canada.33 According to one Advisory
Group member, achieving a consensus regarding the regulatory component of this Framework
required the negotiation of an accountability mechanism that struck a middle ground between the
position of government and industry in favour of “pure volunteerism”, and the push from civil
society members for mandatory standards and law reform to make sanctions and remedies available
in Canadian courts.34
The model of regulation ultimately proposed by the Advisory Group contained two key
components of interest.35 First, it involved the development of a set of Canadian CSR standards of
conduct and reporting obligations. However, it circumscribed the sources of these norms to include
only those international frameworks that result from “multi-stakeholder and multilateral dialogue”.
This caveat refers to private transnational norms designed with the joint participation of civil
society actors, states, and industry. Concretely, the Advisory Group sanctioned the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards and the Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights as the only appropriate sources of standards, in addition to the OECD Guidelines,
already endorsed by the Government of Canada.36 As such, the use of public international human
rights law and treaties as a source of standards was effectively precluded from the proposed
Canadian CSR Framework. Rather, the Report states that the application of the private
32
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transnational standards named above must “observe and enhance respect for” the principles of
public international human rights law “that are within the sphere of control of companies”.37
Second, the Advisory Group’s proposed model included a fact-finding and accountability
component with two key features: an ombudsman and a review committee. In this concept, the
independent ombudsman office would be empowered to investigate and report on complaints with
respect to Canadian extractive companies operating in developing countries.38 This role would feed
into the mandate of a tripartite Compliance Review Committee with the power to consider the
ombudsman’s investigations in order to make determinations and recommendations regarding the
nature and degree of company non-compliance with Canadian CSR Standards. In cases of serious
failure to comply, and when steps to bring the company into compliance had failed, the CSR
framework contemplated that the Government of Canada should sanction the company by
withdrawing financial and/or non-financial support. 39 Like the SCFAIT Report, the Advisory
Group defined these forms of support in terms of financial support from Export Development
Canada (EDC) and political support from diplomatic trade missions, defined as support that goes
beyond ordinary consular services by promoting a Canadian company or its interests in a foreign
country.
3.2 The Federal CSR Policy: The Advantage of Canadian Volunteerism
The Government of Canada waited two years to respond to the Advisory Group Report.
Then, in 2009, it announced its policy “Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social
Responsibility Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector”. This policy represents a
radical embrace of volunteerism that sharply contrasts with the proposals tabled in the SCFAIT
and the Advisory Group Reports.
The overall objective of the federal policy is to “improve the competitiveness” of the sector
by enhancing companies’ abilities to manage social and environmental risks.40 To this end the
policy operates on the basis of four pillars. First, it supports initiatives to enhance the capacities of
37
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developing countries to manage the development of extractive activities and improve opportunities
for economic development. Second, it endorses four voluntary transnational performance
guidelines: the IFC Performance Standards, the Voluntary Principles, the Global Reporting
Initiative (GRI), and the OECD Guidelines. Third, it creates a Centre for Excellence in CSR, and
finally, it creates the Office of the Extractive Sector Corporate Social Responsibility Counselor,
who is a special advisor to the Minister for International Trade. This Office has the mandate to
administer the policy’s regulatory component.
The Office of the CSR Counselor is mandated to review the CSR practices of Canadian
companies operating outside of Canada according to a five-step process that, upon the submission
of a request for review, offers eligible parties informal mediation, followed by the option of formal
mediation.41 It states that an “individual, group or community” who “reasonably believes” that they
have been adversely affected by the activities of a Canadian extractive sector company, for the
reason that they are inconsistent with the endorsed guidelines, is eligible to request a review. At
the same time, a Canadian company can submit a request for review to the Office if it “believes”
that “an identifiable party” has made unfounded allegations against it. In both cases the process is
voluntary and the participants can withdraw at any time. The Office states that its process is not
adjudicative or investigative, rather it aims to promote dialogue, problem solving and conflict
resolution.
The Office opened in March 2010 and began receiving requests for review in October of
that year. To date, the Office has received only three requests for review in two years.42 A Mexican
NGO and labor union jointly requested the first review in relation to Excellon Resources. This
review failed to yield results because Excellon abruptly withdrew from the process before
proceeding to the dialogue stage. 43 The Office received its second request for review from
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organizations in Mauritania concerned about First Quantum Minerals’ mine, but it closed this
review shortly thereafter at the “informal mediation” phase for the reason that the requesters had
not pursued the available “site level grievance mechanism”.44 Two Argentinean NGOs submitted
a third request for review in relation to a project owned by McEwen Mining. Like Excellon,
McEwen Mining withdrew from the process before it could proceed from the “information
mediation” phase to a “facilitated dialogue”.45
3.3 Private Member Bills: An Eclectic Mix of Legal Mechanisms
In the wake of the voluntary federal CSR policy and the public regulation proposals put
forward in the SCFAIT and Advisory Reports, individual Members of Parliament became engaged,
introducing three different private members bills between 2009 and 2010. While each of these
intended to impact the accountability of Canadian mining companies operating abroad, the bills
represent very different approaches to the regulation of the transnational corporation.
Liberal Member John McKay introduced the first of these in 2009 under the banner of Bill
C-300, An Act Respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in
Developing Countries. 46 This Bill passed through its first and second reading at the House of
Commons before it was narrowly defeated at its third and final reading in October of 2010.47 Many
of the civil society organizations behind the Bill 48 had also participated in the National
Roundtables, either as Advisory Committee members or by making submissions. These groups
made enormous efforts to garner political support for the Bill and they attributed its failure to heavy
lobbying and misinformation on the part of the Canadian mining industry.49
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Bill C-300 would have applied to any company incorporated under federal or provincial
law that engaged in mining, oil or gas activities with support from the Government of Canada. Its
stated intention was to ensure that the conduct of these companies is consistent with international
environmental best practices and Canada’s commitments to international human rights standards,
defined as standards based on international customary law and on the international human rights
conventions to which Canada is party. Concretely, the Bill required the creation of corporate
accountability standards that incorporated the IFC Performance Standards, the Voluntary
Principles, and human rights provisions consistent with international human rights standards.
Moreover, Bill-C 300 proposed a complaint mechanism administered by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of International Trade. It would have obligated both Ministers to
receive complaints from Canadian citizens, permanent residents, or residents and citizens from a
developing country, regarding Canadian companies engaged in mining, oil or gas activities. Where
either Minister determined that a corporation had not met the standard of conduct established
pursuant to the Bill, they were to notify Export Development Canada (EDC) and the Canada
Pension Plan (CPP) Investment Board.
Through a consequential amendment to the Export Development Act,50 Bill C-300 required
EDC to make its contracts and transactions conditional on companies’ compliance with the Bill’s
standards. Similarly, the Bill proposed an amendment to the Canada Pension Plan Investment
Board Act51 requiring the Board to take the standards into consideration when investing CPP assets,
and to refrain from investing in any corporation whose activities have been found by the Ministers
to be inconsistent with the standards. Finally, through an amendment to the Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Act,52 the Bill further required DFAIT to undertake its duty to
coordinate Canada’s international economic relations and its efforts to expand Canada’s
international trade and commerce in a manner consistent with the standards. It also required DFAIT
to refrain from promoting or supporting, beyond the provision of ordinary consular services,
mining, oil or gas activities that are inconsistent with the standards set out by the Bill. Based on
the foregoing, it is clear that Bill C-300 was modeled after the proposals in the SCFAIT and the
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Advisory Group Reports, while at the same time expanding their regulatory scope to include CPP
investments and human rights standards.
The second private member’s Bill in the realm of CSR in Canada is Bill C-323, An Act to
amend the Federal Courts Act (international promotion and protection of human rights).53 New
Democratic Party (NDP) Member Peter Julian first tabled this bill in 2009, but after the defeat of
Bill C-300, he re-introduced it to Parliament again in 2011.54 The Bill would extend the jurisdiction
of the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal to include civil claims brought by non-citizens
who allege a violation, committed in a foreign state or territory, of international law or of a treaty
to which Canada is a party. The Bill would then place the burden on the defendant to prove that
the Courts should not take jurisdiction over the claim. Mr. Julian describes his Bill as a Canadian
version of the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act.55
The third private member’s bill to date is Bill C-571, An Act respecting corporate practices
relating to the purchase of minerals from the Great Lakes Region of Africa,56 tabled in 2010 by
NDP Member Paul Dewar. 57 It would apply to any corporation incorporated in Canada that
endeavors to purchase minerals that originate in a designated group of African countries. The Bill
would require companies to undertake certain due diligence practices to ensure that the purchase
of these minerals does not directly or indirectly provide monetary gain to illegal armed groups.
Finally, the Bill requires the CSR Counselor to report on those companies that she believes are not
following appropriate CSR practices in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. In essence, Bill C-571
would expand the mandate of the CSR Office to include reporting on a specific issue and region.
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4 Analysis
John Ruggie, the United Nations Special Representative on the issue of human rights and
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, describes the “business and human rights
predicament” in terms of a “governance gap”. 58 His usage of this term refers to the distance
between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to
manage their adverse consequences. On the other hand, Catherine Coumans, the Research
Coordinator of the NGO MiningWatch Canada,59 describes the same set of concerns in terms of
the “effective impunity” of the transnational corporation.60 Coumans’ concept is defined as those
circumstances where the governments of the jurisdictions where companies operate (host states)
do not hold them to account for their human rights violations, and the governments of the countries
where companies are headquartered (home states) lack the political will to regulate them or provide
the conditions for legal accountability for these violations. Interestingly, the term “impunity” does
not appear in Ruggie’s report, though Coumans does note that the “governance gaps” highlighted
by Ruggie are one way of framing the causes of “effective impunity”.61
The above examples are only two of many that underscore the fact that there is no consensus
on how to describe the legal and regulatory problematic generated by transnational corporate
activity, with the Canadian mining industry’s foreign operations given as one example. Indeed,
how one frames the problem involves making choices that lead to different political, policy and
legal proposals. Thus, there are at least two interrelated arenas for debate on the subject. The first
is a conceptual, or even epistemic, debate about how to define the problem, while the second is a
regulatory debate about how to address the problem, once defined.
The following analysis examines the regulatory and policy proposals advanced in Canada
to date in order to identify the conceptual assumptions they embody regarding the state, the
corporation, and civil society. This is an early stage attempt to interrogate the terms of the debate
in Canada and the manner in which this debate has manifested in the particular legal terrain of law
58
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reform. To do so, this analysis gives special attention to the private and/or public features of each
proposal, the specific way it purports to use law to structure the relationship between the state and
the corporation, and the conception of the private and public spheres that underlie the regulatory
dimensions of each proposal.
This method of inquiry illuminates the fact that, while on a political level it appears that the
regulatory struggle in Canada has taken place between those who advocate enforceable standards
and those who support exclusively voluntary commitments; there are also important conceptual
differences and assumptions in the use of private and public law among the proposals for
enforceable standards. As such, the proposals described in the previous section are analyzed in
terms of three main categories: (1) public law regulatory approaches, (2) voluntary approaches,
and (3) private law litigation approaches.
4.1 Public Regulation Models: What is the Scope of the Public?
The SCFAIT Report, the National Roundtables Advisory Group Report, and Bill C-300 are
all “public regulation” proposals for the reason that they envision either the creation of a new
regulatory body, or the creation of new regulatory duties within an existing federal body. In either
case, the designated body is charged with a regulatory mandate to investigate and evaluate the
conduct of Canadian mining companies according to a set of standards, and to impose a certain
range of sanctions where appropriate. Beyond sharing these public regulation features, these
proposals are also unified by certain fundamental assumptions, which will be interrogated here in
the context of two key regulatory features: standards and sanctions. At the same time, variations
between proposals will be considered.
On the issue of standards, all three proposals aim to create a hybrid standard based on a
blend of voluntary multi-stakeholder CSR standards and international public human rights law
standards. However, the method for constructing this blended standard is contentious. One key
issue that emerges from these three proposals revolves around the relative weight or prioritization
that should be afforded to public sources of standards verses their private counterparts.
Of the three public regulation proposals, the Advisory Group Report is the most explicit
and descriptive on the standards issue. The previous section described how this Report explicitly
excluded public international human rights law as a source of standards in favor of transnational
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norms that originate from multi-stakeholder international processes.62 The Report confirms that
this recommendation was a difficult concession for the civil society members of the Advisory
Group. These members criticized standards originating from investment institutions, such as the
IFC Performance Standards, as “risk-based principles developed by a financial institution and
accepted by corporations”.63 Civil society members would have preferred standards derived from
human rights-based principles reflected in globally endorsed United Nations treaties.64
In response to these concerns, the Advisory Group Report stated that the application of
transnational standards must “observe and enhance respect for” the principles of public
international human rights law “that are within the sphere of control of companies”.65 In other
words, the standards contemplated by the Advisory Group must be consistent with only those
human rights principles that are in Canadian mining companies’ sphere of control. Conversely then,
one might logically reason that, at least in some cases, these standards may in fact be inconsistent
with human rights concerns that are outside of the sphere of control of companies. The Report
seems to acknowledge this possibility when it concedes that its proposal does not cover the full
range of human rights concerns raised by the extractive industry in developing countries. 66
Unfortunately, the Report does not provide concrete examples that might better explain how its
proposed blend of standards might work in practice.
At first brush, it would seem obvious that companies should not be held accountable for
issues that are outside of their “sphere of control”. Yet this simple proposition obscures the fact
that the question of the scope of the human rights obligations of transnational companies under
international law is extraordinarily complex and contentious. This precise issue has polarized
several decades of efforts at the United Nations to create a code of conduct on the subject.67 By
62

The Advisory Group sanctioned the International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards and the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights as the only appropriate sources of standards, in addition to the
OECD Guidelines, already endorsed by the Government of Canada, see ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 13.
63
ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 13, at 12.
64
Id. See also Coumans, supra note 32, at 41-42.
65
ADVISORY GROUP REPORT, supra note 13, at v. In its Report, the Advisory Group acknowledges that the initial
recommended framework falls short of addressing the full range of issues of concern regarding extractive industry,
particularly with regard to human rights, see id. at iv.
66
Id. at iv.
67
Alejandro Teitelbaum, Observations on the Final Report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, The Jus Semper Global Alliance (May 2011), available
online at:
http://www.jussemper.org/Resources/Corporate%20Activity/Resources/Observations_to%20Ruggies_final2011.pdf.

152

adopting the caveat “sphere of control”, the language of the Advisory Group Report lends itself at
best to a contractual conception of companies’ human rights responsibilities. Legally speaking, the
company might only be found to “control” those actions that are directly attributable to its
employees or other agents with whom it enters into a contractual relationship of some kind.
The SCFAIT Report and Bill C-300 propose a method for blending international standards
to create a Canadian CSR standard that stands in contradistinction to the Advisory Group Report’s
circumscription of the role of international human rights norms. However, on this subject, the
SCFAIT Report makes only general recommendations. It simply states that company conduct
should conform to clearly defined international human rights principles and corporate social
responsibility standards.68 Bill C-300 provides some additional detail as to how such a combined
standard might be constructed. Its declared objective is to ensure that Canadian mining companies
operate in a manner that is consistent with Canada’s obligations under international human rights
law. However, in creating a human rights standard to meet this objective, Bill C-300 aims to
incorporate the same set of multisectoral transnational standards that were given priority in the
Advisory Group Report, namely, the IFC Performance Standards and the Voluntary Principles. As
mentioned earlier, the IFC Standards are designed to govern the terms of the loans that the IFC
provides to private enterprises investing in developing countries.
The prospect of melding this set of private transnational standards with international public
law human rights principles is an interesting endeavor. Unfortunately, like the Advisory group
Report recommendations, Bill C-300 was not implemented, making it difficult to conceptualize
how this might occur in practice. Thus, these unfulfilled law reform projects leave a number of
unanswered questions, which are briefly articulated here. First, it is unclear what an integrated
private/public standard might achieve, beyond what is already accomplished by international
public law norms. This question arises given that public law principles are generally far more
expansive than private transnational norms. Moreover, to the extent that there are differences
between the two, it may be the case that risk-based standards and human rights-based norms contain
certain fundamental contradictions. This seemed to be the concern of the civil society members of
the Advisory Group. CSR standards are designed to be compatible with protecting and advancing
the interests of investors, while international human rights standards were created to grant
protections to all individuals. This raises the question of how standards rooted in different
68
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normative logics might be combined, and what logic might orient the resulting blended standard.
For example, how would the interests of communities affected by mining operations be reconciled
with those of the investors in the design of this blended standard?
This question leads to another important, and related, area of analysis, namely the
relationship between the standards and objectives articulated in these regulatory proposals. Both
the SCFAIT Report and Bill C-300 shared a common objective: to ensure that the conduct of
Canadian companies’ is consistent with Canada’s international human rights standards. Thus, both
proposals would impose a duty on the Canadian government to regulate the activities of its mining
companies abroad to meet this objective. In such a regime, the Canadian state would impose its
obligations under international human rights law onto these companies. Further, the regulation
contemplated would extend the scope of these obligations to include communities adversely
affected by Canadian mining companies operating abroad. In sum, the Canadian state would have
an obligation, created by the regulation, to ensure that its companies do not violate the rights of
communities abroad, as articulated by the international treaties that Canada is signatory to.69
This careful (if not laborious) articulation reveals the close relationship between standards
and objectives in regulatory design. For example, in both Bill C-300 and the SCFAIT Report, the
standards also constitute the objectives of the proposed regulation: the objective is to ensure that
companies respect human rights, and the standards imposed on companies are human rights
standards. Thus, standards and objectives are crucial to the design of these public regulatory
regimes and they must inform this article’s analysis of their proposed sanctions. This is the case
because the sanction components of these regulatory regimes constitute the means for achieving
their objectives, which are in turn contingent on the standards they apply.
Turning then to the issue of sanctions, the SCFAIT, Advisory Group and Bill C-300 all
concentrate on the withdrawal of federal government financial and political support. As the first
proposal, the SCFAIT Report set a template in this regard that was subsequently followed by the
other two proposals. While the SCFAIT Report puts forward a model that targets the institutional
financing of Canadian mining companies, it refers to only two sources of financing: private sources
originating from international financial institutions (IFIs), and public financing from funds
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managed by the Canadian government, primarily through Export Development Canada (EDC).
Thus, it locates the enforceable standards it proposes in two spheres, namely transnational private
law and domestic public law. Since the Canadian government lacks the power to unilaterally make
changes in IFI financing, its proposal regarding public financing is of greater interest for the
purpose of this analysis.
What is notable about SCFAIT’s adoption of financing as a method of sanction is the
narrowness of its focus, as in fact the most significant areas of company financing are absent from
the Report. There is no question that the accumulation of capital through financial markets in
Canada is the largest source of financing for Canadian mining companies, as outlined above. At
$58 billion in 2010,70 the outward investments of Canadian mining companies dwarfs the total
investments of EDC in the entire commercial extractive sector, at $14.6 million in the same year.71
Yet the SCFAIT Report does not consider Canadian capital markets whatsoever.
Ostensibly, this is because the Report is concerned only with the federal government’s
“political and financial support” for Canadian mining companies. If so, the Report’s rationale is
predicated on the assumption that government political and financial support does not occur in and
through the private sphere, or in other words, that financial markets exist autonomously of state
decisions, actions, and interventions. 72 By rending invisible the multidimensional role of
government in the creation, maintenance and promotion of capital markets,73 the SCFAIT Report
precludes the market, as an area of possible intervention and sanction, from the scope of the state’s
regulatory authority.
This assumption that the market exists autonomously from the state fits with the SCFAIT
Report’s related conception of the public sphere and the scope of moral responsibility attributable
to the state. As described above, the Report focuses almost exclusively on the financing provided
by EDC, a corporation created and owned by the Government of Canada. The Minister for
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International Trade appoints EDC’s board members, who must report to Parliament annually on
the fulfillment of EDC’s primary objective, which is to develop Canadian capacity to engage in
trade, partly through the provision of credit, insurance and investments to Canadian businesses.74
By focusing exclusively on EDC, the SCFAIT Report circumscribes the role of the
Canadian State in the regulation of Canadian mining companies operating abroad to circumstances
where it has entered into a direct contractual relationship with a company in the form of a financing
agreement. Seen as such, the role of the state as a regulator is reduced to that of a private market
actor in that the scope of its regulatory authority is dictated by its commercial relationships, in this
case as an issuer of loans. Given that human rights and other normative concerns form the
objectives of SCFAIT’s proposed regulatory approach (as discussed above), this method of
sanction serves to equate the state’s sphere of moral responsibility with the circumstances of its
direct financial interests. Thus, this public regulation approach emerges as a kind of “privatism”
in the sense that the state, while apparently acting as a public regulator, would regulate only its
own private commercial relationship with certain corporate actors. The fact that EDC’s decision
making and compliance with social and environmental policies is itself covered by almost total
confidentiality adds to the private nature of this form of regulation.
The Advisory Group Report maintained the SCFAIT Report’s underlying assumptions
regarding the nature of the private and public sphere and their relationship. Like the SCFAIT
Report, it focuses on conditioning the federal government’s project financing, primarily through
EDC. However, it somewhat minimizes the regulatory role proposed in the SCFAIT Report in that
it does not contemplate a requirement that projects be screened prior to financing. 75 Rather, it
specifies that financing may only be withdrawn after a complaint process is completed, and
compliance efforts are exhausted. Further, the Advisory Group does not take up the SCFAIT
recommendation to pressure international financial institutions to enhance the enforcement of CSR
standards.
On the other hand, the Advisory Group shares the SCFAIT recommendation to use the
withdrawal of political support as a potential sanction. It elaborates on the meaning of political
support, which was not expounded on in the SCFAIT Report, and defines it as support from trade
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missions that goes beyond ordinary consular services by promoting a Canadian company or its
interests in a foreign country. In sum, the strength of the public regulatory role in the Advisory
Group Report is somewhat weaker than in the SCFAIT proposal, support for the enforcement of
transnational norms is removed, and the meaning of political support is defined.
On the subject of sanction and financing, the regulatory vision of Bill C-300 most closely
resembles that of the SCFAIT Report. It contemplates imposing a proactive obligation on EDC to
screen projects, together with the withdrawal of access to EDC financial services. It further adds
specific provisions for the withdrawal of Canadian political support, building on the definition set
out in the Advisory Group Report. However, Bill C-300 moved significantly beyond both Reports
in that it introduces an additional form of sanction through the requirement that investments be
screened, and that CPP funds be withdrawn from Canadian mining companies found responsible
for human rights violations abroad. This step is momentous in terms of its potential economic
ramifications. The CPP is unquestionably the largest institutional investor in Canada.76 As of June
2012, the CPP Fund was valued at $165.8 billion,77 affording it a level of investment power that
dwarfs that of EDC, with a cap of authorized capital set at $3 billion.78
Normatively, Bill C-300’s proposal would have transformed the CPP Board’s current
framework for investment decision-making. At present the Board, like all other public sector
pension fund investment boards in Canada, operates in a legal framework that allows it to take
social and environmental considerations into account in its investment decisions only to the extent
that they threaten to negatively impact a company’s profitability.79 The Board explicitly states that
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it does not screen its investments based on these concerns alone for the reason that doing so would
either increase risks or reduce returns. Rather, the Board evaluates these concerns only to the extent
they affect long-term risk and financial returns to beneficiaries.80
The Board’s statements in this regard make it clear that Bill C-300’s proposal represents a
significant incursion of human rights concerns into the market place. While legislative measures
of this nature are not unprecedented globally, they would have been the first of their kind in
Canada.81 Albeit only in the realm of CPP investments, Bill C-300 advances the proposition that
the state may impose human rights (moral) parameters onto private investment decision-making
processes that are not necessarily compatible with optimizing investors’ returns. In what sense are
these decisions private? Of course the CPP is a public pension fund, and like the EDC, the CPP
Board is a Crown corporation, accountable to Parliament, though in this case it’s members are
appointed by the federal Minister of Finance. 82 However, there is a significant conceptual
difference between the proposal to withdrawal EDC loan support and the idea of constraining CPP
investments. The latter of these expands the scope of the state’s moral and regulatory concern to
include the decisions made by the investment administrators of Canada’s national pension fund on
behalf of pension plan beneficiaries. Whereas in the case of EDC the state’s financial interests are
at stake in its capacity as a lender and owner of EDC, in the case of the CPP, the state is intervening
in reference to the private financial interests of 18 million Canadian CPP beneficiaries.
While Bill C-300 significantly expands the economic scope of regulatory intervention, it
maintains a certain conceptual consistency with the SCFAIT and Advisory Group Reports. All
three proposals share a common focus on withdrawing financial support in the form of commercial
investments or loans as their chosen method of regulatory sanction. However, it is unclear how
these sanctions, on their own, will meet the express objectives embodied in the standards discussed
above. More specifically, it is not obvious that the withdrawal of access to EDC loans and CPP
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investments alone has the potential to meet the objectives of the proposed regulation, namely to
ensure that the conduct of Canadian mining companies is consistent with Canada’s human rights
obligations in international law.
Moreover, where problematic mining operations have occurred or continue, the withdrawal
of these forms of financial support provides no apparent remedy to affected communities, who are
nonetheless the presumed rights-holders in the regimes proposed by the SCFAIT Report and Bill
C-300. Given the robust standards and objectives created by these two proposals in particular, it is
conceptually unclear why the scope of the federal government’s regulatory authority and moral
concern should be limited to its role as a lender through EDC, or as the facilitator of pension
investments through the CPP. While these roles are no doubt important and carry economic and
moral weight, they do not subsume the extent of the government’s role in the formation and
maintenance of Canadian markets and, as a corollary, in the operation of Canadian mining
companies.
4.2 The Federal CSR Policy: Civil Society as a Source of Risk?
As indicated above in Part 2, the federal government’s CSR policy represents a total aboutface from the public regulation proposals recommended in the Advisory Group and SCFAIT
Reports, toward an approach based entirely on multisectoral norms and voluntary commitments.
First, while the CSR policy adopts the private transnational standards recommended in the
Advisory Group Report, it omits any reference to public international human rights law. Second, it
disregards both Reports’ recommendations to create an investigative regulatory mechanism, linked
with a possible sanction in the form of the withdrawal of federal financing. Instead, it creates a
voluntary mediation service.
In light of these two features, the federal CSR policy communicates a particular view of the
Canadian State that is distinct from that of the public regulation proposals. It frames the state, not
as a regulator of the human rights impacts of market activities, but rather as a mediator of conflicts
between private parties. Concomitantly, it presumes that the state’s commercial relationships with
the private sector in the form of financing are immune from moral or human rights concerns.
Moreover, to govern mediation between companies and civil society actors, it predominantly
selects norms that originate from private sources, developed in a risk-based investor-oriented
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framework.83 The dominance of such norms in the federal CSR review process would seem to be
at odds with the fact that the civil society actors who are intended to use the process are generally
not in an investor relationship with the company. This returns us to some of the concerns and
unanswered questions raised in the previous section with regard to blending private and public
norms.
Also notable is the apparent incoherence of the state’s mediator role envisioned in the CSR
policy. The policy declares that the Office of the CSR Counselor is an “impartial advisor and
facilitator” and “an honest broker”.84 Yet at the same time the stated purpose of the policy is to
“improve the competitiveness of Canadian international extractive sector companies by enhancing
their ability to manage social and environmental risks.”85 It is difficult to comprehend how the
Office of the Counselor might be impartial when it also forms part of an overarching policy with
the primary objective of improving the situation of Canadian companies. The policy contains no
counter-balancing objective oriented toward improving the situation of those actors who might be
adversely affected by companies. 86 Rather, the language employed to articulate the policy’s
purpose suggests that it considers that the concerns of communities and individuals that might be
raised in the review process are “risks” that must be “managed” for the benefit of the company.
Thus, although at a technical or procedural level the review process may appear to be “fair” or
“impartial”, when placed in the context of its overall policy objectives, this become debatable.
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The claim to fairness and impartiality is further called into question by the terms of the
mediation services offered. The CSR policy allows a company to request a review of civil society
actors who it “believes” have raised unfounded allegations. To date this form of review is
unprecedented in a CSR mechanism. On its face, it appears to be based on a formal proceduralist
concept of fairness in the sense that it allows either opposing party to complain about the other.
However, this gesture toward equal treatment is immediately complicated by the policy’s language
describing parties’ eligibility for the review process. It requires that civil society actors hold a
“reasonable belief” in the substance of their concern, while the company is only required to
“believe” that a party has made unfounded allegations.87
Most significantly, the federal CSR approach diverges dramatically from the definition of
“the problem” put forward in the SCFAIT and Advisory Group Reports’ recommendations to
Parliament, namely law reform in Canada to address the concern that the activities of Canadian
mining companies in developing countries conform to human rights standards.88 In contrast, the
federal CSR policy adopts a very different conception of the fundamental nature of the problem.
Namely, it seems to view civil society actors as the problem. These actors are understood as a
source of risk to companies to the extent that they express either good faith concerns or unfounded
allegations regarding company behavior. Notably, in the view of the federal government, this latter
source of risk is such a significant problem that it merits state intervention in the form of the review
process and mediation service offered by the Office of the CSR Counselor. This is surprising, not
only because this issue is not mentioned in either the SCFAIT or the Advisory Report, but also
because it presumes that companies lack other adequate avenues for raising concerns of this
nature.89
In sum, the federal CSR policy appears to completely invert the orientation of the public
regulation proposals. Rather than reflecting a concern for the human rights consequences of
Canadian mining activities for local communities, it conceives of these communities and other civil
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society actors as a potential source of risk to Canadian mining companies’ success and profitability.
This view might explain why the Office of the CSR Counselor has garnered such little interest from
civil society actors, having registered only three complaints against mining companies in two years.
On the other hand, its services have yet to be used by mining companies to express concerns of
unfounded allegations. Whatever the reasons for this lack of interest in both sides, what is certain
is that its relevancy as a mediation service has yet to be demonstrated.
It should be noted that the federal CSR policy is also the subject of Bill C-571. This Bill
intends to create a special focus within the mandate of the CSR Counselor on the specific issue of
companies’ possible complicity with illegal armed groups in certain African countries. However,
it does not modify the review process and simply requires that the CSR Counselor report on this
specialized subject matter. As such, the provisions of Bill C-571 do not contain material that might
modify or enrich the above analysis.
4.3 Private Law Cause of Action: A Loss of Faith in the State as a Regulator?
The provisions of Bill C-323 are simple but with potentially far-reaching consequences. It
gives the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal jurisdiction over a violation of international
law committed in a foreign state against someone who is not a citizen of Canada. While the scope
of this Bill clearly goes beyond this paper’s focus, for the purposes of the subject matter at hand, it
would entail that a community or individual in a foreign state could bring a private action in Canada
against a Canadian mining company for the violation of its rights, as recognized by the international
human rights treaties to which Canada is party. In fact, based on the political support being
marshaled for Bill C-323, the application of the Bill to the Canadian mining sector is actually one
of its primary objectives.90
Like Bill C-300 and the SCFAIT Report, Bill C-323 intends to impose international human
rights law obligations directly onto Canadian companies. However, unlike these public regulation
proposals, Bill C-323 does not try to create a blended standard; instead it would simply apply public
international law. Moreover, the Bill does not concern itself with company financing. Rather, in
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the framework of a civil claim, it contemplates a monetary sanction that would also serve as a
remedy for victims, assuming that they are able to effectively enforce such an order.
Although Bill C-323’s proponents compare it to the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)91 in the
United States, it contains at least one significant difference, namely it would create a presumption
in favor of extra-territorial jurisdiction. Often, in international tort actions, claimants must convince
the court considering the claim that it should exercise jurisdiction. This burden has created a
significant barrier to claims brought in the United States92 under the ATCA, as well as in Canada93
under existing common law tort causes of action. Having created a presumption of jurisdiction,
Bill C-323 would presumably make it relatively easier for claimants to access Canadian courts.
On its face, Bill C-323 appears to resolve many of the concerns raised by the foreign
operations of Canadian mining companies. It would theoretically include every violation
conceivably captured by the full range of Canada’s international human rights obligations. Further,
it would hold Canadian companies to account in a proceeding with the potential to provide a
remedy to the victims. Of course, on the other hand there are potential practical disadvantages to
addressing these issues through private civil claims. These claims, even when successful, do not
necessarily prevent or halt human rights violations; rather the “injuries” incurred are simply
quantified in monetary terms and, as with any civil claim, there is a danger that the cost of litigation
simply becomes part of the “cost of doing business” for the corporation.
Perhaps Bill C-323 appears to be so effective in resolving some of the issues raised in this
paper because it entirely avoids the question of regulation. It does not create a regulatory duty of
any kind for the Canadian state with regard to either the corporation or civil society. Rather, it
constructs a direct relationship of human rights obligations between these latter two entities. The
problem at hand becomes an issue between two private parties, the corporation and the community,
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Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
In the United States, as of 2004 there were approximately twelve active cases against corporate defendants under
the ATCA, only three or four of which had survived a motion to dismiss on the basis of jurisdiction. Most of the
ATCA cases against private corporations have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and none have resulted in a
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mining companies abroad. Recherches Internationales Quebec v. Cambior Inc., [1998] Q.J. no 2554 (Can. Que. Sup.
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yet ironically this conflict is governed by the state’s international human rights commitments. The
state is not present, while its commitments are.
By eliminating the state from the equation, in a certain sense Bill C-323 represents a kind
of privatization of the problematic discussed in the opening of this paper. As such, a question
lingers in the face of the Bill’s aspiration for legal accountability. If the state’s commitments in
international human rights law are to govern, why not require it to act or regulate in order to ensure
that these commitments are fulfilled? Perhaps the question of the relationship between the state and
the market has become too complex to tackle, and the issues are better resolved by court-awarded
damages in private actions. Or perhaps civil society proponents have calculated that the political
conditions necessary to support a program of effective regulation are simply absent. In either case,
it may be that Bill C-323 signals a certain loss of faith in the possibility that the Canadian state
might act to regulate the activities of Canadian mining companies operating abroad.
5 Conclusion
The above analysis of the public regulation proposals reviewed raises two key themes that
provide fodder for further research and reflection. The first relates to these proposals’ aspiration to
blend private risk-based CSR norms with international public law human rights principles. While
this paper raised several questions in response to this possibility in the abstract, it also observed
that in the concrete example provided by the Advisory Group Report, the use of the term “sphere
of control” seems to reduce the application of public international human rights law to the sphere
of companies’ contractual relationships.
The second key theme relates to the view taken in these proposals of the Canadian state and
its relationship with the market. The common vision of public regulation that emerges focuses on
federal government contracts with companies through EDC. By reducing the discussion of
“government support” to a question of loan financing, these proposals take a market-based or
commercial view of the state (also described above as a form of privatism) that casts its potential
regulatory and moral responsibilities as coterminous with its commercial relationships. Even where
“government support” is expanded to include CPP investments as in the case of Bill C-300, the
assumptions that the market is autonomous of the state, and that the state’s regulatory obligations
are dictated by commercial relationships, remain intact.
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The dominance of contractual and investment rationales in the public regulation proposals
reviewed here is ironic given the political perspectives and aspirations of their civil society
proponents and activists. These groups passionately seek to prevent and remedy human rights
violations committed against communities in developing countries and to hold Canadian mining
companies to account in this regard. Yet each of the proposals contains a certain disjunction
between its broadly stated human rights standards and objectives, and the market-based sanction
or method chosen as a means for achieving this objective. Given the economic and social context
described in this paper’s introduction, it remains doubtful whether or not the financing and
investment sanctions proposed would be capable of “holding companies to account” and “ensuring
that their conduct is consistent with human rights obligations”, to use some of the language of the
SCFAIT Report and Bill C-300.94
In the midst of what may be a highly conceptual and abstract analysis, I realize that the
people behind these public regulation proposals operate within the constraints of what is politically
possible. Faced with a particular political scenario and propelled forward by their conviction to act,
they are not bound simply by conceptual issues. This paper is after all, a “critical legal account” of
the law reform events it depicts. There is no doubt that a “critical social account” would reveal the
fascinating and sophisticated political calculations and trade-offs that activists’ undertook to
advance each of these law reform proposals the great distances that they ultimately achieved.
As stated at the outset, this paper springs from a broader research project concerned with
the dynamics of law and social change in general, and in particular with the use of law as a method
of resistance “from below” to dominate models of economic globalization. The question that drives
this research is how the law might be of use to those who do not benefit, or who do not benefit
equitably, from the activities associated with economic globalization. The law reform proposals
reviewed here indicate that this line of questioning necessarily requires an examination of activists’
engagement with private and public law mechanisms. This paper represents a preliminary step
toward considering how the private or public nature of the legal forum might shape activists’ legal
strategies and articulations of the corporation, the state and the problem.
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HOUSE OF COMMONS STANDING COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 27 at
2-3; An Act respecting Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing Countries,
supra note 45, s. 3.
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To explore this question more fully, the theories of action, resistance and social change that
animate these strategies must be clearly identified. These theories must be built on a conception of
the relationship between legal activism and the social change it pursues. Further, the concepts of
the state and the corporation that are implicit or explicitly present in the arguments and legal
frameworks employed by these strategies must be uncovered. Perhaps the tentative lesson learned
from this case study is that in order to approximate human rights aspirations through the regulation
of Canadian mining companies operating abroad, critical research and thinking is required to
elucidate the full extent of the relationship between the Canadian state, the market, and Canadian
mining companies. Indeed, the aspiration of any activist-oriented conceptual reflection, such as the
one pursued here, is to make a contribution capable of informing political strategy and innovation.
Looming in the background of this discussion is the specter of the Canadian CSR Policy,
which sends the disconcerting signal that the federal government of the day views civil society as
the problem or, stated in market terms, as the source of risk. The present challenge to this policy is
the total pragmatism represented by Bill C-323, where the state, and any concomitant regulatory
question, is eliminated in favor of the effective privatization of the issues in the form of a legislated
civil law cause of action. We can only hope that this (mis)alignment of visions does not allude to
a loss of faith in the possibility of engaging productively with the regulatory questions that are
crystallized by the contemporary foreign operations of Canadian mining companies.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Building the Case for a Home-State Grievance Mechanism: Law
Reform Strategies in the Canadian Resource Justice Movement
- Charis Kamphuis*
Abstract
The vast majority of mining companies operating globally are Canadian. For nearly two decades,
social justice advocates systematically documented the concerns of mine-affected communities in
relation to Canadian operations in developing countries, producing a significant body of empirical
work that described not only the nature of the social conflicts associated with Canadian companies
but also the mechanisms whereby the Canadian government provides companies with political,
economic and legal support. Beginning in 2005, activists, policy makers, industry leaders and
international human rights bodies participated in a sustained debate over the appropriate
Canadian regulatory responses to these issues. This chapter analyses the strategies of law reform
advocates between 2000 and 2017 to critique Canadian policy and the overseas conduct of
Canadian extractive companies. It gives special attention to the 2016 law reform proposal from
Canadian civil society, the draft Business & Human Rights Act. The strategies profiled here are
of special interest because they resulted in a significant, if not unexpected, breakthrough in early
2018 when the Canadian government announced a globally unprecedented new grievance
mechanism: the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise. The discussion is of interest
to those concerned with law’s potential (and limitations) as an instrument of social justice in the
global economy, and particularly for communities affected by foreign resource extraction.
1 Introduction: Context, Issues & Debates
On May 26, 2017, a group of Canadian activists belonging to the Toronto-based Mining
Injustice Solidarity Network occupied the office of Liberal Member of Parliament Michael Levitt,
chairperson of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights, a committee of the Canadian
federal Parliament.1 Their stated goal was to protest “Canadian mining abuses abroad” as well as
the federal government’s inaction in response to draft legislation proposed in 2016 by the Canadian
Network for Corporate Accountability (CNCA).2 The proposal, called The Global Leadership in
Business and Human Rights Act: An act to create an independent human rights ombudsperson for
the international extractive sector,

3

contemplates an International Extractive Industry

* Published in Isabel Feichtner & Markus Krajewski, eds, Human Rights in the Extractive Industries: Transparency,
Participation, Resistance (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019) 455.
1
Saunders S, Activists occupy Liberal MP Michael Levitt’s office to protest Canadian mining abuses. Now Magazine,
31 May 2015, https://nowtoronto.com/news/mining-abuse_1/.
2
Formed in 2005, the Canadian Network for Corporate Accountability (CNCA) brings together 30 environmental,
human rights, religious, labor and solidarity groups from across Canada. The CNCA’s mission is to ensure that
Canadian mining, oil and gas companies respect human rights and the environment when working abroad. To do this,
it advocates for policy and law reform in Canada: Canadian Network for Corporate Accountability, What we do,
http://cnca-rcrce.ca/about-us/what-we-do/; Canadian Network for Corporate Accountability, How we work,
http://cnca-rcrce.ca/about-us/how-we-work/.
3
Canadian Network on Corporate Accountability, The Global Leadership in Business and Human Rights Act: An Act
to Create an Independent Human Rights Ombudsperson for the International Extractive Sector, Draft Model
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Ombudsperson with the power to investigate complaints against Canadian companies and make
recommendations to the Canadian government, the company and/or the complainant, including
with respect to remedies. The proposed legislation also contained some limited incentive and
enforcement tools.
The civil disobedience referred to represents one position in a long history of debate in
Canada on the issues raised by the protestors. This debate began to take shape in Canada in the
late 1990s, and consistently revolved around two interrelated issues. The first point of controversy
arose from competing views of the nature of the problem to be addressed. Advocates raised serious
allegations about the conduct of Canadian resource extraction companies abroad and the human
rights impacts of their operations. They alleged that Canadian companies are routinely causing or
contributing to a long list of harms in developing countries with impunity.4 In contrast, some
industry supporters asserted that alleged or documented abuses signal the behavior of only “a few
bad apples” who are the anomaly, and not indicative of a prevalent or systemic problem.5 Others
said that Canadian companies are improving, and learning from past mistakes.6 Some individuals
in industry and government also took the view that “anti-mining” groups invent or exaggerate their
claims and manipulate local communities.7
The second point of debate in Canada has centered on the nature of the appropriate
government response to the problem, however defined. Between 2005 and 2016, Canadians were
presented with a litany of law and policy initiatives and proposals in response to this issue. This
included a parliamentary committee report in 2005, a series of national roundtables in 2006 and a
multi-stakeholder expert report in 2007. In response, the federal government unveiled two

Legislation, 2 November 2016, http://cnca-rcrce.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/The-Global-Leadership-in-Businessand-Human-Rights-Act-An-act-to-create-an-independent-human-rights-ombudsperson-for-the-internationalextractive-sector-11022016.pdf.
4
Part 2 will review the main sources and content of these allegations.
5
Freeman S, The case for – and against – an ombudsperson to resolve mining disputes. Financial Post, 7 March 2017,
http://business.financialpost.com/business/the-case-for-and-against-an-ombudsperson-to-resolve-mining-disputes.
See for example the terms of the debate on the following recent TV Ontario (TVO) interviews: Paikin S, Toronto:
Mining Capital of the World. TVO, 31 May 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?V=6ndn1lqka3a; Paikin S,
Canadian Mining Accountability Abroad. TVO, 31 May 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?V=Oem4r7zLTEY.
6
Las mineras canadienses gestionan mejor los conflictos que otras de propiedad extranjera. Revista
ENERGIMINAS, 14 August 2017, http://www.energiminas.com/las-mineras-canadienses-gestionan-mejor-losconflictos-que-otras-de-propiedad-extranjera/.
7
This assumption informed Canada’s 2009 CSR Policy which allowed companies to complain to the CSR Counsellor
about communities to NGOs: Kamphuis (2012). It was also present in industry rhetoric in key debates over law reform:
Seck (2011), p. 73. Most recently, this position appeared in a report issued by the Canadian CSR Counsellor, see infra
Part 3.2.
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voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies on point, first in 2009, followed by a
modified version in 2014. Civil society’s dissatisfaction with these government responses was
reflected in four different legislation proposals from opposition Members of Parliament and/or civil
society groups between 2008 and 2016. Finally, international institutions weighed in. Between
2002 and 2017, Canada’s policy position and refusal to develop a legal framework was the subject
of as many as twelve statements from international human rights bodies and three dedicated
hearings before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
While these discussions on the nature of the problem and the nature of the appropriate
Canadian government response have been wide-ranging, Canadian civil society organizations have
significantly focused their efforts on advocating for the creation of an effective state-based nonjudicial grievance mechanism. This chapter’s objective is to record the advocacy strategies that
these organizations, in collaboration with affected communities around the world, used to pursue
law and policy reform in Canada with a special focus on non-judicial grievance mechanisms. This
chapter picks up the story of this debate where previous writing on these issues left off, while at
the same time filling in some empirical gaps.8
This story, as told here, is structured in accordance with the advocacy strategies it depicts.
Part Two surveys how advocates attempted to document and report on the nature of the problem
from the perspective of affected communities. Part 2 also shows how advocates moved beyond
case studies to develop empirically informed general descriptions of the harms associated with
Canadian resource extraction abroad. It also tracks how advocates endeavored to document and
problematize related forms of Canadian government support for the sector. Part Three examines
how the Canadian government responded to these problematizations with the development of a
voluntary CSR policy for the Canadian extractive industry abroad. This part summarizes the CSR
policy status quo in Canada between 2009 and 2017 with a focus on the relevant portions of the
2014 CSR framework. This sets the context for Part Four, which profiles a second set of advocacy
strategies, namely the development of informed critiques of Canada’s CSR policy and associated
non-judicial grievance mechanisms.

These critiques were primarily rooted in experience,

accumulated as advocates tested these mechanisms’ efficacy by supporting affected communities
to file complaints. To a lesser extent, but no less important, some critics invoked international
standards for non-judicial grievance mechanisms as a metric for critiquing Canadian CSR policy.
8

Seck (2011); Seck (2012); Simons (2015); Kamphuis (2012); Coumans (2012)
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In tandem with the strategies of research-based descriptions of the nature of the problem
(Part Two) and experience-based critiques of the government’s CSR policy response (Part Four),
advocates further took up a third strategy. This involved presenting this body of research and
experience to international human rights bodies at every possible opportunity. Part Five catalogues
the resulting statements of numerous international bodies and summarizes their main themes.
Finally, Part Six describes a fourth and final strategy, the development of concrete proposals for
law reform to create a more effective home-state grievance mechanism. Advocates pressured the
Canadian government to consider their proposals, either in the parliamentary process or through
direct political pressure and lobby efforts. This section introduces the history of the law and policy
proposals put forward in Canada between 2005 and 2014 before undertaking an in-depth review of
the groundbreaking 2016 CNCA Ombudsperson proposal.
This study of law reform advocacy in Canada on the issue of home-state non-judicial
grievance mechanisms will be of interest to activists and academics participating in wider global
conversation on transnational corporate accountability for harms caused in developing countries.
Attention to home-state law and policy responses in this context became a permanent feature of
mainstream international legal debate following the UN Human Rights Council’s endorsement of
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011.9 While there is no clear consensus
over the nature of home-state responsibility in international law or the most appropriate responses,
there is common ground that global society is facing a serious problem of corporate impunity, due
in part to the “governance gap”.10 This refers to law’s global and systemic failure to prevent, ensure
accountability, and provide remedy for corporate human rights abuses in the developing countries
that host their operations.11 There is also common ground that home states like Canada must play
an important role in addressing this issue by preventing human rights violations and ensuring access
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UN OHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect,
Respect and Remedy” Framework. UN Doc HR/PUB/11/04 (2011). The Guiding Principles were endorsed by the
Human Rights Council in 2011: UNGA, Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises. UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4, July 2011, para 1.
10
G Gagnon, A Macklin and P Simons cited in Simons and Macklin (2014). Also see ETO for human rights beyond
borders (2013) Maastricht principles on extraterritorial obligations of states in the area of economic, social and cultural
rights. Http://www.etoconsortium.org/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-principles/, p. 3; UNGA, Human Rights
Council, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business
enterprises with respect to human rights, UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev, 25 June 2014,
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?Si=A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1, para 1.
11
Simons and Macklin (2014).

170

to effective remedies. It is also widely agreed that home-state non-judicial grievance mechanisms
form an important part of these efforts.
The Canadian experience is highly pertinent to these international conversations for at least
three reasons: first, due to the size of the Canadian resource extraction industry internationally;
second, given the unparalleled intensity of the Canadian debate on home-state non-judicial
grievance mechanisms over nearly two decades; and third, given advocates’ unprecedented success
in early 2018 when the Canadian government announced a ground-breaking decision to create the
Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise, a new and more robust state-based nonjudicial grievance mechanism.
This chapter is fundamentally an account of civil society strategies to address questions of
global economic injustice by pursuing law and policy reform in a developed capital-exporting
country. In conclusion, I will analyze these strategies, their achievements and limitations, and
identify future areas of research. This chapter may also be of interest to those concerned generally
with global economic injustice. It will be of particular value to those interested in tracking the ways
in which states like Canada actively shape economic relationships in the global economy, as well
as the ways in which social justice advocates might problematize these relations and imagine legal
responses.
2 Establishing the Nature of the Problem with Empirical Research (1999-2017)
2.1 Canadian Global Dominance in Resource Extraction & Canadian State Support
For at least two decades, Canadian companies have been among the most significant players
globally in resource extraction, especially in mining.12 The majority of large and junior mining
companies are incorporated in Canada and Canadian stock exchanges list more mining companies
than any other exchange in the world.13 In 2013, over 50 percent of the world’s publicly listed
exploration and mining companies were headquartered in Canada, numbering approximately 1500,
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For 2005 statistics, see Advisory Group Report (2007) National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) and the Canadian Extractive Industry in Developing Countries, pp. 3-4. For 2008 statistics, see Global Affairs
Canada (2009) Building the Canadian Advantage: A Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian
International Extractive Sector, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topicsdomaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse-2009.aspx?Lang=eng. In 2008, 75 percent of the world’s exploration and mining
companies were headquartered in Canada with an interest in over 100 countries around the world.
13
Kamphuis (2012), p. 1457. Also see UN OHCHR, Statement at the end of visit to Canada by the United Nations
Working Group on Business and Human Rights, 1 June 2017,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/newsevents/Pages/displaynews.aspx?Newsid=21680&langid=E.
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with junior companies accounting for 90% of the total count. 14 That same year, the foreign
presence of Canadian mining companies extended to 107 countries worldwide and Canadian
companies accounted for nearly 31% of global expenditures on exploration.15 In 2015, Canadian
stock exchanges accounted for more than half of the equity capital raised globally for mining.16
Generally, the largest regional destination for Canadian mining investments is Latin America, with
Africa in second place.17 In 2013, nearly half of the total value of Canada’s overseas mineral assets
was in Latin America18 and 41% of the largest companies in Latin America were Canadian.19
Without a detailed history study, it is difficult to determine exactly why the Canadian
mining industry has gained such significant size and global dominance. What is clear though is
that the Canadian state supports the industry in a variety of ways. Some authors have observed
that the Canadian government has historically welcomed and promoted mining, both at home and
abroad.20 Others note that a favourable tax regime is one major explanation for the concentration
of the global mining sector in Canada, 21 along with a securities industry designed to promote
mining.22 A cluster of mining-related equipment and service providers with wide-ranging expertise
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Global Affairs Canada (2014) Canada’s Enhanced Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy to Strengthen Canada’s
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Mining Association of Canada (2016) Facts and Figures of the Canadian Mining Industry: F&F 2016,
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https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/jim-flahertys-corporate-tax-overhaulmade-canada-competitive/article17590384/?Ref=http://www.theglobeandmail.com&.
22
Canadian Network for Corporate Accountability & Justice & Corporate Accountability Project (2014) Human
Rights, Indigenous Rights and Canada’s Extraterritorial Obligations. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Thematic
Hearing
for
153rd
Period
of
Sessions,
http://cnca-rcrce.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/canada_mining_cidh_oct_28_2014_final.pdf, p. 6.

172

has grown up around the Canadian mining industry.23 The Canadian government also provides
direct financial support to the industry with favourable loans from Export Development Canada
(EDC) and through the provision of development assistance to promote corporate social
responsibility at specific mining projects.24
Beyond favourable loans, tax arrangements, and stock markets, the Canadian government
also provides robust legal protection and political support for the sector. In these latter areas, state
support for global mining significantly ramped up during the Conservative government’s time in
power, between 2006 and 2015. In this time period Canada dramatically expanded its Foreign
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (FIPPAs)25 and by 2016 Canada had signed 33
FIPPAs in Latin America and 12 in Africa. Political support for Canadian mining companies
abroad was also formalized and strengthened. In 2007, the federal government announced the
Global Commerce Strategy, followed in 2013 by the Global Markets Action Plan. These policies
involve “economic diplomacy”, promising that “all Government of Canada diplomatic assets are
harnessed to support the pursuit of commercial success by Canadian companies and investors.”26
This includes the Canadian Trade Commissioner Service, which offers companies “privileged
access to foreign governments, key business leaders and decision-makers.”27 The policy claims
that “other countries are doing the same, and Canada…must be more aggressive and effective
than…the competition.”28 The policy of economic diplomacy remains in place to date.29
23
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2.2 Problematizing the Impacts of Canadian Resource Companies Abroad
This section chronicles the various ways in which government, industry and civil society
actors have studied the conduct of Canadian resource companies abroad empirically. Initially, the
Canadian government worked with industry, civil society and academia to lead or enable three
major studies of the issue. The first was an in-depth case study of Talisman Energy Inc., undertaken
in 1999 by the Canadian Assessment Mission to Sudan, also known as the Harkat Mission. The
Canadian government convened this independent fact-finding initiative in response to international
pressure and allegations that Talisman was benefiting from grave human rights abuses in relation
to its operations in Sudan. The Harkat Mission concluded that oil extraction and development was
fueling Sudan’s civil war. It also found that the Sudanese government was using oil company
infrastructure to bomb civilian populations in combination with violent ground operations,
including forced displacement, rape, murder and kidnapping, in order to clear a swath of land
around oil operations to ensure their security in the midst of the war.30
After the Harkat Mission, the Parliamentary Sub-committee on Human Rights and
International Development held several rounds of hearings on the activities of Canadian resource
companies in developing countries. It heard evidence from an array of expert witnesses, industry
representatives, Canadian civil society leaders, and leaders from affected communities. The subcommittee’s 2005 final report was adopted by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (SCFAIT) and submitted to the Canadian Parliament. The report found that:
mining activities in some developing countries have had adverse effects on local communities,
especially where regulations governing the mining sector and its impact on the economic and social
wellbeing of employees and local residents, as well as on the environment, are weak or non-existent,
or where they are not enforced.31

In response to the SCFAIT report, in 2006 the Canadian government formed an Advisory
Group of experts representing industry, NGOs and academia with a mandate to convene the
Canadian National Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Extractive Industry in

human
rights
defenders,
http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_developmentenjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/rights_defenders_guide_defenseurs_droits.aspx?Lang=eng.
30
Simons and Macklin (2014), pp. 1-3, 22-78.
31
House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2005) Mining in Developing
Countries:
Corporate
Social
Responsibility.
38th
Parl,
1st
Sess,
14th
Rep,
http://www.ourcommons.ca/documentviewer/en/38-1/FAAE/report-14.

174

Developing Countries. In their 2007 consensus report, the Advisory Group summarized the
concerns at issue in terms of: environmental concerns, community relations, human rights, security
and armed conflict, labour relations, indigenous peoples’ rights, compatibility of resource
development with national and local economic priorities, benefit sharing with local communities,
ineffective legal systems and the potential for corruption.32
Following the Harkat, SCFAIT and Advisory Group reports, the Canadian government,
with the Conservative Party in power, refrained from further research-based study of these issues
for about ten years. In this vacuum, many academics and civil society groups continued to study
the problem empirically, albeit without support or endorsement from the Canadian government.
Initially, advocates focused primarily on researching and publishing case studies that documented
connections between specific Canadian mining companies and human rights violations in affected
communities around the world.33
Advocates’ grassroots research into specific company misconduct enabled a handful of
affected communities to bring civil claims against Canadian companies to Canadian courts.
However, between 1998 and 2011 a number of attempts to access Canadian courts failed to
overcome procedural objections from the company defendant at a preliminary stage.
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Nonetheless, advocates persisted and between 2013 and 2016 they succeeded in convincing
Canadian courts to try claims against three different Canadian mining companies.35 In 2013, an
Ontario provincial court ruled that a group of plaintiffs have an arguable case against Hudbay
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Minerals Inc and sent the parties to trial. These suits claim damages from serious bodily harm, gang
rape and death perpetrated by security forces at Hudbay’s Fenix nickel mine in Guatemala.36
In 2016 a British Columbia (BC) provincial court sent another suit to trial, finding that BC
is the most appropriate forum to hear claims against Nevsun Resources in relation to its Bisha mine
in Eritrea.37 In this case, the plaintiffs claim that they endured forced labour conditions at the mine,
in violation of Canadian and international law. Finally, in 2017 the BC Court of Appeal found that
that BC is the most appropriate jurisdiction to hear claims against Tahoe Resources in relation to
its El Escobal mine in Guatemala.38 The plaintiffs claim of serious bodily harm caused when Tahoe
security guards shot at them during a peaceful protest will now be heard on the merits.39
The alleged facts in these cases certainly garnered public attention, as did their success in
overcoming significant jurisdictional and procedural obstacles. However, it quickly became clear
to advocates that case studies and litigation alone had limited power to influence broad policy or
law reform responses. Individual studies could not reveal the severity or extent of the problem at
the industry, regional or global level and were too easily written off as examples of just “a few bad
apples”.
Following the high-water mark of the Advisory Group report, it also became clear to
advocates that the Canadian government and industry were no longer interested in collaborating
with civil society to undertake larger scale studies or to create a transparent system for proactively
monitoring conflicts and allegations against Canadian mining companies. One infamous example
of this is a 2009 report, secretly commissioned by the Prospectors and Developers Association of
Canada (PDAC) and leaked to civil society groups in 2010.40 The PDAC report studied the rates
of Canadian involvement in severe ethical, environmental, human rights and occupational incidents
in developing countries.41 It did so by surveying reports and complaints involving the activities of

36

Caal Caal v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., 2020 ONSC 415; Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc, OSCJ, Court File No CV-10411159” (24 September 2010), online (pdf): http://www.chocversushudbay.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Chocv-Hudbay-Statement-of-Claim-updated-Oct-2013.pdf; Chub Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc, OSCJ, Court File No
CV-11-435841” (26 September 2011), online (pdf): <http://www.chocversushudbay.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/11/Chub-v-Hudbay-Statement-of-Claim-updated-Oct-2013.pdf>.
37
Araya v Nevsun Resources Ltd, 2017 BCCA 401, affirming 2016 BCSC 1856.
38
Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc, 2017 BCCA 39, reversing Garcia v Tahoe Resources Inc, 2015 BCSC 2045.
39
Tahoe on Trial, Security Footage Outside Escobal Mine, video, 27 April 2013,
https://tahoeontrial.net/2015/11/19/security-footage-april-27-2013/.
40
Simons (2015), p. 3.
41
Canadian Centre for the Study of Resource Conflicts (2009) Corporate Social Responsibility: Movements and
Footprints of Canadian Mining and Exploration Firms in the Developing World, http://caid.ca/csrrep2009.pdf, p. 4.

176

all mining and exploration companies operating in developing countries over the previous ten
years. On this basis, it identified 171 incidents of human rights violations.42 Of these, Canadian
companies represented 33% of total violations, four times the number attributed to any other
country.43 Importantly, PDAC commissioned this study in the midst of an intense debate in the
Canadian Parliament over proposed legislation that aimed to create a home-state non-judicial
grievance mechanism. Nonetheless, PDAC did not disclose the study’s findings but rather lobbied
vigorously against the proposed legislation.44
In this context, civil society and academic research groups began to work toward their own
general, research-based description of the problem from the perspective of affected communities.
Their first attempt was a 2013 report to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC),
submitted by the Latin American Working Group on Mining and Human Rights. The Working
Group, comprised of six prominent organizations, collected information from grassroots
organizations across eleven Latin American countries.45 It found commonalities across 22 case
studies tracked over a period of three years. On this basis, the Working Group’s final report
summarized the human rights issues associated with Canadian companies in terms of: damage to
the environment, including to water, livelihood and health; and lack of participation and consent,
including inadequate consultation, imposition of projects in spite of opposition, and irregularities
in property acquisition. 46 The report also informed that local communities are not benefiting
equitably and economically from mining projects.47
In addition to capturing social, environmental and economic impacts, the Latin American
Working Group report described problems with civil liberties. In this regard, it reported that some
Canadian mining projects had led to large-scale social conflicts and the criminalization of protest
and dissent. A 2015 MiningWatch report picked up on this theme. It undertook detailed case
42
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studies of four Latin American countries and found a connection between Canadian mining
interests and the growing trend of criminalization of dissent and social protest involving land and
environmental defenders.48
This focus on civil liberties intensified with a 2016 report published by the Justice &
Corporate Accountability Project (JCAP). This report remains the most comprehensive study
undertaken to date on these issues. It systematically documents reported incidents of violence and
criminalization associated with Canadian mining companies operating in Latin America over a
fifteen-year period, from 2000 until 2015.49 Using a recognized, rigorous and replicable research
methodology, JCAP found that 44 people were killed, over 400 people were injured and over 700
people were criminalized in conflicts related to Canadian mining companies in Latin America in
the period under study.50 On the basis of this data, the report concluded that there is close proximity
between Canadian mining companies abroad and violence.51 Notably, the JCAP research did not
include death threats, property destruction, displacement, attempted assassination without injury,
environmental contamination or psychological trauma in its definition of violence. 52 In addition
to the concept of proximity, the JCAP report also explored the concept of complicity in order to
understand the relationship between companies and violence.53
In a similar vein, international organizations also began to compile data on violence against
human rights defenders across sectors and on a global scale. In 2017, the Business & Human
Rights Resource Centre published statistics from its database tracking human rights defenders,
working on corporate accountability issues, who were attacked, harassed or killed in 2015 and
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2016.54 In this two-year period, the Centre identified over 400 cases worldwide, with the largest
concentration of cases in the mining sector (30%). Moreover, one-quarter of all cases were
connected to companies headquartered in China, the United States or Canada. The fact that this
global study tracked the nationality, not only of human rights defenders but also of companies,
meant that its findings further corroborated research focused exclusively on Canada, like the reports
from JCAP, the Latin America Working Group and MiningWatch.
The shift in the civil society research agenda, to move beyond case studies to aggregate
data in order to describe the problem more generally, had a major impact on the debate in Canada.
The JCAP report in particular appears to have had far-reaching effects. It received significant
media attention in the Canadian press and was mentioned in international press, including in the
New York Times. Its authors presented their findings to lawmakers in Canada and numerous human
rights bodies internationally. Importantly, the shift to aggregate data also involved a narrow focus
on civil rights and on violence in particular. Undoubtedly the quantitative clarity of statistics on
violence was an effective strategy for attracting the attention of the public and policy makers. It
was also methodologically rigorous and much simpler than producing large scale aggregate data
on the full range of social, economic and environmental impacts of projects.
While the production of quantitative aggregate data was an invaluable strategy, detailed
individual case studies also made a very important contribution. Case studies helped inform the
framing of aggregate studies and captured critical details about the scope of the human rights
concerns at issue. A small number of case studies also became the basis for civil suits in Canada,
which helped demonstrate the cogency of the alleged facts. In combination, these strategies raised
the public profile of the issues and strengthened the credibility of advocates’ fundamental message:
that the impacts of Canadian resource companies’ operations abroad raise concerns that require a
legal response from Canadian authorities.
2.3 Problematizing the Canadian State’s Support for Companies
Canadian civil society has developed another important research strategy that, although
garnering less attention to date than the research described above, is no less important. This refers
54
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to a stream of research that has documented and problematized Canadian state policies and
practices that support Canadian mining operations abroad. In this regard, advocates’ research has
focused primarily on three main modalities of support: loans from Export Development Canada
(EDC); equity held by the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) in the form of investor shares, and political
support from the Canadian foreign service, known as “economic diplomacy” (see description in
Part 2.1). Both the CPP and EDC are publicly owned Crown corporations that operate at arm’s
length from the federal government.
Early forms of research in the area of financial and political support began with case studies.
In 2007 an organization called the Halifax Initiative published a collection of 23 short case studies
that tracked the quantum of EDC and CPP financial support for each Canadian resource company
and briefly summarized the problems allegedly associated with each companies’ overseas
operations.55 In an early case that raised concerns about political support, a Canadian documentary
filmmaker sued the former Canadian Ambassador to Guatemala for defamation. The filmmaker
had taken live video footage of the violent forced displacement of a community of Indigenous
Guatemalans in 2007 by the Guatemalan military, police, private security companies, and
employees of a Canadian mining company. After the video was posted online, the Ambassador
publicly accused the filmmaker of having fabricated the footage. In 2010, an Ontario judge found
that the Ambassador had slandered the filmmaker by making false statements about his film.56
Following this early work, advocates began to develop of a more comprehensive and
detailed description of the full range of Canadian public supports for companies abroad. For
example, the 2013 Latin American Working Group report to the IAHRC, referred to above,
included numerous examples of the Canadian state’s political, legal and economic supports for
companies. In addition to CPP, EDC and diplomatic support, it described the impact of Canada’s
free trade agreements, development aid and interference in other countries’ domestic policies.57 A
second report to the IAHRC, this time submitted by the CNCA and JCAP in 2014, repeated
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concerns with these policies and argued that Canada lacks effective accountability mechanisms to
oversee company conduct as well as the provision of state support.58
Building on these general descriptions of policy, advocates began to develop detailed
empirical accounts of the government’s modalities of support for Canadian companies in specific
cases. The first line of research in this area focused on the Canadian state’s political support for
companies abroad. In 2013 and 2015, a coalition of Canadian organizations published two
substantial reports based entirely on documents obtained through federal access to information
requests. The reports profiled two different case studies in Mexico, where Canadian embassy staff
and Trade Commissioners had acted to defend Canadian mining companies in spite of strong
opposition from affected communities and in the face of serious and credible allegations of human
rights violations or risks of violations. 59 In both cases, violence occurred against community
members and in one case, a high-profile community leader was assassinated. Also in 2015,
MiningWatch published a report that built on these two studies to identify a wide range of specific
policies and actions of the Canadian state and its representatives in four Latin American counties.60
The report argued that these actions and policies had exacerbated specific conflicts with Canadian
companies, escalating the risk of harm for affected communities and human rights defenders.
Much of the research presented in these reports appeared in a 2016 book published by two Canadian
political scientists who tracked many different forms of Canadian political intervention and
influence in a number of Latin American countries to the benefit of Canadian resource companies.61
In addition to studying the Canadian state’s political support for companies, advocates
continued to raise the issue of public financial support through the CPP and EDC. The primary
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strategy in this regard was to publish credible research on the human rights record of companies
receiving such support. A 2016 report by a coalition of organizations profiled five complaints
against Canadian resource companies brought to Canada’s National Contact Point (to be discussed
in Parts 3 and 4). Among its many findings, the study tracked the quantum of EDC loans and CPP
equity holdings in each company. It found that in three of five cases, companies facing serious
allegations of human rights abuse and environmental harm continued to receive substantial
financial support from these government agencies.62
These findings were further supported by an extremely detailed 2017 case study of serious
human rights allegations against a Canadian company with operations in Brazil. The study found
that despite credible, well known and ongoing allegations, EDC issued five loans to the company
between 2012-2017 totally $850 million in financing, the CPP maintained an equity interest in the
company worth 460 million, and the Canadian embassy continued to offer the company diplomatic
support.63 On the basis of these studies, advocates have called for reforms to ensure due diligence,
transparency and accountability in the decision making of government agencies when it comes to
the provision of political and financial support for companies abroad. Advocates have also called
on the CPP to divest and EDC to deny loans to companies facing serious and credible allegations
of human rights violations.64
The previous pages have referred to numerous studies published between 1999 and 2017
by the Canadian government, civil society and academics documenting a wide range of human
rights and environmental concerns directed at Canadian mining companies’ overseas operations.
Government support for these efforts was relatively short-lived and consisted of funding three
studies and the resulting reports, published between 1999 and 2007 (the Harkat Report, 1999; the
SCFAIT Report, 2005, and the Advisory Group Report, 2007). Following this period, advocates
continued this research, combining detailed case studies with regional, global or industry level
studies. Beginning in 2013, some advocates intensified their efforts to document the breadth of the

62

Above Ground, MiningWatch Canada and OECD Watch (2016) “Canada is Back” but Still Far Behind – An
Assessment of Canada’s National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,
https://MiningWatch.ca/sites/default/files/canada-is-back-report-web_0.pdf, p. 20.
63
Above Ground and JusticiaGlobal (2017), Swept Aside: An Investigation into Human Rights Abuse at Kinross Golds Morro Do Ouro Mine, http://aboveground.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Swept-Aside-Kinross-Morro-do-Ouroreport.pdf.
64
MiningWatch Canada (2017) Almost a Quarter-Million People Worldwide Join Call for Nevsun Resources Investors
to Divest over Abuses at Eritrea Mine, News Release, https://MiningWatch.ca/news/2017/5/3/240000-peopleworldwide-join-call-nevsun-resources-investors-divest-over-abuses.

182

Canadian state’s economic, legal, political and policy support for the sector. These efforts
consisted of general descriptions of state policy in these areas, as well as a handful of detailed case
studies of conflicts between Canadian companies and local communities. In terms of the later, this
research strategy also tracked the quantum of the Canadian state’s financial support and/or specific
practices of diplomatic support in the context of specific conflicts.
3 Canada’s Corporate Social Responsibility Policy Response (2009-2017)
In response to the research described in Part 2, between 2009 and 2017 the Canadian
government developed a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy framework consisting of
three main elements: (1) a CSR policy document; (2) the office of the CSR Counsellor; and (3) the
Canadian National Contact Point (NCP). The CSR policy and Counsellor’s office were first
introduced in 2009 and updated in 2014. The Canadian NCP, first established in 2000 pursuant to
Canada’s membership in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
became a central component of Canada’s 2014 CSR policy.65 In this period, the NCP and the CSR
Counsellor each oversaw a state-based non-judicial grievance mechanism available for mediating
conflicts arising between Canadian companies and those affected by their operations abroad.
This section begins by establishing the main features and outcomes of the 2009 CSR policy
before moving on to describe the 2014 updated policy and NCP mechanism in terms of their
regulatory components: objectives, standards, procedures and potential incentives and
disincentives. This summary of Canadian’s CSR policy in the period in question is important, not
only because it constituted the status quo policy response for nearly nine years to the
problematizations described in the previous section, but also because it formed the basis of a further
suite of law reform advocacy strategies, analysed in Parts 4 and 5 of this chapter.
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3.1 CSR Policy & CSR Counsellor: 2009-2014
In 2009 the Canadian government launched Building the Canadian Advantage: A
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Strategy for the Canadian International Extractive Sector.66
Its objective was to “improve the competitive advantage of Canadian international extractive sector
companies by enhancing their ability to manage social and environmental risks.”67 To this end, the
policy encouraged companies to sign on to voluntary CSR Principles68 and included the statement
that the government “expects and encourages Canadian companies operating abroad to respect all
applicable laws and internationally-agreed principles of responsible business conduct.” 69 Any
reference to human rights was notably absent from the policy’s text.
The CSR strategy also involved the creation of an Office of the Extractive Sector CSR
Counsellor with a mandate to review the CSR practices of Canadian extractive companies
operating abroad and to advise them on the implementation of CSR guidelines. 70 This Office
included a voluntary dispute resolution mechanism whereby an individual, group or community
who “reasonably believes that it is being or may be adversely affected by the activities of a
Canadian extractive sector company in its operations outside Canada” could ask the CSR
Counsellor to initiate a review.71 Surprisingly, the 2009 policy also allowed companies to file a
complaint against individuals or civil society groups. 72 Notably, the Counsellor could only
undertake reviews with the consent of all parties involved and reviews consisted of informal or
formal mediation.
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The first CSR Counsellor served from October 2009 to October 2013.73 During this time
advocates and affected communities brought six cases or “requests for review” to the Counsellor’s
office. These cases involved allegations of labour rights violations, serious environmental damage,
and lack of consultation with affected communities. In three cases the process ended because the
company refused to participate.74 In a fourth case, the requesters asked to keep their identities
confidential and ultimately neither the company nor the requesters responded to the Counsellor’s
mediation efforts.75 In another case the affected community members declined to participate in the
review process.76 In a final case, after informal mediation the company agreed to raise awareness
of its site level grievance process and adopt best practices for dispute resolution.77 However, there
is no indication that the CSR Counsellor oversaw the implementation of this agreement or followed
up on the resolution of the community’s original complaints. In sum, in only one of six cases did
the parties participate in a mediation process leading to an agreement and there is no evidence in
any case that the conflicts improved or that the issues were resolved. The first CSR Counsellor
resigned at the end of 2013 before completing her term.78
3.2 CSR Policy & CSR Counsellor: 2014-2017
Advocates intensely criticized the 2009 CSR policy and its merger results, including at
hearings before the IAHRC in 2013 and 2014. This criticism in combination with the refusal of
some companies to participate in the 2009 dialogue mechanism likely informed the Canadian
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government’s decision to launch a second CSR policy called Doing Business the Canadian Way:
A Strategy to Advance Corporate Social Responsibility in Canada’s Extractive Sector Abroad.79
This new policy described Canadian companies as being on the “leading edge of CSR practice.”80
In terms of standards, it stated that Canada expects its companies operating abroad to
“integrate CSR throughout their management structures so that they operate abroad in an economic,
social and environmentally sustainable manner.” 81

It also articulated the expectation that

companies “respect human rights and all applicable laws, and…meet or exceed widely-recognized
international standards for responsible business conduct.”82 Where local laws are not consistent
with “Canadian values”, the policy encouraged companies to rethink their investment.83 Notably,
while the policy promoted a number of international CSR policies as sources of guidance for
companies, it did not define the standard of “Canadian values” and did not refer directly to
international human rights law.84
While the 2014 policy retained an economic rationale for responsible corporate conduct,
(also prominent in the 2009 policy), it added a moral dimension. It argued that CSR will lead to
“win-win outcomes” by “creating value” for companies and generating benefits and development
for communities.85 In this policy, “doing business the Canadian way” involved being economically
successful and reflecting “Canadian values”. Like its 2009 predecessor, the 2014 policy referred
to local concerns as “environmental and social risks” to the company.86 It made the “business case”
79
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for CSR, advising companies that CSR is good for “traditional notions of profit” and that investors
care about CSR “alignment”. At the same time, the policy reminded companies that it is also
“intrinsically valuable” to contribute to society.87
Within this framework, the CSR Counsellor’s role was that of an expert educator and an
informal complaint mediator.

The Counsellor was to offer “advice and guidance for all

stakeholders on implementing CSR performance guidelines” with special expertise in providing
guidance on effective and meaningful dialogue with affected communities.88 The Counsellor could
also “review the CSR practices of Canadian extractive sector companies operating outside
Canada.”89 A review could be requested by an affected individual, community, or by the company.
In response, the Counsellor attempted to bring the parties together for informal dialogue aimed at
reaching a “mutually beneficial result”. Where formal mediation was required, the Counsellor
could refer the parties to Canada’s NCP, although the policy did not define this threshold. Notably
referral was also not necessary since parties can elect to bring a complaint directly to the NCP
according to its procedures.
The 2014 CSR policy also offered more detail on Canada’s official policies and
mechanisms for politically supporting Canadian companies.

It stated that Canada’s Trade

Commission Service (TCS) will assist extractive companies who are contributing to Canada’s
economic growth, have a demonstrated capacity for internationalization, and have strong potential
to add value to Canada’s economy.90 It described TCS assistance as on the ground intelligence,
practical advice, local contacts, problem solving and market assessment. 91 The CSR policy also
made reference to Canada’s longstanding economic diplomacy policy (see Part 2.1), which it
defined as a suite of services for companies including letters of support, advocacy efforts and
participation in trade missions.92
According to the 2014 policy, companies that aligned their operations with the policy would
receive “enhanced Government of Canada economic diplomacy”.93 It offered no further details or
descriptions of what this involves. However, the policy did envision a new CSR related role for
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Canadian embassies and the TCS with respect to Canadian companies. It suggested that these
agencies might support companies’ CSR practices by helping them conduct social risk analyses,
form partnerships with civil society groups, facilitate dialogue with local communities, and identify
opportunities for social support programs.94
Finally, the 2014 policy included some limited tools to encourage “alignment” with its CSR
guidance and participation in dialogue. A company that refused to participate in the voluntary
review and dialogue process, offered by either the NCP or the CSR Counsellor, would face the
withdrawal of TCS and “other Government of Canada advocacy support abroad”.95 The situation
would also be made public. If a company did not participate and did not “embody CSR best
practice”, it would further be denied economic diplomacy (as defined above) and Export
Development Canada (EDC) would take its non-compliance into consideration in decisions about
financing or other supports.96 The policy offered no further detail with respect to how EDC would
take these facts into consideration. Moreover, according to the terms of the policy, as long as a
company participated in the dialogue process proposed, it would continue to receive government
supports even if its practices were in fact contrary to the policy’s standards.
3.3

Canada’s National Contact Point
This section describes Canada’s National Contact Point (NCP) complaint system given that

it also qualifies as a home-state non-judicial grievance mechanism. As a country belonging to the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Canada is required to
maintain a NCP mechanism. NCPs are mandated to further the effectiveness of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, promote their implementation, and help resolve issues
including through mediation. They are required to operate in an accessible, transparent, predictable
and accountable manner and to effectively and impartially deal with any issues covered in the
Guidelines.97
The Guidelines, first introduced in 2000, were updated in 2011.98 They are also listed
among the standards endorsed in Canada’s 2014 CSR Policy. The Guidelines provide “non94
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binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a global context consistent
with applicable laws and internationally recognized standards.” 99 They include standards that
address the social, economic, environmental and human rights impacts of companies on the
societies in which they operate. The human rights chapter, a 2011 addition, establishes that
multinational enterprises should respect human rights, avoid causing or contributing to human
rights impacts, address adverse consequences, carry out human rights due diligence and provide
legitimate processes for remediation of adverse impacts.100 The Guidelines are significant because
they represent the only multilaterally endorsed comprehensive code of conduct that numerous
governments around the world have committed to promote.101
The Canadian NCP’s procedural guide sets out the various phases of review that may occur
when a complaint is filed alleging that a Canadian company has violated the Guidelines.102 If an
initial assessment reveals that the issues merit further examination, the NCP will offer to facilitate
dialogue between the parties, which may include non-adversarial conciliation or mediation.103 If
an agreement is not reached, the NCP will issue a public statement and if an agreement is reached,
it will issue a report. According to the procedural guide, these documents will contain, at a
minimum, information about the issues and the procedures initiated.104 While participation in the
NCP review is voluntary, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs at the time stated “there are
consequences if Canadian companies do not participate, or do not engage in good faith.” This
likely refers to the potential withdrawal of certain forms of government support, as specified in the
2014 CSR policy. In 2015, the Canadian NCP reported on the first and only known case to date
where this sanction was contemplated. When the company China Gold refused to respond to the
NCP’s efforts to convene a dialogue, the NCP stated that its non-participation “will be taken into
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consideration in any applications…for enhanced advocacy support from the Trade Commissioner
Service and/or Export Development Canada (EDC) financial services”.105 At the time China Gold
was not receiving EDC loans and the Canadian government has not since disclosed any further
information to indicate whether or not this sanction was ever in fact applied to China Gold.
4 Empirical, Normative & Political Critiques of Canada’s CSR Policy
While Canada’s voluntary CSR policy framework was in place, civil society groups in
Canada and around the world consistently called upon the Canadian government to improve its
policy, including by developing a legal framework that regulates the human rights and
environmental impacts of Canadian companies operating abroad, and provides remedies for harms.
In their most political form, these calls took the form of global and national letter writing
campaigns. In 2016 more than 49 organizations sent individual letters to Prime Minister Trudeau
and more than 200 organizations signed a joint letter communicating this message.106 In 2017,
more than 80 Canadian university professors sent a letter to Prime Minister Trudeau with the same
call for action.107 These letters all urged the implementation of an effective non-judicial grievance
mechanism like the one proposed in the CNCA’s Business & Human Rights Act (see Part 6).
Canadian and international civil society rallied around the normative claim that it is wrong for the
Canadian government to continue to promote and benefit from mining abroad without putting
effective mechanisms into place to ensure accountability.108
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This section surveys the empirical and normative strategies that Canadian advocates and
their international partners employed to question the efficacy of the Canadian government’s
voluntary CSR policies, in place from 2009 to 2017. As stated in this chapter’s introduction, in
January 2018 the Canadian government announced its plans to replace the 2014 policy with a new
home-state non-judicial grievance mechanism: the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible
Enterprise (CORE).

While few details are available at time of writing, according to the

announcement, the new mechanism will respond to civil society proposals and will be the first of
its kind in the world. 109 This unexpected development after a prolonged impasse makes the
Canadian civil society strategies critiquing the voluntary CSR status quo all the more important.
4.1 Critiques of Canada’s National Contact Point
After Canada’s updated CSR policy was published in 2014, civil society advocates and
academics undertook to analyse its effectiveness. Recall that the policy relied on and incorporated
Canada’s NCP, which it described as a “robust and proven” complaint mechanism.110 To test this
assertion, three reputable NGOs studied the NCP’s performance in five complaints involving
Canadian mining companies and allegations of serious harm.111 All five complaints were filed
with the NCP after Canada’s 2014 CSR policy was put into place. Following a detailed study of
each complaint, the 2016 NGO report identified numerous shortcomings in the Canadian NCP:
lack of independence, lack of investigative procedures; ineffective recommendations and followup; lack of transparency; unjustified delays; inaccessibility of the mechanism due to high threshold
for accepting complaints; and ineffective penalties.
The report noted that while each OECD country has discretion in how to structure its NCP,
some countries have ensured that their NCP is completely independent of the government. In
contrast, Canada’s NCP is composed entirely of government representatives and is chaired by
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Global Affairs Canada, whose mandate includes expanding trade and investment and providing
special support to Canada’s natural resources sector abroad. The NGO report argued that this raises
questions about the NCP’s impartiality on the basis that Global Affairs may have a conflict of
interest in hearing complaints against the very companies it is mandated to support.112
Another major area of concern in the NGO report was that the Canadian NCP will not
investigate complaints or make any findings: it is only available to facilitate dialogue between
disputing parties. When the NCP makes recommendations, these often fail to address the issues
between the parties, lack justification and lack appropriate follow up mechanisms.113 The report
also found problems with transparency. While the Canadian NCP’s procedural guidelines require
it to publish either a public statement or a report following a complaint,114 the NGO study found
that in practice this does not always occur and any reporting that does occur is sparse.115
Further, the NGO report found that it is unclear how the penalties specified in Canada’s
2014 CSR policy are being applied. Recall that the policy stated that a company’s failure to
participate in dialogue and align with the policy will result in the withdrawal of trade support and
may be taken into account by Export Development Canada (EDC). In the NGO study, companies
named in credible complaints nonetheless continued to receive significant government support and
financing from EDC and the Canadian Pension Plan. Moreover, the report found that the threat of
penalty and the penalty itself was ineffective. For example, it pointed out that China Gold had
refused to participate in any dialogue regardless of the threat of withdrawal of trade support.
Moreover, even after the NCP found the requisite conditions to withdraw federal Trade
Commissioner Services (TCS) from China Gold, the company nonetheless subsequently
participated in a trade mission organized by the provincial government of British Colombia.116
Finally, the NGO report noted that even if supports from EDC and the TCS are withdrawn,
other government services are not impacted. There are also no consequences or penalties for a
company that participates in dialogue but is not compliant with the OECD Guidelines. On the basis
112
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of all of its findings, the NGO report concluded that the Canadian NCP is failing to prevent harm,
improve conditions and facilitate access to remedy.117
4.2 Critiques of Canada’s 2014 CSR Policy & Counsellor
Shortly after the 2014 CSR policy was announced, Canadian law professor Penelope
Simons evaluated the extent to which it met Canada’s obligations to protect human rights and to
ensure that victims have access to effective remedies as set out in the UN Guiding Principles on
Business & Human Rights.118 In her analysis, Simons acknowledged some advances in the 2014
policy, including the statement that Canadian companies are expected to respect human rights.
However, Simons pointed out that the policy does not define any of the standards it refers to,
namely CSR, Canadian values, or human rights, nor does it refer to how companies should meet
these standards. 119 For example, it fails to clearly set out the expectation that companies should
engage in comprehensive and ongoing human rights due diligence as recommended by the Guiding
Principles.120 Simons also argued that merely endorsing a list of intergovernmental or international
multi-stakeholder initiatives is not helpful for the purposes of establishing clear standards.121
Perhaps most importantly, Simons firmly concluded that Canada’s 2014 CSR policy and
NCP procedures, as voluntary consensus-based dialogue and dispute resolution mechanisms, do
not help fulfil Canada’s obligation to take measures to ensure victims’ access to remedy.122 Simons
also found that the CSR Counsellor’s review mechanism does not meet at least some of the criteria
set out in the Guiding Principles for an effective non-judicial grievance mechanism. 123 For
example, it lacks features to ensure that outcomes are rights-compatible and the policy’s potential
sanction tool, namely conditioning or withdrawing some forms of government support, fails to
ensure access to justice for victims.124 Simons also pointed out that the policy failed to offer a
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basis or guideline for measuring non-alignment with the policy such that the withdrawal of support
would be warranted.125
Notably, Simons’ analysis, undertaken shortly after the publication of the 2014 CSR Policy,
was entirely textual. Experience with the implementation of the policy and complaint mechanisms
between 2015 and 2017 revealed further weaknesses in practice. In 2015 the federal government
appointed Jeffrey Davidson to the CSR Counsellor position. Davidson had 35 years of experience
working for a number of mining companies as well as the World Bank on community relations
strategies.126 Following Davidson’s appointment, there is no record of a single request for review
(or complaint) being brought to his office between 2015 and 2017.127 Given the ongoing reports
of harms linked to Canadian extractive companies abroad in this period (see Part 2), this absence
suggests that civil society and affected communities lacked trust in the CSR Counsellor’s review
process from the very beginning. According to the Counsellor’s 2015/2016 Annual Report,
Davidson primarily dedicated his time to public presentations and informal meetings with a wide
variety of mining companies, civil society organizations, academics, industry associations, and
CSR consultants.128 There is no indication that these meetings involved a mediated dialogue of
any kind.
In August 2016, Counsellor Davidson made his first reported country trip to Honduras for
a period of approximately 12 days. The purpose was to explain and promote CSR expectations,
develop a better understanding of the local context, issues and challenges, and establish a
foundation for effective advisory support and constructive intervention if required. 129 In his
country trip report, published about a year later, Davidson described his meetings with stakeholders
and the concerns he heard with respect to the negative impacts of extractive activities in Honduras.
However, the report also contained a series of controversial statements in a section called “The
Canada NGO Connection,” where the Counsellor stated that foreign and local NGOs have
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contributed to the strained and tense situation around extractive activities in Honduras. In this
section, Davidson accused two Canadian NGOs in particular of being ideologically against mining,
of adopting confrontational and adversarial approaches to companies, and of being inherently
opposed to collaborative relationships. The Counsellor’s language also suggested that these groups
perceive themselves as human rights defenders and perceive a culture of impunity for mining
companies in Honduras.
Two weeks after the Counsellor released his report, a group of twenty-four Canadian
NGOs, unions and churches sent a letter to Canada’s Minister of International Trade calling for its
retraction. 130

In their letter, these groups accused the Counsellor of making “sweeping,

unsubstantiated, biased and irresponsible accusations against Canadian CSOs” which minimize the
agency of entire communities, local civil society leaders and organizations in Honduras who have
long expressed legitimate concerns about the extractive sector and regularly mobilized in defense
of their rights and environment.131 The civil society letter further argued that the Counsellor had
misrepresented the role of Canadian NGOs in Honduras and fundamentally misunderstood the
nature of international solidarity relationships between organizations. The letter also stated that
the Counsellor “minimizes the danger faced by human rights defenders in Honduras” which has
been widely recognized by numerous international human rights bodies. These groups charged
that the Counsellor’s “irresponsible assertions” may give license to certain actors in Honduras to
take action against international organizations, something which has occurred in recent years.
It seems fair to say that the CSR Counsellor’s 2017 country trip report resulted in a total
breakdown of his relationship with a considerable cross-section of Canadian civil society. Given
the nature of the statements, the report may have also directly damaged his relationship with civil
society groups abroad. This result is ironic given that the Counsellor’s primarily mandate was to
facilitate dialogue and his goal in visiting Honduras was “constructive intervention”. To date, the
Minister of International Trade has not responded to the civil society letter or request for retraction
of the report.
In sum, advocates critiqued the efficacy and even the legitimacy of the 2014 CSR policy in
three ways. First, by critically analysing the NCP’s response to complaints against Canadian
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resource companies submitted after 2014. Second, by evaluating the CSR policy against the norms
articulated in the UN Guiding Principles. And third, by rallying together to publicly challenge the
CSR Counsellor’s judgment and capacity to facilitate constructive dialogue. Together, these
strategies combined empirical study, normative analysis and political critique. The next section
will examine how advocates took their dissatisfaction with the Canadian CSR policy status quo to
international fora.
5 Building Strong Consensus with International Human Rights Bodies (2002-2017)
Previous sections of this chapter have referred to numerous civil society reports that
documented the human rights concerns of communities affected by the Canadian extractive
industry abroad and further argued that Canada’s existing CSR policies are inadequate. In
conjunction with these strategies, civil society organizations persistently brought this evidence
before international human rights bodies, asking them to evaluate Canada’s approach to its
international extractive sector in light of its international human rights obligations. In the United
Nations (UN) system, advocates brought their concerns to treaty bodies, Special Rapporteurs and
Working Groups, all tasked with interpreting core UN human rights treaties and reviewing state
signatories’ compliance.

In the Organization of American States (OAS), advocates made

submissions to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) at thematic hearings
addressing Canada’s human rights obligations in the area of extractive industries abroad.
This international legal work generated a significant body of commentary. Over a period
of fifteen years, human rights bodies in both systems pronounced on the human rights and
environmental impacts of Canadian resource extraction abroad and the concomitant responsibilities
of the Canadian state. In total, between 2002 and 2017, seven UN bodies issued at least ten separate
statements to Canada on these issues: the UN Special Rapporteur on Toxic Waste, 132 the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,133 the Committee on the Rights of the
132
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Child, 134 the Human Rights Committee, 135 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 136 the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 137 and most
recently, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights.138
In 2013, 2014 and again in 2017, the IACHR dedicated three thematic hearings specifically
to the topic of Canadian resource companies in Latin America and the Canadian government’s
associated policies, laws and responsibility.139 It also received submissions on this issue in 2015
from the Human Rights Research and Education Centre at the University of Ottawa140 and from
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the Counsel of Latin American Catholic Bishops141 at hearings of a more general nature. On this
basis, the IACHR has commented on two separate occasions on Canada’s obligations with respect
to these issues.142 Taking the statements from UN and OAS bodies in combination, in total eight
international human rights bodies made at least twelve relevant statements to Canada on point
between 2002 and 2017.
The timing of these statements in relation to the development of Canada’s CSR policies is
important. The first two UN statements on these issues occurred in 2002 and 2007, before Canada
had announced its 2009 CSR policy. In the five years that the 2009 policy was in place, advocates
obtained two more statements from UN human rights bodies and participated in two IAHRC
hearings. However, the majority of the above-cited statements from international human rights
bodies occurred in a short three-year period after Canada updated its CSR policy in late 2014.
One possible explanation for this distribution is that the 2014 policy change did little if
anything to remedy concerns with the 2009 policy, making Canada appear increasingly intransigent
in its commitment to a voluntary approach. In this context, advocates intensified their efforts to
frame their concerns in terms of Canada’s international human rights commitments. Another
important factor is that advocates began to accumulate a breadth and depth of research establishing
problems with company conduct, state conduct and state policies. International human rights
bodies clearly found this research compelling and they responded accordingly with strong
statements to Canada.
Taken together, these statements contain three main themes. First, human rights bodies
commonly expressed concern in response to numerous reports and findings that Canadian resource
companies are causing environmental harm and contributing to human rights violations in the
developing countries where they operate. Second, all of the bodies in question called on the
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Canadian government to establish effective legislative and administrative law measures to oversee
companies and to prevent human rights violations abroad. In this respect, several statements
recommended that Canada monitor the human rights impacts of Canadian companies’ overseas
operations and require companies to undertake human rights impact assessments of proposed
projects.
Third, a considerable majority of these bodies made recommendations about access to
justice in Canada. This included recommendations that Canada establish an effective state-based
non-judicial system of independent investigation of allegations against Canadian companies,
including accountability mechanisms and possible sanctions such as the withdrawal of state
support. 143 This line of recommendations also included reforms to ensure access to judicial
remedies in Canada. In sum, numerous international human rights bodies sent a strong, unified
and consistent message over a period of fifteen years that Canada’s CSR policies were inadequate
from the perspective of its international obligations.
6 Creating & Advocating for Concrete Law Reform Proposals (2009-2016)
In addition to the strategies mentioned above, Canadian advocates focused their efforts on
developing law and policy proposals in Canada that aimed to address, at least in some way, the
human rights impact of Canadian extractive companies abroad.144 Most of these efforts focused
on the creation of an effective home-state non-judicial grievance mechanism. The first set of
proposals in this regarded emerged from the recommendations of two government commissioned
reports (described in Part 2): the 2005 report of the Parliamentary Sub-committee on Human Rights
and International Development, and the 2007 report of the Advisory Committee for the National
Roundtables on Corporate Social Responsibility and the Extractive Industry in Developing
Countries.145
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Unsatisfied with the 2009 CSR Policy response to these reports, civil society groups in
Canada worked hard to support Bill C-300, An Act respecting corporate accountability for the
activities of mining, oil or gas in developing countries,146 proposed by an opposition Member of
Parliament. The Bill would have required certain Canadian companies to comply with international
human rights standards in their overseas operations and would have obligated the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade to receive complaints about these companies. If either
Minister determined that a company had not met the standards specified, the Bill would have
required the withdrawal of Export Development Canada loans, Canada Pension Plan equity
holdings, as well as diplomatic support. The Bill would have also made the provision of these
forms of financial support conditional on companies’ compliance with the standards specified.
With a minority Conservative government in power, Bill C-300 passed first and second reading in
the Canadian Parliament before it was narrowly defeated in 2010 in its third and final reading.147
Following the defeat of Bill C-300, opposition Members of Parliament introduced two
related bills between 2010 and 2013. The first, Bill C-571, An Act respecting corporate practices
relating to the purchase of minerals from the Great Lakes Region of Africa148 would have required
certain companies to undertake due diligence, and the second, Bill C-323, An Act to amend the
Federal Courts Act (international promotion and protection of human rights)149 would have given
the Canadian federal courts universal jurisdiction over claims of violations of international human
rights law. Neither Bill moved beyond initial stages.
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6.1 Draft Legislation: the Business & Human Rights Act (2016)
The concept of an independent Canadian ombudsperson with the power to receive
complaints about the human rights impacts of the Canadian extractive industry abroad first
appeared as draft legislation in 2014 with Bill C-584 - An Act respecting the corporate social
responsibility inherent in the activities of Canadian extractive corporations in developing
countries. 150 Like those before it, this Bill, proposed by an opposition Member of Parliament, was
defeated at a preliminary stage. However, after nearly a decade in power, the federal Conservative
government fell the next year in 2015. The Liberal Party came to power on an election platform
that included a commitment to implementing an ombudsperson for the Canadian extractive sector
abroad.151
With the apparent opportunity for legislative change at hand, the CNCA intensified its work
on model legislation, unveiling The Global Leadership in Business and Human Rights Act: An Act
to Create an Independent Human Rights Ombudsperson for the International Extractive Sector152
in late 2016. This proposal was considerably more sophisticated and comprehensive than previous
proposals. It likely drew some inspiration from a similar concept developed by two Canadian law
professors in a book published two years prior.153 Also, unlike previous proposals, the CNCA did
not bring the Business & Human Rights Act forward in the Parliamentary process. Rather, they
presented it to government representatives in countless private meetings. This section will describe
the proposed Act’s main features in the following categories: administrative body, regulatory
objectives and jurisdiction; standards; investigatory powers and recommendations; and potential
sanctions.
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6.2 Administrative Body, Regulatory Objectives & Jurisdiction
The draft Business and Human Rights Act aimed to address the harms suffered by
individuals and the natural environment in foreign states in connection with Canadian extractive
industries.154 In relation to these harms, the Act’s objectives were: to promote the avoidance of
harms; to promote the meaningful participation of individuals, groups and local communities in
decisions that affect them; to investigate and report on harms; and to promote the resolution,
remedy and full reparation of harm.155 It also aimed to increase accountability and transparency
with respect to harms.156
In order to meet these objectives, the proposed legislation would have created an oversight
body called the Office of the Extractive Industries Human Rights Ombudsperson, appointed by a
majority vote of the members of the House of Commons and the Senate as a public servant and an
Officer of Parliament, independent from the Government.157 Anyone employed, on the board of
directors or otherwise closely associated with Canadian extractive companies in the previous five
years would not have been eligible for the appointment.158
The proposed Act required a prospective Ombudsperson to have qualifications in three
main arenas: (1) expertise and experience in the investigation and documentation of human rights
infringements; (2) knowledge of international best practice in gender-sensitive investigation and
analysis; and (3) experience in at least one of the following areas: international best practice in the
investigation of sexual violence, extractive industries, Indigenous rights and human rights and
environmental impact assessment and auditing.159
Another important feature of the CNCA’s draft legislation was the intended scope of its
application to any corporation, with a Canadian nexus, engaged in the commercial development of
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oil, gas or minerals in a foreign state.160 A Canadian nexus existed if a company: (1) was listed on
a Canadian stock exchange; (2) incorporated anywhere in Canada; (3) had a principal place of
business in Canada; or (4) was receiving or had received support, subsidy, promotion, partnership
or protection from the Canadian government or a government agency.161 The proposed Act also
captured any affiliate of, including a subsidiary or a company controlled by, a Canadian
corporation, also engaged in the commercial development of oil, gas or minerals.162 Accordingly,
the Ombudsperson’s jurisdiction to investigate would have been established if there was a nexus
between the subject of the complaint and Canada.163 Notably, the scope of the Ombudsperson’s
proposed jurisdiction parallels that set out in existing Canadian legislation with extra-territorial
reach.164
6.3 Standards
Under the draft Business & Human Rights Act, the Ombudsperson had a duty to initiate an
investigation where a complaint named a company with a Canadian nexus and alleged a specified
harm.165 The proposed Act defined harm166 as an infringement of any of the human rights referred
to in numerous instruments of international law: nine core UN human rights treaties,167 two UN
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Declarations, 168 nine core ILO Conventions, 169 the Geneva Conventions and one OECD
Convention.170 Together, these sources of international human rights law would have established
the formal standards for evaluating Canadian companies. When determining whether or not
specified standards had been infringed, the draft Act required the Ombudsperson to consider: the
practice of competent international bodies, certain international environmental standards171 and the
UN Guiding Principles.172 The CNCA’s Ombudsperson would also have had the discretion to
consider international CSR norms, including state-based, multi-stakeholder and norms emanating
from international financial institutions.173
In relation to these standards, a complaint could allege that a Canadian company had, by
act or omission, caused or contributed to a specified harm in a foreign state.174 An investigation
would have similarly been triggered by allegations of a significant risk that such harm could occur.
The same thresholds would have applied to third parties in a material contractual relationship with
a Canadian company. 175 The proposed Ombudsperson would also have had the discretion to
168
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initiate an investigation without a complaint where they suspected that such harm had occurred.176
However, if the alleged harms were trivial or the complaint was frivolous, vexatious or not made
in good faith, the Ombudsperson retained the discretion to decline to investigate.177
6.4 Investigatory Powers & Recommendations
In terms of the investigation itself, the CNCA proposal obliged the Ombudsperson to take
into account the personal circumstances of complainants, including by designing specialized
procedural rules to this end.178 In order to collect evidence in the course of an investigation, the
Ombudsperson could have received submissions and requested documents and evidence from the
parties.179 The Ombudsperson could also have resorted to the courts to request a warrant to search
a location and/or an order to produce documents, including the examination, under oath or not, of
the person named in the order.180 Finally, the draft legislation established terms for coordinating
between the Ombudsperson’s investigation and other Canadian legal procedures181 and it would
have allowed the Ombudsperson to gather evidence in a foreign state with permission.182 In short,
the Ombudsperson contemplated in the proposed Act was imbued with extensive investigatory
powers, which in some cases could be enforced and supervised by a Canadian court.
The CNCA proposal provided that an investigation could be discontinued for one of three
reasons. First, the investigation would end if the Ombudsperson was of the opinion that there was
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no harm, or risk of harm, and that there were no compelling reasons to continue the investigation.183
Second, an investigation would discontinue if the parties entered into a settlement agreement in
accordance with certain requirements. 184 In this respect, the draft Act would have permitted
mediation, provided that: the Ombudsperson believed the matter was appropriate for mediation;
the complainant had given informed consent to mediation; and the relevant facts were known.185
The Ombudsperson would have had the discretion to approve (or not) a mediated settlement
agreement, having regard to the Act’s objectives.186 Final agreements would have been binding on
the parties and enforceable in a Canadian court.187
The third basis upon which an investigation could conclude was if the proposed
Ombudsperson were to find that a Canadian company, or a third party with whom it is in a material
contractual relationship, had failed to respect applicable human rights. This was defined as a
situation where the entity in question had, by act or omission, caused or contributed to harm in a
foreign state, or there was a significant risk that it would do so.188 Upon making such a finding,
the proposed Ombudsperson was required to give any affected party reasonable notice and an
opportunity to respond.189
Following an adverse finding, the Ombudsperson was further required to issue a public
report with an opinion, reasons and appropriate recommendations “of any kind, to any person, or
any agency and body of the Government of Canada”. 190

With respect to the company,

recommendations might have included: to remedy and repair harm done; to prevent further harm
with respect to the specific complaint; or to avoid future harm in all of its operations.
Recommendations could also have been directed at consultation with affected communities at the
project level or at a company’s consultation policies and practices more generally. The proposed
Ombudsperson could have also made recommendations to the complainant, the company or a third
party regarding steps to avoid conflict arising from a project.

Finally, with respect to the

Government of Canada, the Ombudsperson had the discretion to make recommendations,
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“regarding any acts or omissions in the case under investigation” or any related practice, law or
policy or the need for any practice.191
Building on this rubric of potential recommendations following an adverse finding, the draft
Act contemplated significant follow up provisions.

The proposed Ombudsperson’s

recommendations would have included specific timeframes and the addressees of a
recommendation were required to provide written notice of their progress. Moreover, complainants
retained a right to offer their perspective on the implementation of recommendations and the
Ombudsperson was required to issue a follow-up report.192
In this connection, it is important to acknowledge the provisions of the CNCA’s proposed
Act that aimed to ensure transparency throughout the grievance process: in the decision to
investigate, in the investigation itself, and in the outcome. First, the investigation would have
begun with notice to the subjects of the investigation, which would also be posted publicly.193
Alternatively, if the Ombudsperson decided not to investigate, the complainant would be informed
in writing with reasons. 194 Where the parties agreed to a settlement, the Ombudsperson was
required to issue a public report on the settlement at the conclusion of the investigation, or, in lieu
of this report, the parties could agree to publicly disclose a written summary of the complaint,
investigation and the settlement.

Notably, this joint disclosure had to be approved by the

Ombudsperson in light of the draft Act’s mandate to improve transparency and accountability.195
Finally, following the conclusion of an investigation, reports and follow-up reports would
have been made public and shared with relevant international bodies as well as the federal
Parliament.196 When issuing these reports, the Ombudsperson would have had the discretion to
deem sources, information or evidence obtained in the investigation confidential for reasons of
privacy, commercial sensitivity, privilege or safety.197 However, the Ombudsperson would also
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have had the discretion to weigh these confidentiality concerns against the public interest in
disclosure.198
6.5 Potential Sanctions
The draft Business and Human Rights Act would have equipped the Ombudsperson with
the power to recommend a limited set of sanctions. This power would have been triggered where
the proposed Ombudsperson was not satisfied that the company had taken, or was undertaking, all
reasonable steps to comply with either the terms of a settlement or any recommendations. In these
circumstances, the Ombudsperson could have recommended to any and all government agencies
or departments that they withdraw any existing support or subsidy and terminate any promotion or
protection of the company or the project for a stipulated period, or until specific conditions were
met.199 If the company was not currently receiving any such support, the Ombudsperson could
have recommended that it be deemed ineligible for future support. In limited circumstances, the
draft Act would have allowed the Ombudsperson to recommend sanctions of this nature before
giving the company a chance to comply with recommended remedies. This route would only have
been available where the Ombudsperson had found harms of such a serious nature that it would be
inappropriate for the Government of Canada to provide the company with support.
Finally, the proposed legislation included a limited enforcement mechanism in relation to
these narrow sanctions. If the Ombudsperson believed that the government has failed to implement
the recommended sanction within the stipulated timeframe, they could serve the government body
in question with a notice of non-compliance, requiring it either to establish that it had complied, or
to provide reasons for its actions or inactions. 200 Upon receipt of a government response, the
Ombudsperson could have then applied to Federal Court for judicial review of the reasonableness
of the response. Complainants would have had the opportunity to appear as a party to the review
with funding for their reasonable legal expenses. 201 In sum, the proposed legislation allowed for
potential enforcement (judicial review) only with respect to a decision on the part of the Canadian
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government not to withdraw support and protection from a company that had violated human rights
abroad.202
6.6 Analysis of the Draft Business & Human Rights Act
The CNCA’s International Extractive Industry Ombudsperson draft legislation emerged as
an important innovation and strategic maneuver in the debate over home state non-judicial
grievance mechanisms in Canada. Among its strengths, three stand out. First, its standards drew
directly from a large number of international human rights instruments. Second, it envisioned
relatively strong investigation, participation and public reporting features. Third, it contemplated
a strong prerogative for the Ombudsperson to issue, on the basis of case-specific findings, a
potentially wide range of recommendations to the Canadian government, the complainant and the
company in question with respect to remedies, policies and practices.
These strengths are countered by the draft Act’s relative weakness in the area of
enforcement. The proposed Ombudsperson had no power to enforce its recommendations with
respect to its company-specific findings, including any recommended remedies. Its only recourse
vis-à-vis a non-compliant company was to attempt to leverage the withdrawal of Canadian
government support in order to pressure the company to comply with applicable recommendations.
If the government were to refuse to comply with this effort, such leverage would only have been
available if the Ombudsperson could convince a Canadian court that the government’s refusal was
unreasonable, under administrative law principles.
The CNCA’s proposed Ombudsperson regime appeared to be organized around a calculated
trade-off between strong independent investigations, public transparency and broad scope for
recommendations on one hand; and on the other, very limited enforcement power, including no
enforcement of recommended remedies and tenuous enforcement of recommended withdrawals of
government support. Access to remedy under this regime would have depended entirely on the
capacity of the Ombudsperson’s findings and recommendations to generate public (including
governmental) pressure on companies. The proposed legislation’s (albeit weak) sanction feature
could not directly result in remedies. Rather, it was solely directed at the public conscience, in the
sense that, if successfully activated, it could eliminate state support for an offending company. The
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actual impact of such a sanction on any given company would likely depend significantly on the
circumstances of the company, and perhaps even more significantly, on the nature of the
withdrawal of state support. Recall that the concept of state supports articulated in the draft Act
was very broad. At any rate, for companies that do not receive dedicated diplomatic or financial
state support, the available sanction under the proposed regime would have been greatly limited.
7 The Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (January 2018)
At first it seemed that the CNCA’s strategic trade-offs in its model legislation had failed to
render the desired results. This chapter began with a short description of a 2017 activist protest
demanding government action on the CNCA’s proposal. The protestors’ frustration stemmed in
part from the governing Liberal Party’s representations during the 2015 election campaign. At that
time, Liberal Party documents professed to share “Canadians’ concerns about the actions of some
Canadian mining companies operating overseas” and claimed it had “long been fighting for
transparency, accountability and sustainability in the mining sector.”203 The Liberals promised to
ensure that corporations engaged in resource extraction with government support respect
international environmental standards and human rights, including by setting up an independent
Ombudsperson office to consider complaints made against Canadian companies and to investigate
those complaints where warranted.204
During the first two years of their four-year mandate, the Liberals failed to make good on
these promises in two consecutive budgets. 205 After being elected, key federal Ministers declined
to say that change was needed and refused to publicly reiterate their Party’s pre-election
commitments.206 Then, in Fall 2017, the government took an unexpectedly active interest in the
issues when the federal Parliamentary Subcommittee on International Human Rights decided to
convene hearings on human rights and resources extraction in Latin America.
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However, after several weeks of hearings, the CNCA sent an urgent letter to the
subcommittee, raising serious concerns that the hearings were skewed. 207 In addition to calling
very few civil society representatives, the committee ultimately declined to call any witnesses
representing: Indigenous peoples and affected communities in Latin America, experts on Canada’s
international human rights obligations, and the proponents and legal experts behind the CNCA
draft legislation.208 The 2017 hearings were a marked departure from the 2005 SCFAIT hearings,
which had invited a relatively wide range of perspectives including from human rights experts, a
spectrum of civil society representatives and affected communities.209
As the subcommittee hearings wrapped up, advocates argued that they had been “designed
to justify the do-nothing status quo” and that the process had precluded any critical examination of
Canada’s current policy.210 Then, unexpectedly, this dismal assessment of the political moment
was abruptly cast into doubt. In the final weeks of 2017, government officials told Canadian media
that plans were underway to announce a change to Canada’s CSR policies in the area of extractive
industries abroad.211 On January 17, 2018, the Minister of International Trade made good on this
promise and announced his intention to create the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible
Enterprise (CORE) as part of the government’s “progressive trade” agenda.212
While the announcement involved only a few specific details, it is clear that the
government’s CORE mechanism will adopt many of the features proposed in the CNCA’s Business
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& Human Rights Act. 213 For example, the forthcoming Ombudsperson will be mandated to
independently investigate allegations of human rights abuses abroad against Canadian companies
operating in the mining, oil and gas, or garment industries. The Ombudsperson will be empowered
to

compel

documents,

report

independently,

recommend

remedy

and

monitor

implementation. This includes recommendations for compensation, corporate policy changes and
apologies, where appropriate. The Ombudsperson will also have the power to recommend changes
to government policy and/or the withdrawal of trade advocacy support and Export Development
Canada financial support. To support the development of the Ombudsperson’s mandate and
operating procedures, a Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Body (MSAB) of experts from business and
civil society will be put in place. The MSAB will counsel the government on the further
development of its laws, policies and practices with respect to business and human rights.
8 Conclusion & Future Research
There are many details to work out following the Canadian government’s early 2018
announcement of its intention to create a Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise
(CORE). However, there can be no doubt that this new home-state non-judicial grievance
mechanism will be globally unprecedented and appears to signal a sea change in Canadian law and
policy. It is also absolutely clear that this turn of events is a direct result of nearly two decades of
Canadian activism, in collaboration with partner organizations, affected communities and human
rights defenders around the world. The Minister of International Trade actually acknowledged and
celebrated Canadian advocates in his public address announcing the CORE.
This chapter has examined how Canadian advocates employed law and politics to address
concerns with global economic injustice in the Canadian resource sector. Four main strategies
emerge from this account. First, advocates worked with affected communities abroad to document
harms allegedly connected to Canadian extractive projects. In doing so, they compiled detailed
case studies of social, economic and environmental harm, as well as studies based on aggregate
data on infringements of civil liberties. Some case studies led to litigation in Canada, which in turn
helped establish the credibility of advocates’ allegations of harms. In developing their account of
213
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the nature of the problem, advocates also tracked the practices and policies employed by the
Canadian state to support Canadian companies abroad. In this area, they identified insufficient
government transparency, accountability, and even practices that appeared to exacerbate harm or
the risk of harm.
Second, advocates engaged with Canada’s voluntary CSR mechanisms, including by
assisting affected communities to bring complaints. This generated the data necessary to critically
examine these mechanisms’ performance and outcomes. Advocates also critically analyzed the
government’s CSR policy normatively, against criteria for effectiveness, as well as politically, in
relation to the CSR Counsellor’s judgment and capacity to facilitate dialogue with civil society.
Third, advocates presented their concerns with respect to Canadian companies’ conduct and
Canadian state practices and policies to a wide range of international human rights bodies. These
bodies in turn sought representations from the Canadian state and in some cases industry
representatives or companies themselves. In their statements, international bodies were unified
and categorical in their conclusion that Canada was falling short of its international law obligations
in this area and that reform was necessary.
Advocates appealed to this body of data, reports and normative statements in order to
pursue a fourth strategy, building a compelling case for law reform in Canada. To do so, they
developed and advanced concrete reform proposals through a number of formal channels:
parliamentary committee hearings, multi-stakeholder roundtables, legislation proposals to
Parliament from opposition members, and finally through draft legislation proposed directly to the
Liberal majority government. In the process, advocates consistently refined their law reform
proposals, ultimately trading strong transparency and investigatory powers for weak or no
enforcement powers.
Importantly, advocates also used political methods to advocate for their proposals.
References to many of these tactics appear throughout this chapter: coalition building, speaking
tours, documentary films, opinion editorials, open letters to high ranking officials, rallies, sit-ins
and petitions. The main objective was to convince law makers, and the broader Canadian public,
that Canada needs an effective non-judicial grievance mechanism and laws to condition state
support for resource companies on compliance with human rights standards.
Running through all of these strategies is advocates’ larger strategic decision to coalesce
their efforts around calls for an effective home-state non-judicial grievance mechanism. From one
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perspective, this kind of mechanism is attractive because, relative to judicial mechanisms, it is a
potentially less expensive, more accessible avenue for seeking mediated solutions and remedies in
the jurisdiction that theoretically has the strongest institutions and the most power vis-à-vis
companies. From a critical legal studies perspective, perhaps the most interesting feature of the
mechanism now emerging in Canada is its potential capacity to expose the political, economic and
legal relationship between a capital-exporting country and its transnational corporations. One
important feature of the Canadian debate has been a consistent focus on state supports for
companies and the legal frameworks that govern these supports.
However, at this critical point of transition and on the eve of a new status quo, there are
unsurprisingly many unanswered questions. Two of these are worth mentioning here. First, it is
uncertain that the emerging Canadian non-judicial grievance mechanism will actually be effective.
As already observed, it represents a clear trade-off between strong investigatory and disclosure
powers and zero power to enforce recommendations or remedies that benefit communities. It
remains to be seen whether or not transparent and independent investigations, based on a full record
of evidence, will on their own be able to improve the situation of affected communities or secure
remedies in practice. While the government has now conceded that a purely voluntary approach is
not effective, the question of what constitutes an effective home-state non-judicial mechanism is
far from settled. In fact, with the government’s announcement of a forthcoming Ombudsperson,
this debate is really only beginning in Canada.

As before, empirical evaluations of the

mechanism’s performance will be important. Another important future area of research will be to
develop a clear normative framework for evaluating the effectiveness of home-state non-judicial
grievance mechanisms, based on accepted principles of international law as well as on experience
with their implementation. 214
The Canadian government’s announcement also neatly skirts a second line of questioning,
one that has been lurking in the background for some time now. The Canadian debate on the terms
and conditions that should govern the state’s political, legal and economic support for companies
214
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is also only just beginning. The Ombudsperson discussion to date has focused on investigating
company misconduct and withdrawing existing political and economic supports or denying future
supports. However, advocates’ research to date has indicated that there are serious issues with state
due diligence at the outset, before support is provided. There are also unanswered questions about
the norms that should govern state support and how the Canadian public can satisfy itself that
public officials and agents are abiding by these norms.
Moreover, to date the Canadian debate has focused primarily on diplomatic and financial
support (loans) for companies. However, this focus must not distract from the many ways in which
the Canadian government facilitates and enables global markets and the resources extraction
industry in particular.215 There are many other legal regimes that constitute and support companies
and more research is needed to identify how state supports could be addressed in these other areas.
At stake is the nature of the relationship between the state and the transnational corporation, as well
as the state’s obligations to further the public interest, social justice and the protection of human
rights.216
For the moment though, the commitment, creativity and tenacity of Canadian advocates
must be celebrated. After nearly 20 years of sustained advocacy they have accomplished an
incredible feat in moving Canadian policy from voluntary mediation to a mandatory investigation
approach to alleged human rights violations abroad. Undoubtedly, the Canadian experience offers
a wealth of materials for advocates around the world who seek to pressure their home states to
regulate the human rights impacts of their companies’ overseas operations. At the same time, it is
difficult to identify a single lesson or strategy that was most important in the Canada debate. The
most plausible answer is that they were all important and perhaps even essential.
This being said, the account put forward in this chapter does reveal that three important
factors converged in the two years prior to the government’s decision to change its long standing
voluntary CSR policy: the publication of the 2016 JCAP report aggregating data on violence in
Latin America over a 15 year period; the 2016 launch of the CNCA’s draft Business & Human
Rights Act; and the proliferation of strong statements from numerous international human rights
bodies between 2016 and 2017. While the election of a new government was important, the Liberal
Party’s delay and clear reluctance to make good on its campaign promises indicates that a new
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government alone was certainly not sufficient. In the end, perhaps two things are certain: that the
experiment with law’s capacity to create a more just global economy is only just beginning, and
that partnership between legal researchers and social justice advocates is a critical part of the
journey.
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Transnational Mining Justice Social Movement: Reflecting on Two
Decades of Law Reform Activism in the Americas
-

Charis Kamphuis

Abstract
In this article, I consolidate research that tracks the activism of the mining justice social
movement from the late 1990s to present. As a starting point, I conceptualize this movement as a
transnational political project that seeks to transform the terms of corporate resource extraction
pursuant to the political and legal arrangements of neo-liberal economic globalization. In this
context, I reflect on the movement’s most significant human rights-oriented law reform projects
in the Americas: Indigenous right to consultation legislation in several Latin American countries,
and a series of non-judicial grievance mechanisms in Canada, in response to the right to remedy
norm in international law. Drawing on existing research, I conclude that in both cases the state
has responded with law and policy reforms that fall far short of achieving advocates’ objectives.
I argue that these shortcomings are due in part to the persistence of three liberal/neo-liberal
ideologies in the reforms in question: formalism, voluntarism and privatism. To better
understand and explain these findings, I turn to three critical theories of human rights legal
activism: pragmatism, left critique/critical legal liberalism and counter-hegemony. I examine the
work of a range of scholars writing under the banner of each theory in order to identify key
debates and insights that may be instructive as the mining justice movement, and related social
and environmental justice movements, continue to aspire toward a law reform agenda capable of
addressing pressing global environmental and social justice issues.
1

Introduction
The legal instruments associated with economic globalization, including foreign investment

agreements, global markets and trade agreements, have significantly facilitated foreign resource
extraction and imbued it with particular geographic patterns. The majority of mining companies
operating globally are headquartered in Canada, making it an important “home country” for
companies.1 At the same time, almost half of these Canadian companies’ activities take place in
resource rich countries in Latin America, sometimes referred to as “host countries”.2 The social
conflicts that extraction often generates between local communities and foreign companies are
increasingly trans-border in that they may implicate home and host states, investors, NGOs,
lawyers, journalists and researchers in multiple jurisdictions.

1

See for example: UN OHCHR, Statement at the end of visit to Canada by the United Nations Working Group on
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I use the term “transnational mining justice social movement” to refer to the alliances and
coordinated practices that result when mine-affected communities search for legal remedies or law
reform in collaboration with trans-border networks. This article reflects on two of this movement’s
key law reform projects in the last twenty years: Indigenous right to consultation/consent
legislation in Latin America and right to remedy legislation in Canada. 3 In undertaking this
reflection, I draw on my experiences and observations accumulated over more than ten years
participating in the movement, as a Canadian advocate, lawyer and an academic, who has also lived
and worked in Latin America. 4 My participation in the movement has included academic
publications alongside close work with civil society organizations in Canada and Latin America,
as well as advocacy for the law reforms and/or the underlying rights claims that I study here.5
In this article’s second part, I refer to literature on social movements in order to identify
the political and institutional aspects of the mining justice movement’s engagement in law reform
activism as a means for changing the terms, conditions and relations of neo-liberal globalization
that characterize the dominant model of resource extraction.6 Advocates and affected communities

3
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(Washington, January 2018), online:
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have argued that the state’s regulation of transnational mining is inadequate and that mining
companies are not properly held to account for harm that may flow from their actions and
operations. 7 They argue that companies are able to violate human rights and degrade the
environment with impunity, while unjustly accumulating enormous wealth. They believe that
states and companies have repressed legitimate critiques of, and opposition to, these practices.8
This compels them to employ a number of political and legal tactics, including a turn to law reform
advocacy an effort to address their concerns. While my social movement approach highlights the
significance of the movement’s fundamental normative positions, it does not presume consensus
on the goals or the appropriate strategies or tactics.9
In this article’s third part, I examine the mining justice movement’s efforts to advance two
related justice-oriented law reform agendas in both home and host countries. The first achievement
builds on advances in the inter-American human rights system with a body of jurisprudence, first
initiated in 2001, that recognizes Indigenous collective property rights in relation to resource
extraction. As countless resource-related protests, blockades, and domestic lawsuits unfolded
across the Americas, beginning in 2011 several Latin American countries passed national
legislation that purported to codify Indigenous communities’ rights to free, prior and informed
consultation in relation to government decision-making about resource extraction.10
The second achievement profiled here is related, and follows a similar temporal trajectory,
albeit in the northern half of the Americas. In the late 1990s, the question of effective remedies for
harms caused by Canadian resource companies overseas became a topic of discussion in Canada
among federal public officials, and beginning in 2005 it became the subject of a series of law reform

7
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proposals and federal policy statements. These efforts culminated in 2019 when the Canadian
government created the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE), a
mechanism that purports to improve access to remedies for individuals and communities harmed
by the overseas operations of Canadian companies.
While acknowledging these important achievements, my concern in this article is also with
their limitations (at least to date) from the point of view of the objectives of the mining justice
movement and the advocates and communities who have pushed for these changes. After nearly
twenty years of sustained and focused transnational activism on these issues, research and critical
analysis indicate that the resulting law reforms fall short of generating material and meaningful
improvements in the circumstances of the communities they seek to benefit. Given the powerful
social and political mobilizations behind these reforms, this observation compels deeper inquiry
and reflection in an effort to more fully conceptualize and explain these achievements and
limitations.
With an analysis that brings my chosen case studies into conversation, I identify three key
themes in the movement’s law reform outcomes that signal the persistence of problematic classical
liberal and neo-liberal ideologies and legal forms. 11 These are: (1) a formal equality view of
relations between companies, communities and civil society actors (formalism); (2) a view of state
and company obligations as voluntary/unenforceable (voluntarism); and (3) a view of the state as
a private actor, solely or primarily concerned with promoting private economic interests, instead
of as a public regulator acting in the public interest (privatism). To the extent that the movement
has sought to address these three issues at the outset in its law reform proposals, it has been
unsuccessful in influencing the final result, fashioned and approved by lawmakers.
In part four, I review the work of theorists across the disciplines of political science, law &
society, history and international relations who are similarly interested in examining how
progressive political projects engage in legal activism in their efforts to create a more just society.
I identify three frameworks that grapple with this issue: (1) pragmatism, (2) left critique / critical
legal liberalism, and (3) counter-hegemony. Under the banner of each approach, the theorists
reviewed in this section share a common interest in activists’ use of liberal legal constructs to
pursue political projects built upon principles and values that are critical of some of liberalism’s
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foundational frameworks. This review of each approach is by no means comprehensive, but rather
represents a sampling of key concepts, priorities and critiques.
My approach to each theoretical framework follows a similar method.

I begin by

summarizing the contribution of each author in order to identify key points of consensus and
debate. With this foundation, I put each theoretical approach into dialogue with my empirical
observations about the mining justice movement’s law reform efforts (described in Part 3). The
objective of this exercise is to draw insights from each approach in order to better understand the
achievements and limitations that emerge from the mining justice movement’s 20-year experiment
with law reform-oriented activism.
This article’s transnational lens on the movement’s sustained engagement with domestic law
reform in Canada and Latin America offers an important opportunity to examine law’s potential as
a tool in the pursuit of a more just global economic system. The successes of the progressive
activists studied here deserve recognition and celebration, while their setbacks warrant careful
reflection. In conclusion I reflect on the common themes and debates that appear to cut across all
three theoretical traditions and I explore some potential pathways forward in light of my reflection
on the experiences, knowledge and strategies accumulated by the mining justice movement to date.
2

Transnational Lawyering & the Social Movement Context
Social movement lawyers agree that one’s approach to lawyering must be informed by the

nature of the actors and issues at play.12 This position stands against an approach that articulates
the legal professional’s tasks and obligations in accordance with a generic set of standards and
procedures, regardless of context. In their work on “cause lawyering”, Austin Sarat and Stuart
Scheingold argue that conventional ideas of legal professionalism are challenged where a lawyer
has a personal commitment to the cause underlying the legal work being performed.13 They further
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assert that when “cause lawyers” begin to work for social movements, the departure from
conventional approaches to lawyering becomes even more profound and complex.14
Sarat and Scheingold rely primarily on the work of Charles Tilly to define a social
movement in terms of its ability to generate a “sustained series of interactions between power
holders and persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency lacking formal
representation”.15 In Tilly’s conception, these interactions are notable for their capacity to make
“publicly visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power”.16 Further, in his
view a social movement is also marked by its ability to mobilize public demonstrations of support
for its demands. To this definition, Sarat and Scheingold add that social movements are “concrete
and embodied” in the people, organizations and actions that constitute them.17
Social movements are also defined by their transcendence of any particular place, event,
institution or individual.

Although interest groups (understood primarily as advocacy

organizations) participate in, and act as conduits of, social movements, a movement cannot be
reduced to these organizations. 18 Reading Tilly together with the work of political scientist
Michael McCann, Sarat and Scheingold take the view that a social movement is an expression (a
“collective voice”) of political protest and moral vision19 that leads its participants to seek the social
and political transformation of their society in the hope of creating a better society.20
Drawing on the work of Sarat and Scheingold, it is clear that the actors, concerns and legal
strategies analyzed in this article constitute elements of a broader, and considerably consolidated,
social movement, defined in part by its dissent to, criticism of and/or protest against what are
viewed as the unjust consequences of foreign mining activities in developing countries. This
mining justice movement is made up of affected communities, faith groups, not-for-profit
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organizations, labour unions, lawyers, academics and journalists, located in numerous countries in
both the global North and South. No single group or community represents this movement and
groups work together through a series of overlapping and fluid networks. The advocacy and dissent
tactics adopted by this movement include civil disobedience, media strategies, letter writing
campaigns, research and report writing, law reform efforts, litigation, complaints to domestic and
international bodies, and various kinds of appeals directly to company executives or investors.21
The interface between some of these tactics and the law is the precise focus of this study.
This diversity of tactics indicates that the members of the movement have specialized roles
and a range of proximities to the issues. Mine-affected communities in the global South, including
Indigenous communities, are on the front lines of the impacts of industrial mining. They often
receive direct support from local civil society organizations, including not-for-profits, faith groups
and unions. These local groups bear witness to the concerns of mine affected communities, provide
information and resources, and assist in articulating communities’ objectives. Moreover, they often
liaise with their civil society counterparts in a developing country’s capital city and/or in the global
North, sharing information and developing research, communication and advocacy strategies.
Academics and journalists in both the North and the South are embedded in these civil society
relations, with a specialized role due to their training in credible and independent research methods,
and their capacity to disseminate research and information to the public and policy makers. Finally,
lawyers in the global North and South may work with all of these groups, providing legal advice
and translating communities’ concerns into legal claims that have traction with adjudicators, public
authorities and company executives.
In this way, this movement’s actors have been able to sustain interactions with both
international and domestic law and policy makers in multiple jurisdictions, as well as in some cases
with corporate executives. These interactions have led to a growing list of law reform initiatives
in a number of domestic contexts, together with institutional policy and normative responses in
diverse international and domestic arenas.22 Moreover, these interactions, initiatives and responses
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often overlap with the activities of other interrelated movements, including most notably those
concerned with the intersection between transnational corporate activity and human rights more
generally, and with other specific industries or sectors, such as for example the garment industry.
There is also considerable overlap between the mining justice movement and Indigenous peoples’
movements as well as with the environmental and labour movement, especially those elements
concerned with other forms of resource extraction, such as petroleum and forestry.23
In spite of the overlapping nature of these movements, it is possible to identify a discrete
trans-border movement specifically concerned with the impacts of industrial mining on
communities in the global South and the capacity of these communities and their allies to dissent
to these mining practices. This movement appears to coalesce more or less around a critique of
neo-liberal globalization, along with a loosely shared moral vision, often articulated with one or
more of the following concepts or principles: corporate accountability/responsibility,
environmental sustainability, business respect for human rights, and Indigenous rights to
consultation, consent, and self-determination. The movement’s central objective is to articulate
and implement new ways of formulating the relationship between the corporation, the state (both
host and home states), and affected communities, in an effort to approximate socio-economic
relations and environmental practices that are more just and sustainable.
This article focuses on ways in which movement actors have pursued this vision and
translated it into concrete legal and advocacy strategies that aim to support two specific rights
claims: (1) the Indigenous right to consultation/consent in relation to resource extraction, and (2)
the right to remedy for corporate-caused harm in the resource extraction process and related
activities such as security operations. As such, my approach here resonates with Sarat and
Scheingold’s concept of law as a “useful site for articulating and advancing alternative visions of
the good.”24
Having characterized in general terms the actors, issues and normative vision of the mining
justice movement, the next step is to evaluate how this comes to bear on the movement’s
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engagement with liberal legal forms. For Sarat and Scheingold, lawyering with a social movement
raises a fundamentally political question: “what do cause lawyers do for, and to a social
movement”.25 In this way, they conceive of lawyering as a political and social practice that will
come to bear in some way on a political force (the movement) that is already in motion. In their
view, law’s utility as a tool for social movements depends on the ability of the movement (and
lawyers) to “politicize the law” by strategically exploiting the cultural resonance of rights and
legality.26
One contribution of this approach is its focus on the movement’s political processes outside
of law. Sarat and Scheingold understand social movement lawyering as an essentially political
practice, where law is a political resource used by social movements as part of a series of strategic
choices in a broader political struggle. This undoubtedly resonates with experiences in the mining
justice movement, where communities frequently resort to protest and/or civil disobedience when
other channels fail where specific legal arguments and lawsuits are only one part of a broader set
of demands and justice concerns with respect to global resource extraction.
Yet this emphasis on politics outside of law highlights the need for its counterpart. In other
words, a full exploration of the mining justice movement’s achievements and limitations requires
a theoretical frame that captures not only the politics of how social movements use law in a broader
political process, but that also recognizes that the identification and articulation of law by a social
movement is itself a political act. In other words, the theoretical perspectives explored in Part 4 all
share a sensitivity to the ways in which lawyering with social movements involves making political
and strategic choices both inside and outside of law. In the course of emphasizing the politicization
of the law, Sarat and Scheingold seem to take for granted the fundamentally political question of
the very content and form of the law. Although they insightfully point out that the lawyer’s
effective exploitation of the cultural resonance of legality is crucial for the movement, this point
nonetheless circles around equally crucial questions of what law, in what form, and with what
consequences for the movement’s vision.27
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While it is undoubtedly true, as Sarat and Scheingold state, that social movement lawyering
significantly involves responding to decisions made by the movement, this study of the mining
justice movement reveals that it is not often obvious, especially in the transnational context, what
“right” should be claimed28 and what form of law should be deployed. As a movement turns to the
law, complex decisions must be made regarding how to translate its moral vision into legal
argumentation and legal processes. The mining justice movement does not simply seek to access
established rights, but rather is attempting to re-imagine the way that relationships are constituted
and regulated in the global economy. Thus, while Sarat and Scheingold’s pragmatic concept of
“politicization” is useful in that it calls attention to some of the choices made in a movement’s use
of law as a political resource, it does only part of the conceptual work necessary to understand the
translation of the movement’s moral vision into legal formulas and strategies.
At this juncture, it is important to once again recognize that opinions have certainly varied
among mining justice movement participants about the strategic value of the specific law reform
proposals analyze here. 29 This highlights the comments above with respect to the political,
internally contested and complex nature of a social movement’s engagement with law. However,
this disagreement does not detract from the fact that the proposals studied here are undoubtedly the
most prominent developed by the movement over the last twenty years. They reflect a vision that
has garnered broad civil society support in key moments, although the eventual state-controlled
legal outcomes are criticized by many movement actors.
In sum then, two useful insights can be drawn from the work of Sarat and Scheingold. The
first is the importance of characterizing the political context and the moral vision of a particular
social movement. In response, I have made some general assertions about the mining justice
movement. The second insight comes as a reminder to be attentive to the political decisions made
by social movements outside of law, which includes the instrumentalization of law. In response, I
have added that these decisions are often inextricable from political decision made inside of law,
in relation to the form and content of the law to be deployed. This argument will be explored more
fully in part three of this article.
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3

The Transnational Mining Justice Movement: 20 Years of Law Reform Activism
As indicated, this article analyzes the mining justice movement’s use of litigation and law

reform in two key areas. The first area captures an inter-related set of collective legal claims,
namely to communal property rights and Indigenous rights to consultation and consent, that aim to
modify the terms and conditions of the state’s prerogative to privatize, and the companies’ legal
rights to exploit, natural resources. Several Latin American countries are currently leaders among
developing countries in the area of constitutional Indigenous rights recognition and related law
reform in the area of consultation.30 The second area of legal activism refers to efforts to address
the potential harm caused by a company’s overseas operations, by advocating for the right to
effective remedy and accessible mechanisms for redress in a company’s home country. In this
area, Canada, as the most important home state for mining companies globally, has been the site
of significant law reform debate and innovation on the topic of access to remedies.31 Interestingly,
law reform debates and new developments in these two areas have unfolded almost
contemporaneously in Latin American and Canada.
The interconnections between these two areas of mining justice advocacy makes this study
all the more pertinent. These efforts have required the transnational mining justice movement to
engage in legislative drafting of proposed new administrative and regulatory regimes in Canada
and Latin America. In terms of related litigation efforts, lawyers in Canada have focused on
bringing civil law claims, while efforts in Latin America have focused on constitutional Indigenous
rights claims.32 Taken together, these two areas of legal activism have typically involved framing
the issues in relation to public international law and in terms of at least four fundamental rights
claims: the right to property/land/resources, the right to consultation/consent, the right to free
expression and association, and the right to remedy.
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More specifically, mining related conflicts are often framed as struggles over the terms
and conditions of property relations between companies and affected communities. The issue of
control and distribution of land, resources and wealth is often at the core of contestations over
consultation/consent, and the very meaning of these concepts. When expressions of critique or
opposition to mining are met with repression or coercive practices, activists often frame the issues
in terms of the right to free expression and protest. Finally, when social and environmental
conflicts escalate and companies become perpetrators of harm or are complicit, the movement has
documented the problem of impunity and has invoked the right to remedy as the basis for
fashioning novel transnational law regimes.
These interrelated rights claims, and the law reform efforts they underpin, are an important
site of analysis because together they have constituted a dominant mode of political engagement
by activists and local communities with the social justice issues raised by transnational resource
extraction. In the remainder of this section, I draw on previous studies to synthesize and integrate
my findings of the strategies, challenges and contradictions generated by activists’ invocation of
the aforementioned rights in an effort to advocate for the law reforms referred to above. Not only
does this involve distilling the content of these rights claims, it also requires assessing the efficacy
of these law reform strategies from the perspective of mining-affected communities, their justice
concerns and the aforementioned moral vision of the movement. Drawing on my findings in a
larger body of work, I analyze the ongoing presence of problematic liberal and neo-liberal
ideologies and legal forms in the state-controlled laws that have resulted from the movement’s
efforts.
3.1 Indigenous Rights Recognition and Law Reform in Latin American “Host”
Countries
The intensification and expansion of resource extraction in Latin America since the early
2000s has provoked opposition from many Indigenous peoples and affected communities. States
and companies have not managed this opposition constructively and Indigenous leaders, human
rights and land defenders have often faced threats, violence and repression in response to their
opposition.33 Communities and whole regions have often concluded that they have no choice but
33

Jayalaxshmi Mistry, “Defending the environment now more lethal than soldiering in some war zones – and
indigenous peoples are suffering most” The Conversation (5 August 2019), online:

228

to resort to protest and civil disobedience in order to defend their interests, environment and
livelihoods. Alongside this phenomenon, and in response to litigation, inter-American human
rights bodies and Latin American constitutional courts began to recognize a range of Indigenous
rights in relation to resource extraction.34 Then, beginning in 2011, and typically in response to
protest, a handful of countries in the region enacted Indigenous right to consultation legislation,
often specifically focused on resource-related decision-making. These major achievements in the
areas of judicial recognition and law reform represent a relatively rapid transformation of the
normative landscape in the Americas in relation to Indigenous peoples, territory and resources,
especially at the domestic level.
However, close and applied study reveals that these normative advances in Latin America
in the areas of free, prior and informed consultation/consent, collective property and equitable
compensation, are precarious in practice, especially in relation to foreign resource extraction. One
fundamental issue is that the recognition of these rights in constitutional and/or international law
has for the most part ignored the question of how they might be claimed and enforced in practice.35
Critically, rights recognition has not included related reforms to the procedural rules that establish
the specific processes whereby Indigenous rights might be claimed and potentially enforced. This
observation applies to both the Inter-American legal system as well as Latin American
constitutional law.
Inter-American human rights law requires Indigenous communities to exhaust internal
remedies before bringing a petition to the Inter-American Commission or Court on Human Rights
against a member state. However, in practice communities often find it extremely difficult to
identify and/or access appropriate domestic remedies or pathways to remedies. If communities
seek an exception to the exhaustion of remedies rule for the purposes of pursing their claim in the
<https://theconversation.com/defending-the-environment-now-more-lethal-than-soldiering-in-some-war-zones-andindigenous-peoples-are-suffering-most-118098>.
34
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inter-American system, they then incur the additional evidentiary burden of proving the lack, or
inadequacy, of appropriate domestic remedies. If communities pursue their rights claims before
domestic courts, among other obstacles, they will undoubtedly encounter generic constitutional
procedures that are not designed to account for the historical, social, cultural and economic contexts
that inform Indigenous peoples’ rights violations. This in turn affords the courts discretion to
impose onerous and inequitable procedural requirements on Indigenous claimants. For example,
there are often few if any legal safeguards to prevent courts from resorting to formal/strict
interpretations of procedural rules like limitation period requirements, with the effect of blocking
substantive analysis of Indigenous rights claims.36
These deficiencies and oversights create serious obstacles for Indigenous peoples in Latin
America who seek to assert their constitutional and internationally recognized rights in legal venues
that are binding on their state governments: domestic courts and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. In contrast to the intensity of the social conflict between Indigenous communities
and resource companies, communities have brought relatively few cases to the courts and even
fewer have been successful. For example, the Constitutional Court in Peru first recognized
Indigenous consultation rights in 2008 and then decided several related cases between 2008 and
2012. However, the Court has not decided a single Indigenous right to consultation case since
2012, and only one of the decided cases has involved an Indigenous claimant asserting a specific
right, the others were brought by NGOs or associations on behalf of Indigenous peoples generally.
A similar pattern is observed in the inter-American system. Between 2001 and 2015 approximately
eleven Indigenous or Afro-descendant property and/or consultation/consent rights related petitions
against seven South and Central American member states were admitted, although not all have yet
been the subject of decisions on the merits.37 Not only is this less than one case a year for the entire
region, missing from this timeframe are many countries with large Indigenous populations,
including Colombia, Peru, Brazil and Mexico.
As such, a situation has emerged whereby there is relatively widespread legal or
constitutional recognition of Indigenous legal rights to communal property, but comparatively few
examples of these rights being invoked by specific communities in domestic legal proceedings.
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While a full examination of the reasons for this situation is beyond the scope of this study38, it is
clear that the progressive international recognition and domestic constitutionalization of
Indigenous rights in Latin America has not been accompanied by the development of accessible
and equitable procedures for enabling claims brought by specific communities in relation to
specific foreign-owned resource extraction projects.
Adding to the inequities and obstacles that Indigenous peoples encounter in accessing
domestic and international courts for the purposes of making property and consultation/consent
rights claims, a second fundamental issue arises from the experience across South America with
the codification of the right to consultation in national legislation. This refers to the emergence
between 2011 and 2015 of statutes in four Andean countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Peru)
that establish mechanisms and rules to govern state consultations with Indigenous peoples in
relation to, inter alia, proposed resource extraction projects. 39 There is now an abundance of
empirical research (field work) and positive law analysis that evidences the grave deficiencies in
these statutes.40 Indeed the negotiations between Indigenous communities, their allies, and the
state that led up to the creation of these statutes were fraught with political conflict and in some
cases communities and allies withdrew from the process in protest.41
There is also broad consensus that consultation processes in the region, implemented
pursuant to these laws and regulations, have failed to ameliorate profound power disparities and
information gaps. This includes poorly designed processes, lack of accessible and adequate
information, together with inadequate or non-existent safeguards and oversight of agreements
reached between communities and private or state actors. As such, there are few if any examples
of consultation processes and resulting agreements that meet the standards required by international
human rights law.42
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One sign that business as usual appears to continue in spite of Indigenous rights recognition
and Indigenous consultation legislation in Latin America is the reality of ongoing social conflict
and violence that surrounds resource extraction in the region.43 Moreover, there is an unfortunate
compounding impact between the problems with consultation and consent/agreement legislation,
and the problem of inequitable and inappropriate procedural rules that function as gatekeepers to
substantive judicial scrutiny of Indigenous rights claims.

As described above, the research

indicates that legal and political conditions in many Latin American countries generate a serious
risk that Indigenous communities may enter into agreements with state entities and/or resource
companies in the absence of full information and knowledge of the meaning and significance of
the agreement, without a variety of safeguards and sometimes as a result of inappropriate or illegal
tactics on the part of company and/or state officials. When this occurs, communities may find it
difficult or even impossible to resort to the courts to challenge inequitable consultation processes
and/or illegitimate “agreements” due at least in part to the lack of appropriate procedural pathways
to accessing the courts for Indigenous rights claimants.
This analysis signals that Indigenous rights recognition and consultation legislation have
not necessarily resulted in the achievement of concrete and substantively positive results for
affected communities. This article does not presume to explore all of the complex, multifaceted
and contextual reasons for this. As indicated above, the analysis developed here is primarily
conceptual in that it is narrowly focused on the content and form of the law reforms that have
resulted from the movement’s activism.
In this regard, one relevant observation is the fact that these reforms have ultimately
required Indigenous communities and their advocates to translate their concerns into the classical
liberal legal frameworks of property rights and contract/free choice. When land is taken and
agreements are broken or misunderstood, human rights law has required Indigenous peoples to
package their justice concerns as alleged violations of procedural obligations to consult, communal
property rights and/or of contractual obligations in relation to benefit agreements. Researchers
have observed that in both the implementation of right to consultation legislation, as well as in the
judicial interpretation of procedural rules that govern the admissibility of rights claims, existing
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laws have allowed state and company authorities to adopt a formal equality stance to circumscribe
the scope of consultations or to preclude Indigenous rights claims alleging violations from being
heard on the merits.44
Added to this, right to consultation legislation to date has not included mechanisms that
enable Indigenous peoples to effectively enforce resulting agreements with government or to
challenge deficient consultation processes in the courts. In other words, the codification of the
state’s obligations to recognize consultation rights and seek agreements has paradoxically left the
effective enforcement of this obligation unaddressed. Importantly, this reality of weak or inexistent
enforcement mechanisms for state actors is consistent with the standard treatment of company
obligations to consult and respect Indigenous rights as a matter of voluntary or discretionary
corporate social responsibility. Legislative advances in Latin America to date have not directly
addressed the legal obligations of companies in relation to Indigenous peoples and their
consultation rights.

For example, the formation of industry-Indigenous agreements remains

entirely unregulated.45
These weaknesses in the regulation/enforcement of Indigenous peoples’ legislated rights to
consultation vis-à-vis private and public actors exist in combination with the absence of appropriate
procedural pathways for judicial enforcement of Indigenous constitutional rights, described above.
When these gaps and deficiencies are viewed in combination, state and company obligations to
consult Indigenous peoples and respect their land and natural resource related rights, are potentially
rendered inaccessible and unenforceable in practice, even in the face of positive law recognizing
these rights.
There is another common thread between the shortcomings of Indigenous rights principles
and jurisprudence, as recognized by international human rights bodies and Latin American
constitutional courts, and the creation of statutes that codify Indigenous consultation processes in
the context of proposed resource extraction. The research cited in this section reveals that reform
in both of these areas have insufficiently accounted for the significance of social context, power
and epistemology in determining how positive law becomes meaningful and emancipatory in
practice. Judicial recognition and statutory reforms to date have not adequately contended with the
44
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problem of power and the reality of longstanding and radical economic deprivation/exploitation,
and social and cultural domination, of Indigenous communities at the hands of public authorities
and private actors. This context has serious implications for how knowledge and agency are
conceptualized within the legal constructs of property, contract, and consultation, which are
fundamentally predicated on the presumption/possibility of free and informed choice (consent).
3.2 Right to Remedy Law Reform in Canada “Home” Country
A second major area of law reform activism taken up by the transnational mining justice
movement focuses on the responsibilities of capital exporting “home states” to ensure that adequate
remedies are available to those in developing countries who are harmed by their companies’
oversees operations. Discussion of law reform in Canada in this area first began in the late 1990s,
intensifying after 2005, and is ongoing. The bulk of these discussions, and various concrete
proposals, have focused on the creation of a non-judicial state-based grievance mechanism in
Canada.46 This refers to an administrative body, created by the Canadian (federal) government,
and empowered to receive and investigate human rights complaints with respect to the overseas
operations of Canadian resource companies. Within the frameworks of international law, calls for
this kind of mechanism have invoked the human rights concepts of the victim’s right to a remedy
and the state’s duty to protect human rights.47
Advocates have employed a range of strategies to support their argument that Canada
should create this kind of grievance mechanism.

This includes extensive empirical and

documentary research to establish that Canadian mining companies are credibly linked to a range
of human rights violations in connection with their overseas operations.48 Advocates have further
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sought to uncover certain forms of Canadian government economic and political supports for
companies who are the subject of serious allegations. Added to this, they have undertaken a variety
of strategies to establish that existing remedies and mechanisms in Canada are inadequate. 49
Finally, advocates have brought these concerns to international human rights tribunals, who have
in turn issued numerous statements that together establish an emerging consensus that Canada has
a duty to ensure access to effective remedies in Canada for harms caused by its corporate nationals
abroad.50
Initially, the Canadian government responded by creating two different mechanisms, the
Canadian National Contact Point (2000) and the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Counsellor
(2009 and 2014), each with a similar mandate to receive complaints and mediate if all parties
consent. The standards that govern these mechanisms are non-binding and both lack any power to
investigate, make findings of fact or require action or remedy from any party. Numerous studies
have concluded that they are not effective in providing remedies for alleged harm, resolving
conflicts, or improving the situation of mine-affected communities.51
With this background, the mining justice movement in Canada proposed an Ombudsperson,
an agency with the power to fully investigate alleged human rights violations perpetrated by
Canadian industries overseas. In the civil society proposal, this included the power to compel the
participation of the company respondent, including the production of documents, to make findings
of fact, and to make these available to the public. This also included the power to make
recommendations: to the company with respect to reparations or other actions linked to remedies,
as well as to government with respect to appropriate responses or policies, including potentially
withdrawing financial and political support for a company found responsible for a violation. In

49

See for example: Above Ground, MiningWatch Canada and OECD Watch (2016) “Canada is Back” but Still Far
Behind – An Assessment of Canada’s National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, https://miningwatch.ca/sites/default/files/canada-is-back-report-web_0.pdf; Canadian Network for
Corporate Accountability & Justice & Corporate Accountability Project (2014) Human Rights, Indigenous Rights
and Canada’s Extraterritorial Obligations. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Thematic Hearing for
153rd Period of Sessions, http://cnca-rcrce.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/canada_mining_cidh_oct_28_2014_final.pdf. For a comprehensive survey of these
strategies, see Kamphuis, “Home-State Grievance Mechanisms”, supra note 21.
50
See for example UNESC, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the
sixth periodic report of Canada, UN Doc E/C.12/CAN/CO/6 (2016),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2fCAN%2fCO%2f6
&Lang=en, at para 15. For a comprehensive summary of these statements see: Kamphuis & Gardner, supra note 22
at 89-91.
51
See literature cited at supra note 49.

235

this proposal, financial support referred to loans from Export Development Canada (a crown
corporation) and political support referred to diplomatic support through embassies and trade
officials.
Significantly, in their proposal, Canadian civil society decided not to demand that the
proposed Ombudsperson would have the power to enforce remedies or sanctions.52 Thus advocates
made a strategic choice to orient their proposal toward strong investigatory powers and
transparency provisions, with weak or no enforcement power. As such, the worst outcome for a
company under the proposed regime was a negative final report and the loss of certain federal
government supports. The company could have continued to operate in Canada under provincial
law and could have therefore avoided compliance with recommended remedies.
There was much celebration in early 2018 when the Canadian government publicly
announced its intention to create a Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE)
with a number of key features that aligned with the civil society proposal.

This was an

extraordinary step forward after many years of government resistance and inaction. However, the
status of this achievement quickly fell into question.

Following this announcement, the

government faced intense opposition from industry representatives who lobbied vigorously against
the government’s planned approach. 53 After 15 months of delay, in April 2019 the Prime
Minister’s Office finally created the CORE with an Order-in-Council (OIC). 54 However, the
details revealed that the government had stripped the Ombudsperson of all of the features that
would make it effective. The CORE as created is not independent from government, has no power
to compel the production of documents, and has no power to enforce remedies or sanctions.
Perhaps most shocking, the new CORE included provisions that would have allowed
companies to file complaints, and seek remedies, against civil society groups for “unfounded
52
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human rights allegations”. Unfortunately, this kind of provision is not new to the Canadian debate
in this area, as a version of it first appeared in the 2009 CSR policy, referred to above.55 While the
government ultimately decided to remove this provision from the CORE terms of reference about
six months later,56 its decision to adopt such a provision in both the 2009 and 2019 versions of its
framework is deeply troubling for at least two reasons. First, there is strong evidence that
companies are more than capable of availing themselves of existing civil laws available to seek
remedies for unfounded allegations (defamation). 57

Moreover, it is well documented that

companies are willing to abuse defamation laws to silence their critics.58 Indeed, in recent years,
several Canadian provinces have enacted legislation to address this problem.59 As such, there is
no basis for the government’s apparent conclusion that companies are suffering from inadequate
remedies or access to justice problems vis-à-vis their critics.
Second, the government’s decision to allow companies to use the Ombudsperson to
complain about human rights activists cynically contorts a mechanism whose ostensible purpose
was to address the problem of inadequate remedies for human rights abuses perpetrated by
transnational companies in developing countries.

This contortion reflects a logic of false

equivalence (or formal equality) between companies on one hand, and affected communities and
human rights activists on the other. This formalist approach negates the well-documented problem
of corporate impunity and the economic, legal and political power imbalance between corporations
and those affected by their operations.
The extensive work of the mining justice movement in advocating for access to remedies
in Canada has made a significant contribution to raising the profile of these issues, in
conceptualizing law and policy responses, and in shaping the international law conversation.
Notwithstanding these major achievements, at present, the outcome of these efforts is rather dismal.
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After nearly two decades of extensive research, numerous reports, strong statements from
international human rights bodies, and significant debate and discussion at the federal level,
including in Parliament and at parliamentary committee hearings, advocates have been unable to
convince the Canadian government to create an effective home-state non-judicial grievance
mechanism. In spite of election promises, and even public commitments once in power, federal
political leaders have reneged and remained unwilling to create an investigatory body that is
independent and has adequate power to acquire the relevant evidence, ensure that harms are
remedied, and require government to halt support for problem companies.

Civil society

organizations were so appalled by the end result, that in 2019 they collectively resigned in protest
from the government created Multi-Stakeholder Advisory Board.60
Like the Latin American case study referred to above, this Canadian case study forces the
question of why the sustained advocacy and mobilization of this social movement over nearly two
decades has thus far been unable to achieve law reform results that approximate its goals and vision.
As before, this article’s analysis of this complex question is conceptual, and by no means
comprehensive. It does not even begin to flesh out and analyze the larger political, legal and
economic contexts that have impacted this outcome, such as for example the role of corporate
lobbying.61 At this stage the discussion is limited to some narrow, albeit important, observations
about the strategic and conceptual choices that advocates have made to date in its law reform efforts
in Canada.
As mentioned, for the past decade, some proponents for corporate accountability have
devoted significant effort to pursuing the idea of a Canadian federal agency empowered to receive
complaints from alleged victims of human rights abuses in connection with Canadian resource
extraction projects abroad. These advocates have argued that this agency, or Ombudsperson, must
be independent from government, and with the power to undertake mandatory and thorough
investigations followed by public reporting requirements. They calculated that they would be more
likely to obtain an agency with these features alone, than an agency with additional enforcement
60
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powers. Likewise, this included a focus on advocating for an Ombudsperson with the power to
make policy recommendations to government, including for the withdrawal of financial and
political support for problem companies. In this civil society proposal, the agency could pursue
judicial review of government inaction in response to the Ombudsperson’s recommendations.62
These strategic trade-offs have meant that the civil society proposed mechanism would have
been much weaker than Canada’s existing federal and provincial human rights bodies with a
territorial focus. 63 The proposal also fell significantly short of the emerging international
consensus on what is required for home-state non-judicial mechanisms to be effective in relation
to the objective of remedying the harms that flow from transnational human rights violations.64
Yet even this compromise proposal has not gained traction with the Canadian government and
industry.
This summary helps isolate two defining characteristics of the pragmatic approach to law
reform taken by proponents of the Ombudsperson proposal. The first is a pragmatic approach to
regulation. As mentioned, advocates intentionally avoided proposals that include an agency with
the power to enforce remedies and sanctions.65 As such, these proposals adopted a self-regulation
or voluntary approach when it comes to remedy for harm. I refer to this as a pragmatic decision
because many members of the movement are proponents of improving access to remedy and are
highly critical of voluntary approaches, which are part-and-parcel of the neoliberal economic
arrangements that they oppose.
Strategically speaking, advocates hoped that strong provisions for getting to the truth and
making it public (investigation, the power to order disclosure and mandatory transparency) would
generate sufficient public pressure on companies to follow a recommended course of action (ie
remedy). Thus, even though the civil society proposal includes some mandatory features, it
nonetheless also has some resonance with neo-liberal regulatory approaches, where attention is
dedicated to transparency with the assumption that companies will voluntarily adjust their behavior
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in response to public pressure.66 For example, this is the same logic behind many industry-backed
initiatives, like Publish What you Pay, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives, or the
Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, which all focus solely on transparency.
The second key feature of the civil society approach to the Ombudsperson is its concept of
the relationship between the state and the private sector. Recall that the sole sanction component
of the civil society proposal was the potential withdrawal of state financial and political support
for a specific company. While this reflects one dimension of the relationship between the Canadian
state and Canadian companies, a wider view reveals that this relationship also manifests in the
Canadian state’s role in constituting foreign investment markets and in enabling and facilitating
the industry itself.67 For example, the Canadian state (federal and/or provincial) has a role in:
enabling the formation of companies in Canada through corporate law; establishing the terms
according to which companies raise capital through securities law; determining the rules that
govern the taxes they owe the public through corporate tax law and tax treaties; providing
companies with privileged access to foreign government decision-makers through services
provided by Canadian embassies and the larger foreign service; and establishing the rules that
govern companies’ foreign investments through investment law and treaties. This list highlights
some of the areas where the Canadian state takes a range of positive steps to shape and enable the
market and the industry.
This also helps put civil society’s focus in its law reform proposal on political support,
through special services provided to companies by the Canadian foreign service, and financial
support, through preferential loans and insurance provided by Canada’s export credit agency
(Export Development Canada or EDC) into context.68 This focus on withdrawing political and
66
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economic services as the sole form of regulatory sanction tacitly accepts the state-company
relationship as a direct bilateral relationship, similar to the logic of private contract, where the state
appears to operate as a private contracting party, instead of as a public regulator. This is not to say
that these contractual relationships don’t formally exist or are not relevant, indeed EDC support is
issued pursuant to a contract and more recently Canadian diplomatic support also requires
companies to sign an agreement called an Integrity Declaration in exchange for various support
services (wherein the company is referred to as the government’s client).69 The point here is to
highlight that civil society’s approach to public regulation has attempted to infuse this contractual
relationship with certain human rights conditions. However, this attempt to add new terms to the
contract has not challenged or changed the fundamental logic of casting the state-company
relationship as one of private contract. On its own, this approach omits from view the multifaceted,
proactive structural and systemic role of the Canadian state in constituting the market and the
sector.
This analysis reveals that Canadian mining justice advocates’ home-state grievance
mechanism law reform proposals significantly, albeit inadvertently, resonate with neo-liberal
approaches to regulation, the state and the company. In this approach, transparency/reporting is
the goal of the investigation, remedies for human rights violations remain voluntary, and the
Canadian state’s relationship with the company is narrowly defined in terms of contract. It is
important to acknowledge that this approach was the product of a pragmatic trade off in that
advocates hoped that it would be relatively more politically palatable to government and industry.
This article does not aim to second guess or criticize these difficult strategic choices, which are
shaped by numerous constraints and factors. Rather, it seeks greater insight into these trade-offs
by examining this pragmatic approach to law and regulation conceptually. Here this examination
highlights apparent contradictions between these civil society-based law reform proposals (and
their state-controlled outcomes) and the movement’s political and philosophical opposition to neoliberalism as a political and economic system, that is not only unjust and antithetical to meaningful
respect for human rights, but is also fundamentally predicated on formalism, voluntarism and
privatism.
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In other words, the analysis here suggests that activists concerned with inadequate state
regulation and remedies have made pragmatic choices that (perhaps paradoxically) find them
promoting a law reform proposal that reflects a voluntary model of regulation (re remedy), and
tacitly accepts the role of the state as a provider of political and economic services to companies.
Ultimately, the Canadian government’s 2019 Ombudsperson regime maintained this voluntary
approach, added in (at least initially) the formal equality dimensions discussed above, and even
discarded the features necessary for adequate reporting/transparency.

Unfortunately, civil

society’s strategic trade-offs in formulating its proposal appear to have had little success in securing
law reforms that align with the substantive change that the movement desires.
3.3 Themes & Common Problems
The introduction to this section described how the regulation of Indigenous peoples’ right
to consultation in Latin American, and access to remedy law reform proposals and outcomes in
Canada, are both a product of the activism of the transnational mining justice social movement,
often working in conjunction or overlapping with other social movements.
These two case studies share a common focus on activists seeking to create new state-based
regulation of the harms potentially generated by private sector activities (resource extraction). The
recognition of the right to consultation and its legal regulation in the Latin American context
emanated from the domestic judiciary and the state (respectively) in response to Indigenous
peoples’ resource-related protests, advocacy and litigation on one hand, and norm development in
international courts, on the other. In the Canadian context, the movement focused on developing
proposals for a home-state non-judicial grievance mechanism, most recently called the Canadian
Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise. Thus, these two case studies share a common focus on
those instances where the movement has demanded that the state develop new legislation and create
new processes (consultation and investigation/remedies) to respond to the movement’s specific
justice demands. Notably, in both case studies these regulation-oriented law reform efforts
emerged on the heels of private law litigation against companies (Canada) and public law litigation
claiming constitutional rights (Latin America).
There are also commonalities in the limitations that emerge from the reforms ultimately
adopted in each context. In the Latin American context, the judicial recognition of Indigenous
rights to property and consultation/consent have not addressed the issue of whether or not the
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existing rules of civil procedure that ultimately mediate rights claims are appropriate, given
Indigenous peoples’ social, cultural and economic context. This contributes to a situation where,
even decades after the judicial recognition of rights, massive social protests are common and very
few communities have brought their rights claims to the courts. Likewise, the regulation of the
right to consultation has lacked effective enforcement and oversight mechanisms and has failed to
create the conditions necessary to ensure that communities can obtain just and equitable
agreements. Thus, there is a yawning gap between positive law and the conditions and mechanisms
required to make it meaningful.
In Canada, civil society law reform proposals to advance the right to remedy for mineaffected communities abroad have also had mixed results. As described above, the movement made
strategic choices in the framing of its most recent proposal, first, by adopting a relatively narrow
(contractual) view of the Canadian state’s support for companies, and second, by trading
enforcement of remedy provisions in the hope of strong independent and transparent investigations.
While the campaign around the proposal certainly generated greater public awareness, including
in the Canadian financial press,70 unfortunately, the trade-off did not materialize as hoped. The
resulting mechanism is weak, not only from a remedy perspective, but it retains inadequate
reporting/investigation powers. Moreover, at first the result appeared to be even worse than the
status quo when the government was initially willing to adopt a bizarre formal equality logic that
would have allowed companies to use this purported human rights mechanism to request an
investigation of human rights activists.
Thus, notwithstanding the remarkable strengths, commitments and tactics of the mining
justice movement, another common thread that unites these two case studies is the prevalence of
three liberal and neo-liberal approaches to law, imbedded in both law reform outcomes: (1) formal
equality treatment of actors that ignores power (formalism); (2) inadequate or inexistent
enforcement mechanisms that effectively amount to voluntary treatment of state and company legal
obligations (voluntarism); and (3) a view of the state as a private/economic actor rather than a
public regulator (privatism). This analysis reveals that the social movement’s legal strategies,
developed in a human rights law framework, have been unable to overcome imbedded liberal and
neo-liberal concepts of the state, the individual/community and the private sector. These concepts
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have ultimately shaped the law reforms that resulted from the movement’s activism, to the dismay
of many movement participants.
4

Theorizing the Mining Justice Movement’s Law Reform Activism
The observations presented in the previous section provide an entry point into a rich

tradition of debate on the question of how to theorize the relationship between progressive
movements and the law in liberal and neo-liberal legal orders. The next section turns to examine
the four different approaches that directly grapple with this question: pragmatism, left critique,
critical legal liberalism, and counter-hegemony. This review identifies assumptions, propositions
and conceptual tools in each approach in an effort to isolate analyses, critique and prescriptions
that offer insight into the successes and limitations of the mining justice social movement’s law
reform outcomes, described above. As such, the discussion represents a survey of some important
thinkers in each area, rather than a comprehensive assessment of any given theoretical tradition.
4.1 Pragmatism
For the purposes of this discussion, pragmatism is understood both as a philosophy of social
movement activism and action, and as an approach to studying social movement’s use of the law.
Among the texts discussed in this section, two take a pragmatic approach to the study of social
movements (Kennedy 2001; Sarat & Scheingold), another studies social movement pragmatism
(Kennedy 2013), while the fourth blends these distinct lines of inquiry (White & Perelman). The
significance of these distinctions is taken up in more detail at the end of this section. This section
begins with a summary of the treatment of pragmatism by these authors in the context of social
movement lawyering, and then goes on to analyze the value of their insights in relation to the
mining justice social movement.
a. Pragmatism and Human Rights Lawyering
The analytical frame (described in section 1 above) that Sarat and Scheingold use to study
social movement lawyering is implicitly built upon a particular definition of pragmatism. They
evaluate the efficacy of lawyering in terms of its ability to maximize the movement’s capacity to
approximate its moral vision of a better society. As stated previously, Sarat and Scheingold’s
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central thesis is that lawyering tactics will be most effective if they are able to exploit the cultural
resonance of legality and rights in favor of the movement’s objectives.
In an essay first published in 2001, David Kennedy also takes a pragmatic approach in his
critical analysis of the international human rights movement. 71 Kennedy poses this question:
“assuming the goals and intentions of humanitarian action are clear, how can we improve our
ability to assess whether humanitarian work in fact contributes more to ‘the solution’ than to ‘the
problem’?”72 To answer this question, Kennedy argues that one must weigh the “benefits” against
the “costs” generated by the movement. While the bulk of his essay is dedicated to developing
hypotheses about possible costs, Kennedy also briefly defines what he views to be indicators of
movement success. He argues that the “benefits” of the movement materialize in the form of
“distributions of power, status, and means” in favor of those who share its objectives.73
In a follow up essay published in 2013, Kennedy takes the position that it is now more
accurate to speak of international human rights as a regime rather than as a movement or an idea.74
He uses the term “regime” to refer to human rights both as a professional practice and as a practice
of governance.

Kennedy argues that human rights in this sense currently suffer from two

“dangers”: idolatry and pragmatism. 75 In this framework, idolatry refers to the veneration of
classical human rights tools and norms, such that advocates become blind to other approaches to
human emancipation, other issues of injustice not easily captured by human rights frames, or the
unintended costs of human rights victories. On the other hand, Kennedy defines pragmatism as
participation in governance, which includes the use of instrumental reasoning and the weighing of
costs and benefits.76 Pragmatism provokes significant concerns for Kennedy, indeed, he states that
the “most significant challenges for the human rights movement in the years ahead will be to
understand what it means to be a participant in governance”.77
To resolve the idolatry/pragmatism conundrum, Kennedy argues that human rights
proponents must acknowledge humanism as a political project, together with the concomitant fact
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that the practice of human rights involves making political decisions, increasingly as “rulers”.78 In
this context, Kennedy calls for humanitarian professionals to engage in “responsible rulership”,
defined as a willingness to exercise power, participate in political conflict, and responsibly exercise
human freedom, which he contrasts with “the ethical self-confidence of idolatry or the evasions of
instrumental reason”.79 Yet in spite of his forward looking prescription for human rights practice,
Kennedy ultimately forecasts the decline of human rights as a politically relevant project with the
potential to productively address pressing global concerns of climate and social inequality.
Lucie White and Jeremy Perelman also reflect on pragmatism in their case study of human
rights campaigns that have unfolded on the African continent in relation to social and economic
issues.80 Drawing on these experiences, they endeavor to theorize the “on the ground” human
rights practices of African lawyers, all of whom view their legal activism as a political practice.81
In doing so, White and Perelman observe two common “strategic patterns of engagement” among
activists: pragmatism and performance.82 In their analysis, pragmatism is defined by activists’
conscious decision to engage in human rights activism in spite of their awareness of the limits of
human rights as a liberal legal form.83 White and Perelman argue that in doing so, activists attempt
to “devise a new kind of [rights] practice” that goes beyond formalistic legal practice and is capable
of framing public debate, influencing political will and spurring a social movement.84
Building on this definition of activist pragmatism, White and Perelman identify three
features of the pragmatic practices observed in their study. More than just characteristics, these
features are essentially theories of effective movement tactics. The first is the belief that litigation
is not the best method for achieving economic and social rights objectives, but that under certain
conditions, and together with a toolbox of other political tactics, it can be used to help build the
strategic power of a movement’s campaign.85 The second is a concerted focus on the state as a
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target of advocacy, which includes multiple public actors and domains.86 However, White and
Perelman report that there is no consensus among activists on the degree to which the state should
be prioritized among other possible targets of advocacy. In fact, they argue that the third feature
of activist pragmatism is its explicit willingness to engage both private and public actors.87 White
and Perelman observe that the advocates in their study “reject the moral logic of the public/private
divide.” 88
Turning to the movement’s goals (ends), White and Perelman identify two main objectives,
first, the disruption of inequitable social and economic patterns, and second, sustainable
institutional change. 89 However, they also identify a common set of normative commitments
among the activists they study. Specifically, these activists are committed to engaging with liberal
legalism from a critical perspective, to incorporating an ethos of critical epistemological pluralism
into their human rights work, and to prioritizing the possible redistributive outcomes of their
political practices.90
b. Pragmatism and the Mining Justice Movement
This section distils three key themes at play in the literature reviewed above, and considers
their significance for the law reform experiences of the mining justice movement as described in
the previous section.
Pragmatic Study vs. Movement Pragmatism
The concepts and frameworks discussed above reflect two different approaches, the first is
the study of social movement pragmatism on one hand, and the second is the pragmatic study of
social movements, on the other. The latter of these is concerned with the extent to which a social
movement achieves particular results, however defined. In this vein, Kennedy (2001) enquires into
the “costs” of the human rights movement, and Sarat and Scheingold are concerned with the degree
to which social movement lawyers are able to exploit the cultural resonance of rights and legality.
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In contrast, a study of social movement pragmatism examines how social movements
employ pragmatism as a philosophical approach to engaging with law to achieve the changes they
seek. This is the approach taken by Kennedy in his 2013 essay where he conveys caution about
pragmatism among human rights practitioners. Interestingly, White & Perelman’s study melds
these two approaches together. While they specifically theorize social movement pragmatism, they
also dedicate considerable energy to measuring the social movement’s capacity to achieve a
specific result, namely that of structural institutional change.
The distinction between pragmatism as an object of study and pragmatism as an approach
to study assists in analyzing the mining justice movement’s engagement in law reform. It also
reveals that this study combines both elements.

On one hand it studies social movement

pragmatism, such as the mining justice movement’s pragmatic decision to use liberal legal human
rights forms (consultation, remedy) to argue in favor of law reform. Another example is the
movement’s pragmatic trade off in Canada between transparent investigations and enforceable
remedies. In this specific sense, this study resembles White and Perleman’s and Kennedy’s (2013)
examination of social movement pragmatism. At the same time, this study is also pragmatic in the
sense described by Sarat & Scheingold, in that it examines the movement’s law reform efforts in
terms of their success in achieving a desired result, normative goal or ideal, and in the sense
proposed by Kennedy (2001) in that it endeavors to identify unintended costs. .
Definitions of Pragmatism
A second group of observations relate to the definitions of social movement pragmatism
that the authors reviewed here employ. Recall that Sarat & Scheingold define pragmatism as the
use of political tactics, primarily outside of the law, to exploit law’s cultural renaissance in an effort
to garner broad support of the movement’s normative vision. Kennedy (2013) defines pragmatism
as the conversion of the movement’s practices into professional practices and practices of
governance. Finally, White and Perelman define pragmatism as the conscious use of a legal form
(human rights) that is perceived to be problematic but that is employed strategically in the pursuit
of some normative end that aligns with deeper values (pluralism and redistribution).
These conceptions of movement pragmatism are not necessarily incompatible; rather they
highlight that there is a possible range of pragmatic practices that a movement may take up at any
given time, or even simultaneously. This reveals that the mining justice movement has been
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pragmatic in the ways described here. It has employed many tactics outside of positive law to
exploit the cultural renaissance of international human rights norms in order to advocate for
domestic law reform. In both case studies discussed here (right to remedy in Canada and right to
consultation in Latin America), movement actors formed coalitions and focused on the state as a
target of advocacy in an effort to engage in the “practice of governance”, referring to concerted
discussions of the contours of proposed new legislation. Finally, movement actors have attempted
to use liberal legal forms strategically by infusing them with community/Indigenous perspectives
(pluralism), and to achieve greater accountability for the distribution of the costs and benefits of
resource extraction. However, in this final area, that of shifting economic, political and cultural
power, the largest gap appears to emerge between the actual law reforms that have ultimately
resulted from the movement’s efforts, and its ideals of pluralism and redistribution.
Pragmatism and Normative Commitments
Another item of interest is the way that the authors reviewed here locate ethics, principles
and normative commitments in their analysis. Norms emerge in Sarat and Scheingold’s analysis
in their identification of the movement’s ends. The movement is defined by its pursuit of a social
arrangement that is more acceptable in moral terms (“a different better society”), an ideal that they
suggest is never fully realizable.91 They write that for cause lawyers, “the Good is known in the
causes for which they work even as its realization may be deferred.” 92 Part 2 of this article
described in general terms some of the features of “the Good” or the “better society” sought by the
mining justice movement.
The relationship between pragmatic social movement practices and ethics or normative
commitments is also a theme in White and Perleman’s article. While they describe the activists in
their study as fundamentally pragmatic, at the same time they observe these activists to be operating
within the bounds of a consistent and identifiable ethical framework that guides and orients their
pragmatism in some respect. Notably, in the law reform case studies described in Part 3 of this
article, governments created mechanisms to facilitate civil society participation in law reform
discussions relating to consultation laws in Latin American and the Ombudsperson in Canada
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(2018 and 2019). However, when the government’s course veered too far away from core
movement principles (for example, with respect to the effectiveness of the Ombudsperson as a tool
for corporate accountability, or with respect to meaningful consultation processes for Indigenous
communities), civil society partners and/or Indigenous organizations withdrew in protest. Thus,
pragmatic decisions to participate in governance were limited by certain principled commitments,
which were ultimately put to the test.
As stated previously, in his 2001 article Kennedy takes the position that there is never a
consensus regarding a movement’s normative goals. Rather, he opts for a materialist definition of
movement goals, proposing that the success (benefits) of the movement can be evaluated in terms
of the redistribution of power, resources and status toward those who share the movement’s goals.
For him, participation in the social movement raises the ethical obligation to reflect on the possible
negative outcomes (costs) of the movement and weighing these against its positive achievements
(benefits). While Kennedy acknowledges that different individuals will see and value costs and
benefits in different ways, he asserts that this does not deter from the ethical duty to weigh costs
and benefits. This theme is extended in his 2013 follow up article where he argues that to the extent
that movement participants pragmatically become powerholders, they must engage in “responsible
rulership”. In sum, Kennedy shifts the focus away from the movement’s normative vision and
toward a series of ethical concerns about the movement itself. His goal is to develop and defend a
concept of movement ethics or a normative framework that might guide movement pragmatism.
The discussion in Part 3, examining the limitations associated with the mining justice
movement’s law reform outcomes, reflects Kennedy’s proposal to identify potential costs of the
decision of some movement actors to participate in governance through law reform advocacy. In
this regard, studies have concluded that in Latin America, rights recognition without appropriate
and equitable procedural pathways, and consultation legislation that fails to account for colonial
histories, power and epistemology, have carried unintended costs. This includes for example
legitimizing unfair agreements between communities and companies/the state while at the same
time insulating these agreements from judicial scrutiny. In other words, where the legal recognition
of human rights claims leaves the status quo of business as usual unaddressed in practice, there is
a risk that powerful actors will appeal to human rights norms to legitimate the status quo. This is
most crudely depicted in the Canadian case study where advocacy for a non-judicial human rights
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remedy in Canada has twice resulted in a mechanism that also allows companies to bring
complaints against human rights activists.
This summary highlights that the “weighing” process that Kennedy proposes is difficult to
undertake in practice. State recognition of the right to consultation and the right to remedy has
certainly strengthened the movement’s capacity to appeal to the “cultural resonance” of these
rights, thereby potentially influencing state and company conduct for the better. However, the
countervailing cost of inadequate or partial reforms that legitimate unfair outcomes is a serious
concern. While Kennedy’s assertion, that there is an ethical duty to weigh costs and benefits, is
well received, he offers little guidance on how exactly this might be undertaken.
These different accounts of the location of normative and ethical concerns in relation to
social movement pragmatism suggest that there are at least three different ways of emphasizing
principle in relation to pragmatism: (1) in the movement’s ends; (2) in the movement’s values; and
(3) in the movement’s ethical responsibilities. In the first, the movement’s normative commitment
is to its ultimate goal or ideal form of social change. In the second, the movement undertakes its
work within the constraints of certain movement values. And in the third, the movement is charged
with an ethical commitment to weigh the costs and benefits of its achievements.
Summary: insights from pragmatism for the study
The discussion above reveals that pragmatism is an approach that offers helpful tools for
this article’s analysis of the mining justice movement and the limitations of its law reform outcomes
to date. Taken together, the authors cited here make three contributions to this article’s research
question. First, they help to characterize this study as a pragmatic study of the mining justice
movement, as well as a study of the movement’s pragmatism. Second, they provide a spectrum of
definitions of pragmatism that help conceptualize different aspects of the movement’s pragmatism.
Finally, they establish the importance of identifying the relationship between normative
commitments, and the movement’s pragmatic practices. For example, both case studies in Part 3
included examples where movement actors decided to withdraw from participation in governance
in the name of their values.
However, Kennedy’s assertion that movements undertake a balancing exercise between the
costs and benefits of their achievements is particularly pertinent. This highlights not only that
movements may fall short of their goals, but that engagement with law may generate costs. In the
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study undertaken here, both issues emerge. While the movement has achieved definite gains in
raising the public profile if its concerns, in other respects its law reform outcomes fell short of its
goals when the state responded by adopting legal instruments that perpetuate problematic liberal
or neoliberal forms. The next section will shed greater light on this issue and in particular the
challenge that inheres in evaluating the net outcome of countervailing wins and losses.
4.2 Left Critique and Critical Legal Liberalism
The discussion above hints that social movement pragmatism and the pragmatic study of
social movements are both inevitably laden with a particular relationship with liberalism. Recall
that Sarat and Scheingold define progressive social movements, in part, by their interaction with
power holders, protest, and the pursuit of societal change. Where liberalism is the dominant
organizing philosophy of a particular society, social movements must necessarily contend with
liberal institutions, legal frameworks and subjectivities in the formulation of their ends and means.
In Part 3, this article described how the mining justice movement developed specific law reform
proposals in its attempt to transform the relations that characterize resource extraction. It also
analyzed how the reforms ultimately adopted by the state have incorporated and perpetuated certain
liberal and neo-liberal frameworks and assumptions.
Critical legal scholars have focused on theorizing the relationship between progressive
activists, the law and liberalism. This section will review two contributions to the topic: that of
Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, followed by that of Lucie White and Jeremy Perelman. These
two pairs of authors each make their contributions as the editors of a collection of book chapters.
Thus, their reflections are particularly helpful as they center on developing a theoretical framework
for understanding the range of empirical contexts studied in each book’s case study-based chapters.
a. Critique & Liberal Law
Wendy Brown and Janet Halley introduce their edited collection Left Legalism / Left
Critique with a chapter dedicated to theorizing “left critique” and advancing a case for its
importance as a component of left politics.93 Brown and Halley conceive of left critique as an
intellectual and political commitment to relentlessly and critically assess ostensibly progressive
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political or legal projects. In their framework, liberalism and liberal legalism constitute the central
targets of, but also threat to, progressive political projects. They define liberalism as a political
order characterized by modern democratic constitutionalism and abstract individualism.94 In this
political order, the state’s legitimacy is tied to its role as the guarantor of equality before the law
and individual freedom, both of which are secured through the legal protection of individual
rights.95 Liberalism thus casts the state and the law as neutral vessels for the pursuit of these ideals.
Brown and Halley’s define “the left” in terms of its relationship to liberalism: it is a project
committed to revealing the limitations of liberal justice as well as to advancing alternative visions
of justice.96 In their view, critique is the left’s necessary starting point because it illuminates the
ways in which the liberal state and the law function as sites and instruments of domination. Brown
and Halley fashion their concept of critique by drawing on a long intellectual history of theorizing
critique. They find strands of this history in the German philosophical tradition, from Kant to
Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and the Frankfurt School, as well in the work of Derrida and Foucault.
Notwithstanding the differences and strains of critique in these and other traditions, Brown
and Halley assert that critique is fundamentally a method of inquiry into a formulation that aims to
examine and test its premises. 97 Critique seeks, not to determine truth or acquire objective
knowledge, but rather to obtain greater perspective and insight. As such, it often works at the level
of epistemology, uncovering how ideology and power produce what is understood to be the
problem, as well as the range of available political and legal possibilities. Importantly, since
critique requires the critic to interrogate their most revered maxims, the political commitments that
compel the critic toward critique will almost inevitably change in its wake.98
This frames Brown and Halley’s concern with the fact that progressive projects increasingly
and significantly articulate their understanding of the political or social problem they seek to
address, and the model of justice they seek to advance, in terms of a need for law reform or change
within the legal system.99 Brown and Halley refer to this orientation and its attendant practices as
“left legalism”, which comprises two different modes: rights legalism and governance legalism.
The latter arises when the left attempt to capture or influence some part of the state’s administrative
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apparatus.100 In Brown and Halley’s analysis, left legalism demands scrutiny (critique) for the
reason that, at least at some level, it takes up the liberal promise that law can provide an effective
vehicle for the pursuit of justice.101
This informs the question that underlies Brown and Halley’s edited collection: what are the
limits, paradoxes, and perils of contemporary practices of left legalism?102 In pursuing this line of
inquiry, they are interested in identifying lessons that point to ways in which the left might
productively reformulate its politics. The nature of this question and its related objective reveal
that a normative definition of the good may underlie Brown and Halley’s project of left critique.
Arguably, lessons learned from the pitfalls of left legalism can only be understood in reference to
some ultimate objective. As stated above, Brown and Halley refer to left critique’s objective of
greater insight and perspective into practices of domination. However, they also appear to
subscribe to a definable normative vision, namely greater substantive freedom and equality.103
As Brown and Halley apply the method of critique to practices of left legalism, they
demonstrate one of critique’s key qualities: it is not oriented toward providing clear answers,
political prescriptions, outcomes or resolutions.104 The first example of this is depicted in their
treatment of the theme of the relationship between the left and liberalism. On one hand, they argue
that when left projects are translated into the frames of liberal legalism, the progressive project
necessarily enters into tension with, or perhaps will even be forced to abandon, its original values
and aims.105 In their view, this occurs because the values and objectives of the left are inherently
in tension with those of liberalism. They point out that the very fact of making a claim to justice
in the language of liberalism shapes the subjects and the relationships that are spoken of. At this
juncture Brown and Halley warn that to the extent that left legalism reproduces a liberal normative
order, it is responsible for the consequences, however unintended.106
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Yet on the other hand, they make a point of not categorically rejecting either legalism or
liberalism as inherently flawed.107 Rather, they argue that it is the left’s current engagement with
the law that has robbed the left of its power and potential. For example, they argue that rights,
while classically central to liberal orders, maintain a “certain formality and emptiness which allows
them to be deployed and redeployed by different political contestations.”108
A second example of the slippery nature of critique in Brown and Halley’s analysis is
depicted by their articulation of the relationship between the left and law. On one hand they argue
that left projects in liberal democratic orders cannot avoid rights and governance legalisms and
their problematic baggage.109 They specifically discount the (possibly utopian) idea that there
could be a “pure left political space independent of legalism”.110 According to Brown and Halley,
this is the case because, given that culture and law are not distinct, the left cannot escape the law
just as it cannot escape culture. 111 Yet even while they reject this ideal, Brown and Halley are
fascinated by the possibility of discovering politics outside of legalism, 112 or politics that is
relatively “less saturated” by legalism. 113 They describe these politics as “radically democratic”
and focused on deep deliberations about society’s governing values and practices.114
In light of critique’s function to provide perspective rather than truth, it is perhaps not
surprising that Brown and Halley’s response to the question of the limitations and effects of left
legalism is open-ended. They suggest that critique reveals that the effects of law (and law reform)
are complex, multiple and contingent, in a way that is analogous to the effects of the exercise of
other forms of cultural power and norms. Accordingly, they describe the effects of left legalism as
“mutable and contestable interventions into complex discursive and distributive systems”, rather
than as “monolithic installations of ‘justice’”.115
Lucie White and Jeremy Perelman’s theory of critique offers further insight into the
relationship between social movements and liberalism.

As stated previously, White and

Perelman’s intervention is informed by their empirical study of economic and social rights activism
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on the African continent, presented in their book Stones of Hope. In interpreting and bringing
together multiple case studies, they identify “critical/transformative legal liberalism” as a
theoretical vantage point116 that helps explain the approach taken by the activists they study. (Note
that their description of critical legal liberalism as a theory, resonates and somewhat overlaps with
their account of pragmatism).
White and Perelman describe activism carried out in this framework as “an engaged but
critical stance toward liberal values” that employs a “set of recognizably legal, but also explicitly
political, advocacy strategies.” 117 A “critical stance” means that activists attempt to develop
politically progressive interpretations of liberal legal norms and further, they are reflexive about
the interpretations that they put forward.118 Moreover, White and Perelman assert that this stance
is politically committed to a fair distribution of resources and power. 119 Finally, critical legal
liberalism is grounded in democratic deliberation. Not only do activists fashion their progressive
interpretations of the law as a result of participation and debate, but they also pursue the
redistribution of resources in part in order to better equip the poor with the material conditions
necessarily to participate in liberal democracy.120
Activists operating in a critical legal liberalism framework are also realistic about what can
be accomplished with liberal legal claims because they believe that the rules of the game are not
substantively fair, even though they might be objectively neutral. 121 However, in spite of, or
perhaps because of this, these activists are committed to using the law pragmatically in an effort to
realize their redistributive aims. In practice, this often involves using the language of rights
strategically and stretching it to support claims that entail economic and social redistribution.122
According to White and Perelman, because of its political commitment to redistribution,
critical legal liberalism is able to fully answer progressive critiques of rights-centered activism,
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which they attribute to “the skeptics”.123 The activists in White and Perelman’s study do not depart
from the assumption that successful rights claims in and of themselves will result in greater social
equality. Rather, they invoke these claims as part of a broader political struggle by harnessing their
normative and moral force. The rights claim affords activists greater symbolic power to inspire
social mobilization, strengthen political organizing, and pressure power-holders.

In this

framework, White and Perelman argue that activists are able to use human rights claims to open
up broader democratic debates about deeper policy questions regarding the nature of the
relationship between the market, the state and its population.124 In their study, activists were able
to avoid the pitfalls of formalism and formal equality because they interpreted human rights claims
in light of underlying commitments to the deeper values of dignity, security and political
democracy.125
Skeptical Critique vs Engaged Critique
White and Perelman’s conversation with “the skeptics” raises the possibility of tensions
between “critical legal liberalism” and “left critique”. In general terms, these concepts are
evidently focused on the same set of legal practices, namely those of activists and social movements
loosely understood as progressive, or as part of the left. However, there are important distinctions
between the two approaches. Left critique evaluates the engagement of progressive political
projects in left legalism in order to gain greater perspective and insight. Critical legal liberalism is
a theory of human rights activism that attempts to answer critiques of this activism that originate
on the left.
Thus, these two concepts are in a direct conversation: left critique marshals a critique that
critical legal liberalism attempts to answer. Some contours of this conversation can be distilled
from the critique of “pragmatism” launched by Brown and Halley and from White and Perelman’s
vigorous response to “the skeptics”. Thus a question emerges: how does Brown and Halley’s
critique of pragmatism apply, if at all, to the pragmatism that forms part of White and Perelman’s
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framework? Or stated somewhat differently, how does White and Perelman’s concept of critical
legal liberalism answer the concerns expressed by Brown and Halley’s left critique?
As a starting point, both sets of authors define pragmatism similarly. Brown and Halley
define it as those instances where a progressive political project consciously adopts a legal category
that is problematic from the perspective of the values of that project. As stated earlier, White and
Perelman define pragmatism as activists’ conscious and reflexive decision to engage in human
rights activism in spite of their awareness of the limits of human rights as a liberal legal form.
Brown and Halley observe that pragmatists often rationalize that the strategic use of liberal
legal tools will provide justice for disadvantaged groups who stand to benefit from the advancement
of specific changes to the law.126 Brown and Halley’s central problem with this is that, in their
view, it inadvertently relies on a liberal concept of law as merely instrumental (a means to an end),
rather than as a form of politics with substantive content and consequences. 127 They assert that
rights and governance legalisms are always dependent on normative categories that draw their
meaning and power from the broader social context and that contain substantive elements that
contradict progressive projects. For their part, and in response to those who question the potential
of human rights activism to approximate its aspirations, White and Perelman argue that the political
commitment of activists to redistribution helps to avoid the possible pitfalls and limitations of
packaging social and economic claims into human rights legal frames.
The apparent divergences in these authors’ respective treatment of pragmatism can be
explained in part by scrutinizing in closer detail the role in their analysis of two fundamental
concepts: law and politics. The above review reveals that these authors appear to be emphasizing
different theories of the nature of law, and its relationship with politics. For Brown and Halley,
law is inherently political and its political nature is inescapable because of its status as a cultural
form. They are unflinching in their assertion that law cannot be a neutral, empty vessel for the
pursuit of politics. This leads them to the potentially contradictory conclusion that the left must
engage differently with the law, while at the same time developing politics that are somehow “less
saturated” by the law. Brown and Halley respond to this conundrum with the concept of critique.
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They believe that critique holds the potential to open pathways toward transcending, transforming
or subverting liberalism’s legal categories.
White and Perelman agree with the assertion that law is political and carries problematic
liberal baggage. However, they argue that a radical political commitment to redistribution is
capable of surmounting this baggage and pushing the boundaries of liberal interpretations. Recall
their contention that activism carried out in the critical legal liberalism framework provides a full
answer to the concerns of the skeptic. They assert that a progressive political agenda has the power
to harness the symbolic power of the law in a larger process of social transformation. In this view,
the problem of the political nature of law can be resolved by an equally political project, namely
that of redistribution. Thus, unlike Brown and Halley, White and Perelman do not long for politics
outside of law. Rather they aim to politicize law by bringing it into the politics of anti-poverty
activism, and by bringing politics to bear on law.
Thus, while both sets of authors agree that law is political, they emphasize different aspects
of this point. White and Perelman see law as political primarily because of its role in the
constitution and maintenance of a power structure, defined most importantly by social inequality.
On the other hand, Brown and Halley’s emphasize law’s political role in a series of cultural
processes and productions of norms and subjectivities, all of which are implicated in power
relations. This analysis of the nature of law and politics in the work of these authors returns this
discussion full circle to the questions above, which interrogated critical legal liberalism’s attempt
to answer the concerns of left critique. At this juncture, two avenues of response emerge.
In one sense, it may be that White and Perelman commit the error that Brown and Halley
attribute to pragmatism, namely they believe that the human rights movement can use liberal law
instrumentally in the service of the objectives of redistribution. In this view, the weakness in White
and Perelman’s theory is the fact that it significantly relies on activists’ political commitment to
redistribution in order to address the skeptics’ concerns with left legalism. As a result, they do not
seem to account for the cultural force of law and the possibility that the very process of engaging
liberal legal forms will in turn shape the nature of the political struggle for economic and social
justice. When White and Perelman make the assertion that pragmatism involves a commitment to
epistemological pluralism, and that a legal claim’s utility to a political struggle is derived from its
symbolic normative power, they implicitly acknowledge that law carries cultural/ideological
content that prefigures activists’ engagement with it. However, perhaps due to a problem of
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emphasis, their theory falls short of accounting for the possibility that the transformative process
is a two-way street. Just as activists seek to transform liberal law, their political projects are
similarly shaped by their very engagement with this cultural form.
On the other hand, a second avenue of interpretation is available, leading to a more
charitable response to the question above. It might be argued that by reflexively politicizing the
law, White and Perelman are on a path toward resolving the conundrum encountered by Brown
and Halley in their desire for politics outside of law. In this view, the politicization of the law
serves as an opportunity to apply the lessons of critique in renewed contexts and struggles and to
explore different and more satisfactory modes of left legalism. As such, the value of critical legal
liberalism may be in its potential to move beyond critique’s apparent propensity toward political
paralysis. However, the lessons of critique suggest that such aspirations may well depend on the
capacity of critical legal liberalism to be robustly reflexive. In White and Perelman’s framework,
reflexivity is a component of critical legal liberalism but its role and importance is arguably underdiscussed. In the spirit of left critique, reflexivity must extend to include not only awareness of the
possible pitfalls of human rights activism and the cultivation of strategic lessons, but also intensive
scrutiny of the assumptions and categories that frame one’s activist engagement with law, and with
what consequences.
The discussion so far highlights two interrelated areas where further theoretical
development would enhance the capacity of critical legal liberalism to respond to the challenge of
left critique. The first relates to the need to fully acknowledge and theorize the ways it in which
redistributive politics are themselves shaped by the use of the human rights legal form, and the
second refers to the need to develop a robust theory of reflexivity that includes critique of activists’
practices, assumptions, and categories. These two concerns allude to a fundamental tension that
arguably underlies the conversation between left critique and critical legal liberalism, namely, the
extent to which the human rights practices in White and Perelman’s study take epistemological
concerns into account.
To be fair, certain features of White and Perelman’s concept of critical legal liberalism
directly respond to some concerns of the so-called skeptics, in addition to the fact that it includes
a commitment to epistemological pluralism.128 However, it is not clear how critical legal liberalism
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effectively addresses the epistemological issues raised by activists’ engagement with human rights
legal forms. Not only are these concerns paramount in Brown and Halley’s intervention, they are
also prominent in David Kennedy’s article, which White and Perelman cite as a representative
placeholder for “the skeptics”. Kennedy opens his article with the concern that human rights
activism occupies the field of emancipatory possibilities, ways of thinking, vocabularies, projects
and institutions.129
Substantive Equality & Radical Democracy
In spite of these potential tensions and differences in emphasis, left critique and critical
legal liberalism share deep normative commitments to substantive equality and radical democracy.
They evaluate activist interventions in terms of the degree to which they contribute to creating
greater conditions of equality, freedom and human dignity in the individual and collective lived
experience of daily life. They hope that progressive activism might help enable the necessary
conditions for radical democracy, defined in part as widespread participation in inclusive
conversations regarding society’s most fundamental governing arrangements. For Brown and
Halley this refers to the values and practices that regulate subject formation, while White and
Perelman single out policies that determine the arrangement and distribution of resources and
power.130 For both sets of authors, these normative aspirations spring from their yearning for a
society capable of overcoming the failures of liberalism.
The second important similarity between these authors is the recognition that the results of
a movement’s engagement with liberal legalism are inevitably complex and uncertain. Neither
approach takes the perspective that progressive advocacy efforts are certain to produce their desired
effects. Rather, these authors are explicitly anti-essentialist in their view of these practices. This
is most clearly demonstrated in Brown and Halley’s argument that the effects of law are complex,

the solution too narrowly by delegitimizing remedies in the domain of private law, by insulating the economy from
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multiple and contingent, and in White and Perelman’s use of the theoretical lens of legal pluralism
and historical institutionalism in order to illuminate and anticipate possible unintended effects.
b. Critique and the Mining Justice Movement
The concepts, tensions and themes that emerge in the conversation between left critique
and critical legal liberalism are at the heart of this article’s analysis of the mining justice movement.
The concept of left legalism accurately describes the movement’s turn to litigation and law reform
as a means for realizing its goals. Similarly resonating with left critique, many of the movement’s
participants are critical of liberalism’s most fundamental legal frameworks, such as property and
contract, and most central institutions, in particular the market, voluntary or soft law, and the
corporation. Concepts from critical legal liberalism are also relevant. Its focus on economic and
social rights activism and its political commitment to redistribution resonates with the concerns
and commitments of the mining justice movement. Moreover, the activist orientation within
critical legal liberalism toward engaged critique connects with the mining justice movement’s
decision to use law reform to fashion concrete proposals for positive change.
The theoretical questions posed by left critique and critical legal liberalism closely parallel
those that drive this study of the mining justice movement. Like Brown and Halley, this study is
concerned with the question of how movement actors, by taking up liberal legal forms,
inadvertently became party to the reproduction of certain liberal ideologies and their legal
counterparts. This is reflected in the results of two areas of law reform activism, where formal
equality (formalism), voluntary approaches to legal obligations (volunteerism) and a privatized
view of the state (privatism) have prevailed in the resulting reforms, notwithstanding movement
actors’ best efforts. The findings summarized in Part 3 suggest that in taking up “the liberal
promise that law can be an effective vehicle for the pursuit of justice”, mining justice movement
participants advocated for law reforms that ultimately reproduced or further entrenched certain
elements of the liberal and neo-liberal normative order. This observation appears to validate the
position of the skeptics and the concerns expressed by Brown and Halley.
Left critique and critical legal liberalism offer insights that help further explain these
observations. Taken together, these theories help capture the operation of two forms of power that
underlie the relationship between law and politics, namely power as knowledge and power as
material resources. Both are at play in the shortcomings of the mining justice movement’s law
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reform outcomes. Focusing on power as knowledge, Brown and Halley insist on the meanings,
symbols, relationships, norms and subjectivities that flow from the concepts and forms of law
employed by the left. In this regard, the law reform outcomes studied here have maintained the
abstract decontextualized subjectivities and relationships embedded in formalism, along with the
corporate norms and relationships that underlie privatism and volunteerism. In terms of power as
material resources, White and Perelman emphasize the hierarchies, inequalities, asymmetries and
erasures implicated in the construction and maintenance of legal concepts and regimes. This
highlights that the mining justice movement’s law reform outcomes in the two areas studied appear
to have done little to disrupt the entrenched systemic and unequal distribution of economic and
political power in favor of the private sector.
Both critical theories also add greater depth and complexity to this study’s effort to put the
mining justice movement’s law reform outcomes into a larger context or perspective. To be clear,
this reflection on unintended outcomes should not serve to minimize or ignore the accomplishments
and positive results of the movement’s important work. Indeed, Part 3 of this article reveals that
the movement’s activism has raised the public profile of its concerns, and transformed the way in
which all actors, corporate, state and community, see and frame the issues. Recall that Brown and
Halley argue that the effects of left legalism are always multifaceted, paradoxical, contradictory
and contingent. In other words, no result is all “good” or all “bad”. Moreover, Brown and Halley
agree with White and Perelman that at any point in time, it is not possible to be deterministic or
predictive about the future impacts of legal activism. Notably, this approach seems to diverge from
the more simplistic costs/benefits analysis that Kennedy prescribed, which led to the unanswered
question about how a movement might undertake a balancing exercise of this kind.
Brown and Halley’s approach in particular suggests that the significance and impact of left
legalism may be very difficult to anticipate prospectively and may shift over time and in relation
to other factors. For example, how might we understand and capture the multifaceted impacts,
especially for grassroots political mobilization and consciousness raising, of the historically
ground-breaking recognition by states and companies alike that Indigenous communities have
special communal property rights/claims and must be freely consulted and potentially
compensated? How might we balance this positive, albeit symbolic change, with the negatives of
formalism embedded in the resulting consultation laws that perpetuate colonial assumptions, power
inequities and risk legitimating unfair results? Would we have been better off without this
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symbolic recognition? Or does it constitute another (albeit imperfect) legal and political tool in a
much longer process of struggle?
Similar questions might be asked of right to remedy law reforms in Canada. How can we
understand the impact of the Canadian state’s (albeit symbolic and indirect) recognition that it has
an obligation to create a mechanism to investigate and remedy human rights abuses alleged against
Canadian companies abroad?

Does this impact outweigh the problems with the resulting

mechanism, which is (on its own) incapable of providing meaningful remedies and perpetuates
neoliberal approaches to public regulation and corporate accountability?
While these questions are critically important, they also can feel impossible to answer, and
as a result disheartening, when structured as a kind of balancing exercise. Brown and Halley’s
proposal is helpful in this sense because it encourages us to explore the limitations, contradictions
and paradoxes of left legalism without slipping into a simplified one-off costs/benefits framework.
Moreover, a simple cost/benefit frame may also be unhelpful because it can foment polarization
within the movement of different view about tactics. While the identification of unintended
consequences is important, it does not mean that positive results are irrelevant or were not worth
the effort. The fact of an unintended consequence does not necessarily mean that the chosen tactic
was unwise. Indeed, activists and social movements work within a whole raft of constraints that
shape their choices, including with respect to tactics.
In the spirit of Brown and Haley’s concept of critique, the purpose of questions like those
formulated above, is to gain insight and perspective, not truth and categorical conclusions. In this
regard, one insight derived from the questions themselves is the revelation that the main
accomplishments of the mining justice movement’s law reform efforts to date is the
affirmation/recognition (explicit or implied) of state obligations in positive law (right to
consultation legislation) and/or policy (right to remedy mechanisms). It is a major milestone for
the Canadian state to accept that it has a duty to strengthen access to remedies, and for Latin
American states to codify in legislation that Indigenous peoples have procedural and substantive
collective rights in relation to resource extraction. However, in both the Canadian and the Latin
American case studies, the movement has encountered serious obstacles and resistance among state
and corporate actors, who have worked to ensure that law reform outcomes maintain liberal
subjectivities, ideologies (formalism, volunteerism, privatism) and entrenched inequities.
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In recognizing and analysing the pitfalls encountered by specific mining justice movement
law reform efforts (left critique), this study nonetheless shares critical legal liberalism’s interest in
the possibility of an engaged response to left critique. In other words, it seeks insight and lessons
from past efforts in order to formulate a more productive re-engagement with law. Critical legal
liberalism’s efforts to respond to the skepticism of left critique contains two key elements that may
assist in forging a way forward: commitment to redistribution and contribution to democratic
politics.
First, White and Perelman asserts that human rights activism can overcome the perils of
left legalism, formalism and formal equality if it stretches the language of rights to support social
and economic rights and redistribution. Part 2 described how economic and environmental justice
(redistribution) is arguably central to the mining justice movement’s moral vision, while Part 3
described how the movement adopted demands for law reform in the areas of Indigenous rights to
property and consultation (Latin America) and the right to remedy/accountability for corporate
caused human rights abuse (Canada). However, the movement’s experience, at least to date,
indicates that it has been difficult to infuse these liberal rights claims with redistributive content/
outcomes, either in terms of knowledge (epistemological pluralism) or in material distributions of
wealth and power. Movement actors have found it difficult to subvert the ideologies of formalism,
volunteerism and privatism, embedded in neo-liberal constructs of consultation (contract) and the
right to remedy. In other words, contrary to White and Perelman’s assertion, movement actors’
political commitment to redistribution was not sufficient to overcome the pitfalls of left legalism.
It has not been easy for activists to meaningfully translate this commitment into tangible results.
Ultimately, when designing new laws, the state has fallen back into its old liberal habits.
Second, White and Perelman argue that the movement must use human rights claims to
foster wider democratic debate about deeper policy questions regarding the relationship between
the market, the state and its population. Brown and Halley similarly share the conviction that legal
activism must be supportive of “radical democracy” and deep deliberations about society’s
governing values and practices. This fits with their concept of operating inside the law while
simultaneously attempting to transform it, transcend it, and seek politics that are “less saturated”
by law.
In this area, it is not easy to identify the extent to which the mining justice movement’s
right to remedy and right to consultation law reform proposals have been able to foment
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mainstream debate on underlying global economic arrangements. While the movement has
certainly used the media and a variety of knowledge dissemination strategies to encourage public
debate on specific issues, it has found it challenging to attract sufficient mass popular support for
its causes. In Canada, the government’s responses to date (and failed promises) signal that it has
consistently calculated that it can ultimately ignore the movement’s demands with little political
cost, at least domestically.131 Similarly, in Latin America, the movement has faced criminalizing
and at times violent and racist rhetoric in the media and directly from elected officials in response
to Indigenous and Campesino protest and justice claims, pitting these “backward minority” groups
against the interests of the broader population in so-called “progress” and “development”. In this
light, right to consultation laws have done little to trouble the entrenched economic arrangements
and the political ideologies that underpin industrial resource extraction in Latin America. Indeed,
it is possible that the mere fact of right to consultation laws may more readily enable powerholders
to construe opposition and dissent as irrational and backward when mine affected groups reject
proposed processes and outcomes.132
In the end, the insights of left critique appear to have held true. The mining justice
movement’s experience with the law reforms studied here indicates that its commitment to
redistribution, on its own, has not necessarily safeguarded its proposals from the pitfalls of left
legalism. At least for the moment, the liberal claims to consultation and remedy do not appear to
have resulted in a more expansive approach to economic, social and environmental justice.
Similarly, the presence of voluntarism, privatism and formalism in resulting law reforms suggest
that movement actors have not been able to subvert or shift a liberal and neo-liberal worldview of
the legal (rights-bearing) subject, the market and the state. Moreover, the movement’s capacity to
connect its goals to broader societal normative debates about society’s governing principles
appears, at least for the movement, to be limited. There is evidence that the larger population has
not responded in a sustained and meaningful way to the call for democratic debate on these issues,
notwithstanding the movement’s laudable public education and knowledge dissemination efforts,
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especially through the media.133 What is significant here is that while many members of the mining
justice movement hold deep commitments to redistribution and democratic politics, they have been
unable to obtain law reform results (governance legalism) that connect meaningfully with these
goals.
4.3 Counter-Hegemony
This section turns to the concept of counter-hegemony as the final step in its exploration of
critical approaches to law and their potential application to the experience of the mining justice
movement. The writing of Antonio Gramsci make interesting, but limited comments on the role
of law in hegemony theory: in the formation of the state, the hegemonic bloc, civil society, and the
strategies of counter-hegemony. 134

As such, the authors considered here adapt Gramsci’s

framework to the specific context of their analysis. This section begins by distilling each author’s
treatment of the concept of counter-hegemony before making some comparative observations that
help assess the contributions of the concept to this article’s examination of the mining justice
movement. This analysis picks up on and extends the insights developed in the discussion above
of pragmatism, left critique and critical legal liberalism.
a. Counter-Hegemony, Human Rights and Economic Globalization
In her 2005 article, Claire Cutler applies Gramsci’s concept of law to the international plane
in order to theorize the role of international law in the constitution of the global political
economy.135 In doing so, she comments on the relationship between resistance and international
legal hegemony.136 To this end, she presents the praxis conception of international law.137 This
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refers to law’s potential to give rise to “forces of both domination and potential emancipation.”138
In this view, law’s emancipatory potential is contingent on its capacity to transform global
asymmetries of power and influence.
The concept of the commodity legal form is central to Cutler’s analysis of resistance.
Drawing on the work of a number of theorists, Cutler suggests that law takes on a specific form
and significance in different historical moments, and that this form derives from its relationship
with economic production and political power. Under conditions of capitalism, law takes on a
form that mirrors the commodity form of production, which reduces diverse objects to their
exchange-value.139 Cutler attributes the following characteristics to the commodity form of law: it
conceals inequalities by creating the “appearance of equality between people as legal subjects”; it
presents “the communal protection of private property rights…as natural”; and it “formalizes the
private/public distinction, emptying the private sphere of political content”. 140 These qualities
signal the fetishization of the commodity form of law, meaning that it presents the coercive,
oppressive and inherently inequitable economic and political system as rational and equitable.141
Cutler then describes the commodity form of law under contemporary conditions of
globalization. She argues that the global political economy is undergoing a process of juridification
whereby Anglo-American legal concepts have expanded their scope and influence on local
orders.142 The result of juridification in this historical moment is that the commodity form of law
has become hegemonic and now defines the international historical bloc, 143 which Cutler
characterizes as postmodern and late capitalist.144 She finds evidence of postmodern forms of law
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in the phenomenon of legal pluralism,145 while late capitalist forms are those that “facilitate the
displacement of welfare states…through deregulation and privatized legal codes”, including “softlaw re-regulation”.146 Cutler further argues that the commodity form of international law under
late capitalism is also dialectical. This is represented by the tension between hard legal regimes,
which purport to enforce private property rights on an equal playing field, and soft laws, which are
rationalized as the most efficient means of regulating the social dimensions of global capitalism.147
For Cutler, this dialectic fundamentally functions to protect capital: hard laws “constitutionalize
private regimes of accumulation” while soft law regimes incorporate and eliminate critique.148
Having characterized in detail the commodity form of international law, Cutler sketches
some ideas for resistance. Crucially, she argues that resistance must be accomplished “through the
revelation of the fetishism and mystification of the legal and commodity forms”.149 This involves,
at least in part, critiquing dominant representations of private interests as communal, rational and
common sense. 150 Cutler also argues that resistance is linked to the dialectical operation of
international law. This means that the distinction between hard and soft law must be challenged to
reveal that its fundamental function is to protect capital.151 Cutler further argues that the praxis of
international law requires that resistance be grounded in practical, local experiences, where
“common sense understandings of power and authority might be challenged”.152 Finally, Cutler
suggests that the objective of resistance is to pursue “emancipatory politics both through law and
against law” or, stated somewhat differently, to “negate law through law”.153 This articulation
refers back to Cutler’s praxis conception of international law, which encapsulates law’s double
face of coercion and consent, its dialectic of hard and soft law, as well as its transformative
potential.
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Like Cutler, in their 2005 edited collection Law and Globalization from Below, Boaventura
de Sousa Santos and César Rodríguez-Garavito focus on corporate globalization.154 While they
build on the work of hegemony theorists who track the reproduction of the hegemony of
transnational capital,155 they also distinguish themselves. Rather than focusing on the reproduction
of hegemony, they concentrate on identifying the legal strategies and tactics that effectively subvert
it.156 To this end, they focus on the question of how and why hegemonic structures change.157 To
answer this question, they elaborate on their project of cosmopolitan subaltern legality, which they
refer to as “a mode of socio-legal theory and practice” and “an approach rather than a theory”.158
They position this approach as the legal counterpart of counter-hegemonic globalization.
For Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito, the term “cosmopolitanism” incorporates two
key features: first, the moral claim that justice and equality concerns transcend state boundaries;
and second, the ethical commitment to collaboration, pluralism and diversity.159 Importantly, the
authors “revise” cosmopolitanism’s “Western” or “Northern” origins and orientations by
introducing the concept of the subaltern. They use this term to refer to all who are the victims of
discrimination, exclusion or deprivation of any form, anywhere in the world. 160 In this view,
counter-hegemonic strategies and tactics fundamentally privilege the role and perspectives of the
subaltern in order to conceive of new forms of global politics and legality.161
Framed with the moral lens of cosmopolitanism and the political lens of the subaltern,
Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito turn to the concept of “legality” in relation to the study of
counter-hegemonic responses to globalization. They describe this mode of study as “bottom-up”
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in that it favors “the detailed empirical study of legal orders as they operate on the ground.”162
This includes tracking the legal, illegal and non-legal strategies of transnational and local
movements, in relation to state and non-state legal orders at every scale.163
The cosmopolitan subaltern legality approach is at once pragmatic and pluralist. First, it is
willing to go beyond law, in that it examines “the potential and limitations of law-centered
strategies for the advancement of counter-hegemonic political struggles”, as well as the importance
of political mobilization for the success of subaltern legal strategies.164 Second, it is willing to
affirm the full range of rights related strategies. Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito’s observe
that individual rights strategies may be important for the subaltern who face, among other things,
the coercive imposition of neoliberal political and legal arrangements. At the same time, subaltern
legality cultivates and explores conceptions of rights that go beyond liberalism and that might be
characterized by “solidaristic understandings of entitlements grounded on alternative forms of legal
knowledge.”165 Finally, cosmopolitan subaltern legality is focused on legal projects emerging from
local, non-English speaking, grassroots organizations and community leaders.166 It aims to shed
light on the alternative forms of knowledge, law and politics that subaltern counter-hegemonic
legal practices advance in their effort to introduce a “new common sense”. 167 However, it does
not idealize these coalitions and strategies; rather it is attentive to their tensions, contradictions or
shortfalls.
Among the contributions to Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito’s edited collection,
Ronen Shamir’s chapter on the politics of corporate social responsibility (CSR) fits squarely with
this article’s focus on the mining justice movement.168 Shamir sets up his analysis as a dialectic
between the hegemonic economic, political and cultural power of multinational corporations
(MNCs) on one hand, and on the other, counter-hegemonic efforts to subject this form of private
power to legal oversight and control in favor of the public good.169 These counter-hegemonic
practices take place at the international level, where activists advocate for the international
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regulation of MNCs according to universal standards. They also occur at the domestic level, in
MNCs’ home states, where activists pressure the courts and governments of developed countries
to regulate the human rights consequences of corporate activity abroad. 170

Shamir’s first

fundamental assertion is that the study of these counter-hegemonic practices must take hegemonic
responses into account.171
Shamir casts voluntary CSR as a fundamentally important “hegemonic counter-response”
to counter-hegemonic efforts to critique and politicize corporate practices.

In his detailed

description of the numerous practices, discourses and tools of voluntary CSR, two key features
emerge that are central to its status a hegemonic counter-response. The first is the principle of selfregulation, which Shamir characterizes as “the corporation’s most crucial frontline in the struggle
over meaning and an essential ideological locus”.172 The second key feature is the integration of
CSR into the corporation’s profit model through “the language of instrumental-rationality”, or
more simply put, under the slogan “CSR is good for business”.173 He concludes that by design,
CSR constitutes an attempt to pre-empt, de-radicalize and de-politicize counter-hegemonic efforts
to develop enforceable laws capable of controlling corporate power.174
Building on this, Shamir makes his second fundamental assertion, namely that neoliberal
tendencies within civil society organizations and transnational social movements must be taken
into account when theorizing counter-hegemonic globalization. 175

He believes that these

tendencies have consequences for the movement’s ability to successfully advance alternative
agendas. 176 This is especially pertinent because, writing in 2005, Shamir concludes that these
movements have largely failed to control corporate power. 177 Two features of the “neoliberal
170
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(2002) 16:1 Ethics & Intl Aff 89; Morton Winston, “NGO Strategies for Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility”
(2002) 16:1 Ethics & Intl Aff 71. While Shamir’s chapter dates to 2005, since its publication many of the trends he
describes have only intensified. His subsequent work tracks some of these trends. See for example: Ronen Shamir,
“Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World Culture or World-Capitalism?” (2011) 45:2 Law and Soc’y Rev 313;
Ronen Shamir, “The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality” (2008) 37:1 Econ & Soc 1; Ronen
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blueprint of civil society” emerge from his arguments. The first is the rise and expansion of a
segment of the not-for-profit sector that functions to enhance corporate and/or government power,
such as through the promotion of voluntary CSR. Shamir has gathered a wealth of information on
the influence of “corporate-sponsored and corporate-oriented NGOs” on the CSR movement.178
Dubbing them market-oriented NGOs (MaNGOs), he places them as part of a broader and
somewhat older trend toward the corporatization of civil society.179
The second civil society feature of concern for Shamir is perhaps more complex and subtler
in its design and consequences. He argues that many of the organizations that participate in
counter-hegemonic social movements have come to share some fundamental social characteristics
with the MNCs that they oppose.180 Specifically, he is concerned with the NGO’s institutional
paradigm and what he sees as its bias “toward the corporate hegemonic model of organization and
implementation.” 181 He is also concerned with what has become the typical configuration of
counter-hegemonic coalitions, where the poor and oppressed advance their claims principally
through the formation of ties with large institutional players and Northern experts.182
Shamir argues that these counter-hegemonic elites share a particular culture of professional
expertise and of scientific managerial language, that in some important respects resembles that of
the corporate classes, and that in some cases amounts to a managerial approach to social action and
social change.183 In what is perhaps his most important example of this, Shamir points out that,
while disagreeing on a number of substantive matters, corporate and the counter-hegemonic elites
both tend to rationalize, legalize, codify and regulate moral claims, particularly through the
language of human rights.184 Interestingly though, for Shamir this second concern and its features
do not automatically preclude the counter-hegemonic status of particular movements. He seems to
accept that these features might exist within counter-hegemonic coalitions.185 However, in his
Shamir & Dana Weiss, “Corporations, Indicators, and Human Rights: A Material Semiotics View” in Kevin Davis et
al, eds, Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Data (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
178
Ibid at 95.
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Ibid at 105, 109.
180
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Oxford University Press, 1979).
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Shamir cites the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South Africa, a movement to demand access to affordable
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view, they compel us to identify and come to terms with their potential adverse consequences for
imagining and realizing emancipatory alternatives to contemporary globalization.186 In this sense,
his contribution calls for greater critical awareness and reflection on the institutional forms,
knowledge forms and languages adopted by counter-hegemonic movements.
b. Counter-Hegemony and the Mining Justice Movement
The counter-hegemony theorists discussed above develop and adapt their interpretation of
Gramsci’s writing to a context. Claire Cutler focuses on international law and the global political
economy. Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César Rodríguez-Garavito share Cutler’s scale of
analysis, although they are concerned more broadly with all contemporary forms of globalization,
as well as local articulations of law. Finally, Ronen Shamir concentrates specifically on the
international politics of corporate social responsibility. Although each author’s conclusions are
grounded in their respective context, there are common themes and debates that run through these
contributions. In the remainder of this section, I extract common points of interest and consider
their relevance to the mining justice movement’s experience with the law reform activism studied
here.
Two of the authors reviewed here theorize hegemonic responses to counter-hegemonic
resistance. While Cutler and Shamir use different terminology, they seem to agree on a basic
premise: hegemony responds to counter-hegemony by partially addressing and incorporating its
concerns, such that critique loses its cogency and capacity to generate substantive changes to
hegemonic arrangements. Cutler uses Gramsci’s term “transformismo”, defined as the “process
by which opposition and resistance to hegemony is absorbed into the dominant ideology” resulting
in the elimination of opposition.187 Shamir adopts the phrase “hegemonic counter-responses” to
describe voluntary CSR’s effect of pre-empting, de-radicalizing and de-politicizing efforts to
develop enforceable laws capable of controlling corporate power.188
have. Interestingly, the TAC is also the focus of a chapter in White & Pearlman’s edited book: William Forbath,
“Cultural Transformation, Deep Institutional Reform, and ESR Practice: South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign”
in White & Perelman, Stones of Hope 54, supra note 80. Further research could examine similarities and differences
in the ways in which these two different theoretical frameworks (counter-hegemony and critical legal liberalism)
approached and interpreted this case study.
186
Ibid at 113.
187
Cutler, supra note 131 at 536. Note that Cutler also sees soft laws and CSR as part of the dialectic of the international
commodity legal form under conditions of late capitalism. As such, she sees these legal innovations both as part of
the hegemonic development of international law, and also as a specific response to resistance.
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These descriptions of counter-hegemonic responses help to characterize state responses to
the mining justice movement’s calls for law reform. As described previously, state-driven reforms
have recognized certain human rights obligations, while retaining liberal and neo-liberal
frameworks (formalism, privatism and voluntarism) that arguably preclude these reforms from
serving as effective instruments of justice. The concept of “transformismo” helps to highlight the
power relations at play in this dialectic. The state’s response, and in particular formal equality,
risk (superficially) legitimating the very relations of injustice that the movement has sought to
transform. The case study of right to consultation legislation in Latin America is one clear example
of this. Moreover, the state’s response to resistance may exhaust the movement by generating a
new burden to once again demonstrate empirically and normatively the shortcomings of new laws.
The Canadian case study of a litany of deficient right to remedy mechanisms is a good example of
how transformismo can become an endless cycle that risks exhausting the movement. In sum, the
experience of the mining justice movement resonates with these authors’ assertion that resistance
will be met with a hegemonic counter-response that incorporates demands in an effort to weaken
them and maintain the power status quo.
This discussion raises the important question of how these theorists define movement
practices as counter-hegemonic (or not). Shamir in particular cautions against the assumption that
the efforts of NGOs and inter-governmental organizations are necessarily counter-hegemonic. He
demands a critical interrogation of civil society practices in order to determine their implications
for corporate hegemony. As a group, the authors display some variance in their willingness to
classify human rights claims as counter-hegemonic. Shamir is suspicious of the dominance of
these claims in counter-hegemonic movements, especially because corporations and the institutions
that support them have incorporated human rights language. In contrast, Sousa Santos and
Rodriguez-Garavito more readily accept that rights claims have the potential to produce
strategically valuable results for counter-hegemonic movements, although they would prefer to
foster claims that advance alternative forms of knowledge. In sum, there is consensus among these
authors that rights claiming could be transformative of power relations, but that this tactic is also
(significantly) vulnerable to transformismo.
The question of how the authors reviewed here define counter-hegemony is linked to the
way they define movement success.

Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito’s begin with

cosmopolitan subaltern legality, the term they use to describe the legal counterpart of counter-
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hegemonic movements. In this framework, success is articulated in moral and epistemological
terms: it is the approximation of the cosmopolitan values of justice, equality and pluralism, defined
from the perspective of the subaltern. On the other hand, Cutler and Shamir’s concept of success
focuses on power: Cutler describes counter-hegemony as a transformation in power asymmetries,
while Shamir suggests that it is evidenced by greater public or popular control over corporate
power.
The differences in emphasis among these authors in defining counter-hegemonic success
can be woven into a three-part framework. First, a movement is successful when it changes
dominant ideas (common sense). Second, these changes must have real consequences for the
distribution and exercise of power. And finally, these changes must advance an alternative
normative vision of the good (justice and equality) defined from the perspective of a less-powerful
group (the subaltern).
Applying this framework to the mining justice movement’s law reform results helps to
analyze the dynamics of hegemony and counter-hegemony in this case study. These law reform
efforts have certainly impacted ideas/common sense about state obligations. As described in Part
3, the state has recognized and created new legal regimes, ostensibly to support the right to
consultation (Latin America) and the right to remedy (Canada). These regimes certainly represent
some change in state norms and practice. However, research and critical analysis has shown that
these changes have done little to transform power asymmetries (Cutler) or ensure greater public
control over corporate power (Shamir). While activists and community leaders have worked hard
to communicate the lived experience of mine affected communities (the subaltern) and an
alternative normative vision of social and economic relations, they have not been able to ensure
that the resulting reforms enacted by the state (the executive branch) reflect this vision or
substantively assist these communities.
The discussion of movement success raises another interesting theme among the authors,
namely the route that they would prescribe for achieving the goals of counter-hegemony. This
follows the logic of “what do we want?” and “how do we get there?”. For Cutler, the crucial work
of counter-hegemony involves critically deconstructing the law and the economy to demonstrate
that they are not morally or politically neutral forces, but rather the result of political choices that
benefit capitalist classes. She refers to this process as the demystification of the commodity form
of law.
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Still on the theme of prescriptions, the authors engaged here rally around the idea that
counter-hegemonic politics must be rooted in practice. On this basis, Cutler’s demystification of
the commodity form must connect with people’s everyday experience of the economy and the law.
Similarly, Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito call for the detailed empirical study of how legal
orders actually operate on the ground, and an approach to scholarship that is sensitive to alternative
forms of legal knowledge, otherwise hidden in local practices and forms of resistance. Given his
emphasis on hegemonic counter responses, Shamir takes a slightly different approach to the topic
of practice. He is concerned with the extent to which the dominant civil society institutional form,
the NGO, imposes technocratic, managerial ways of thinking and being onto claims that emanate
from grassroots social movement actors. His concern is that the neoliberal NGO institutional form
has the effect of disassociating the politics of counter-hegemony from practical experience. It is
worth noting that Shamir’s frame resonates with Kennedy’s reflection (Part 4.1) on the politics and
ethics of the human rights movement’s participation in governance or “rulership”.
Once again, these insights from this group of counter-hegemony theorists are significant
for the mining justice movement. Movement actors pursued law reform by packaging their claims
in the language of human rights. However, these proposals to date have not addressed fundamental
issues with the legal and economic arrangements that enable and protect transnational corporate
resource extraction (Cutler and Shamir). Rather, the resulting reforms have added a layer of law,
namely procedure (consultation) or weak oversight (complaint/review), to existing arrangements.
This helps explain, at least in part, why power relations appear to have continued largely
undisrupted by these reforms.
In terms of the call from these authors to root legal change in everyday/ordinary/subaltern
experience, the approach of the mining justice movement has been mixed. On one hand, the
movement has been remarkably effective in gathering data and telling the story of affected
communities and their experiences of social and economic injustice and violence. Further,
advocates have consistently appealed to this evidence of injustice to advocate for the law reforms
studied here. However, on the other hand, advocates have faced obstacles in ensuring that law
reform outcomes account for, and respond to, the realities of social and economic power and
context. Thus, while advocates have done well to document grassroots community experiences
and connect these with its advocacy efforts, they have been less successful in achieving law reform
outcomes that meaningfully address these documented realities of injustice. The prospect of
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fashioning rights claims and securing law reforms that are responsive to the perspectives and
experiences of the subaltern, represents a formidable and as yet unresolved challenge for the mining
justice movement.
Finally, some of the authors reviewed here pick up the theme of the relationship between
counter-hegemonic movements and the law as a potentially progressive tool for social change. It
is common ground among them that this is always contingent on the strength of accompanying
forms of non-legal political mobilization. Further, they all agree that law is a crucial site of
struggle. In Cutler’s praxis conception, international law has the potential to give rise both to forces
of emancipation or domination. As a result, law as domination must then be negated, or overcome,
with law as emancipation. This is what she means by the phrase “negate law through law”. Rather
than a debate over what the law says (how rights are recognized and interpreted), for Cutler the
struggle is over the actual form that law takes – the commodity form. In this view, struggle occurs
over what the law is, and in particular its relationship with the state and capital. Cutler’s challenge
to reconceive of law resonates with Sousa Santos and Rodriguez-Garavito’s conception of
subaltern cosmopolitan legality. While they see practical value in rights strategies organized
around classically liberal rights, their main interest is to identify conceptions of rights that go
beyond liberalism and represent alternative forms of knowledge.
Building on these discussions in relation to this final theme, three interconnected ways of
thinking about the role of the law in social struggles seem to emerge. In the first, the struggle
revolves around what the law says or should say, including debates over interpretation of law. This
involves attempts to introduce new ideas and practices, and it conjures up commonly observed
struggles over distribution, entitlements and recognition. In the second, the struggle takes place
over what the law is (ie the commodity form), how it reflects, produces and rationalizes the state
and the market. This moves toward deeper political transformations of power and legitimacy,
market and state. Finally, in the third approach, the struggle is over the knowledge or worldview
that the law embodies. This alludes to deeper transformations of the values, ethics, culture and
histories that underlie law’s vision of the good.
The three-part typology once again serves as a useful guide for analysis of the achievements
and limitations of the law reforms pursued and obtained by mining justice advocates. Proposed
reforms have focused on obtaining legal recognition of, and regimes to support, new state duties in
relation to the right to consultation and the right to remedy. However, the outcomes have done
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little to disturb key elements of law’s “commodity form” under conditions of late capitalism
(Cutler), namely formalism, voluntarism, and privatism. While advocates have appealed to
community-based forms of knowledge and worldviews, they have not been able to ensure that the
state-controlled results are infused with subaltern ways of knowing.
In sum, these counter-hegemony theorists offer a variety of perspectives that enrich our
understanding of mining justice advocates’ experiment with law reform. In some areas these
theorists echo the debates at play in the previous discussions of pragmatism and left legalism. In
particular the debate over the strategic value, or inevitability, of rights is a common theme, as well
as the role of alternative forms of knowledge and the complexity of civil society’s potential role in
governance legalism or decision-making (rulership). Counter-hegemony as an approach adds
value to this discussion due to its emphasis on (international) capitalism, structural power relations,
and the relationship between the state and capital. This emphasis is certainly important in light of
the concerns of the mining justice movement. The next section picks up on this by drawing together
common themes and important differences across the theoretical approaches consulted in this
article.
5 Conclusion
This article has examined key law reforms that have emerged from the activism of mining
justice movement advocates over the last twenty years. In Latin America, courts began in 2001 to
recognize Indigenous rights and a number of states responded to Indigenous peoples’ ongoing
opposition to neo-liberal natural resource extraction with right to consultation legislation,
beginning in 2011. In Canada, over the course of nearly twenty years of corporate accountability
“right to remedy” advocacy, the state responded with a series of home-state, non-judicial grievance
mechanisms, primarily directed at extractive industries (2009, 2014 and 2019). However, a wealth
of critical analysis and empirical research suggests that these reforms have had limited success, at
least to date, in meaningfully furthering the movement’s human rights and social justice goals. In
this article I have argued that this is due, at least in part, to the persistence of three fundamental
liberal and neo-liberal ideologies, formalism, privatism and volunteerism, that are tenaciously
embedded in these law reforms. This assessment of twenty years of transnational law reform
activism on the part of mining justice movement advocates calls for reflection on the strengths and
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weaknesses of their experiment with law reform in the age of human rights and neoliberal economic
globalization.
This article attempts to respond to this call by consulting the work of critical theorists
who, while working from a variety of different contexts, are united by their examination of
progressive movements’ engagement with law in an effort to transform the unjust economic and
social conditions that result from liberal and neo-liberalism political and economic arrangements.
These authors adopt specific and varied vocabulary to refer to this engagement: pragmatism, left
legalism (rights or governance legalism), critical/transformative legal liberalism, subaltern
cosmopolitan legality, and counter-hegemony.

Although there are certainly differences in

emphasis, these authors and approaches have much in common. They all believe that law is an
important, perhaps inevitable, site of struggle.

However, they also see social movement

engagement with liberal law as fraught with political and epistemological risks, paradoxes and
tensions with the movement’s goals. They similarly agree that this necessitates a commitment
within the movement to ongoing critique of liberalism/capitalism/hegemony, alongside reflexivity
and critical assessment of the costs/benefits, limitations, contradictions, etc. of legal activism. At
the same time, all authors recognize that political action outside of law is critical to the movement’s
successful engagement in legal activism, and some authors push for political projects that are less
reliant on liberal legal claims.
The theorists here also agree that progressive social movement’s productive engagement
with liberal law should be informed (and constrained) by a variety of normative commitments to:
meaningful/substantive equality and freedom, epistemological pluralism, fomenting deeper and
richer democratic debate, redistribution, and public control of corporate power. In terms of legal
tactics, these authors are fixated on the dominance of human rights as the contemporary language
and tool of progressive movements. Generally, they see rights legalism as problematic in that it
inevitably carries political content that risks narrowing the movement’s capacity to conceive of
human freedom, prevents other ways of knowing, and is easily coopted by hegemonic liberalism
and capitalism. However, their strategies and degree of optimism in relation to rights activism
varies. Some authors emphasize the strategic value of rights due to their malleability and lack of
fixed content, as demonstrated by ongoing struggles and shifts over time in their meanings and
interpretations. Some authors see rights as uniquely able to capture and advance the specific
concerns of marginalized groups.
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Less optimistically, the experience of mining justice movement advocates with law reform
rooted in human rights frames, appears to resonate, at least for now, with some of the pitfalls of
rights legalism that these theorists identify. As indicated, the state has responded to advocates’
demands and fashioned law reforms that are predicated on some of the same problematic liberal
and neo-liberal ideologies that many members of the movement oppose (formalism, voluntarism
and privatism). The persistence of formalism in particular indicates that these new laws and
regimes are not appropriately sensitive to alternative worldviews, power relations and context.
Voluntarism and privatism reflect the well-known legal foundation of neo-liberal resource
extraction: private ownership of and profit from resources, without effective state protection of the
public interest, broadly defined, and without effective accountability mechanisms. In the result,
the laws, practices and systems of unjust mining arguably remain fundamentally intact and
undisturbed, albeit with an added layer of largely ineffective (consultation and remedy) reforms.
There is a risk that these kinds of reforms may serve to legitimate business as usual, as rhetorical
and even legal devices in the hands of powerful states and companies.
At the same time, advocates’ success in pressuring the state to recognize and create
regimes in relation to Indigenous peoples’ right to consultation and a general right to remedy,
represents a significant and perhaps even radical change in the normative status quo in the last
twenty years. These new laws and regimes, however limited, provide new tools and platforms for
advocacy and mobilizing that may propel more meaningful change in the future. Notwithstanding
their pitfalls, it is arguably better for marginalized communities to have a recognized law and a
process to appeal to, instead of no law at all. On the other hand, do these inadequate laws merely
distract and exhaust the movement with few results? It is methodologically difficult, and likely too
early, to evaluate the medium and long-term impact of these changes for the strength of the
movement and future demands/changes.
At this juncture, the empirical and theoretical analysis marshaled here provides a
preliminary map of some potentially key sites of struggle and legal innovation going forward.
Given this article’s focus on public law regulation, these conclusions likely have greater direct
relevance to that domain, although knowledge gained about public law activism may also provide
important insights to other domains, such as for example civil litigation activism. An important
lesson is that the movement must continue to challenge liberal law’s commodity form (to use
Cutler’s term) as manifest in formalism, privatism and voluntarism. In the law reform experiment
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of the last twenty years, these features of liberal law have emerged as tenacious obstacles to the
movement’s social change agenda. This lesson pushes toward the development of proposals that
change the fundamental legal arrangements that enable mining injustice, rather than adding a
(potentially symbolic) layer of human rights reforms to existing structures.

Moreover, the

movement will continue to be challenged to fashion its demands with reflexivity and with particular
attention to the significance of social context, power, epistemological pluralism and subaltern
worldviews. This will require further innovation in translating subaltern ways of being and
knowing into law reform agendas that are responsive to this diversity.
This article’s scope, and the insights summarized above, have focused on the substantive
content of specific public regulation law reform proposals and outcomes. This of course does not
address the political and ideological obstacles to pursing counter-hegemonic reforms in practice,
such as for example the corporate capture of most liberal states, which consistently prevents
governments from implementing even modestly progressive proposals. 189 Both avenues of
research and inquiry are equally important. The theorists surveyed here have argued that critical
reflection on the question of how movements translate their vision into specific law reforms is
incredibly important. At the same time, the strategic and practical question of how to engage
effectively with the state to pursue social change is equally crucial. Movements need both an
agenda that will help approximate their vision, as well as a strategy for achieving that agenda.
The reality of serious structural obstacles to the mining justice movement’s social justice
law reform agenda presents an important area of further research as well as a potential opportunity.
Perhaps these structural issues will ultimately push toward a broader re-conception of the
movement itself, one that integrates its focus on the specific injustices of global mining with a clear
articulation of how these injustices connect with the larger unfolding injustice faced by all of
humanity, that of catastrophic climate change, growing global inequality and radical and rapid
environmental degradation. The same legal and economic arrangements, liberal ideologies, and
state-corporate relations that produce mining injustice are at the root of the broader planetary
environmental and social justice crisis. In this light, the lessons learned from the mining justice
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movement’s experiment with public regulation law reform activism over the last twenty years may
have broader significance and application.
Observing the emerging signs of the times, a greater emphasis on large-scale structural
change may indeed be the way of the future for the mining justice movement. In 2018, Swedish
activist Greta Thunberg began a simple act of protest that galvanized youth around the world to
join her and demand that elected politicians undertake swift and radical societal changes in order
to address the climate crisis. In August 2019, Thunberg began a journey to visit Canada, the US
and several Latin American countries.190 She had decided to connect her climate crisis struggle to
the situation of environment and land defenders globally who face criminalization, threats and
violence due to their opposition to harmful resource extraction, including and often especially
industrial mining.191 Indeed, in 2019 the UN Human Rights Council and Special Rapporteurs also
began to emphasize this important connection.192
These developments suggest that the mining justice movement may begin to more
explicitly conceive of its law reform agenda in concert with other movements calling for structural
changes to address the environmental and human costs that flow from corporate globalization. The
mining justice movement may intensify its efforts to connect with other movements to formulate
and pursue fundamental changes to the interrelated systems of extraction, consumption, pollution,
and the economic and environmental injustices, that characterize modern life and liberal societies.
In this frame, the mining justice movement would remain rooted in the concerns of Indigenous and
other marginalized mine-affected communities, while also actively connecting these to related
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concerns and debates unfolding in the broader society, which is increasingly concerned with the
survival of life on the planet.193
As the mining justice movement continues to experiment with substantive law reform, it
will require innovative lawyering capable of marrying the political and epistemological insights
and commitments of left critique, counter-hegemony and critical legal liberalism, together with the
engaged, yet reflexive, stance of pragmatism. The task at hand is the articulation of a more radical
law reform agenda that moves beyond adding a layer of process or oversight to existing legal and
economic arrangements. The agenda of the future, if it will be able to address these urgent issues,
must aim to fundamentally transform the ways in which law structures the relationship between
the state, the private sector, people and all living things. The knowledge, experiences, strategies
and commitments of the transnational mining justice social movement undoubtedly make an
important contribution to these broader, ongoing and collective efforts to forge a productive and
effective agenda for legal activism and research, in pursuit of global social and environmental
justice.
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